Murray Moten
Born | Hawker, South Australia | 3 July 1899
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Died | 14 September 1953 Adelaide, South Australia | (aged 54)
Allegiance | Australia |
Service/ | Australian Army |
Years of service | 1916–1918 1923–1953 |
Rank | Brigadier |
Unit | 48th Battalion |
Commands held |
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Battles/wars |
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Awards |
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Early life and World War I enlistment
Murray John Moten was born on 3 July 1899 at
In August 1917 Moten enlisted for overseas service in the Australian Imperial Force, not long after he turned 18,[1] by which time his mother had died.[3] Moten was sent on leave – apparently suffering from flat feet[1] – but was discharged as medically unfit due to heart problems and poor physique in January 1918.[4] Moten returned to civilian life and was transferred to the head office of the Savings Bank of South Australia in Adelaide.[1]
Between the wars
Having resigned from the senior cadets, Moten was appointed as a provisional
In 1930, with austerity measures from the Great Depression biting and the election of the Scullin Labor government, universal service was suspended, and due to falling volunteer numbers, the 48th Battalion was amalgamated with the 43rd Battalion to form the 43rd/48th Battalion.[6] At the same time, the Citizens Forces were renamed the Militia.[7] Moten was elected the President of the Bank Officials' Association of South Australia in 1934.[1] On 17 December 1936,[5] Moten was promoted to lieutenant colonel and took command of the 43rd/48th Battalion. By October 1938, Moten was working as a sales clerk in the mortgage department of the Savings Bank of South Australia.[1]
World War II
Two months after the outbreak of
Palestine and Egypt
The 2/27th Battalion entrained for
Syria-Lebanon campaign
Brigadier Jack Stevens's 21st Brigade was given the task of advancing north up the 40 km (25 mi)-wide coastal route, and was split into two columns. Moten's column, consisting of the 2/27th Battalion and some light tanks, supported by artillery and engineers and with naval gunfire support, was given the task of clearing the coastal road after the 2/14th Battalion had captured the border posts, while a similar column based on the 2/16th Battalion advanced up the more difficult inland road. A subsidiary column formed by the British Cheshire Yeomanry horsed cavalry regiment would provide eastern flank protection to Moten's column and assist if his column was held up at the Litani River.[22]
Initial operations and capture of Innsariye
The invasion began in the early hours of 8 June but Stevens decided not to push Moten's fully-motorised column through the 2/14th Battalion, but instead kept that unit moving forward to establish if the French had cratered the road or demolished bridges that would stop the 2/27th from advancing. By the end of the first day, the 2/14th Battalion had occupied the town of Tyre. The 2/27th began moving forward on 9 June once a large crater in the road at Iskandaroun had been filled by engineers.[23] In heavy fighting, the 2/16th crossed the Litani by boat on 9 June, and that evening, supported by a company of the 2/27th Battalion, they began clearing the opposite bank. During this fighting, the detached company of the 2/27th captured an entire company of Algerian colonial troops. That night the river was bridged by the engineers using pontoons, and the rest of the 2/27th began crossing in their vehicles on the morning of 10 June.[24]
On 10 June the 2/27th advanced along the coast road led by a squadron of cavalry mounted in carriers, while the 2/16th cleared the high ground to the east. The cavalry pushed on through sporadic resistance past Kafr Badda, but both infantry battalions met opposition among the hills east of the road, and suffered casualties.[25] Stevens, seeking to keep the French off-balance, ordered Moten to attack the French positions at Innsariye at midnight, which he did after a 30 minute artillery barrage with two companies leading. These met heavy resistance, and were also delayed while some enemy tanks were dispersed by the artillery, so a third company was swung around the leading companies on the right flank and pushed towards the battalion's final objective. Moten, who was forward with the third company, saw an opportunity to encircle the French still resisting the leading companies, and ordered the third company to take up a position on high ground overlooking a road running east from the French positions towards Es Sakiye, with his headquarters and the pioneer platoon deployed onto high ground above the coastal road to block that line of withdrawal for the French. The French surrendered at dawn on 11 June. The 2/14th Battalion then led the advance until the following day, when the 2/27th again took up the role.[26]
At this stage the advance was held up by the French north of Khan Saada, where they had established defensive positions in the Wadi Zaharani, which dominated the intersection with the road running east towards
Capture of Sidon
The task of capturing the key city of Sidon was initially given to the 2/16th Battalion, with the 2/27th companies at Darb es Sim to guard the approaches to Sidon from the east, although the orders to do so had not reached them. On 12 June, Moten had made an assessment that the best way to capture Sidon was not to attack frontally as the 2/16th was ordered to do by Stevens, but to push through the hills to the village of Miye ou Miye, 5 km (3.1 mi) east of Sidon, then attack Sidon from the flank. By the morning of 13 June, Moten's forward companies were on the southern bank of the Sataniq River, but he was unable to communicate with them in the rough terrain. He sent a patrol to locate them, and Stevens then ordered the rest of the 2/27th to join them and attack Sidon in accordance with Moten's appreciation of the best way to capture the city. All members of the battalion were very weary after five days of constant advancing and fighting, and when the trailing companies reached the lead ones before dawn on 14 June, they relieved them so they could prepare for the attack. After a gruelling cross-country march to the start line, the attack was met with significant resistance. On the same day the 2/14th was counter-attacked by a strong French force supported by tanks, but this was stopped with the assistance of the artillery. Acting on information from his advanced companies that Miye ou Miye had been abandoned, on the morning of 15 June Moten pushed his troops forward to the village and met no opposition. The 2/27th advanced to the outskirts of Sidon and a patrol was sent into the town which discovered that the French had withdrawn. Moten and his headquarters entered the city shortly afterwards, then Moten commandeered a taxi to report to Stevens who entered the city at 16:00.[28]
French counter-attacks
Initially successful French counter-attacks on the inland column around Merdjayoun resulted in Stevens being ordered on 17 June to hold any further advance and send the 2/14th Battalion to reinforce Australian troops at Jezzine. Stevens requested a replacement, and was allocated a British unit, the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster), transferred from the British 16th Infantry Brigade.[29] Despite the halt until the situation at Merdjayoun was resolved, the 21st Brigade pushed forward strong cavalry patrols and on 19 June the 2/16th captured the village of Jadra north of the Wadi Zeini. The 2/27th followed up and took up positions in the El Ouardaniye—Sebline-Kafr Maya area that afternoon. On 21 June Moten sent patrols to Sebline and Kafr Maya, and for the next few days the battalion picqueted the lateral roads and tracks further south protecting the eastern flank of the coastal column. On 25 June, Stevens sent the 2/27th and 2/16th forward to the El Haram ridgeline, and ordered Moten, who was to hold the right-hand position on the ridge, to send patrols towards Er Rezaniy. In the meantime, the 2/25th Battalion, supported by two companies of the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, was tasked to clear the French from the area between the two columns. At dawn on 26 June, the 2/27th and 2/16th secured the ridge against minimal French resistance.[30]
On 28 June, the 7th Division, reinforced by the Australian
Capture of Damour and armistice
For the capture of Damour, the 2/27th was to conduct a single company preliminary operation to destroy French positions on a spur west of the village of El Mourhira, then after that company was relieved by two companies of the 2/14th Battalion, the 2/27th would cross the Damour River to El Boum and Four-à-Chaux and turn the French flank. Significant artillery support was to be provided for the brigade attack.[32] The lead company of the 2/27th moved off from El Haram at dusk on 5 June, and marched cross-country to El Batal where they rested for three hours. A little after midnight they set off again, crossed the Damour at a point identified during the earlier reconnaissance, and climbed up a goat track to El Boum. Fixing bayonets around dawn, the lead platoon stormed the village to find it empty, with a few French troops fleeing in the distance. The next company suffered casualties among key personnel and was scattered by artillery fire, but the third company swapped objectives with it. The lead company was held up by an enemy position, but the arrival of the third company bolstered the assault and the position surrendered. The rest of the battalion pushed on and achieved its objectives. A platoon was posted on a feature known as Hill 512 which overlooked the village of Daraya. After 24 hours of hard marching and climbing, along with some fighting, including steep ascents of 240 m (800 ft) and then 300 m (1,000 ft), the battalion had secured the corridor through which the 17th Brigade was to pass then attack, cutting the road leading north out of Damour towards Beirut. Ultimately, Stevens pushed the 2/14th Battalion, less the two companies at El Mourhira, through the corridor to secure the start line for the 17th Brigade attack, and the 17th Brigade followed.[33] The most advanced company of the 2/27th reached the eastern outskirts of Damour and sent two platoons into the town where they had several sharp exchanges of fire with French troops and captured more than their own number.[34] Attacks from the south prompted the French to withdraw, and the town was secured by the morning of 9 July.[35]
It soon became apparent that the French had withdrawn a considerable distance on all fronts of the campaign, and Stevens was ordered secure the villages of Abey and Kafra Matta overlooking Damour. Moten sent out a patrol that found the villages empty of French troops, which were then occupied by the 2/14th.[36] The French commander had been considering capitulation for a couple of weeks at this stage, and a message had been sent to him by the commander of the Australian I Corps, Lieutenant General John Lavarack, as early as 30 June urging him to negotiate. A ceasefire came into force at 00:01 on 12 July.[37] The 2/27th had suffered over 150 casualties during the campaign.[38] Following the surrender of Vichy forces, the 2/27th undertook garrison duties around Hammana, near Beirut, and Bakhaoun in the Tripoli sector, as part of the Allied occupation force.[11][39] In October, Moten spent two weeks in hospital with measles.[40]
Brigade command and awards
Moten was promoted to
To effect the capture of Saida [Sidon] in the face of a well organized and determined defence which blocked any progress along the Coast Road it was necessary to turn the position from the right flank. On 13 Jun., therefore, Lt.-Col. M. J. Moten was ordered to take his Bn. into high ground and capture Mey Ouimye. The terrain over which the Bn. was forced to move was extremely difficult and during the move fwd. it was dive-bombed and machine-gunned from the air and came under Arty. fire. Due to Lt.-Col. Moten's driving force and initiative the posn. was captured on 14 Jun. and the Bn. taken fwd. into such a posn. as to force the abandonment of the Saida defences. On the morning of 15 Jun. Col. Moten perceived that the Saida garrison had apparently withdrawn and immediately sent a patrol into the town. Throughout these two days his example, initiative and leadership contributed very largely to the abandonment of the Saida defences. This officer also showed excellent leadership skills, gallantry and devotion to duty at Battle of Damour.
— The London Gazette 12 February 1942
Ceylon
In early January 1942, it was agreed between the British and Australian governments that the 6th Division would be withdrawn from Syria and move to the Far East in response to the entry of Japan into the war.[46] In late January and early February, the Australian government agreed to the deployment of the 6th Division to Java to oppose the Japanese southward thrust.[47] These plans were soon changed when it was decided that two brigades should be diverted to defend Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka), and the 16th and 17th Brigades were chosen for this task.[48] Moten embarked from the Middle East with his headquarters on 10 March and disembarked at Colombo on 24 March.[49]
The Second AIF force in Ceylon was commanded by
Papua and New Guinea
The brigade went into camp near
Despite the resounding Allied victory in the
Defence of Wau
An ad hoc Australian formation known as
On 14 January, the first fighting elements of the 17th Brigade began arriving in Wau by air, led by B Company of the 2/6th Battalion and the advanced brigade headquarters. B Company was immediately pushed forward to support the independent companies while the bulk of the 2/6th had arrived in Wau by 19 January and another company was quickly placed astride another track leading from Lae to Wau. The air transport of the brigade was hampered by poor flying weather and accidents, and it took much of the following week for the rest of the brigade to concentrate in Wau. Moten's aircraft turned back on 15 January, and he did not reach Wau until the following day. He was scathing about the air transport arrangements, saying that they were "uneconomical and haphazard". By 19 January significant elements of the 2/6th were effectively deployed on the tracks leading towards Wau.[62]
On 21 January, a patrol from the 2/6th observed Japanese troops moving forward, but the enemy axis of advance was not clear. The last of the 2/6th arrived in Wau on 23 January, and the following day the lead elements of the 2/5th Battalion and some engineers flew in. Moten intensified patrolling to establish the Japanese main advance, and by 26 January had determined that they were using an old disused track labelled the "Jap Track". He decided that, despite a lack of reserves in Wau due to the slow buildup, he would attack the advancing Japanese from the forward positions of the 2/6th on the Black Cat Track. An aggressive enemy advance up the "Jap Track" completely derailed this plan, and Moten responded with piecemeal defensive deployments as troops arrived in Wau, including forward positions south east of Wau near Leahy's Farm. By late on 28 January, the rest of the 2/5th had not been able to get to Wau, and the 2/7th Battalion was also stuck on the ground in Port Moresby. Moten called most of his forward elements to withdraw to Wau and deployed them in close defence of the village and airfield. Finally on the morning of 29 January the weather broke enough for the rest of the 2/5th and the main body of the 2/7th Battalion to arrive. They were rushed into defensive positions around the airfield.[63]
Before dawn on 30 January the Japanese assault on the airfield began, beginning from the south east. Moten's positions held, and by mid-morning he considered that with the arrival of two guns of the
Moten then committed the 2/5th Battalion to offensive action, and in hard fighting up to 9 February they cleared the area west of the Bulolo River, killing hundreds of Japanese and putting the rest to flight.[66] This effectively destroyed Japanese strength in the Wau Valley.[67] After consolidation, Moten rested part of the 2/5th and pushed the three platoons of the 2/3rd Independent Company along the three tracks leading towards Mubo. On the northern Black Cat Track, elements of the 2/6th largely held off a Japanese counter-attack on 10 February. Moten held them there rather than withdrawing them to Wau to rest, as the overall situation remained unclear. They were relieved by a 2/3rd Independent Company platoon on 15 February. The Japanese fell back in an orderly fashion towards Mubo, harassed by aircraft and patrols. On 26 February, an attack by the 2/5th Battalion and 2/7th Independent Company from the Australian right flank to clear the Japanese staging areas around Buibaining met with almost no opposition. By the end of the month Moten's force had driven the Japanese back to Mubo.[68] During the advance to Wau and retreat to Mubo, the main Japanese fighting force, the 102nd Infantry Regiment, had likely suffered around 1,200 killed, as well as some who had died of starvation.[69]
In early March, Moten was recommended by the General Officer Commanding
Brigadier MOTEN, D.S.O., E.D. commanded 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. Group which successfully defeated the strong Japanese attack on WAU, between Jan 27 and Feb 20, 1943. From captured orders, it is known that the Japanese attack was made by 102 Regtl. Grp, of which two Infantry Battalions, augmented by the personnel of one Artillery Battery and one Engineer Company were forward, the Third Infantry Battalion being in reserve. When the Japanese attack suddenly developed at WANDUMI on Jan. 27, Brigadier MOTEN had with him only half of 17 Inf. Bde. personnel and no Artillery. On Jan 30. the enemy made a heavy attack and came within 400 yards of WAU airfield. This effort was, however, repelled by the infantry with its light weapons and 350 casualties inflicted on the Japanese. After the arrival of reinforcements on Jan 30-31, Brigadier MOTEN further defeated the enemy and proceeded to drive him back, eventually, by Feb. 20, forcing him back to WAIPALI-GAUDAGSAL AREA, more than 20 miles from WAU. It is estimated that the Japanese casualties in the whole operation were not less than 1200. Under critical circumstances Brigadier MOTEN showed a high order of leadership and control.
Salamaua–Lae campaign
In early March Moten reminded his forward troops, the 2/7th Independent Company supported by the 2/5th Battalion, to maintain close contact with the Japanese. This they did via aggressive patrolling, and by the end of March were closed up on Mubo itself.[73] In early April Moten sent the 2/7th Battalion to relieve the forward troops.[74] Moten had decided that the main threat to Wau was now from the area of the Markham Valley, he deployed the 2/6th Battalion to cover those approaches, the 2/7th remained opposite Mubo, and the 2/3rd Independent Company was positioned in the Missim area. By this time, the 2/5th and 2/7th Independent Companies were being withdrawn, and the lead battalion of the 15th Brigade, the 24th, was arriving.[75] Throughout April, Moten's force continued to patrol the approaches to Mubo.[76] The terrain and weather were some of the most unpleasant faced by Australian troops during the war. Rugged mountains, almost impenetrable jungle, kunai grass, gloom and rain were the rule for much of the time. Moten established rest camps where his troops could sleep in dry conditions, have a few hot meals, and wash themselves and their uniforms. These were positioned rear of the forward positions, and one was established at Edie Creek. Such rest camps helped reduce the depression and illness that went hand-in-hand with the terrible conditions.[77]
On 23 April, Kanga Force was dissolved and the headquarters of
On 12 May, Moten revised his plan based on his expectation that the Japanese would remain on a defensive footing around Salamaua and Mubo, and decided he would continue to use only one battalion forward, with a company securing the coast south from the Bitoli River to Nassau Bay through raiding. The 2/7th Battalion remained forward, with a company of the 2/6th attached for the coastal task, and the rest of the brigade would be held in reserve. Both Savige and Moten were concerned about the southern or right flank around Nassau Bay and Duali. Moten concentrated on aggressive patrolling, and soon this had restricted the Japanese to their defensive positions. Towards the end of May, Moten brought the 2/6th Battalion up to relieve the 2/7th Battalion in the brigade forward area.[84] By the first week in June, the 2/6th was deployed with companies on: Lababia Ridge – with a platoon at Napier; at Mat Mat; at Summit; and at the Saddle. The 2/5th and 2/7th Battalions were located in and around Wau. Moten was unhappy with the position of the 2/6th Battalion company at Lababia Ridge, and ordered adjustments so that Japanese activity near the Pimple would be easier to detect. At the same time, Moten was tasked with assisting the landing of a US battalion at Nassau Bay followed by an attack on Mubo as part of an upcoming offensive, and he tasked reconnaissance patrols to Nassau Bay.[85] Moten was tasked with coordinating the landing and then, taking the US battalion under command, capturing Mubo. On 15 June Moten briefed senior commanders – including the commander of New Guinea Force, Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring, and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Frank Berryman, on his five-phase plan for the operation, and Herring expressed his satisfaction with Moten's arrangements.[86]
The 17th Brigade repulsed Japanese assaults at Mubo and Lababia Ridge and following the capture of Komiatum and Mount Tambu in August, Moten was appointed
Later life
After returning to Australia, Moten was transferred to the Regimental Supernumerary List on 17 January 1946 in Adelaide and he resumed his civilian career. He led the Australian army component of the
Moten collapsed at the 27th Battalion ball at the Torrens Drill Hall on 5 September 1953 and on 14 September, while in the Royal Adelaide Hospital, he died of a heart attack. He was buried with full military honours in Centennial Park Cemetery with Anglican and Catholic rites. He was survived by his wife, daughter and two sons. His son, John Moten, was Director-General of Security (the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation) from 1988 to 1991.
Footnotes
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Sutton 2006.
- ^ a b National Archives 2021, p. 27.
- ^ National Archives 2021, p. 23.
- ^ National Archives 2021, p. 35.
- ^ a b c National Archives 2021, p. 18.
- ^ Kuring 2004, p. 112.
- ^ Palazzo 2001, p. 110.
- ^ McKenzie-Smith 2018, p. 2248.
- ^ a b c National Archives 2021, p. 50.
- ^ The London Gazette 17 October 1930, pp. 6309–6311.
- ^ a b c d e Australian War Memorial 2021.
- ^ Kuring 2004, p. 117.
- ^ Palazzo 2004, p. 94.
- ^ Kuring 2004, p. 139.
- ^ Australian War Memorial 2014.
- ^ Burns 1960, p. 20.
- ^ Burns 1960, pp. 24–25.
- ^ Burns 1960, pp. 26–27.
- ^ Long 1953, p. 335.
- ^ 2/27th Battalion War Diary May 1941, p. 23.
- ^ 2/27th Battalion War Diary May 1941, pp. 27–28.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 341–343.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 348–351.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 360–366.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 366–367.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 375–378.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 378–379.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 380–385.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 412–413.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 460–462.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 465–474.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 480–481.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 482–484.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 490–495.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 495–502.
- ^ Long 1953, p. 503.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 511–513.
- ^ Long 1953, p. 526.
- ^ Burns 1960, pp. 86–99.
- ^ National Archives 2021, pp. 50–51.
- ^ 17th Brigade War Diary December 1941, p. 2.
- ^ Australian War Memorial 2005.
- ^ Long 1953, pp. 535 & 544.
- ^ The London Gazette 12 February 1942, pp. 703 & 705.
- ^ National Archives 2021, p. 48.
- ^ Long 1953, p. 549–550.
- ^ Wigmore 1957, pp. 443–444.
- ^ Wigmore 1957, p. 460.
- ^ a b c National Archives 2021, p. 51.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 77–79.
- ^ a b McKenzie-Smith 2018, p. 2085.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 25–26.
- ^ 17th Brigade War Diary August 1942, pp. 2–4.
- ^ 17th Brigade War Diary September 1942, pp. 2–5.
- ^ 17th Brigade War Diary October 1942, pp. 2–4.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 349.
- ^ Walker 1957, pp. 112–114.
- ^ 17th Brigade War Diary January 1943, p. 3.
- ^ Kuring 2004, pp. 140 & 176.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 540–543.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 545.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 543–546.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 547–554.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 544–557.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 558–563.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 563–568.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 573.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 568–574.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 576.
- ^ National Archives 2021, p. 16.
- ^ The London Gazette 18 May 1943.
- ^ National Archives 2021, p. 56.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 583–584.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 586.
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 24.
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 18.
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 21–22.
- ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 588.
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 28–31.
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 31.
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 34–35.
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 38–41.
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 42–43.
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 43–52.
- ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 59–62.
- ^ Dexter 1961, p. 71.
References
Books
- Burns, John (1960). The Brown and Blue Diamond at War: The Story of the 2/27th Battalion A.I.F. Adelaide, South Australia: 2/27th Battalion Ex-servicemen's Association. OCLC 2104460.
- OCLC 220806033.
- Kuring, Ian (2004). Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788–2001. Loftus, New South Wales: Australian Military History Publications. ISBN 1-876439-99-8.
- OCLC 3134080.
- McCarthy, Dudley (1959). South-West Pacific Area—First Year: Kokoda to Wau. Australia in the War of 1939–45, Series 1, Army. Vol. V. Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: OCLC 3134247.
- ISBN 978-1-925675-146.
- Palazzo, Albert (2001). The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901–2001. Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-551506-0.
- Palazzo, Albert (2004). "Organising for Jungle Warfare". In Dennis, Peter; Grey, Jeffrey (eds.). The Foundations of Victory: The Pacific War 1943–1944. Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Army History Unit. pp. 86–101. ISBN 978-0-646-43590-9. Archived from the originalon 9 March 2016.
- OCLC 1070821527. Retrieved 26 December 2021.
- OCLC 464084033. Retrieved 25 December 2021.
Websites
- "17th Brigade". Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 25 November 2005. Retrieved 25 December 2021.
- "2/27th Battalion". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 19 December 2021.
- "Army: Detailed Structure". Military Organisation and Structure, Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 9 January 2014. Retrieved 21 December 2021.
- "NAA: B2458, 420451". National Archives of Australia. Retrieved 19 December 2021.
- Sutton, R. (2006). "Moten, Murray John (1899–1953)". ISSN 1833-7538. Retrieved 19 December 2021.
- "SX2889 Brigadier Murray John Moten, CBE, DSO & Bar". Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 6 March 2016. Retrieved 19 December 2021.
War diaries and gazettes
- "17th Brigade War Diary December 1941". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 21 December 2021.
- "17th Brigade War Diary August 1942". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 25 December 2021.
- "17th Brigade War Diary September 1942". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 25 December 2021.
- "17th Brigade War Diary October 1942". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 25 December 2021.
- "17th Brigade War Diary January 1943". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 26 December 2021.
- "2/27th Battalion War Diary May 1941". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 21 December 2021.
- "No. 33653". The London Gazette. 17 October 1930.
- "No. 35452". The London Gazette (Supplement). 12 February 1942.
- "No. 36018". The London Gazette (Supplement). 18 May 1943.