Ngô Quang Trưởng
Ngô Quang Trưởng | |
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Hồ Chí Minh Campaign |
Ngô Quang Trưởng (13 December 1929 — 22 January 2007) was an officer in the
In 1972, he was made the commander of I Corps after incompetent leadership by General Hoàng Xuân Lãm resulted in a South Vietnamese collapse in the face of the Easter Offensive, a massive conventional invasion by North Vietnam. He stabilized the ARVN forces before turning back the communists.
In 1975, the communists attacked again. This time, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu gave contradictory orders to Trưởng as to whether he should stand and fight or give up some territory and consolidate. This led to the demoralization of I Corps and its collapse, allowing the communists to gather momentum and overrun South Vietnam within two months. Trưởng fled South Vietnam during the fall of Saigon and settled in Virginia in the United States.
Early years and military beginnings
Trưởng was born in 1929 to a wealthy family in the
After graduating from Đà Lạt, he soon saw action in a 1955 operation to eliminate the
Rising through the ranks
In 1964, Trưởng was promoted to major and made commander of the 5th Airborne Battalion. He led a heliborne assault into Đỗ Xá Secret Zone in
In 1966, the Buddhist Uprising broke out in central Vietnam with Buddhists protested military control of the government.[3] Trưởng was asked to quell the rebellious 1st Division in Huế, which had decided to stop military operations against the VC in solidarity with the Buddhist protest movement. A Buddhist, Trưởng, was uncomfortable with his mission, but he carried out his orders.[1] On 18 June, he commanded three airborne battalions that entered the city and restored order within two days and he put the 1st Division under government control.[4]
General
As a result of his efficient display, Saigon made Trưởng's appointment as 1st Division commander permanent. With his hands-on leadership, Trưởng quickly moulded the unit, which had a poor reputation prior to his arrival,
During the
Corps commander
During his tenure in the Mekong Delta, Trưởng established a system of outposts along the border with Cambodia to block infiltration of PAVN/VC personnel and supplies into the region. He used the three divisions in his Corps in regimental-sized combined arms task forces and staged sweeps to seek and destroy PAVN/VC forces in their strongholds. He increased the capability of the RF/PF, which had a reputation for unreliability in his area, making them a productive part of his anti-PAVN/VC apparatus.
Trưởng used the RF/PF that he had enhanced to fill the void, and they strengthened the government control in the region despite having nominally less resources.
Known for his unbending integrity, Trưởng vigorously moved against "ghost" and "ornamental" soldiers, deserters and conscription evaders in his region.[1] Abrams said that only Trưởng and Phạm Văn Phú among the division and corps commanders had not begun to psychologically crack under the pressure of the PAVN onslaught.[13]
During the PAVN's
Collapse of South Vietnam
Trưởng remained in command of I Corps until the collapse of South Vietnam, when the north of the country lapsed into anarchy amid confused leadership by President Thiệu. I Corps fielded three infantry divisions, the elite Airborne and Marine Divisions,
Thiệu called Trưởng to Saigon on 19 March to brief him on the withdrawal plan. Trưởng intended to order a retreat to Huế, Đà Nẵng and Chu Lai, and then move all the forces to Đà Nẵng to regroup and dig in.[17] Thiệu then stunned Trưởng by announcing that he had misinterpreted his previous orders:[19] Huế was not to be abandoned, despite losing two divisions in recent days.[16][20] In the meantime, the withdrawal preparations and the increasing North Vietnamese pressure caused civilians to flee in fear, clogging the highway and hampering the withdrawal.[21] Trưởng requested permission to withdraw his forces into the three enclaves as planned; Thiệu ordered him to "hold onto any territory he could with whatever forces he now had, including the Marine Division", implying that he could retreat if needed.[22] Trưởng returned to Đà Nẵng to be greeted by the start of a PAVN offensive.[23] President Thiệu made a nationwide radio broadcast that afternoon proclaiming that Huế would be held "at all costs",[24] contradicting the previous order. That evening Trưởng ordered a retreat to a new defense line at the Mỹ Chánh River to defend Huế,[25] thereby ceding all of Quảng Trị Province. He was confident that his forces could hold Huế, but was then astounded by a late afternoon message from Thiệu that ordered "that because of inability to simultaneously defend all three enclaves, the I Corps commander was free ... to redeploy his forces for the defense of Đà Nẵng only."[20][24][26] The people of Quảng Trị and Huế began to leave their homes by the hundreds of thousands, joining an ever-growing exodus toward Đà Nẵng.[17]
Meanwhile, the PAVN closed in on Đà Nẵng amid the chaos caused by Thiệu's confused leadership.[24][27] Within a few days I Corps was beyond control.[28] The South Vietnamese tried to evacuate from the other urban enclaves into Đà Nẵng, but the 1st Division collapsed after its commander, Brigadier General Nguyễn Văn Điềm, angered by Thiệu's abandonment, told his men, "We've been betrayed ... It is now sauve qui peut (every man for himself) ... [S]ee you in Đà Nẵng."[24][25][29] The overland march, pummeled by PAVN artillery the entire way,[20][24] degenerated into chaos as the 1st Division descended into anarchy as it moved toward Đà Nẵng. The remainder of the force deserted or began looting.[25] Only a minority survived and some disillusioned officers committed suicide.[30][31]
As anarchy and looting enveloped Đà Nẵng, and a defense of the city becoming impossible, Trưởng requested permission to evacuate by sea, but Thiệu, baffled, refused to make a decision.[30][32] When his communications with Saigon were sundered by PAVN shelling, Trưởng ordered a naval withdrawal, as Thiệu was not making a decision either way.[32][33]
With no support or leadership from Thiệu, the evacuation turned into a costly debacle, as the PAVN pounded the city with artillery, killing thousands of people. Many drowned while jostling for room on the boats; with no logistical support from Saigon, those vessels sent were far too few for the millions of would-be evacuees.[32] Only around 16,000 soldiers were pulled out,[34] and of the almost two million civilians that packed Đà Nẵng, a little more than 50,000 were evacuated.[34] As a result, 70,000 troops were taken prisoner,[35] along with around 100 aircraft.[36][37] Trưởng and his officers swam to a boat in the sea and evacuated to Saigon.[38][39] In quick succession the remaining cities along the coastline collapsed and half the country had fallen in two weeks.[40][41]
Upon arriving in Saigon, Trưởng was appointed deputy chairman of the Joint General Staff and given responsibility for organizing the defense of Saigon, however he found the area was too large and difficult to be defended with the forces available.[42]
Trưởng was reportedly hospitalized for a
Life in the United States
Trưởng's family was initially broken up amid the confusion. His wife and eldest son ended up in
In 1983, he became an American citizen and moved to Springfield, Virginia. He studied computer programming at Northern Virginia Community College and worked as a computer analyst for the Association of American Railroads for a decade until he retired in 1994.[43]
Trưởng wrote several military history works commissioned by the United States Army Center of Military History, as part of its Indochina Monographs series. These were The Easter Offensive of 1972 (1979), RVNAF and US Operational Cooperation and Coordination (1980) and Territorial Forces (1981).[1]
Death
Trưởng died of cancer on 22 January 2007, at the Inova Fairfax Hospital in Falls Church, Virginia. At the time of his death, Trưởng was survived by his wife, three sons, two daughters, twelve grandchildren and two great-grandchildren.[1] After his death, the Virginia House of Representatives and Senate passed a joint resolution "Celebrating the Life of Ngo Quang Truong".[1]
Assessment
Trưởng was widely regarded as South Vietnam's finest officer, and the US officers that worked with him generally rated him to be superior to most American commanders. He was also renowned for his integrity and his uninvolvement in corruption, favoritism or political cronyism, as well as his empathy and solidarity with his soldiers.[1][44] William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam from 1964–68, said that Trưởng "would rate high on any list of capable South Vietnamese leaders ... [other U.S. commanders] so admired Trưởng that they would trust him to command an American division."[1][45] His successor Creighton Abrams, who oversaw the American war effort until 1972, said that Trưởng "was capable of commanding an American division".[1]
Lieutenant General
General
Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks, who served in Vietnam and was a professor of military history at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, said of Trưởng:
A humble man, Truong was an unselfish individual devoted to his profession. He was fiercely loyal to his subordinates, and was known for taking care of his soldiers, often flying through heavy fire to stand with them in the rain and mud during enemy attacks. He treated everyone the same and did not play favorites.[1]
Unlike some South Vietnamese generals who had grown rich as they ascended the ranks, Trưởng was regarded as being completely incorruptible and lived a "spartan and ascetic" life. According to Lieutenant General Cushman, Trưởng did not own a suit, and by the time he was appointed to command IV Corps, his wife tended to pigs, which were kept behind his basic living quarters in the headquarters at Cần Thơ. Cushman added that Trưởng was always looking for means to raise his soldiers' material and family lives. Trưởng did not tolerate favoritism. He once received a request to transfer his nephew from the front line to a desk job; he refused and the nephew later was killed in action. General Bruce Palmer Jr., said Trưởng "deserved a better fate" than the mauling of his soldiers amid Thiệu's confused orders and the collapse of South Vietnam.[1]
Notes
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w Willbanks, James H. (2007). "'The Most Brilliant Commander': Ngo Quang Truong". Historynet. Retrieved 14 July 2010.
- ^ Dale Andrade, Trial by Fire. New York: Hippocrene, 1993.
- ^ Wiest, pp. 55–65.
- ^ Wiest, p. 62.
- ^ a b Wiest, p. 63.
- ^ Wiest, p. 70.
- ^ Wiest, p. 69.
- ^ Sorley, p. 266.
- ^ Sorley, p. 73.
- ^ Sorley, p. 74.
- ^ a b c Sorley, p. 269.
- ^ Tucker, p. 293.
- ^ Sorley, p. 330.
- ^ a b c d Willbanks, p. 246.
- ^ a b c d Dougan and Fulghum, p. 66.
- ^ a b Dougan and Fulghum, p. 69.
- ^ a b c Willbanks, p. 247.
- ^ Dougan and Fulghum, p. 68.
- ^ Dougan and Fulghum, pp. 68–69.
- ^ a b c Willbanks, p. 248.
- ^ Willbanks, pp. 247–48.
- ^ Vien, p. 102.
- ^ Dougan and Fulghum, pp. 69–70.
- ^ a b c d e Dougan and Fulghum, p. 70.
- ^ a b c Willbanks, p. 250.
- ^ Vien, p. 104.
- ^ Willbanks, pp. 247–50.
- ^ Dougan and Fulghum, p. 74.
- ^ Hosmer, Kellen and Jenkins, p. 109.
- ^ a b Dougan and Fulghum, p. 73.
- ^ Willbanks, pp. 250–51.
- ^ a b c Willbanks, pp. 252–53.
- ^ Dougan and Fulghum, pp. 80–81.
- ^ a b Dougan and Fulghum, p. 83.
- ^ Willbanks, p. 253.
- ^ Willbanks, p. 255.
- ^ Momyer, p. 76.
- ^ Willbanks, p. 251.
- ^ Dougan and Fulghum, pp. 74–80.
- ^ Isaacs, p. 380.
- ^ Willbanks, pp. 254–55.
- ^ Hosmer, Stephen; Kellen, Konrad; Jenkins, Brian (1978). The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese military and civilian leaders. RAND Corporation. p. 118.
- ^ Hung, p. 361.
- ^ a b Sullivan, Patricia (25 January 2007). "Ngo Quang Truong; South Vietnamese Army General". The Washington Post. Retrieved 16 July 2010.
- ^ William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976, pp. 303, 488.
- ^ Tucker, pp. 293–94.
References
- Cao Van Vien (1983). The Final Collapse. Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History.
- Dougan, Clark; Fulghum, David; et al. (1985). The Fall of the South. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. ISBN 0-939526-16-6.
- Hosmer, Stephen T.; Konrad Kellen; Jenkins, Brian M. (1980). The fall of South Vietnam: statements by Vietnamese military and civilian leaders. New York City: Crane, Russak. ISBN 0-8448-1345-1.
- Isaacs, Arnold R. (1983). Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-3060-5.
- Momyer, William W. (1975). The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951–1975: An Analysis of its Role in Combat. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press.
- ISBN 0-06-015640-6.
- Sorley, Lewis (1999). A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York City, New York: Harvest Books. ISBN 0-15-601309-6.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ISBN 1-57607-040-9.
- Wiest, Andrew A. (2008). Vietnam's forgotten army: heroism and betrayal in the ARVN. New York City: New York University Press. ISBN 978-0-8147-9410-4.
- Willbanks, James H. (2004). Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 0-7006-1331-5.
External links
- "The Ia Drang Valley campaign was a landmark for me, because it introduced me to the most brilliant tactical commander I'd ever known." by General Norman Schwarzkopf
- Ngo Quang Truong biography (in French)
- Vietnam War Bibliography: The ARVN and the RVN
- History of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
- The Battle for Huế, 1968 by James H. Willbanks