Phạm Ngọc Thảo
Phạm Ngọc Thảo | |
---|---|
Saigon, South Vietnam | |
Allegiance | Viet Minh (1946-1954) Viet Cong (as an intelligence agent, 1957-1965) Army of the Republic of Vietnam (1960-1965) |
Years of service | 1960–1965 |
Rank | Colonel |
Phạm Ngọc Thảo (
During the
Through intrigue, Thảo also helped destabilise and ultimately unseat two South Vietnamese regimes—Diem's and the military
Thảo's real identity as a sleeper agent was kept secret after the end of Vietnam War. One of the reasons was to protect Thảo's family, which at that time had members living in the United States. His secret identity was eventually revealed and the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam posthumously awarded him the title Hero of the People's Armed Forces in 1995.[2]
The main protagonist in the film Cards on the Table was based on Phạm Ngọc Thảo.[2]
Early Việt Minh years
Born Phạm Ngọc Thuần, Thảo was one of eleven children of a Vietnamese
Thảo spent his teenage years obsessed with his motorcycle.[3][6] Despite being educated at an upper-class school that served children of French colonial administrators and privileged Vietnamese—French was the medium of instruction and Gallic culture and history a major part of the curriculum[7]—Thảo was attracted to nationalist politics. He participated in Hồ Chí Minh's revolutionary campaigns for Vietnamese independence and joined the Việt Minh.[3][4]
In September 1945, Hồ declared independence under the
In 1946, France attempted to reassert control over its colony and conventional military fighting broke out.[10] Thảo served with the Việt Minh in the Mekong Delta in the far south of Vietnam during the war against French rule from 1946 to 1954. He almost met his end before he had started; he was apprehended by the local communists in Mỹ Tho, who saw his French-style dress and mistook him for a colonial agent.[11] They tied him up and chained him to a block of stone before throwing him into a river to drown. However, Thảo broke free of the weight and swam to safety.[12] Thảo proceeded further south and deeper into the Mekong Delta to the town of Vĩnh Long, where he was again arrested by the local Việt Minh. Just as Thảo was about to be executed by drowning, one of the communists realised he was a brother of one of their comrades. Thảo was released and rejoined his family, who lived in the region.[13]
As a leader of the resistance, Thảo was allocated the responsibility of indoctrinating the 1947 batch of recruits with Việt Minh ideology. One of Thảo's students was his future enemy, South Vietnamese General and President
Thảo remained in the anti-communist south when
Undercover communist in the South Vietnamese army
The U.S.-backed Diệm was passionately anti-communist. In 1957, he initiated an "Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign" to root out Việt Minh members and their sympathisers. Thousands of people were killed or jailed, and in time Diệm's campaigns created more sympathy for the Việt Minh. Before 1960, various small-scale pro-Communist uprisings were taking place in the countryside.[21] Thảo went on the run and hid in Vĩnh Long, worried that Diệm's men were after him.[22] In December 1960, North Vietnam's Politburo authorised the creation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, popularly known as the Viet Cong. The VC were dominated by communists, but portrayed itself as a nationalist militant organisation, stating its aim to be the "reunification of the fatherland" with the overthrow of the "disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administration". The creation of the Vietcong marked an escalation in the scale and organisation of the insurgency that developed into the Vietnam War.[23]
Thảo's Catholic background helped him to avoid detection as a communist. He and his brother were the only members of the family who were not anti-communist.
Tảng believed that Thục "undoubtedly considered that Thảo's Catholic and family loyalties were stronger and more durable than his youthful enthusiasm for revolution". He felt that Thảo had tricked Thục into believing that he was no longer a communist, and that his inside knowledge would be useful to the Ngô family. Thảo started by training the Civil Guard.[26] As a result of his family's Catholic connections, Thảo rose steadily in the ARVN, since Diệm's regime had always promoted officers primarily on religious preference and loyalty. Nhu sent him to Malaysia to study counterinsurgency techniques, and upon his return, Thảo became a vital part of Nhu's efforts to purge the army of disloyal officers.[3][4] As Thảo kept a close watch on those who commanded troops, lest they use their personnel in a coup, the leading officers were keen to maintain a good relationship with him, which increased his effectiveness as a spy.[27] Thảo rose even further when the troops he commanded helped put down the November 1960 coup attempt against Diệm.[3][4] Thảo assisted Khánh and Trần Thiện Khiêm to put down the revolt. All three were promoted, with the latter pair gaining the leadership of the ARVN and of the combined forces, respectively. This cemented the trio's close ties.[1]
Thảo was promoted to the post of chief of
The US ambassador,
Strategic Hamlet Program
In 1962, Nhu began work on the ambitious Strategic Hamlet Program, an attempt to build fortified villages that would be secure zones for rural Vietnamese. The objective was to lock the VC out so that they could not operate among the villagers. Thảo supervised these efforts, and when told that the peasants resented being forcibly removed from their ancestral lands and put into forts that they were forced to build, he advised Nhu and Tuyến that it was imperative to build as many hamlets as fast as possible.[37] This pleased the VC, who felt that Thảo's efforts were turning the rural populace against Saigon.[38] Thảo specifically had villages built in areas that he knew had a strong VC presence. This increased the number of VC sympathisers who were placed inside the hamlets and given identification cards. As a result, the VC were able to more effectively penetrate the villages to access supplies and personnel.[39][40]
Later in 1962,
Fall of Diệm
In 1963, the Diệm regime began to lose its tight control over the country as civil unrest spread as a result of the
Tuyen's group ended up being led by Thảo but his initial coup plans were shelved when American
Thảo commanded around two dozen tanks, which formed a column in the streets surrounding the
The US media's links to Thảo have been the source of historical debate. The journalists' reporting of Diệm's authoritarian rule, military failures,[53] and attacks on Buddhists shifted American public opinion and put pressure on Washington to withdraw support for the Ngô family and seek a change of leadership.[54][55][56][57] William Prochnau felt that the fall of Diệm was the biggest influence of the media on American foreign policy in over six decades.[58] Thảo and Phạm Xuân Ẩn had been the source of much of the media's information. Conservative revisionist historians have accused the media of bringing down Diệm by publishing reports that, according to them, were based on false data disseminated by communist propagandists to unfairly malign Diệm's rule,[59][60][61] which they claim was effective and fair towards the Buddhist majority.[62]
Participation in military junta
After the fall of the Diệm regime, Thảo was designated by the head of state Minh and the civilian Prime Minister
The generals sent Thảo to Fort Leavenworth in the United States for six months to learn conventional warfare tactics. He also spent a month in England before returning to South Vietnam. By this time, Minh's junta had been replaced in a 1964 January coup by Khánh.[69] It is suspected that one of the generals' motives for deploying Thảo overseas was his continual involvement in plotting.[70] Khánh appointed Thảo as his press officer as well as an unofficial political adviser.[69]
Later that same year, Khánh became involved in a power struggle with his deputy Khiêm as well as Minh, who had been retained as the titular head of state. Thảo was a close friend of Khiêm, so when Khánh prevailed in the power struggle, Khánh despatched Khiêm to
1965 attempted coup
In late December 1964, Thảo was summoned back to Saigon by Khánh, who correctly suspected him and Khiêm of plotting together with Washington. Thảo suspected Khánh was attempting to have him killed,[71][77] so he went underground upon returning to Saigon, and began plotting in earnest, having been threatened with being charged for desertion.[69] He sheltered in a house belonging to a friend of Trương Như Tảng.[78] The ruling junta appealed to Thảo in newspaper advertisements and broadcasts to follow orders to report, but he ignored them.[79] In mid-January 1965, the regime called for him to report to his superiors in the ARVN, warning that he would be "considered guilty of abandoning his post with all the consequences of such a situation" if he failed to do so.[69]
Due to his Catholic background, Thảo was able to recruit Diệm loyalists such as Phát.
Phát and other pro-Diệm officers opposed the Buddhist influence being exerted on Khánh.[14] Thảo consulted Kỳ—who wanted to seize power for himself—before the plot, and exhorted him to join the coup, but Kỳ claimed that he was remaining neutral. Thảo thus believed Kỳ would not intervene against him,[70] but Kỳ was strongly opposed to Thảo and Phát.[81] American intelligence analysts had believed that General Don was involved in the coup with Phát and Thảo, but this was proven false when the action started.[87] Eight months after the coup was over, Don told the American historian George McTurnan Kahin that he had been plotting with Thảo, who had planned for him to become Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the military, but that the Đại Việt and Thảo's Catholic civilian allies had insisted on installing Khiêm, a Catholic.[87] A month before the coup, American intelligence analysts had believed that Thảo was planning to replace Khánh as commander-in-chief with Don.[88]
Shortly before noon on 19 February, he used around 50 tanks, their crew and a mixture of infantry battalions to seize control of the military headquarters, the post office and the radio station of Saigon. He surrounded the home of Khánh and Gia Long Palace, the residence of head of state Phan Khắc Sửu.[86][89] The tanks were led by Colonel Dương Hiếu Nghĩa, a Catholic member of the Đại Việt.[81] The country was still trying to find stability, with Phan Huy Quát being appointed prime minister just three days earlier.[89] Khánh managed to escape and flee to Vũng Tàu. His plane lifted off from Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the country's military headquarters, just as rebel tanks were rolling in, attempting to block the runway.[70][90] Thảo's men tried to capture the Saigon base of the Republic of Vietnam Navy, and its commander, Admiral Chung Tấn Cang, but were foiled,[91] but they did capture a number of junta members at Tan Son Nhut.[81]
Thảo made a radio announcement stating that the sole objective of his military operation was to get rid of Khánh, whom he described as a "dictator". He said that he intended to recall Khiêm to Saigon to lead the Armed Forces Council in place of Khánh, but would retain the civilian cabinet that answered to the generals.[86] In doing so, he caught Khiêm off guard, asleep in his Maryland home. When informed of what was happening, Khiêm sent a cable in which he pledged "total support" to the plot.[92] The coup group made pro-Diệm announcements, claiming then-U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. "was wrong in encouraging the coup against Diem rather than correcting mistakes".[81][93]
A Catholic rebel officer made a speech extolling Diệm, and mourning his loss. This gave the impression that the coup plotters wanted to roll back the country to a Diệm-era position and punish those who had been involved in Diệm's overthrow and execution.[81] Thảo's group also promised to aggressively fight the VC and cooperate with the United States. Throughout the day, a series of anti-Khánh speeches were broadcast on radio,[79] and the rebels claimed to have the support of four divisions, something that was regarded as dubious.[91] U.S. government analysts concluded that the rebellion was "primarily a move by die-hard neo-Diemists and Catholic military militants, disturbed at the rise of Buddhist influence, opposed to Gen. Khánh and—in a vague, ill-thought-out way—desirous of turning back the clock and undoing some of the results of the November 1963 ouster of Diem."[80] Among the civilians linked to Thảo's plot were Catholic academics and a militant priest.[80]
As Diệm had strongly discriminated along religious lines, the rebels' comments caused a negative response among the Buddhist majority. The Buddhist activist monk Thich Tam Chau called on Buddhists to support the incumbent junta.[81] The pro-Diệm speeches also alarmed pro-Buddhist and anti-Diệm generals, such as Nguyễn Chánh Thi and Nguyễn Hữu Có, who had been part of the failed 1960 and successful 1963 coups against Diệm respectively. They thought that Thảo and Phat might seek revenge, driving many anti-Diệm officers who may have otherwise been neutral or sympathetic to the coup, to swing more towards Khánh.[81]
Although Taylor and US military commander General William Westmoreland wanted Khánh out, the pro-Diệm political ideology expressed by Thảo's supporters alienated them, as they feared that the coup plotters would destabilize and polarize the country if they took power. The Americans worried that Phat and Thảo could galvanize support for Khánh through their extreme views, which had the potential to provoke large-scale sectarian divisions, playing into the hands of the communists and hindering wider American objectives.[81] They were also worried by Thảo's intention to remove Quát and the civilian government, whom he saw was "too susceptible to Buddhist peacemongering".[81][94] The U.S. saw civilian participation in governance as a necessity. They worried that a Khánh victory would enhance his prestige, so they wanted to see some third force emerge and defeat both the Thảo and Khánh factions. Westmoreland and Taylor decided to work for the failure of both Thảo and Khánh, and helped organize US advisers for the purpose.[81]
Phat was supposed to seize the Bien Hoa Air Base to prevent air force chief Kỳ from mobilising air power against them, but he failed to reach the airfield before Kỳ,[86] who circled Tan Son Nhut and threatened to bomb the rebels.[70][86] Most of the forces of the III and IV Corps surrounding the capital disliked both Khánh and the rebels, and took no action.[95] However, as night came, senior military opinion began to turn against Thảo and Phát, although it was not clear at this stage whether the anti-Thảo forces being organised and led by Thi were hostile to Khánh as well.[91][96]
At 20:00, Phát and Thảo met with Kỳ, and insisted that Khánh be removed from power. The coup collapsed when, between midnight and dawn, anti-Thảo forces swept into the city from the south along with some components of the
Before fleeing,
Hiding and death
While in hiding in Catholic villages, Thảo expressed his willingness to surrender and cooperate with Quát's government, if he and approximately 50 officers involved in the coup were granted amnesty. He also offered to go into exile in the United States, where his family had moved when he was sent there for training in 1964.[102] In May 1965, a military tribunal sentenced both Thảo and Phát to death in absentia. The death sentence was attributed to the influence of Thi, who had assigned hit squads to look for him. After the conclusion of the trial, it was announced that the Armed Forces Council would disband and give the civilians more control in running the government. Thi was believed to have agreed to the transfer of power to a civilian government in return for Thảo's death. As a result, Thảo had little choice but to attempt to seize power in order to save himself and he and Thi began to manoeuvre against one another.[103]
On 20 May, a half dozen officers and around forty civilians, most or all of whom were Catholic, were arrested on charges of attempting to assassinate Quát and kidnap Thi and Kỳ. Several of the arrested were known supporters of Thảo and believed to be abetting him in evading the authorities. Despite this, Thảo himself managed to escape, even as a US$30,000 bounty was put on him by the junta. On 16 July 1965, he was reported dead in unclear circumstances;
Legacy
Although Thảo's last plot failed, his activities in 1965 and the resultant infighting led to a series of internal purges within the ARVN. Amid the instability, the VC made strong gains across the country throughout the year.[108] In response to the deteriorating military situation, the Americans began to deploy combat troops to South Vietnam in large numbers.[109]
Thảo was posthumously promoted by the ARVN to the rank of one–star general and awarded the title of martyr (Vietnamese: Liệt sĩ). After the Fall of Saigon and the end of the Vietnam War, the communist government awarded him the same title and paid war pensions to his family, claiming him as one of their own.[71][105] In 1981, the communists had his body exhumed and reburied in the "Patriots' cemetery" in Ho Chi Minh City (previously Saigon).[110] Tảng believed Thảo "was a man who throughout his life fought single-mindedly for Vietnam's independence".[106] Tảng, who later abandoned communism, said that Thảo "was a nationalist, not an ideologue",[111] and credited him with turning the military tide towards the communists by helping to bring down Diệm and fomenting chronic instability and infighting for 18 months.[111] Hồ Chí Minh had reacted to Diệm's death by saying "I can scarcely believe that the Americans would be so stupid".[112] A communist report written in March 1965, soon after Thảo's revolt had caused Khánh to depart, stated that "The balance of force ... has changed very rapidly in our favor. ... The bulk of the enemy's armed forces ... have disintegrated, and what is left continues to disintegrate".[113]
Phạm Ngọc Thảo was the prototype of Nguyễn Thành Luân, who was the main protagonist of the novel called
Notes
- ^ a b Tang, pp. 49–50.
- ^ a b Hoàng Hải Vân (20 December 2012). "đề=Những giọt nước mắt của ông Mười Hương". Báo Thanh Niên.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Shaplen, pp. 309–310.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Langguth 2000, pp. 160–162.
- ^ Tang, p. 4.
- ^ a b c d Tang, p. 42.
- ^ Tang, pp. 4–5.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 18–23.
- ^ Tang, pp. 7–8.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 21–23.
- ^ a b c Tang, p. 43.
- ^ Tang, pp. 43–44.
- ^ a b Tang, p. 44.
- ^ a b c VanDeMark, p. 80.
- ^ Goscha, p. 191.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 40–41.
- ^ Lindholm, p. 48–50.
- ^ Chapman, p. 699.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 85.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 98.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 90.
- ^ a b Tang, p. 45.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 119–121.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 18–25.
- ^ a b Hickey, p. 96.
- ^ Tang, p. 46.
- ^ Tang, p. 48.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 86–88.
- ^ Tang, p. 49.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 107.
- ^ Tang, p. 50.
- ^ a b Wyatt, p. 73.
- ^ Wyatt, p. 85.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 106.
- ^ Hickey, p. 95.
- ^ Hickey, p. 97.
- ^ Karnow, p. 274.
- ^ Tang, p. 47.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 127.
- ^ Langguth 2000, pp. 168–169.
- ^ Langguth 2000, p. 175.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 142–144.
- ^ Jones, pp. 240–260.
- ^ Shaplen, pp. 197–198.
- ^ Karnow, p. 300.
- ^ Hammer, p. 264.
- ^ Karnow, p. 317.
- ^ Tang, p. 52.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 205.
- ^ Hammer, p. 292.
- ^ Shaplen, pp. 209–210.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 180.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 170–173.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 140–150.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 220–221.
- ^ Winters, pp. 174–177.
- ^ Prochnau, p. 496.
- ^ Prochnau, pp. 196–197.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 214–215.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 39–40.
- ^ Winters, pp. 177–180.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 216, 233, 274.
- ^ Shaplen, pp. 224–226.
- ^ Tang, p. 54.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 278–282.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 339–350.
- ^ Jones, pp. 436–440, 447–452.
- ^ Karnow, p. 300, 317.
- ^ a b c d Shaplen, pp. 308–309.
- ^ a b c d VanDeMark, p. 81.
- ^ a b c d e Tucker, p. 325.
- ^ Kahin, pp. 220–232.
- ^ Kahin, pp. 228–232.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 310–325.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 393–396.
- ^ Kahin, p. 231.
- ^ Tang, pp. 56–57.
- ^ Tang, p. 57.
- ^ a b c d Langguth & 1965-02-20.
- ^ a b c Kahin, p. 299.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Kahin, p. 301.
- ^ Kahin, pp. 245–260.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 395–400.
- ^ Kahin, pp. 290–298.
- ^ Kahin, p. 513.
- ^ a b c d e f g Shaplen, pp. 310–312.
- ^ a b Kahin, p. 514.
- ^ Kahin, p. 512.
- ^ a b Moyar, p. 363.
- ^ Tang, p. 363.
- ^ a b c The New York Times & 1965-02-21.
- ^ a b Time & 1965-02-26.
- ^ Moyar, p. 777.
- ^ Kahin, p. 515.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 363–364.
- ^ Kahin, pp. 301–303.
- ^ a b Kahin, p. 302.
- ^ a b Moyar, p. 364.
- ^ VanDeMark, p. 82.
- ^ The New York Times & 1965-02-20.
- ^ Kahin, p. 303.
- ^ Shaplen, pp. 321–322.
- ^ a b Shaplen, pp. 338–344.
- ^ Kahin, p. 497.
- ^ a b Hammer, p. 249.
- ^ a b Tang, p. 61.
- ^ Kỳ, pp. 115–116.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 364–367.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 694–696.
- ^ Karnow, p. 39.
- ^ a b Tang, p. 62.
- ^ Moyar, p. 286.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 283–284.
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