Tanks of the Israel Defense Forces
This article deals with the history and development of
Overview
Before Israel gained independence in 1948, neither Israel nor the Arab nations surrounding it had many tanks. The Arabs and the Israelis had to find their weapons through arms dealers or from any country that would supply them. The first armored tanks and vehicles in Israel were, like many other countries, imported or based on others' designs; but eventually developed their own. But in Israel, plans to import them began before the country was even formed, and rudimentary armoured cars and trucks were prepared in secret. The Palmach was an elite fighting force of the Haganah, the underground army of the Yishuv (Jewish community) and had been established on 15 May 1941. By the outbreak of the Israeli War for Independence in 1948, it consisted of over 2,000 men and women in three fighting brigades.
Following the United Nations General Assembly vote for the Partition Plan for Palestine on 29 November 1947, the Jewish forces started to build and procure mobile armoured cars and supply trucks and to purchase and bring in tanks and a large number of half-tracks to prepare for the termination of the British Mandate and Israeli proclamation of statehood on 14 May 1948.[1] During this period, the Jewish and Arab communities under the British Mandate clashed with only light arms, while the British intervened only on an occasional basis during their withdrawal.
From January onwards, operations became increasingly militarised. A number of Arab Liberation Army regiments infiltrated into Palestine, each active in a variety of distinct sectors around the different coastal towns. They consolidated their presence in Galilee and Samaria.[2] The Army of the Holy War, under the command of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, came from Egypt with several hundred men. Having recruited a few thousand volunteers, al-Husayni organised the blockade of the 100,000 Jewish residents of Jerusalem.[3]
To counter this, the Yishuv authorities tried to supply the city using convoys of up to 100 armoured vehicles, but the operation became more and more impractical as the number of casualties in the relief convoys surged. By March, al-Husayni's tactic had paid off. Almost all of Haganah's armoured vehicles had been destroyed, the blockade was in full operation, and hundreds of Haganah members who had tried to bring supplies into the city were killed.[4] The situation for those who dwelt in the Jewish settlements in the highly isolated Negev and north of Galilee was more critical.
The Arab League began to believe that the Palestinian Arabs, reinforced by the Arab Liberation Army, could put an end to partition. The British decided on 7 February 1948 to support the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine by Jordan.[5]
Ben-Gurion ordered
The adoption of Plan Dalet marked the second stage of the war, in which Haganah took the offensive and the stated purpose of which was to take control of the territory of the Jewish state and to defend its borders and people, including the Jewish population outside of the borders, in expectation of an invasion by regular Arab armies.
The first operation, named
1,500 men from Haganah's Givati brigade and Palmach's Harel brigade conducted sorties to free up the route to the city between 5 April and 20 April. The operation was successful, and enough foodstuffs to last 2 months were trucked into Jerusalem for distribution to the Jewish population.[13] The success of the operation was assisted by the death of al-Husayni in combat.
At the same time, the large-scale operation of the Arab Liberation Army was defeated at Mishmar HaEmek.[14] Their Druze allies left them through defection.[15]
Within the framework of creating Jewish territorial continuity according to Plan Dalet, the forces of Haganah, Palmach and Irgun moved to consolidate areas with Jewish populations as the British had essentially withdrawn their troops.
The situation pushed the leaders of the neighboring Arab states to intervene, with the Arab Legion of Transjordan's monarch, King Abdullah I moving tanks and armoured forces into the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine.
Preparing for Arab intervention from neighbouring states, Haganah successfully launched Operations
History
Pre-World War I to British Mandate period
The military forces of Israel can trace its roots to Jewish paramilitary organizations in the
End of British Mandate/Arab–Israeli War of 1948
The modern military forces, the IDF was founded following the
Then on 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion
The new army of Israel organized itself quickly during the ensuing
.Facing them were the forces of Egypt's army, which in 1948 was able to field a maximum of around 40,000 men. Initially, an expeditionary force of 10,000 men was sent to Palestine, consisting of five infantry battalions, one armoured battalion equipped with British
The other main force facing Israel was Jordan's
On 14 May Syria invaded Israel with the 1st Infantry Brigade supported by a battalion of armoured cars, a company of French R35 and R39 tanks, an artillery battalion and other units. However within a week it had been halted in a series of battles around Degania.[30]
The heaviest fighting occurred in
After the 1948 war, the Israel Defense Forces shifted to low intensity conflict against Arab Palestinian guerrillas. In late 1954, Nasser began a policy of sponsoring raids into Israel by the fedayeen, triggering a series of Israeli reprisal operations.[32] At this time following the outbreak of the Algerian War in late 1954, France began to ship more and more arms to Israel.[33] In November 1954, Shimon Peres visited Paris, where he was received by the French Defense Minister Marie-Pierre Kœnig, who told him that France would sell Israel any weapons it wanted to buy.[34] By early 1955, France was shipping large amounts of weapons to Israel.[34] Then Nasser's moved towards the nationalization of the Suez Canal and sent Egyptian forces to seize control of the canal and implement its nationalization.[35] Egypt also closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, in contravention of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. As tensions mounted, Israel also made an application to the US in 1955 to purchase 60 M47 tanks. After the US refused, Israel applied again in 1958, this time to purchase 100 M47 tanks, but the answer was the same.
1956 Suez Crisis
At the period right before the 1956 Suez war, the Israelis were also deeply troubled by Egypt’s procurement of large amounts of Soviet weaponry that included 530 armored vehicles, of which 230 were tanks and the influx of this advanced weaponry altered an already shaky balance of power.[36] Additionally, Israel believed Egypt had formed a secret alliance with Jordan and Syria.[37]
So with British and French support, Israel reacted and sent its armoured forces into the Sinai and
Dayan ordered the IDF forces to seize Crossroads 12 in the central Rafah area, and to focus on breaking through rather than reducing every Egyptian strongpoint.[38] The IDF assault began with Israeli sappers and engineers clearing a path at night through the minefields that surrounded Rafah.[38] French warships led by the cruiser Georges Leygues provided fire support, through Dayan had a low opinion of the French gunnery, complaining that the French only struck the Egyptian reserves.[39]
Using the two paths cleared through the southern minefields, IDF tanks entered the Rafah salient.[39] Under Egyptian artillery fire, the IDF force raced ahead and took Crossroads 12 with the loss of 2 killed and 22 wounded.[39] In the north, the Israeli troops fought a confused series of night actions, but were successful in storming Hills 25, 25A, 27 and 29 with the loss of six killed.[39] In the morning of 1 November, Israeli AMX-13s encircled and took Hills 34 and 36.[40] At that point, General al-Abd ordered his forces to abandon their posts outside of Rafah and retreat into the city.[41]
With Rafah more or less cut off and Israeli forces controlling the northern and eastern roads leading into the city, Dayan ordered the AMX-13s of the 27th Armored Brigade to strike west and take al-Arish.[41] By this point, Nasser had ordered his forces to fall back towards the Suez Canal, so at first the Bar-Lev and his men met little resistance as they advanced across the northern Sinai.[41]
On 29 October, Operation Kadesh – the invasion of the Sinai, began when an Israeli paratrooper battalion was air-dropped into the Sinai Peninsula, east of the Suez Canal near the Mitla Pass. At the same time, Colonel Sharon's 202nd Paratroop Brigade raced out towards the Mitla Pass. Dayan’s efforts to maintain strategic surprise bore fruit when the Egyptian commander Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer at first treated the reports of an Israeli inclusion into the Sinai as a large raid instead of an invasion, and as such Amer did not order a general alert. By the time that Amer realized his mistake, the Israelis had made significant advances into the Sinai. Dayan had no more plans for further advances beyond the passes, but Sharon decided to attack the Egyptian positions at Jebel Heitan. Sharon sent his lightly armed paratroopers against dug-in Egyptians supported by aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery. Sharon's actions were in response to reports of the arrival of the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the 4th Egyptian Armored Division in the area, which Sharon believed would annihilate his forces if he did not seize the high ground. Sharon sent two infantry companies, a mortar battery and some AMX-13 tanks under the command of Mordechai Gur into the Heitan Defile on the afternoon of 31 October 1956. The Egyptian forces occupied strong defensive positions and brought down heavy anti-tank, mortar and machine gun fire on the IDF force. Gur's men were forced to retreat into the "Saucer", where they were surrounded and came under heavy fire. Sharon sent in another task force while Gur's men used the cover of night to scale the walls of the Heitan Defile. During the ensuing action, the Egyptians were defeated and forced to retreat.
On 30 October, a probing attack by Israeli armour under Major Izhak Ben-Ari turned into an assault on the Umm Qataf ridge that ended in failure. To the south, another unit of the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade discovered the al-Dayyiqa gap in the Jebel Halal ridge of the "Hedgehog". The Israeli forces stormed and took the al-Dayyiqa gap. An IDF force entered the al-Dayyiqa and at dawn on 31 October attacked Abu Uwayulah and after an hour's fighting, Abu Uwayulah fell to the IDF.
On the morning of 1 November, Israeli and French aircraft launched attacks on the Egyptian troops at Umm Qataf and the 37th Armored Brigade came in and joined the 10th Brigade to assault Umm Qataf, and the Egyptian commander ordered a general retreat from the "Hedgehog" on the evening of 1 November.
1967 Six-Day War
In the 1967
So, by the time of the Six-Day War, Israel had in use the
The Egyptian forces consisted of seven
Israeli forces concentrated on the border with Egypt included six armoured brigades, one infantry brigade, one mechanized infantry brigade, three paratrooper brigades, giving a total of around 70,000 men and 700 tanks, who were organized in three armoured divisions.
The Israelis broke through with tank-led assaults against the Egyptian army in Sinai. In the
In the center of Israel, the
In the north on the Golan Heights, the Israeli forces faced the Syrian army which consisted of about 75,000 men grouped in nine brigades, supported by an adequate amount of artillery and armour. Israeli forces used in combat consisted of two brigades (the
Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Golan Heights from the surrounding Arab states, changing the balance of power in the region as well as the role of the IDF.
War of Attrition
The
Usually it was limited artillery duels and small-scale incursions into Sinai, but by 1969 the Egyptian Army started larger-scale operations. On March 8, 1969, Nasser proclaimed the official launch of the War of Attrition, characterized by large-scale shelling along the Suez Canal, extensive aerial warfare and commando raids.[45][47] Hostilities continued until August 1970 shortly before Nasser's death and ended with a ceasefire, the frontiers remaining the same as when the war began, with no real commitment to serious peace negotiations.
Yom Kippur War
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat had signaled soon after he Nasser's death that, in return for a total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he was ready to recognize Israel as an independent state but this did not lead to any agreement with Israel, so Sadat felt he had only the military option. The Yom Kippur war was a conflict between the Arab world and Israel that lasted from October 6, 1973 to October 25, 1973. The Yom Kippur War began when a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on Yom Kippur which happens to be the Jewish day of atonement and the holiest day for people of the Judaic faith.
The Arab coalition launched a joint surprise attack on Israeli positions in the Israeli-occupied territories on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism, which occurred that year during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed ceasefire lines to enter the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights
Anticipating a swift Israeli armored counterattack by three armored divisions,[48] the Egyptians had armed their assault force with large numbers of man-portable anti-tank weapons—rocket-propelled grenades and the less numerous but more advanced Sagger guided missiles, which proved devastating to the first Israeli armored counterattacks. Each of the five infantry divisions that was to cross the canal had been equipped with RPG-7 rockets and RPG-43 grenades, and reinforced with an anti-tank guided missile battalion.
The Israelis who have begun to receive quantities of the US
The Israelis repulsed the armoured thrust and followed up with counterattack through the gap between the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies and established bridgeheads on the east and west banks of the canal. The Israeli Armored Divisions then crossed through the breach to the west bank of the canal and swung southward, encircling the 3rd Army.[53] The Israeli forces on the west bank launched an offensive with an armoured thrust toward Ismailia and toward Suez City while other Israeli forces pushed west toward Cairo and south toward Adabiya. By the end of the war, the Israelis had advanced to positions some 101 kilometres from Egypt's capital, Cairo, and occupied 1,600 square kilometres west of the Suez Canal. They had also cut the Cairo-Suez road and encircled the bulk of Egypt's Third Army.
One of the greatest tank battles in history, the Battle of Golan Heights, took place during the Yom Kippur War. In the
in reserve) and 188 batteries. They began their attack with an airstrike by about 100 aircraft and a 50-minute artillery barrage. The forward brigades of three divisions then penetrated the cease-fire lines and bypassed United Nations observer posts, followed by the main assault force, which was covered by mobile anti-aircraft batteries, bulldozers to penetrate anti-tank ditches, bridge-layers to overcome obstacles, and mine-clearance vehicles.The engineering vehicles were priority targets for Israeli gunners and took heavy losses, but Syrian infantrymen, braving intense fire, advanced forward and used their entrenching tools to build up earthen causeways for the tanks, enabling them to overcome anti-tank ditches.[54]
At the onset of the battle, the Israeli brigades of some 3,000 troops, 180 tanks and 60 artillery pieces faced off against three infantry divisions with large armour components comprising 28,000 Syrian troops, 800 tanks and 600 artillery pieces. In addition, the Syrians deployed two armoured divisions from the second day onwards.[55][56][57][58]
Every Israeli tank deployed on the Golan Heights was engaged during the initial attacks. Reservists were directed to the Golan as quickly as possible. They were assigned to tanks and sent to the front as soon as they arrived at army depots, without waiting for the crews they trained with to arrive, machine guns to be installed on the tanks, or taking the time to calibrate the tank guns (a time-consuming process known as bore-sighting). The Syrians had expected it to take at least 24 hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, reserve units began reaching the battle lines only 15 hours after the war began. Israeli reserve forces approaching the Golan Heights were subjected to Syrian artillery fire directed from Mount Hermon.
Syrian forces suffered heavy losses as Israeli tanks and infantry fought desperately to buy time for reserve forces to reach the front lines, and conducted stopgap blocking actions whenever the Syrians were on the verge of breaking through. However, the Syrians pressed the attack in spite of their losses, and the vastly outnumbered defenders lost a number of tanks.[54] Whenever Syrian tanks penetrated the Israeli lines, Israeli gunners would immediately rotate their turrets and destroy them before turning their attention back to the oncoming forces.
At night, the Syrians made deadly use of infrared technology, while the Israelis responded by using illumination rounds and xenon light projectors on their tanks. The tide in the Golan began to turn as the arriving Israeli reserve forces were able to contain the Syrian advance. Beginning on October 8, the Israelis began pushing the Syrians back towards the pre-war ceasefire lines, inflicting heavy tank losses. By October 10, the last Syrian unit in the central sector had been pushed back across the Purple Line (the pre-war ceasefire line). After four days of intense and incessant combat, the Israelis had succeeded in ejecting the Syrians from the entire Golan.[54]
The UN brought about a ceasefire, largely negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union, on October 22, but though most heavy fighting ended on October 28, the fighting never stopped until January 18, 1974.
The IDF had also a number of Magach (מגח; Ma-GAKH)
The surprise of the
2023 Israel-Hamas war
During the
Israeli tanks have deliberately run over dozens of Palestinian civilians during the war.[62]
Development of Israel's tanks
In 1965, Israel's military establishment began research and development on a domestically produced tank, the "Sabra"
By 1974 initial designs were completed and prototypes were built. After a brief set of trials, work began to retool the
In addition to its own designs, Israel had upgraded the many tanks it had and even renamed them. Israel's formerly British Centurions, bought in the late 1960s, were renamed "
Original Centurions had
The engine has been changed to a more efficient diesel engine, fire control has been modernized, armour has been thickened, and an improved ammunition layout allows more rounds to be carried. An improved fire extinguishing system, better electrical system and brakes, and an increased fuel capacity, complete the modifications. The Sh'ot can be distinguished from the Centurion by its raised rear deck, to accommodate the bigger engine. They either have the original 7.62 mm calibre MG on the commander's cupola or have it replaced by a 12.7 mm calibre HMG and American radios.[original research?]
Many different variants were bought by Israel over the years from many different countries. Many components of these would find their way into the
Though the Sho't tank was not commonly perceived as a principal battle tank during the
]Less than 100 Centurion tanks of the
The Sho't became emblematic of Israeli armour prowess.[
Foreign military imports of tank equipment or tanks
France
Starting on the Independence day on 14 May 1948 (5 Iyar 5708), a strong military, commercial and political relationship were established between France and Israel until 1969. In 1953, an Israeli delegation visited
The highest level of the military collaboration was reached between 1956 and 1966.[72] At this time France provided almost all the tanks along with aircraft and military ships. In 1969 the French president Charles de Gaulle limited the export of weapons to Israel. This was the end of the "golden age" 20 years of relations between Israel and France.
Germany
The Israeli Merkava MK IV tank uses a German V12 engine produced under license.[73]
United Kingdom
After the British withdrew, they left behind some equipment, including
The British-made Centurion Main Battle Tank was a commercial, as well as a military, success. The Centurion was perhaps the first tank to face itself in a shooting war. Egypt, Iraq, and Israel bought Centurions and used them against one another in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Some feel the reason that Israeli Centurions defeated the Arab T-55's and even T-62's is because the Centurion has good sights and the Arab tanks were downgrades of the original design, as the T-55 used by the Soviet and Warsaw pact Armies had 200mm armor thickness while T-55's sold to the Arabs had only 120mm frontal armor and mediocre side and rear armor.[citation needed]
United States
As of 2010[update], the
Since 1976, Israel had been the largest annual recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. In 2009, Israel received $2.55 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants from the Department of Defense.[76] All but 26% of this military aid is for the purchase of military hardware from American companies only.[76]
Overview per tank
(Only tanks that were built/used in significant numbers are listed.)
M22 Locust – An American-designed airmobile light tank
M4 Sherman – (Medium Tank, M4)
Hotchkiss H35 – French light infantry tank, a char d'accompagnement.
Magach (M48/M60) – (מגח; Ma-GAKH) designation refers to a series of tanks in Israeli service. The tanks are based on the American M48 and M60 Patton tanks. Magach 1, 2, 3, and 5 are based on M48 tanks; Magach 6 and 7 are based on M60 tanks. Israel needed tanks to defend her borders from the Arab states and the American M48 tank was the best choice at the time.
AMX-13 – The AMX-13 Light Tank was designed to a new post-World War 2 French Army requirement, and France supplied them to the IDF.
M48 (Patton) – The M48 "Patton" first generation main battle tank (MBT) was supplied to the IDF by the United States.
Merkava (Chariot) – The Merkava (Hebrew: ⓘ, "chariot") is a main battle tank used by the Israel Defense Forces. The tank began development in 1973 and entered official service in 1979. Four main versions of the tank have been deployed. It was first used extensively in the 1982 Lebanon War. The name "Merkava" was derived from the IDF's initial development program name.
- Sho't Meteor – Centurion tanks with the original Rolls-Royce Meteor engine.
- Sho't Kal Alef/Bet/Gimel/Dalet – modernised Centurion tanks with a new powerpack (the Continental AVDS-1790-2A transmission).
The addition "Kal" refers to the abbreviation of the engine manufacturer "Continental", originally notated in Hebrew as שוטקל, which reads "Sho'tCal". But since Cal also means "lightweight" and the ק is closer to K than C, the name Sho't Kal struck on outside the Hebrew speaking world.
Entered service in 1970; by 1974 all Israeli Centurions were upgraded to Sho't Kal. Subvariants indicate upgrades received by Sho't Kal tanks during their operational life, including a new turret rotating mechanism, a new gun stabilizer, a new fire-control system and preparations for the installation of the Blazer Reactive armour. Both versions of the Centurion tank, were upgraded to the 105 mm L7 gun.
Armor Corps
The Armored Corps is the principal maneuvering corps, and primarily bases its strength on Main Battle Tanks.
- Armor Corps
- 7th Sa'ar Armored Brigade
- 188th Barak Armored Brigade
- 401st Ikvot HaBarzel Armored Brigade
- 460th Sons of Light Armored Brigade
See also
- Arab–Israeli conflict
- Defense industry of Israel
- Israeli security forces
- Israeli wars
- Israeli–Palestinian conflict
- Military equipment of Israel
- Military history of Israel
- Military operations conducted by the Israel Defense Forces
References and footnotes
- ^ Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine A/RES/181(II)(A+B) 29 November 1947 Archived 17 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Yoav Gelber (2006), pp.51–56
- ^ Dominique Lapierre et Larry Collins (1971), chap.7, pp.131–153
- ^ Benny Morris (2003), p. 163
- ^ Henry Laurens (2005), p.83
- ^ Benny Morris. 1948. p. 119.
- ISBN 978-0-470-35203-8. Retrieved 12 April 2011.
- ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. Retrieved 13 July 2013.
Instructions called for demolition of villages that could not be held permanently. Another paragraph detailed the method for taking over an Arab village: Surround the village and search it (for weapons). In case of resistance—annihilate the armed force and expel the population beyond the border. ... If there is no resistance, a garrison should be stationed in the village. ... The garrison commander should expropriate all weapons, radio receivers and vehicles. All political suspects should be arrested. After consulting the appropriate political authorities, appoint local institutions for administering the village internal affairs. The text clarified unequivocally that expulsion concerned only those villages that would fight against the Hagana and resist occupation, and not all Arab hamlets. Similar guidelines related to the occupation of Arab neighborhoods in mixed towns. In his article written in 1961, Khalidi and those who followed in his footsteps presented the guideline instructing the Hagana units to expel the Arab villagers as the principal issue of Plan D. Furthermore, they have distorted its meaning by portraying it as a general order embracing all Arabs in all villages. The text, however, is clear enough: reading Plan D as it is, without deconstructing it to change its meaning, show that there is no correlation between the actual text, and the significance, background and outcomes that the Palestinian scholars and their Israeli colleagues assign it. These paragraphs of Plan D were of marginal significance, and their contribution to shaping a policy towards the Arab population was immaterial. Arab policies were decided either locally, by commanders in the field and their local advisors on Arab affairs, or by the Arabists within Ben- Gurion's inner circle of advisors who advised their superiors. Ber, Pasternak and even Yadin did not pretend to be authorities on Arab affairs or any other issues of high policy. Their concerns were just military, and the scheme's purpose was preparing for the Arab invasion, not expelling the Palestinians.
- ^ MidEast Web, Plan Daleth (Plan D)
- ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. Retrieved 14 April 2011.
- ^ Ten years of research into the 1947-49 war - The expulsion of the Palestinians re-examined. By Dominique Vidal. Le Monde diplomatique. December 1997.
- ISBN 9780300126969. Retrieved 13 July 2013.
At the time, Ben-Gurion and the HGS believed that they had initiated a one-shot affair, albeit with the implication of a change of tactics and strategy on the Jerusalem front. In fact, they had set in motion a strategic transformation of Haganah policy. Nahshon heralded a shift from the defensive to the offensive and marked the beginning of the implementation of tochnit dalet (Plan D)—without Ben-Gurion or the HGS ever taking an in principle decision to embark on its implementation.
- ^ Dominique Lapierre et Larry Collins (1971), pp.369–381
- ^ Benny Morris (2003), pp. 242–243
- ^ Benny Morris (2003), p.242
- ^ Benny Morris (2003), pp.248–252
- ^ Benny Morris (2003), pp.252–254
- ^ How the Palmach was formed (History Central)
- ISBN 965-05-0695-0.
- ISBN 978-1-84176-372-9.
- ^ Morris, 2003, p. 16.
- ^ Yoav Gelber, Palestine 1948, 2006 – Chap.8 "The Arab Regular Armies' Invasion of Palestine".
- ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. Retrieved 14 July 2013.
A war between Israel and the Arab States broke out immediately, and the Arab armies invaded Palestine.
- ^ Morris, 2008, pp. 236–237, 247, 253–254
- ^ Pa'il, Meir (1982). "The Infantry Brigades". In Yehuda Schiff (ed.). IDF in Its Corps: Army and Security Encyclopedia (in Hebrew). Vol. 11. Revivim Publishing. p. 15.
- ^ Tucker & Roberts 2008, p. 520.
- ^ Karsh 2002, pp. 26–27.
- ^ Karsh 2002, p. 27.
- ^ "Trans-Jordan: Chess Player & Friend". Time. 16 February 1948. Archived from the original on February 1, 2011. Retrieved 20 April 2010.
- ^ Pollack 2002, pp. 448-457
- ^ Karsh 2002, pp. 61–62.
- ^ Vatikiotis, P.J. Nasser and his Generation, pp. 252–253.
- ^ Neff, Donald Warriors at Suez, pp. 160–161.
- ^ a b Neff, Donald Warriors at Suez, pp. 162–163.
- ^ Kissinger, p. 530
- ^ Zeev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, pp. 65–66, Simon and Schuster (1974)
- ^ Soviets Threaten Israel, Ben-Gurion Responds. Jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Retrieved on 8 September 2011.
- ^ a b c d e f g Varble, Derek (2003) p. 40.
- ^ a b c d Varble, Derek (2003) p. 41.
- ^ Varble, Derek (2003) pp. 41–43.
- ^ a b c Varble, Derek (2003) p. 43.
- ^ Pollack 2004, p. 59.
- ^ Pollack 2004, p. 294
- ^ Oren, pp. 281–282
- ^ a b Dunstan 2003, pp. 7–14
- ^ "Egypt Will Fight, Nasser Shouts". Pittsburgh Post-Gazette: 2. November 24, 1967.
- ^ Aloni, Shlomo (2004). Israeli Mirage and Nesher Aces. Osprey. pp. 46–53.
- ^ Shazly, pp. 224–225.
- ^ Gawrych 1996, pp. 41–42.
- ^ a b Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, p. 310.
- ^ a b Cite error: The named reference abc-clio1 was invoked but never defined
- ^ Rabinovich, p. 355.
- ^ Pollack, p. 118.
- ^ a b c Rashba, Gary (October 1998, online June 12, 2006) (12 June 2006). "Yom Kippur War: Sacrificial Stand in the Golan Heights". Military History magazine via HISTORYnet.
{{cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires|journal=
(help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) - USMC Major Michael C. Jordan (1997). "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Arab Policies, Strategies, and Campaigns". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved April 20, 2009.
- ^ Major George E. Knapp (1992). "4: Antiarmor Operations on the Golan Heights". Combined Arms in battle since 1939. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Archived from the original on May 7, 2010. Retrieved June 1, 2009.
- ^ Peter Caddick-Adams, "Golan Heights, battles of", The Oxford Companion to Military History, ed. Richard Holmes. Oxford University Press, 2001.[page needed]
- ^ O'Ballance (1978). Chapter 7: "The Syrians attack", pp. 119–146.
- ^ a b "Patton Tanks in Israeli service", Vehicles, Israeli weapons.
- ^ "Trade register", Arms trade, Sipri.
- ^ "All-woman Israeli Tank Crews Killed 50 Terrorists Over 17 Hours of Combat on October 7". Archived from the original on 2023-11-26. Retrieved 2023-11-28.
- ^ "War on Gaza: Israeli tanks deliberately ran over dozens of Palestinians". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 4 March 2024.
- ^ Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, pp. 291–293.
- ^ "Israel and Depleted Uranium". Salem-News.com. May 13, 2010.
- ^ Antill, P. (6 April 2001). "Merkava Main Battle Tank (Israel)". HistoryOfWar.org.
- ^ a b "Merkava series". War Online. Archived from the original on 2008-05-27. Retrieved 2008-07-04.
- ^ Staff Writer (16 February 2012), The Centurion Sho't of Israel - Centurion (A41) - Main Battle Tank, militaryfactory.com, retrieved 23 December 2012
- ^ Spencer C Tucker; Priscilla Mary Roberts (2008), The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social and Military History -, p. 995
- Christopher F. Foss(2002), Jane's armour and artillery Volume 23, p. 57
- ^ Military Channel - "Top 10 Tanks - Centurion (No.5)"
- ^ Givati, p. 82-85.
- ISBN 9780743265959.
- ^ "Defense & Security Intelligence & Analysis: IHS Jane's | IHS". Articles.janes.com. Retrieved 2013-07-20.
- ^ a b AirForce Journal on Operation Nickel Grass
- ^ "31st Munitions Squadron (31st MUNS)". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 10 June 2010.
- ^ a b Sharp, Jeremy M. (4 December 2009). "CRS report for Congress: U.S. foreign aid to Israel" (PDF). Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 8 June 2010.
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{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link
Further reading
- Rosenthal, Donna (2003). The Israelis. Free Press. ISBN 0-7432-7035-5.
- Ostfeld, Zehava (1994). Shiftel, Shoshana (ed.). An Army is Born (in Hebrew). Israel Ministry of Defense. ISBN 965-05-0695-0.
- Gelber, Yoav (1986). Nucleus for a Standing Army (in Hebrew). Yad Ben Tzvi.
- Shif, Yehuda, ed. (1982). IDF in Its Corps: Army and Security Encyclopedia (18 volumes) (in Hebrew). Revivim Publishing.
- Tira, Ron, ed. (2009). The Nature of War: Conflicting Paradigms and Israeli Military Effectiveness. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1-84519-378-2.
- Roislien, Hanne Eggen (2013). "Religion and Military Conscription: The Case of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)". S2CID 144226866.
- Country Briefing: Israel, Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 June 1996