United Kingdom in the Soviet–Afghan War
Though not officially a belligerent during the
The British also played a vital role in support of the US government's Operation Cyclone, from which the latter provided far more in financial and material terms. Unlike the US which had to funnel its program through Pakistan, the UK played a more direct combat role in Afghanistan itself – in particular, using retired or seconded Special forces such as the Special Air Service and private military corporations to support the resistance groups in practical manners. One of Britain's greatest contributions was training the Mujahideen; not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in the Gulf states and the UK itself.[1]
The UK's role in the conflict entailed direct military involvement not only in Afghanistan but the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. By the war's end, Britain's support to the Afghan resistance turned out to be
Background
Britain had fought in Afghanistan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. British paranoia of
After the 1940s, Britain played a very little role in Afghan politics, and this opened the door for the
Discontent fermented amongst the people of Afghanistan, and anti-government revolts
In May 1979,
as a sham which enabled the Soviet bloc to wage the Cold War by other means, and professed in her memoirs that their intervention in Afghanistan came as no surprise.Britain's involvement
Within three weeks of the Soviet invasion, the cabinet secretary,
Thatcher had a long conversation with US President
Support for the Afghan resistance was approved by the British government who then authorized MI6 to conduct operations within the first year of the Soviet occupation. This was to be coordinated by MI6 officers in
Thatcher discussed British military aid with Pakistan's foreign minister
Ahmad Shah Massoud
MI6 sought to find the faction that they could support – after approval for operations the first move was in February 1980 just two months after the Soviet invasion, MI6 officers led by the Far East's Controller Gerry Warner met tribal leaders in the Pakistan border area within a school to offer help and support if necessary. Warner then briefed an officer to find a
MI6's battleground – the Panjshir Valley
Fighting in the Panjshir valley became the Soviet Union's major focus for offensives in Afghanistan.
Through MI6, Massoud accepted an annual mission of two of their officers as well as military instructors (a total of five to eight men) for him and his fighters.
Obtaining supplies in the first year proved difficult however, as the Soviets and their allies began to mine the route between them and Pakistan. Finding Afghans willing to drive supplies to them proved difficult but
MI6 team's most important contribution to Massoud and his fighters was helping with organization and communications via radio. Several of these tactical radios made by British firm Racal were supplied in early 1982 to the Panjshir.[34] The radio system was the Jaguar high frequency hopping network and computers,[35] which not only intended to prevent Soviet eavesdropping, but were also exceptionally useful for Massoud to coordinate his forces.[36] The team taught English to Massoud's aides (one of which was Abdullah Anas) so they could better use the radios. By 1986 a full system had been established after training had been completed.[37]
Added to this was intelligence – Cheltenham-based GCHQ intercepted and translated Soviet battle plan communications.[38] This was then relayed to the MI6 teams, who had with them equipment such as the American-made AN/URS11 remote controlled signals intelligence transceiver and Satellite phones. From the intercepted Soviet intelligence MI6 was able to adjust mujahid training accordingly.[39] During the Soviet Panjshir VII offensive, which would be one of the largest of the war, the radios and British intelligence combined had warned Massoud. This gave him details of the 11,000 Soviet and 2,600 Afghan soldiers, under Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Sokolov, supported by 200 aircraft and 190 helicopters assaulting the valley.[40] These details saved Massoud and his men's lives, and despite the losses during the offensive they survived the huge onslaught. Through the following offensives (Panjshir VIII and IX) as well, MI6 was providing him with more than just secure communications.[41]
The operatives also helped to retrieve abandoned or destroyed Soviet equipment including crashed Soviet helicopters, one of which was a downed
In line with Carrington's wish for a 'televised war' MI6's training and operational efforts doubled as a sideshow providing the international coverage of Massoud's fight against the Soviets in the Panjshir.
The operatives always saw front-line action assisting Massoud's men mostly using silencer rifles. They witnessed the interrogation of Russian prisoners and assisted in directing mortar fire. At one point three operatives and their Afghan escorts were lured into a Soviet helicopter ambush – they only escaped when an Afghan officer lured the helicopter away sacrificing his life so they could escape.
Another incident involved an ex-SAS operative; Andy Skrzypkowiak who was working as a BBC cameraman with Massoud's men. Known as 'the Pole' (due to his Polish background) and brought out rare images of Massoud's guerrilla attacks against the Soviets. In October 1987 on his way back from the Panjshir he was killed by the CIA backed Hezb-e-Islami fighters led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as punishment for 'bringing war footage of Massoud's military victories to the West'. Skrzypkowiak's killers were not found and Hekmatyar even rewarded them, such was the interfactional rivalry at the time. Britain's response was muted over the death of Skrzypkowiak even though they had concerns about how brutal and extremist Hekmatyar was.[46]
Supporting Operation Cyclone
America's Operation Cyclone which was the CIA's program to arm and finance the Afghan mujahideen began in 1981 – the first US aid package worth $3.2 billion. Britain would play a vital role in the program in many ways.[47] MI6 reactivated their long-established networks of contacts in Pakistan which they relayed to the CIA.[48] The two most prominent were the Mahz-i-Milli Islam (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) led by a former senior officer in the Royal Afghan army, Brigadier General Rahmatullah Safi's Mahz-i-Milli Islam group, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group Hezb-e-Islami – both introduced to the CIA in the same year.[49]
In late 1983 the head of the CIA's Afghanistan operation, Gust Avrakotos met with some MI6 agents in London, one of whom had just returned from three months inside the warzone. Avrakotos questioned Massoud's truce with the Soviets but he got a better understanding of the situation with British intelligence and reports from the field. He realized MI6's budget cuts led them short on delivering vital supplies. Avrakotos also concluded that funding MI6 independently had to be done secretly under the noses of other CIA officials, as well as the Pakistanis.[50] From him money was poured into MI6, increasing their expenditure tenfold and allowing them to carry out further operations.[51] Through Avrakotos the CIA used MI6 operatives to set up listening devices near Russian bases such as at Bagram. These teams were sent throughout the war to track the movements of Soviet tanks and aircraft.[52]
MI6's base of operation was in Islamabad – where everything was organized for Britain's covert war against the Soviet Union. In charge there was Anthony Hawkes, who from 1984 until 1988 ran operations. Assisting the CIA and ISI in Islamabad was MI6 officer Alastair Crooke who coordinated the assistance of training and supplies to Abdul Haq. The latter would become an intermediary for the CIA, MI6 and the Kabul front. Haq's office in Peshawar became the organizing centre of resistance with MI6 and CIA operatives assisting – most of the time they supplied him with maps of new targets they wanted Haq to hit.[53] Intelligence from GCHQ was also relayed to the CIA and ISI who were helping with their respective Mujahideen groups.[54]
There were however some differences between America and the UK during the war. There was also a focus on Massoud who would be the subject of criticism from China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia as well as the CIA, due mostly to his truce with the Soviets and their Afghan counterparts which took place in 1983. With Pakistan unwilling to assist Massoud as he was a Tajik the US had to follow suit. The British role was particularly resented by the Pakistanis,[55] who accused Massoud of an unwillingness to fight, but the truce was a tactical move so that he was able to regroup his forces, as his supplies were running critically low. Despite the CIA's doubts on Massoud, MI6 pursued an act to support him regardless.[51]
With Pakistan and the US working together, British intelligence believed that "the CIA was being too alarmist about the Soviet threat to Pakistan." Some British officers thought that backing militant Islamic groups such as that of Hekmatyar was dangerous, particularly in the wake of the death of Andy Skrzypkowiak.[56] The Americans on the other hand still had suspicions about Britain's role in Afghanistan – they had assumed that they were trying to do as much as 'stay in the game' and that the 'Brits' had an agenda that America was trying to take the lead in their 'old back yard'.[57]
Arms and supplies
From the start of the war the mujahideen were sent hundreds of thousands of old British army small arms, mostly
In the Spring of 1986, Whitehall sent weapons clandestinely to some units of the Mujahideen, and made sure their origins were open to speculation.[61] The most notable of these was the Blowpipe missile launchers which had proved to be a failure in the Falklands War and had been mothballed by the British army, but were available on the international arms market.[62] Around fifty launchers and 300 Missiles were sent from the Short factory in Belfast and were mostly given to Haq's Hezb-e-Islami as they were easy to get through from Pakistan to Afghanistan between 1985 and 1986. British personnel then trained the Mujahideen on the missile, but the system nevertheless proved ineffective; thirteen missiles were fired for no hits.[63][64]
With the failure of the Blowpipe missile, the American FIM-92 Stinger was chosen which was also sent clandestinely. The CIA eventually supplied nearly 500 Stingers (some sources claim 1,500–2,000) to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and 250 launchers. American personnel however were not able to train the Mujahideen, so instead, they were trained by the Pakistani ISI and a few SAS (some of whom had used the weapon in the Falklands War). The Stingers however were not able to intercept the high-flying Soviet jets. ISI however made sure that Massoud's forces received none of the Stingers, even though eight (a fraction of 1% of the total) were smuggled in.[65] The impact of the Stinger on the outcome of the war is contested, particularly in the translation between the impact on the tactical battlefield to the strategic level withdrawal, and the influence the first had on the second.[66]
Training
Britain's biggest contribution to the war by far was training the Mujahideen fighters.
The Special Air Service themselves were sent to Pakistan in 1983 and worked alongside US special forces in training Pakistan's SSG commandos. They would then guide guerrilla operations in Afghanistan in the hope officers could impart their learned expertise directly to the Afghans.[71] They taught the Mujahideen how to shoot down Russian helicopters.[72]
For Massoud's men, it was different, due to Pakistan's hostility they had to take them out of Pakistan and be trained elsewhere. Massoud stated that his men needed battlefield organisation skills and so picked out the best of his junior commanders to be trained by the British.[73] Here KMS was involved and they organized flights to be sent out to secret MI6 and CIA bases in Oman and Saudi Arabia to train. There the Afghan commanders were trained in sabotage, reconnaissance, attack planning, arson, and how to use explosive devices and heavy artillery, such as mortars. The next stage was how to attack aircraft and lay anti-aircraft and anti-armour ambushes.[74]
KMS even organised the commanders to be sent to Britain – the training camps there were set up in late 1983. Disguised as tourists, the selected Mujahideen commanders were trained in three-week cycles in Scotland, northern and southern England on SAS training grounds, living in old barns.
Into the Soviet Republics
The UK's role in the conflict entailed direct military involvement not only in Afghanistan but the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.[68] From 1984 in conjunction with the CIA and ISI, MI6 helped organize and execute "scores" of guerrilla-style attacks. These included rocket attacks on villages in Tajikistan and raids on Soviet airfields, troop supplies and convoys in Uzbekistan which flowed through these areas, some 25 kilometers in these territories.[76]
These were the first direct Western attacks on the Soviet Union since the 1950s and they reached their peak in 1986.
Pakistan's ISI requested
End of support
There would be nine Soviet directed offensives in the Panjshir valley in total. The last, 'Panjshir IX' ended in 1985, and the Soviets withdrew from the area the following year. The offensives were a failure overall - with each one either repelled, or after a Soviet withdrawal, Massoud's forces would then retake it. Massoud thus became known as the 'Lion of Panjshir'.[82]
By the time the new Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he was looking for a way to disengage from Afghanistan. Newspaper reports linking Britain with the supply and training of weapons to the Mujahideen led to Soviet anger. Gorbachev put to Margaret Thatcher that there would be a solution if Britain stopped supplying and training the rebels. Thatcher did neither, and denied any British involvement, and only in Parliament did she state that diplomatic solutions were the answer to the end of the war. She was still however vocally supporting the Mujahideen in the same year and even met with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Haq in Downing Street.[83]
Towards the end of the war, Britain was virtually running its own version of Operation Cyclone.
Consequences
Britain's role in the war was the most extensive covert operation their government had implemented since the
After the Soviet withdrawal, CIA and MI6 officers in Pakistan prepared for what happened next. MI6 was still supportive of Massoud, while the CIA still hoped Heketmayer would be the ideal choice to lead an anti-communist government. The British also wanted the United Nations to push for a compromise peace between the factions but the CIA wanted to push on.
In the subsequent aftermath of 9/11 there was controversy with the fact that Britain had been involved in training and arming the Mujahideen, and from which some officers went on to command senior positions in the
Since its establishment of the 'increment' during the war MI6 continued to use this in the 1990s with both SAS and SBS providing small detachments. Coordination and tasking would be routed through a fourth ministry of defense adviser typically an SAS officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel designated MODA/SO who joined other Ministry of Defense Advisers in the Secretariat.[96]
The war itself had had the bonus for the British getting their hands on or the ability to study and acquire knowledge of a large range of Soviet equipment – this being from the latest
Legacy
Scottish journalist and author John Fullerton who was a 'contract labourer' for MI6, in the role of head agent on the Afghan-Pakistan frontier during the war – used his experience which formed the novel Spy Game.[97]
See also
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Further reading
- Dorril, Stephen (1993). The silent conspiracy : inside the intelligence services in the 1990s. London: Heinemann. OCLC 28375863.
- Qayyum Kahn, Abdul (2021). Understanding Afghanistan : history, politics and the economy. London. OCLC 1267687242.)
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