Battle of Porta
Battle of Porta | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS) | Royal Italian Army | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Georgios Zarogiannis Dimitris Tasos Thanasis Koufodimos | Giuseppe Berti | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Pelion and Kissavos sub-commands Reserve ELAS forces Agrafa sub-command as reinforcements and reserves |
24th Pinerolo Inf. Div. (four battalions) companiesTwo Aromanian legionary | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
200–253 partisans |
3,000–4,000 men (1st day), rising to c. 5,500 (2nd day) 4 bomber & 1 recon. aircraft | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
3 wounded | 3 Italian soldiers and 5 Legionaries killed | ||||||
Location within Greece |
The Battle of Porta (
In spring 1943, a wave of successes demonstrated the rise of the
In
Facing far superior numbers and lacking sufficient ammunition, the partisans were able to hold back the Italians at Porta on the first day, but at Mouzaki, the Italians forced them back and occupied the village. After reinforcements were brought in during the night, the Italians managed to advance on both flanks on 9 June, threatening to encircle the partisan position at Porta. The ELAS partisans withdrew to the mountains, but their actions had been successful in that the Italians, having suffered significant casualties, broke off their planned anti-partisan sweeps in the mountainous interior without continuing their advance.
Background
On 6 April 1941, following a botched
The winter and early spring of 1943 saw a series of resistance successes against the Italians in the mountainous areas of mainland Greece, with battlefield victories such as at Fardykambos, or the liberation of towns like Karditsa (12 March), Grevena (24 March), and Metsovo (22 April).[3][4] By 16 April an Italian report noted that "control throughout the north-east, centre and south-west of Greece remains very precarious, not to say nonexistent".[5] As a result, the high command of the Italian army in Greece, the 11th Army in Athens, decided to mount a large-scale and concerted anti-partisan effort, aimed at hemming in the partisan forces in the Pindus mountain massif, and then launching coordinated and concentric attacks in Thessaly, Central Greece, and Epirus to clear the area.[6] The operation would begin after 20 May, the deadline set by the new collaborationist government under Ioannis Rallis for partisans to surrender in exchange for a full amnesty.[7]
Consequently, the ELAS Central Committee issued orders to its regional headquarters to prepare for the attack, gathering the bulk of its forces in the Pindus massif, and relocating itself there, while leaving behind rear guards to obstruct the Italians.
Battlefield and opposing forces
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/%CE%93%CE%B5%CF%86%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B9_%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85_%CE%91%CE%B3._%CE%92%CE%B7%CF%83%CF%83%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%AF%CF%89%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%82_%CE%A0%CF%8D%CE%BB%CE%B7_%CE%A4%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC%CE%BB%CF%89%CE%BD_-_panoramio.jpg/220px-%CE%93%CE%B5%CF%86%CF%8D%CF%81%CE%B9_%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85_%CE%91%CE%B3._%CE%92%CE%B7%CF%83%CF%83%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%AF%CF%89%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%82_%CE%A0%CF%8D%CE%BB%CE%B7_%CE%A4%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC%CE%BB%CF%89%CE%BD_-_panoramio.jpg)
The Porta Pass is formed by the
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Mimis_Boukouvalas.jpg)
The defence of the pass was undertaken by the eastern Thessalian sub-commands of Pelion and Kissavos, which were closest to the area. The Koziakas sub-command was ordered to occupy the Kalambaka–Diava pass, while a detachment sent to the Agrafa area for procuring supplies was ordered to remain there and carry out harassing attacks.[13] The ELAS forces deployed in the Porta–Mouzaki numbered in total 235 partisans,[b] aided by four groups of Reserve ELAS fighters from the villages of Dousikos, Porta, Beletsi, and Mouzaki, but only the Dousikos group actually fought in the battle, as the others were used as covering forces and messengers.[15] The two detachments of the Kissavos sub-command, reinforced by a squad from the Agrafa sub-command—8 squads in total—held the Porta straits, while the Pelion sub-command, likewise reinforced with a squad from Agrafa—6 squads in total—held the passes at Mouzaki.[15]
Typical for Greek resistance fighters during this time, their weaponry was a medley of different origins: Greek
The commanders at Porta, as well as of the overall force, were Cavalry Captain Georgios Zarogiannis (
In early June 1943, the Italians held Trikala with a cavalry and an infantry regiment, with a couple of tanks, an artillery battalion, engineers and support services, with a further cavalry regiment at Simikli (now Polyneri). The morale of the Italian forces was low, but its command was aware, from spies and reconnaissance flights, that ELAS had left some small forces in the Porta–Mouzaki area and had begun erecting fieldworks there.
The battle
8 June
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a3/Italian-soldiers-in-the-Yugoslavian-Front-in-Albania-391759053046.jpg/220px-Italian-soldiers-in-the-Yugoslavian-Front-in-Albania-391759053046.jpg)
The Italians' plans became apparent on the night of 7 June, when their force began moving by road from Trikala to the village of Gortzi on the road to Petra.[18] At about 01:00 on 8 June, the telephone operator from Poliana informed ELAS command of the Italian movement, and the partisans were alerted to occupy their positions. The Italians arrived at Beletsi at 04:30.[17] In order to increase the psychological impact on the partisans, the Italian commander placed his cavalry in front, advancing at the double.[17]
At 05:30, men of an advanced detachment from Pelion, situated on the heights above Beletsi, opened fire on the advancing Italians, before retiring higher up the mountain side.[25] Shortly after, Italian cavalry and motorcycle troops made contact with the defensive position of the Kissavos men at Petra. As Italian infantry followed up their advance guards, fighting developed both at Petra and at Mouzaki.[26] Both sides made use of their heavy equipment, while the Italian aircraft also began attacks. The Greeks' mortar proved inaccurate, due both to the lack of sights and being unable to train because of the lack of ammunition.[26]
On the Porta sector, the Italians withdrew around noon, leaving only a detachment of 40 men to watch the entrance in a guardpost outside Porta. Shortly afterwards a group of five partisans led by "Peronosporos" ('mildew') managed to crawl up to them without being seen, surprise the garrison, and force them to withdraw completely.[26] At about the same time, Lieutenant Georgios Nikitas took over the command of the partisan mortar and relocated it, greatly improving the accuracy and effect of its fire, which helped to scatter the Italian cavalry massing for an attack outside Beletsi in the afternoon. Repeated cavalry attacks between Porta and Dousikos were repelled by partisan fire before they came near the Greek positions. These were the last Italian attempts against Porta for that day.[27]
The Italians pressed their main attack in the direction of Mouzaki, and by noon had made some small progress. The commander of the Greek Pelion sub-command, Thanasis Koufodimos ("Petros Pilioritis") was wounded by a mortar fragment at c. 12:30, followed by another partisan, Dervisis. Despite his wound, Koufodimos remained in his post directing the battle until his replacement, Ioannis Katsantonis, arrived in the afternoon.[26] Around noon, the Italians occupied the village of Mouzaki, which they plundered and torched. To avoid being surrounded and outnumbered, the Pelion squads began withdrawing to the ridge between Beletsi and Mouzaki and the village of Porti. In the evening, the Italians broke off their advance and withdrew to Beletsi and Mouzaki.[28]
9 June
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/51/%CE%91%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AC%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%82_%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85_%CE%95%CE%91%CE%9C-%CE%95%CE%9B%CE%91%CE%A3.jpg/220px-%CE%91%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AC%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%82_%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85_%CE%95%CE%91%CE%9C-%CE%95%CE%9B%CE%91%CE%A3.jpg)
During the night Italian vehicles brought up more troops, including the cavalry regiment at Simikli and one infantry battalion each from Larissa and Volos, bringing the total force to 5,500 men, according to the testimony of Italian prisoners taken by the partisans. These reinforcements arrived during the morning.[28][29] The partisans' shortage of ammunition, bad the day before, was now worse.[28] According to Boukouvalas, messages were sent to the village of Prodromos, where the nearest ELAS force under the teacher Lepouchis was quartered. They requested he take his men to Lesiana, to the right and rear of the Italians, and attack them from there. However, Lepouchis put the proposal to a vote among his men, who rejected it as most expected that the Porta position could not be held.[30] The partisans did receive a reinforcement of 60 men from Pertouli during the night, who took position on the eastern flank of the Porta position.[31]
At dawn, the Italians renewed their assault with artillery and air support. Their attack was aimed not only to the south against Mouzaki as on the previous day, but also to the north against Mount Koziakas, in a pincer movement against the partisan positions.[28] The first assault was thrown back; Boukouvalas reported that the partisans could see the Italian commanding general landing in his liaison plane to bolster his men's morale.[32] The Italians managed to reach Porti around noon and torch it, but their subsequent attempts to push forward into the southern flank of the Petra position were repelled. The role of the Hotchkiss machine gun, emplaced outside Porti and manned by "Flogas" ('flame'), proved crucial as its fire pinned down the Italian troops for the rest of the day.[33]
On the northern flank, however, the Italians had more success: cavalry squadrons reconnoitred the approaches to Mount Koziakas, finding that the partisans held only the area up to the villages of Dousikos and Lepenitsa. In the afternoon, two battalions launched an attack on the northern flank of the Porta position, captured the villages of Gorgyri and Xylopariko, and pushed on to the heights of Lepenitsa, from where the Italians and their Legionary auxiliaries could flank the ELAS forces at Dousikos; the ELAS forces withdrew higher up the mountain.[34] After the squad defending the area ran out of ammunition, the Italians entered the village of Dousikos in the afternoon and set it on fire, threatening the defenders of Petra, who were also running low on ammunition, with only 2 to 5 rounds per rifle and no mortar shells.[35] At the same time, on the southern flank the Italians applied renewed pressure on the Sklataina–Vatsinia axis, threatening to outflank the Porta position.[36]
Consequently the ELAS commanders ordered a withdrawal, which began at 17:00, in the direction of Tyrna. At 17:30 they blew up the road bridge over the Portaikos river to impede an Italian advance. The withdrawal was so fast that the Italians, busy torching the village of Porta, lost contact with the partisans. Once the Porta troops were safely withdrawn and a new defensive position established at Dramizi, the Mouzaki position was evacuated under cover of night.[35][37]
Aftermath
According to EAM/ELAS members, the c. 250 partisans, fighting for two days against a vastly superior force, suffered only three wounded. The official number of Italian casualties recorded by the Hellenic Army History Directorate was three Italian soldiers and five Legionaries killed.[38] Other sources give much larger figures: about 300 dead and wounded, including a major;[35][39] the military commander of ELAS, Stefanos Sarafis, who was nearby at Tzourtza, claimed "almost 500" Italian dead and wounded, as well as the loss of many horses and an aircraft,[21] although later in his memoirs he raised the number of Italian casualties to "approximately 700".[40] The following day, the Italians torched the villages of Porta, Vatsinia, Chania, and Ropotania.[d] Estimating the partisan forces present at many times their actual number,[42] they made no attempt to enter the mountainous regions, and after gathering their dead returned to Trikala two days later.[35][43] Only eight days later did 1,500 men from Trikala move against the Agrafa area, setting fire to the villages of Vounesi, Kanalia, and Mesenikolas. Near Vounesi they were confronted by some 30 partisans of the Agrafa sub-command. The partisans withdrew higher up the mountain after a first firefight; the Italians, suspicious of a larger ambush, broke off the operation and returned to their bases.[43][44]
For ELAS, the battle of Porta was of particular importance as the first time it confronted the Italians as a regular army in a "more or less full-scale defensive action", as Sarafis describes it, rather than hit-and-run ambushes. This marked the transformation and maturation of ELAS from a guerrilla force into "disciplined troops who knew how to fight", a fact readily recognized by the Italians themselves: the Italian commandant at Trikala remarked as much to the local Greek prefect, reprimanding him for not providing accurate information about the partisans.
Notes
- ^ In his memoirs, Boukouvalas claims a total force of only 140 men, reinforced during the battle with 60 more.[14]
- ^ According to the contemporary reports of the 11th Army, the Pinerolo division was classed as "incomplete" in terms of effectiveness in spring 1943, having only about 60% of the automobiles and pack animals on its table of organization and equipment, and 85% of personnel.[24]
- ^ Following the Italian surrender, the Italian forces in Thessaly went over to ELAS, and partisans captured the military archives of the Aosta regiment. Based on these documents, they held its commander, Colonel Berti, as prisoner with the intention of trying him for war crimes, but he was released on the intervention of the British military mission.[41]
References
- ^ Mazower 1993, pp. 5–22.
- ^ Mazower 1993, pp. 103ff., 123ff..
- ^ Eudes 1973, pp. 42–49.
- ^ Grigoriadis 1982, pp. 215, 218–219.
- ^ Mazower 1993, pp. 135–136.
- ^ a b c Grigoriadis 1982, p. 244.
- ^ Ballis 1981, p. 100.
- ^ Hatzis 1983, pp. 110–115.
- ^ Ballis 1981, pp. 101–102.
- ^ a b Sevastakis 1978, p. 386.
- ^ Ballis 1981, pp. 100–103.
- ^ Ballis 1981, pp. 103–104.
- ^ Ballis 1981, p. 103.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, pp. 386–387, 389.
- ^ a b Ballis 1981, p. 104.
- ^ Ballis 1981, pp. 50, 104–105.
- ^ a b c Sevastakis 1978, p. 387.
- ^ a b c Ballis 1981, p. 105.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, pp. 49, 387.
- ^ a b Grigoriadis 1982, p. 245.
- ^ a b c d Sarafis 1980, p. 130.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, pp. 48–50, 387.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, pp. 48–49, 387.
- ^ Bregantin 2010, pp. 267, 268.
- ^ Ballis 1981, pp. 105–106.
- ^ a b c d Ballis 1981, p. 106.
- ^ Ballis 1981, pp. 106–107.
- ^ a b c d Ballis 1981, p. 107.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, pp. 55, 389–390.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, pp. 56–57, 390.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, p. 389.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, p. 390.
- ^ Ballis 1981, pp. 107–108.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, pp. 390–391.
- ^ a b c d Ballis 1981, p. 108.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, p. 391.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, pp. 56, 391.
- ^ Αρχεία Εθνικής Αντίστασης, p. 162.
- ^ a b Hatzis 1983, p. 110.
- ^ Sarafis 1980, p. 429.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, pp. 58, 103.
- ^ Sevastakis 1978, p. 390 (note 3).
- ^ a b c Sevastakis 1978, p. 57.
- ^ Ballis 1981, pp. 108–109.
- ^ Ballis 1981, p. 109.
- ^ Eudes 1973, pp. 109–110.
- ^ Sarafis 1980, pp. 181ff., 199.
Sources
- Ballis, Dimitrios E. (1981). Ο ΕΛΑΣ στη Θεσσαλία [ELAS in Thessaly] (in Greek). Athens: Synchroni Epochi.
- Bregantin, Lisa (2010). L'occupazione dimenticata. Gli italiani in Grecia 1941-1943 (PhD) (in Italian). Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia.
- Eudes, Dominique (1973). The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949. Translated by John Howe. New York and London: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 978-0-85345-275-1.
- OCLC 165816421.
- Hatzis, Thanasis (1983). Η νικηφόρα επανάσταση που χάθηκε [The victorious revolution that was lost] (in Greek). Vol. II. Athens: Dorikos.
- Hellenic Army History Directorate (1998). Αρχεία Εθνικής Αντίστασης, 1941-1944. Τόμος 3ος "Αντάρτικη Οργάνωση ΕΛΑΣ" [National Resistance Archives, 1941-1944. 3rd Volume "ELAS Partisan Organization"]. Athens: Hellenic Army History Directorate. ISBN 960-7897-31-5.
- ISBN 0-300-06552-3.
- ISBN 9780850362442.
- Sevastakis, Alexis (1978). Καπετάν Μπουκουβάλας: Το αντάρτικο ιππικό της Θεσσαλίας [Kapetan Boukouvalas: The partisan cavalry of Thessaly] (in Greek). Athens: Diogenis.
External links
- Antonis Vogiazos (Director & Scenario), Angelos Kovotsos (Production Director), Vaso Kanellopoulou (Producer), Petros Antaios (Scenario), Nikos Svoronos (Historical Advisor) (1987). ΧΡΟΝΙΚΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΘΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΤΙΣΤΑΣΗΣ, Επεισόδιο 8: ΤΟ ΑΝΤΑΡΤΙΚΟ ΚΙΝΗΜΑ ΣΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟ ΕΞΑΜΗΝΟ ΤΟΥ 1943 [Chronicle of the National Resistance, Episode 8: The partisan movement in the first semester of 1943] (in Greek). Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation. Battle of Porta segment with on-site shots and interviews of Mimis Tasos ("Boukouvalas"), Giorgos Zarogianis ("Kavallaris"), Leonidas Pappas, at 26:35–36:03. Retrieved 26 January 2019.