Operation Harling
Operation Harling, also known as the Battle of Gorgopotamos (
Operation Harling | |||||||
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Part of Axis occupation of Greece in World War II | |||||||
![]() The modern viaduct over the Gorgopotamos river | |||||||
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Background
Operation Harling was conceived in late summer 1942 as an effort to stem the flow of supplies through Greece to the
In Greece meanwhile, the first attempts at armed resistance in
The mission
Landing in Greece, contacting the Resistance
The SOE team numbered thirteen men and was divided into three groups, each including a leader, an interpreter, a sapper and a radio operator. The first group was composed of Lt. Colonel Eddie Myers, CO of the mission and group leader, Captain Denys Hamson as interpreter, Captain Tom Barnes (a New Zealander) as the sapper and Sergeants
The team was distributed per group to three
In the meantime, the main group was being hidden by the local Greeks and constantly moved around the area to prevent their capture by Italian searching parties, while Woodhouse set out to the town of Amfissa to establish contact with Cairo.[13] During this time, Myers and Hamson, led by a local Greek guide, Yiannis, undertook a reconnaissance of the three prospective targets, and chose Gorgopotamos, which afforded better prospects of success: its garrison of 80 Italians was small enough, and it offered good access, cover and a line of retreat for the attacking force.[14] On 2 November, Woodhouse set out to establish contact with Zervas' men in the Valtos Mountains region, while on 14 November, Major Cooke's team rejoined the main party, with information that they had made contact with Aris. Woodhouse returned on the same day, with Zervas and 45 of his men.[15] From the outset, Zervas was enthusiastic for the mission, but Velouchiotis less so, for the Athens-based leadership of EAM-ELAS still did not appreciate the importance and potential of armed struggle in the countryside, preferring to focus on the cities instead. In the end, Velouchiotis, on his own initiative and contrary to the instructions received from EAM, decided to participate in the operation.[7][16]
The sabotage
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/40/Vojski_vo_Grcija_2.jpg/220px-Vojski_vo_Grcija_2.jpg)
The force available for the operation numbered 150 men: the twelve-strong British team, which would form the demolition party, 86 ELAS men and 52 EDES men, who would provide cover and neutralize the garrison. According to the plan, the attack was to take place at 23:00 on 25 November. Two teams of eight guerrillas were to cut the railway and telephone lines in both directions, as well as cover the approaches to the bridge itself, while the main force of 100 guerrillas was to neutralize the garrison (most of them were Italian troops). The demolition party, divided into three teams, would wait upriver until the garrison had been subdued, and then lay the charges.[17]
The attack on the garrison outposts on the two ends of the bridge began as scheduled, but went on far longer than the time originally allotted. Myers took it upon himself to send the demolition teams in while the fight was still under way.[18] The setting of the charges was delayed also, since the girders to be destroyed turned out to be differently shaped than had been anticipated, forcing the British sappers to cut their plastic explosive charges to pieces and then assemble new ones.[19] After the charges were set and the fuses were lit, the first explosion occurred at 01:30, heavily damaging the central pier and collapsing two spans. The British demolition teams then set new explosives to the second pier and the remaining span, which went off at 02:21. In the meantime, the guerrilla outposts had engaged and halted a train with Italian reinforcements heading to the scene.[20] By 04:30, the entire attacking force, which had suffered only four wounded, had successfully disengaged and retreated to its assembly area.
Aftermath
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/65/Zervas_Wanted_Poster.jpg/220px-Zervas_Wanted_Poster.jpg)
The sabotage mission was a major success for SOE, being the biggest such operation carried out until then. Although its original military objective, the disruption of supplies for Rommel's troops, had been rendered obsolete by the Allied victory at El Alamein, it did display the potential for major guerrilla actions in serving Allied strategic objectives, encouraged SOE to aid the development of resistance movements, and provided a major morale boost for occupied Greece.[21] In its aftermath, the Harling mission was not withdrawn, as originally envisaged, but instructed to remain on spot and form the British Military Mission to Greece.[19] Unfortunately for the Greeks however, it was the last time where ELAS and EDES, the country's two major guerrilla forces, would cooperate militarily; within a month, the first clashes between ELAS and EDES forces occurred, a prelude of the open conflict that would erupt between ELAS and the other resistance groups in 1943, and a herald of the Greek Civil War from 1946 to 1949.[7] The bridge itself was repaired in 19 days by the IV Ferrovieri Battalion, of the Royal Italian Army's Ferrovieri Engineer Regiment.[22]
References
- ^ Clogg (1986), pp. 142–143
- ^ a b Papastratis (1984), p. 129
- ^ McGlynn (1953), pp. 3–4
- ^ Woodhouse (2002), p. xi
- ^ a b Woodhouse (2002), p. xii
- ^ Clogg (1986), pp. 140–141
- ^ a b c Clogg (1986), p. 143
- ^ McGlynn (1953), p. 4
- ^ Howarth (1980), p. 98
- ^ McGlynn (1953), pp. 4–5
- ^ Howarth (1980), pp. 98–99
- ^ McGlynn (1953), p. 9
- ^ McGlynn (1953), pp. 5–7
- ^ McGlynn (1953), pp. 7–8
- ^ McGlynn (1953), pp. 8–9
- ^ Woodhouse (2002), p. 33
- ^ McGlynn (1953), pp. 10–11
- ^ McGlynn (1953), pp. 11–12
- ^ a b Howarth (1980), p. 100
- ^ McGlynn (1953), p. 12
- ^ Woodhouse (2002), p. 26
- ^ Franzosi, Pier Giorgio (1991). L'Arma del Genio. Rome: Esercito Italiano - Rivista Militare. p. 224. Retrieved 5 December 2019.
Sources
- Clogg, Richard (1986), A Short History of Modern Greece, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-33804-2
- Hamson, Denys (1946), We Fell Among Greeks, Jonathan Cape
- Howarth, Patrick (1980), Undercover, the men and women of the Special Operations Executive, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-7100-0573-1
- McGlynn, M. B. (1953), "Special Services in Greece", Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 - Episodes & Studies, Volume 2, Wellington: War History Branch, Department Of Internal Affairs
- Myers, E.C.W. (1955), Greek Entanglement, Rupert Hart-Davis
- Papastratis, Prokopis (1984), British policy towards Greece during the Second World War, 1941–1944, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-24342-1
- ISBN 978-1-85065-487-2