Battles and operations of the Indian National Army
The Battles and Operations involving the Indian National Army during
Background
The
First INA
The prestige of
Espionage in India
Intelligence summaries initially did not believe the INA to be a substantial force or have any purpose more than propaganda and
Espionage in Burma frontier
Around this time, the
Second INA
The strategy of operation of the
The INA's own strategy was to avoid set-piece battles for which it lacked arms, armament as well as man-power.
The plans for operation decided between Bose and Kawabe specified that the Japanese and INA forces were to follow a common strategy. The INA was to be assigned an independent sector of its own and no INA unit was to operate less than a battalion strength. For operational purposes, the
beginning the next phase initialing local resistance and revolts within India.Arakan
In March 1944, the Japanese forces began its offensive into India's eastern frontier. The plans for the offensive directed three divisions from
Meanwhile, the 1st battalion of the INA's 1st Guerrilla regiment, lightly armed, was directed to towards the south to participate in the diversionary attack.
Imphal and Kohima
The Arakan offensive was intended to create a diversion for Mutaguchi's forces, while drawing out and destroying as much of the British reserves as possible.[8] In the centre, Mutaguchi's 15th Army was to be the decisive factor in the Manipur Basin. As the battle progressed Mutaguchi's 31st Division engaged the commonwealth forces at Kohima, while the 15th Division was detailed to move down Kohima road to the North-west of Imphal.[14] The main force detailed to engage Imphal, the 33rd Division (the Yamamoto Force, led by Yamamoto Tsunoru), however, was to approach from the south-east via the Tamu Road that had been built by the Commonwealth forces earlier.[14] The INA's four guerrilla regiments (except for No.1 Battalion) were directed to Tamu road and detailed to push into India as Imphal falls.[12]
The 2nd and 3rd battalions, led by
Among the responsibilities of Khan's forces was the protection of the southern flank of Mutaguchi's forces from
With the Messervy's 17th Indians
With the offensive more or less stopped by mid-May in the face of fierce resistance from the commonwealth forces, Khan's forces were redirected to engage Kohima. Khan moved across the Japanese rear with the 3rd Battalion and portion of the 2nd. By the time he reached Ukhrul however, Mutaguchi's 31st division had begun withdrawing from Kohima. Khan decided to attack Imphal instead.[16]
The 2nd Guerrilla Regiment, or the Gandhi Regiment as it was called, consisted of two battalions. Led by Inayat Kiyani, it was directed along the axis of the 15th Army's offensive. Like the 1st Guerrilla, it had crossed the
Pritam's unit was however, walked into an ambush laid by a detachment of Gurkhas. By the end of the night, Pritam's unit made a number of counter-attacks. They were soon reinforced by the rest of Kiani's men. The skirmish turned into bloody fight as the alerted British forces reinforced and called up air and artillery support. After two days of failed counter-attacks and taking heavy losses, Kiani withdrew. The unit suffered nearly two hundred casualties in the assault.[19] The 2nd Guerrilla was never able to participate in further attacks up the Tamu road after this. It was subsequently tasked to cover the left flank of the Yamamoto force, in the rough countries of the south.[19] Through June, the unit maintained aggressive patrols south of Palel-Tamu road, mounting raids and laying ambushes against the by now advancing British forces. It started withdrawing with the Japanese in late June.[19]
The 3rd Guerrilla, or the Azad regiment, was under the command of Col. Gulzara Singh. The unit marched from Yeu through the
The 4th Guerrilla, or the Nehru regiment, left
The initial successes in upper Burma, the engagements at Kohima, and the encirclement of Imphal was a key factor in convincing the INA that the offensive was succeeding. The forward HQ of the INA was moved to
Burma
The commonwealth forces broke the siege of Imphal on 22 June 1944. By mid July, the fortunes of battle had been reversed and the Yamamoto force began a fighting withdrawal with the forces of the INA's first division protecting its flanks. The INA forces began withdrawing two days before Mutaguchi's forces, while Shah Nawaz's forces had already reached Tamu. The withdrawing forces faced acute shortages of supply of food, ammunition and medicine, compounded by the Monsoon rains which rendered the Japanese supply chains as well as INA's own already poor logistics further incapable.[21] Disease, compounded poor sanitation, malnutrition, lack of medicine and inability to evacuate the worse-affected due to a lack of transport took a heavy toll on both INA as well as Japanese troops.
Fay describes the retreat of the units under Shah Nawaz in some detail, holding that the other units must have gone through a similar experience.
Preparing for defence
Of the INA's 1st division, the elements of what remained of the 1st Guerrilla Regiment were stationed at the town of Budalin, south of Yeu through most of early Autumn, while the remaining battalion of the 2nd and the units of the 3rd (Gandhi and Azad, respectively) were stationed in Mandalay in the south and at Chaungu to the north of it respectively.[24] All the three regiments were ordered to Pyinmana, south of Mandalay, in November to reorganise. All three units later came under the command of (then) Maj. Gen Shah Nawaz Khan.
The 4th Guerrilla regiment, which had reached
Of the 2nd Division, the 1st Infantry Regiment had started for the front in May 1944 overland, while its heavy weaponry were to transported by sea. These were, however, lost when the ship carrying the weapons was
The 5th Guerrilla Regiment was moved in December 1944 from Malaya to Mingaladon, close to
Irrawaddy
For the Commonwealth IV Corps's sector, it was vital to seize the area around Pakokku and establish a firm bridgehead quickly. Slim's 7th Indian Division's crossing was made on a wide front.
Pagan and Nyaungu were defended by two battalions (No.s 7 and 9) of the Indian National Army's 4th Guerrilla Regiment, with the 8th battalion held in reserve at Tetthe.[28] Of these, the 7th battalion, totalling about four hundred troops, was positioned to the east of Nyangu town, while Pagan was being defended by about five hundred troops of the 9th battalion at Pagan. The regiment was armed with rifles, three light mortars with sixty rounds between them, and four machineguns.
Messervy's 7th Indian division, attempting to cross the
Mount Popa
The 2nd Infantry, with
With the
At Popa, Sahgal's 2nd infantry regiment was reinforced with the remnants of Dhillon's 4th Guerrilla and Khan's 1st Guerrilla. Khan had in the meantime been given the command of the 2nd Division. By the last week of March, the last of Sahgals units had reached Popa. Sahgal sent out roving columns to engage the British forces. Using guerrilla tactics, his troops, along with Dhillon's, engaged British troops. For their part, the latter used similar tactics of "search and destroy" using small units of highly mobile mechanised troops. To prevent the allied forces from identifying his actual strength while the rest of his troops arrived in small packet, Sahgal set up active and aggressive patrolling, with Dhillon ordering the same to his unit. The troops successfully laid ambushes and engaged the British troops using
The 7th Indian division now faced the additional task of protecting the lines of communication to the besieged 17th Indian Division through the two roads that ran through the region. Towards the end of March, the leading motorised brigade of Indian 5th Division reinforced them, and began clearing the Japanese and the INA troops from their strongholds in and around Mount Popa to clear the land route to Meiktila.[34] By the end of the month, Sahgal was forced to withdraw his forces further to Leygi, five miles (8 km) from Popa. By 3 April, the last of the British operations to clear resistance in and around Popa began, as Sahgals forces successfully defended their position against a number of attacks by units of the 5th motorised brigade. By the end of the 6th however, Sahgal had begun losing men to in a massive scale as his 1st battalion defected after having faced off the attacks of the 5th. As the Japanese began to withdraw on the 8th, the orders for the INA's withdrawal were issued by Shah Nawaz on the 10th.[35]
Moving only by night and under air attacks, the units at and around Popa withdrew, helped by fierce resistance from three skeleton Japanese divisions at Pyawbwe. Sahgal, with the larger number of the remnant and pursued by Slim's forces, withdrew over the Kyaukpadaung-Meiktila road towards
Fall of Rangoon
As the Japanese forces withdrew from
Withdrawal from Burma
With the surrender of Sahgal's forces at Irrawaddy and the remnants of Khan and Dhillon's forces a few weeks later, the INA's fighting capability was all but annihilated. Bose's government had withdrawn from Rangoon along with the Japanese forces and Ba Maw's government. The remnants of the INA's first guerrilla regiment, the X-regiment as it came to be called then, also attempted to march to Bangkok. The Rani of Jhansi troops, who were around Rangoon at this time, began a long march on foot through Burma in efforts to reach Singapore or the safe haven of Bangkok. Bose walked with them. Their retreat was hindered by Aung San's Burmese guerrillas, as well as by Chinese forces who laid ambushes for the retreating Japanese troops.
Indische Legion
The
Holland and France
A majority of the troops of the Indian Legion, were to remain in Europe through the war and was never utilized in their original perceived role over Persia and Central Asia. The Legion was transferred to Zeeland in the Netherlands in April 1943 as part of the Atlantic Wall duties and later to France in September 1943, attached to 344 Infanterie-Division, and later the 159 Infanterie-Division of the Wehrmacht.
From Beverloo in
Indische Freiwilligen Legion der Waffen SS
The Legion was stationed in the
Italy
The 9th Company of II Battalion of the Legion also saw action in
Impact
The INA's role in military terms is considered to be relatively insignificant, given its small numerical strength, lack of heavy weapons (it utilised captured British and Dutch arms initially), relative dependence on Japanese logistics and planning as well as its lack of independent planning. Shah Nawaz claims in his personal memoirs that the INA was a very potent and motivated force. Fay however, reinforces the argument that the INA was relatively less significant in military terms. Its special services group played a significant part in halting the
Nevertheless, Fay argues, the INA was not significant enough to militarily beat the British Indian Army, and was moreover aware of this and formulated its own strategy of avoiding set-piece battles, garnering local and popular support within India and instigating revolt within the British Indian army to overthrow the Raj. Moreover, the
References
- ^ Aldrich 2000, p. 159
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 409
- ^ a b c Fay 1993, p. 410
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 292
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 298
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 138
- ^ Chand 2005, p. 226
- ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 281
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 296
- ^ "INA's Victory & Defeat". Hindustan Times. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007. Retrieved 8 July 2007.
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 265
- ^ a b c d e Fay 1993, p. 285
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 264
- ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 284
- ^ a b c d e Fay 1993, p. 286
- ^ a b c d e Fay 1993, p. 287
- ^ Bakshi A. "Azad Hind Expedition: A tribute to the braves of the Indian National Army". CUVL India. Archived from the original on 29 September 2007. Retrieved 22 June 2007.
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 288
- ^ a b c d e Fay 1993, p. 290
- ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 301
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 300
- ^ a b c Fay 1993, p. 303
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 302
- ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 316
- ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 317
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 319
- ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 320
- ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 330
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 332
- ^ Slim 1961, p. 425
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 333
- ^ a b Fay 1993, p. 334
- ^ Fay 1993, pp. 341–352
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 348
- ^ Fay 1993, pp. 352–354
- ^ Fay 1993, p. 358
- ^ Axis War Makes Easier Task of Indians. Chandra Bose's Berlin Speech. Chandra Bose’s Berlin Speech. Syonan Sinbun, 26 January 1943.
- ^ Kurowski, The Brandenburgers – Global Mission., p. 137
- ^ a b Houterman, Eastern Troops in Zeeland, The Netherlands, 1943-1945, p. 63
- ^ BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3684288.stm
- ^ Davis, Flags of the Third Reich 2: Waffen SS, pp. 22
- ^ Antonio J Munuz – The East came West
- ^ a b Sarkar 1983, p. 411
Bibliography
- Aldrich, Ricjard J (2000), Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-64186-1
- Fay, Peter W. (1993), The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945., Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press., ISBN 0-472-08342-2
- Chand, Hukam (2005), History of modern India: (1885 A.D.-1947 A.D.), Anmol publications, New Delhi., ISBN 81-261-2283-8
- Sarkar, Sumit (1983), Modern India, 1885-1947, Delhi:Macmillan, ISBN 978-0-333-90425-1
- Slim, W. (1961), Defeat into Victory., New York, David McKay., ISBN 1-56849-077-1