Lê Quang Tung
Lê Quang Tung | |
---|---|
Born | Cần Lao Party | 13 June 1919
Years of service | 1950s–1963 |
Rank | Colonel |
Commands held | Commander, Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces |
Battles/wars | Xá Lợi Pagoda raids |
During the 1950s, Tung was a high-ranking official in Nhu's
Tung's main military programme was a scheme in which
Following the pagoda raids, the United States terminated funding to Tung's men because they were used as a political tool rather than against the
Early career
Tung was born on 13 June 1919, in
Head of special forces
Tung had been trained by the CIA in the United States.
On 21 August 1963, Tung's men, acting on Nhu's orders,
Another notable religious attack was perpetrated by Tung's men in 1963. A hugely oversized
Tung also headed a group run by the CIA, in which ARVN personnel of northern origin infiltrated
At Nhu's request, Tung was reported to have been planning an operation under the cover of a government-organised student demonstration outside the
U.S. sanctions
Following the pagoda raids, the U.S. began exploring the possibility of replacing Diệm. Cable 243 informed the US embassy to look for alternative leadership if Diệm did not remove Nhu.
The McNamara–Taylor mission's report noted that one of the reasons for sending Tung's men into the field was because they "are a continuing support for Diệm".[23] The Americans were aware that removing the special forces from Saigon would increase the chances that a coup would succeed, thereby encouraging the army to overthrow the president.[23] Diệm and Nhu were undeterred by the suspension of aid, keeping Tung and his men in the capital.[24] In private talks with US officials, Diệm insisted that the army was responsible for the pagoda attacks and that Tung's men were already under the control of the JGS.[25]
Coup and assassination
By September, Diệm and Nhu knew that a group of generals were planning a coup.
Codenamed
However, Nhu and Tung were unaware that Đính was part of the real coup plot. The III Corps commander told Tung that the counter-coup needed to employ an overwhelming amount of force. He said that tanks were required "because armour is dangerous". In an attempt to outwit Tung, Đính said that fresh troops were needed,[30] opining:
If we move reserves into the city, the Americans will be angry. They'll complain that we're not fighting the war. So we must camouflage our plan by sending the special forces out to the country. That will deceive them.[30]
The loyalists were unaware that Đính's real intention was to engulf Saigon with his rebel divisions and lock Tung's loyalists in the countryside where they could not defend the president.[28] Tung and the palace agreed to send all four Saigon-based special forces companies out of the capital of Saigon on 29 October 1963.[30]
On 1 November 1963, Tung was summoned by the coup organisers to the Joint General Staff headquarters near
During the early stages of the coup, the rebels forced Tung to order his men to surrender. This meant that only the Presidential Guard was left to defend Gia Long Palace.[33][34] At 16:45, Tung was forced at gunpoint to talk to Diệm on the phone, telling the president that he had told his men to surrender. Minh ordered Nhung to execute the Diệm loyalist. Tung had failed to convince the president to surrender and still commanded the loyalty of his men. The other generals had little sympathy, since the special forces commander had disguised his men in army uniforms and framed the generals for the pagoda raids.[35][36] The generals were aware of the threat Tung posed; they had discussed his elimination during their planning,[37][38] having contemplated waging an offensive against his special forces.[39]
At nightfall he was taken with Major Lê Quảng Trịệu, his brother and deputy,[15][32] hands tied, into a jeep and driven to edge of the air base. Forced to kneel over two freshly dug holes, the brothers were shot into their graves and buried.[35] The coup was successful, and on the following morning, Diệm and Nhu were captured and executed.[15][40]
Notes
- ^ Karnow, p. 123.
- ^ a b Jones, p. 301.
- ^ a b Shaplen, p. 190.
- ^ Prochnau, p. 368.
- ^ Karnow, p. 307.
- ^ a b Langguth, p. 248.
- ^ a b Jones, p. 390.
- ^ a b Karnow, p. 309.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 143–50.
- ^ a b Karnow, p. 317.
- ^ a b Jacobs, pp. 152–53.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 166–67.
- ^ Jones, pp. 299–309.
- ISBN 0-423-00580-4.
- ^ a b c d e f g Tucker, p. 227.
- ^ Prochnau, p. 411.
- ^ Karnow, p. 378.
- ^ Jones, p. 393.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 163–64.
- ^ Jones, pp. 356–57.
- ^ Jones, p. 359.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 246–47.
- ^ a b Hammer, pp. 235–36.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 272–73.
- ^ Hammer, p. 282.
- ^ a b Karnow, p. 318.
- ^ Jones, pp. 398–99.
- ^ a b c Karnow, p. 319.
- ^ a b Sheehan, p. 368.
- ^ a b c Jones, p. 399.
- ^ a b Jones, p. 408.
- ^ a b Karnow, p. 321.
- ^ Jones, p. 410.
- ^ Hammer, p. 287.
- ^ a b Jones, p. 414.
- ^ Hammer, p. 290.
- ^ Karnow, p. 310.
- ^ Jones, p. 325.
- ^ Jones, p. 388.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 324–26.
References
- Hammer, Ellen J. (1987). A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York City: E. P. Dutton. ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
- Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
- Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: how the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War. New York City: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
- ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
- ISBN 0-8129-2633-1.
- Shaplen, Robert (1966). The Lost Revolution: Vietnam 1945–1965. London: André Deutsch.
- ISBN 0-679-72414-1.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-57607-040-9.