Ngô Đình Cẩn
Ngô Đình Cẩn | |
---|---|
Saigon, South Vietnam | |
Cause of death | Execution by shooting |
Nationality | Vietnamese |
Occupation | Member of the Diệm government |
Known for | Younger brother and confidant of South Vietnam's first president, Ngô Đình Diệm |
Signature | |
Ngô Đình Cẩn (Vietnamese: [ŋo˧ ɗɨ̞̠n˦˩ kəŋ˦˩]; 1911 – 9 May 1964) was the younger brother and confidant of South Vietnam's first president, Ngô Đình Diệm, and an important member of the Diệm government. Diệm put Cẩn in charge of central Vietnam, stretching from Phan Thiết in the south to the border at the 17th parallel, with Cẩn ruling the region as a virtual dictator. Based in the former imperial capital of Huế, Cẩn operated private armies and secret police that controlled the central region and earned himself a reputation as the most oppressive of the Ngô brothers.
In his youth, Cẩn was a follower of the nationalist
Cẩn's influence began to wane after his elder brother
Early years
Cẩn was the fifth of six sons born to Ngô Đình Khả, who was a mandarin in the imperial court of Emperor Thành Thái, who was ruling under French control.[2][3]
Khả retired from the court in protest at French interference, taking up farming.
Details about Cẩn's early life are scarce. In his youth, he had studied the writings and opinions of the renowned anti-French Vietnamese nationalist
Vietnam was in chaos after the Japanese invaded the country during World War II and displaced the French colonial administration. At the end of the war, the Japanese left the country, and France, severely weakened by political turmoil within the
Cẩn's men helped to cower the populace into voting for his brother. Those who disobeyed were often chased down and beaten, with
Rule
With Diệm's ascent to the leadership of South Vietnam in 1955, Cẩn's stock rose. Cẩn had no formal position in the government but was effectively regarded as the warlord of central Vietnam. He had almost unlimited power in the region, often interfering with army operations against the Viet Cong in a style described as "feudal".[17] Robert Scigliano, a journalist and academic from the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, asserted that Cẩn, along with Nhu, Madame Nhu and eldest brother Archbishop Pierre Martin Ngô Đình Thục formed "an extralegal elite which, with Diệm, directs the destiny of Vietnam".[17] Cẩn sometimes vetoed government-appointed officials posted to central Vietnam from Saigon.[18]
Cẩn ran his own personal army and secret police, which fought the Viet Cong and imprisoned other anti-communist political opponents. Cẩn accumulated great wealth through corrupt practices such as
He was often in conflict with his brothers regarding internal matters,
Anti-communism
In spite of his autocracy and iron rule, Cẩn earned praise from Huế-based US officials for his relatively high levels of success against the Cong san insurgency. Cẩn's central region was much more peaceful than the restive areas near Saigon and the Mekong Delta. Cẩn created the Popular Force organisation to operate in central Vietnam.[1] The Popular Force was an alternative to the Strategic Hamlet Program which was used on a much larger scale in the south by Nhu, who moved peasants into fortified camps in an attempt to isolate Viet Cong cadres from accessing the rural populace and intimidating or otherwise gaining their support.[25] Cẩn assumed a third or so of the rural peasantry were Viet Cong sympathisers, significant enough to render the hamlets ineffective by intimidating other villagers from within. Cẩn's Popular Force were a group of volunteers who underwent rigorous training similar to United States Marine Corps Recruit Training. Those who passed the training were put into units of 150 men and assigned to live and work in the villages by day. At night, they did defence patrols, using hit-and-run tactics against the Viet Cong. According to the report by US officials in central Vietnam, the program aroused popular support because of the integration of the Popular Force's personnel into the daily life of the village and the sense of security that the force provided.[1] The units were generally regarded as being successful in their six-month deployments, allowing them to be deployed to the next trouble spot.[1] Officials in Washington disagreed with the assessment of their subordinates in central Vietnam, alleging that Cẩn was mainly using the Popular Force for repressing dissidents.[26]
Buddhist crisis
Cẩn was considered the most secular of the four Ngô brothers who controlled Vietnam's domestic affairs. With the appointment of elder brother Thục as the Archbishop of Huế in 1961, Cẩn became less influential as Thục aggressively blurred the distinction between church and state. In early 1963, Nhu sent an emissary from Saigon telling Cẩn to retire and leave for Japan.
Another notable religious incident occurred in the central region under Cẩn's rule in 1963. A hugely oversized
Downfall and arrest
Sparked by the killings in Huế on Vesak, the Buddhists organised nationwide mass protests against the religious bias of the Diệm regime throughout the summer of 1963, demanding religious equality.[20][30] The protests were met with brutal crackdowns, including ARVN Special Forces attacks on Buddhist pagodas which left hundreds missing, presumed dead.[31] As public discontent heightened, a group of ARVN officers planned and carried out a US-backed coup in November. This came about after Cẩn's protégé Tôn Thất Đính switched sides and helped the coup when his corps was expected to remain loyal.[32] Diệm and Nhu were executed at the conclusion of the coup.[33]
Following the downfall of the Ngô family, the White House came under pressure from the South Vietnamese public to take a hard line against Cẩn.[34] Mass graves containing 200 bodies were found on his land. The US consul in Huế, John Helble, confirmed the existence of rows of 18th-century style dungeons with filthy, dark cells in an old French arsenal. Although junta member General Trần Văn Đôn asserted that the compound predated the Diệm era, the town's citizens saw Cẩn as a mass murderer. On 4 November, two days after the coup ended, thousands of irate townspeople walked three kilometres to Cẩn's house on the city's southern outskirts – where he lived with his aged mother – demanding vengeance. The junta had ringed the home with barbed wire and armoured cars, sensing that the populace would riot and attack Cẩn.[34] By this time, Cẩn had escaped to a Catholic seminary, but was considering applying to the Americans for political asylum.[35] The US State Department was faced with a dilemma: sheltering Cẩn would associate them with the protection of a corrupt and authoritarian regime that had tortured and killed thousands of its own people. Allowing Cẩn to be attacked by angry mobs would damage the reputation of the new American-backed junta.[34][35] The State Department instructed:
asylum should be granted to Ngo Dinh Can if he is in physical danger from any source. If asylum granted explain to Hue authorities further violence would harm international reputation new regime. Also recall to them that U.S. took similar action to protect Thich Tri Quang from the Diệm government and can do no less in Can case.[35]
The White House sent a cable to the
US ambassador
Trial and execution
It was reported that General Nguyễn Khánh – who had deposed Minh in a January 1964 coup – offered Cẩn exile if he handed over his foreign bank deposits. Cẩn protested, saying that he had no money. Đôn later claimed that Khánh would have executed Cẩn anyway, as Cẩn would have known of the corruption that the generals were party to.[37] During the Ngô era, Khánh commanded the ARVN II Corps, which had operated in the Central Highlands under Cẩn's supervision.[38][39] Despite having helped to arrest Cẩn, Lodge advised Khánh to be restrained in his handling of the case for fear of stoking religious resentment or upsetting international opinion with a death penalty.[40]
Lodge later claimed the South Vietnamese prosecutors failed to make any case against Cẩn. The Vietnamese leader also had to contend with the other side of the arguments, from those who considered themselves to be victims of the Diệm regime.
Cẩn's diabetes worsened during the course of the trial, and by the time he was executed, his elderly mother had died. He suffered a heart attack while in custody. On 9 May 1964, he was carried on a stretcher into the prison courtyard and assisted by guards and two Catholic priests to stand alongside the post to which he was tied. He was blindfolded against his request and shot in front of approximately 200 observers. Lodge defended his actions, claiming the United States did all it could to prevent the execution. The ambassador claimed Cẩn would have been allowed to seek refuge at the US embassy,[37] despite the fact that he had ordered Conein to intercept Cẩn at the airport.[36] Rev. Cao Văn Luân, Catholic rector of Huế University who had been fired for falling afoul of the powerful Archbishop Thục, asked Lodge that Cẩn not be executed. According to Luân, Lodge reportedly assured the rector the execution would not take place.[37] Cẩn left his personal fortune, which had indeed been deposited in foreign banks, to Catholic charities.[43]
References
- ^ a b c d Jones, p. 205.
- ^ a b Jacobs, pp. 18–19.
- ^ a b Tucker, pp. 288–93.
- ^ Tucker, p. 292.
- ^ a b Hammer, p. 114.
- ^ Tucker, p. 326.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 21.
- ^ Karnow, p. 210.
- ^ Buttinger, p. 1253.
- ^ Tucker, p. 142.
- ^ a b Jacobs, pp. 22–25.
- ^ S2CID 145272335.
- ^ Karnow, p. 239.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 95.
- ^ a b c Miller, p. 207.
- ^ Miller, p. 208.
- ^ a b c d Buttinger, pp. 954–55.
- ^ Scigliano, Robert. South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (1964), p. 58. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- ^ Tucker, p. 59.
- ^ a b c Tucker, pp. 288–89.
- ^ a b Karnow, p. 246.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 87.
- ^ a b Langguth, p. 99.
- ^ a b Buttinger, pp. 1149–50.
- ^ Karnow, p. 273.
- ^ Jones, p. 217.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 105–10.
- ^ Hammer, p. 116.
- ^ a b Prochnau, p. 411.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 142–52.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 152–53.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 318–22.
- ^ Karnow, p. 326.
- ^ a b c d Jones, p. 433.
- ^ a b c d e f g Hammer, pp. 305–06.
- ^ a b c Jones, p. 434.
- ^ a b c Hammer, pp. 306–07.
- ^ Tucker, p. 299.
- ^ Tucker, p. 580.
- ^ a b c d McAllister, p. 760.
- ^ McAllister, p. 778.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 325–26.
- ^ Langguth, p. 258.
Sources
- Buttinger, Joseph (1967). Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
- Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
- Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: how the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
- ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
- McAllister, James (2008). "'Only Religions Count in Vietnam': Thich Tri Quang and the Vietnam War". Modern Asian Studies. 42 (4). New York: Cambridge University Press: 751–82. S2CID 145595067.
- Miller, Edward (2004). Grand Designs, Vision, Power and Nation Building in America's Alliance with Ngo Dinh Diem, 1954–1960. UMI.
- ISBN 0-8129-2633-1.
- Scigliano, Robert (1964). South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-57607-040-9.