Operation Backstop
Operation Backstop | |
---|---|
Part of the Croatian War of Independence | |
Type | Preemptive deployment |
Location | Western Slavonia, Croatia |
Planned by | United Nations Protection Force |
Objective | Defence of the UNPA Western Slavonia |
Date | Early 1993 |
Executed by | Elements of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry |
Outcome | No combat resulted from the deployment. |
Casualties | None |
Operation Backstop was a
Although no HV attack occurred in the area during the UNPROFOR mandate, elements of the plan were used by the 3rd Battalion of the PPCLI as the HV clashed with the
Background
In November 1991 Croatia, Serbia and the
Despite the Vance plan's requirement for the immediate withdrawal of JNA personnel and equipment from Croatia, the JNA stayed behind for seven to eight months. When its troops eventually pulled out, the JNA transferred their equipment to the RSK.[5] Because of organisational problems and breaches of the ceasefire, the UNPROFOR did not begin to deploy until 8 March[6] and took two months to fully assemble in the UNPAs.[7] The UNPROFOR was tasked with demilitarising the UNPAs, maintaining the ceasefire, monitoring local police and creating conditions for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.[8] These comprised more than 300,000 Croats who were exiled from RSK-controlled territory[9] and 20,000 Serbs who fled areas of western Slavonia captured by the Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska – HV) in Operations Swath-10, Papuk-91 and Hurricane-91 in late 1991.[10]
A portion of western Slavonia, encompassing an area approximately 90 by 45 kilometres (56 by 28 miles), was designated as the UNPA Western Slavonia (or Sector West) by the peace plan. Although unlike other UNPAs, the RSK controlled only about one-third of the area—in the south, centred on the town of
Canadian order of battle
CANBAT 1 initially included elements from the 1st Battalion of the
Plan
The UNPROFOR operations staff in Sector West developed several defensive plans, assigning top priority to the plan
CANBAT 1 was expected to deploy one mechanised company each to the JORDBAT and the NEPBAT AORs to position themselves defensively. The forces would attempt to deter the HV from advancing, demonstrate its resolve to defend Sector West, engage the HV with
Reaction to Operation Maslenica
In January 1993, when the HV launched Operation Maslenica (which aimed to capture the Maslenica Bridge), Canadian troops acted in accordance with part of Operation Backstop. They dug in their positions, reinforcing the Nepalese troops for 72 hours and expecting an HV attack in Sector West. No reinforcements were deployed to the JORDBAT AOR, and the UNPROFOR prepared to blow up the only bridge across the Sava River (linking Sector West and Bosnian Serb-held territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina) to prevent the Army of Republika Srpska from advancing into the area.[20]
In response to Operation Maslenica, RSK president
Exercise
The 2nd Battalion of the PPCLI replaced the 3rd Battalion in April as CANBAT 1.[27] The commander of the 2nd Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Calvin, instructed his troops to approach their tasks differently than the 3rd Battalion had. Calvin (unlike his predecessor) did not want the RSK forces or the HV to be aware of CANBAT 1 operations, ordering the battalion to observe radio silence.[28] According to Canadian journalist Carol Off, Calvin was eager to fight and instructed his troops to return fire if necessary. The situation in Sector West deteriorated when Jordanian General Shabshough replaced Zabala in March. A major contribution to the deterioration was Shabshough's minimal involvement with local authorities, in contrast to Zabala's cooperative approach.[29]
To reassure the Sector West
Aftermath
According to Croatian political scientist Vladimir Filipović, it is unclear whether the limited resources earmarked for the operation and the unclear motivation of CANBAT 1 troops would stop several HV brigades; according to Hague, the plan did not indicate how CANBAT 1 or the other elements of the UNPROFOR would retreat through Croatia after such a clash.[21] Hague questioned the feasibility of Operation Backstop, because the advance-warning requirement was considered impossible to meet. The UNPROFOR had no reliable military intelligence on HV movements outside the UNPAs, or beyond 30-kilometre (19 mi)-wide zones around the UNPAs (where only United Nations Military Observers were present).[22] However, Hague considered Operation Backstop a deterrent.[32]
Although Operation Backstop was within the UNPROFOR mandate (since the peacekeepers were authorised to use force to prevent armed incursions into the UNPAs), Croatian authorities resented the operation. Croatia considered the UNPROFOR overzealous in defending the UNPAs and protecting the Serbs while failing to ensure the fulfilment of other aspects of the Vance plan, such as the return of refugees to their homes.[21]
By September 1993, CANBAT 1 was relocated from Sector West to Sector South (northern Dalmatia and Lika).[33] The UNPFROFOR mandate in Croatia expired on 31 March 1995, and the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 981 establishing the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) instead.[34] Sector West was captured by the HV in Operation Flash in early May 1995, with no resistance from UN peacekeepers.[21] The main axis of the first day's HV advance was the Zagreb–Belgrade motorway, as anticipated by the planners of Operation Backstop.[35]
Footnotes
- ^ Armatta 2010, pp. 194–196.
- ^ Marijan 2012, p. 103.
- ^ The New York Times & 24 December 1991.
- ^ Ahrens 2007, p. 110.
- ^ Armatta 2010, p. 197.
- ^ Trbovich 2008, p. 300.
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 106–107.
- ^ Hague 1995, p. 5.
- ^ Calic 2012, p. 122.
- ^ HRW & 13 February 1992, note 28.
- ^ Hague 1995, p. 6.
- ^ Hague 1995, Annex C.
- ^ a b Hewitt 1998, p. 29.
- ^ Filipović 2008, p. 57.
- ^ Hague 1995, p. 19.
- ^ Filipović 2008, p. 58.
- ^ Hewitt 1998, p. 30.
- ^ Hewitt 1998, p. 48.
- ^ a b Hague 1995, p. 23.
- ^ a b Hewitt 1998, p. 52.
- ^ a b c d e Filipović 2008, p. 63.
- ^ a b Hague 1995, p. 26.
- ^ a b RTS & 19 October 2012.
- ^ Rupić & Sekula 2010, p. 60.
- ^ Rupić & Vučur 2009, p. 151.
- ^ Hewitt 1998, p. 53.
- ^ Hewitt 1998, p. 55.
- ^ Hewitt 1998, p. 56.
- ^ Filipović 2008, p. 64.
- ^ Hewitt 1998, pp. 55–56.
- ^ Hague 1995, p. 24.
- ^ Hague 1995, pp. 23–24.
- ^ Hewitt 1998, p. 60.
- ^ Ahrens 2007, pp. 166–168.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 297.
References
- Books
- Ahrens, Geert-Hinrich (2007). Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia. Washington, D.C.: ISBN 978-0-8018-8557-0.
- Armatta, Judith (2010). Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Durham, North Carolina: ISBN 978-0-8223-4746-0.
- Calic, Marie–Janine (2012). "Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991–1995". In Ingrao, Charles W.; Emmert, Thomas Allan (eds.). Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative. West Lafayette, Indiana: ISBN 978-1-55753-617-4.
- OCLC 50396958.
- Hague, K. C. (1995). UNPROFOR: A Perspective From the Field (PDF). Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: (PDF) from the original on 17 June 2019.
- Hewitt, Dawn M. (1998). From Ottawa to Sarajevo: Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans. Kingston, Ontario: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University. ISBN 978-0-88911-788-4.
- Rupić, Mate; Vučur, Ilija, eds. (2010). Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat 1990.-1995. – Dokumenti, Knjiga 7 [The Republic of Croatia and the Croatian War of Independence 1990–1995 – Documents, Volume 7] (PDF) (in Croatian). Zagreb, Croatia: Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata. ISBN 978-953-7439-22-4. Archived from the original(PDF) on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 15 November 2014.
- Rupić, Mate; Sekula, Janja, eds. (2010). Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat 1990.-1995. – Dokumenti, Knjiga 8 [The Republic of Croatia and the Croatian War of Independence 1990–1995 – Documents, Volume 8] (PDF) (in Croatian). Zagreb, Croatia: Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata. ISBN 978-953-7439-13-2. Archived from the original(PDF) on 12 October 2016. Retrieved 23 November 2013.
- Trbovich, Ana S. (2008). A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-533343-5.
- Wood, John (2003). The Chance of War: Canadian Soldiers in the Balkans, 1992–1995. Toronto, Ontario: ISBN 978-1-55002-426-5.
- Scientific and professional articles
- Filipović, Vladimir (July 2008). "Kanadska Brigada "Princeza Patricija" u zapadnoj Slavoniji 1992.-1993.: Pripreme, djelovanje, poteškoće" [Canadian Princess Patricia Brigade in Western Slavonia 1992–1993: Preparations, Activities, Problems]. Polemos: Journal of Interdisciplinary Research on War and Peace (in Croatian). 11 (22). Zagreb, Croatia: Croatian Sociological Association and Jesenski & Turk Publishing House: 51–70. ISSN 1331-5595.
- Marijan, Davor (May 2012). "The Sarajevo Ceasefire – Realism or strategic error by the Croatian leadership?". Review of Croatian History. 7 (1). Croatian Institute of History: 103–123. ISSN 1845-4380.
- News reports
- "Džakula: Hadžić bio protiv suživota" [Džakula: Hadžić Was Against Coexistence]. Radio Television of Serbia. 19 October 2012. Archived from the original on 1 December 2013.
- Kinzer, Stephen (24 December 1991). "Slovenia and Croatia Get Bonn's Nod". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 20 June 2012.
- Other sources
- "Appendix E: Helsinki Watch Letter to Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia, February 13, 1992" (PDF). War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina. New York City: Human Rights Watch. 13 February 1992. pp. 310–357. ISBN 1-56432-083-9. Archived(PDF) from the original on 24 December 2003.