1991 Yugoslav campaign in Croatia
1991 Yugoslav campaign in Croatia | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Croatian War of Independence | |||||||
| |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
SFR Yugoslavia SAO Krajina SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia SAO Western Slavonia | Croatia | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Veljko Kadijević Blagoje Adžić Slobodan Milošević |
Franjo Tuđman Gojko Šušak Martin Špegelj Anton Tus | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Serb Volunteer Guard White Eagles |
Croatian National Guard (until November 1991) Croatian Army (from November 1991) Croatian Police Croatian Navy Croatian Defence Forces | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
September 1991 145,000 troops 1,100 tanks 700 APCs 1,980 artillery pieces |
September 1991 58,000 troops January 1992 155,772 troops 216 tanks 127 APCs 1,108 artillery pieces | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
1,279 killed | 3,761 killed | ||||||
Civilian casualties: See the Aftermath section |
The 1991 Yugoslav campaign in Croatia was a series of engagements between the
The campaign effectively started on 20 September 1991, even though relatively minor offensive actions had already been undertaken. By the end of the month, it suffered from serious delays and manpower shortages caused by low call-up turnout in
The strategic situation permitted the development of the
Background
In 1990, following the
Milošević became de facto commander of the JNA once he secured control over the rump federal presidency and through his influence over the federal defence minister
At the beginning of 1991, Croatia had no regular army. In an effort to bolster its defence, it doubled police numbers to about 20,000. The most effective part of the force was the
The Croatian view of the JNA role in the Serb revolt gradually evolved between January and September 1991. The initial plan of
Prelude
The JNA intervened directly against Croatia in early July in Baranja, north of the city of Osijek. On 1 August, they drove Croatian forces out of Erdut, Aljmaš and Dalj, and out of Baranja around 22 August.[16] During the summer of 1991, the Croatian Serb military consolidated in the territory under its control. In Banovina, Glina was captured from the ZNG on 26 July. That same day, two Croatian police stations near Hrvatska Kostajnica were captured, isolating the town.[17] The attacks, codenamed Operation Stinger, were carried out by the 7th Banija Division, spearheaded by the Knin special police led by Dragan Vasiljković.[18] In the aftermath of capture of the Kozibrod police station, Serb forces committed the first mass killing,[19] involving the deaths of ten captured policemen and seventeen civilians.[20]
The ZNG successfully defended Hrvatska Kostajnica until mid-September. In August, Croatian Serbs acting under the operational control of the JNA
On 1 September 1991, Tuđman accepted an EC-proposed ceasefire and peace conference, despite his ultimatum demanding that the JNA return to its barracks by 31 August. After the Yugoslav Presidency also accepted it, the conference began on 7 September. Four days later, the Croatian member and chair of the federal presidency,
Order of battle
In early September 1991, the ZNG had 8,000 full-time and 40,000 reserve troops. The four guards brigades of full-time troops were the only units of the ZNG that were fully equipped with small arms, but even they lacked heavy weapons. A 10,000-strong special police force was established to replace the personnel transferred from the original special police units to the guards brigades. In September, the Croatian small arms stockpile consisted of 30,000 purchased abroad in addition to 15,000 previously owned by the police.[12] The Battle of the Barracks resulted in a large increase to ZNG weapon holdings—allowing full arming of its existing units, raising of an additional 40–42 brigades and fielding a total of 200,000 troops and 40,000 police by the end of the year.[26] The ZNG captured 250 tanks, 400–500 heavy artillery pieces, 180,000 small arms and 2,000,000 long tons (2,200,000 short tons) of ammunition. In addition, 3,000 officers, mostly Croatian by nationality, changed allegiance and left the JNA to join the ZNG.[28] In 1991, the ZNG was supported by the Croatian Defence Forces (Croatian: Hrvatske obrambene snage, HOS)—a militia raised by the Croatian Party of Rights. The party stated it had as many as 3,000 troops, but the police estimated it at 250 armed militiamen.[29]
The JNA planned a two-stage
Timeline
The JNA developed a plan to defeat Croatia militarily, overthrow its government and create conditions necessary for the continued existence of Yugoslavia. The plan was amended in September 1991 to accommodate the besieging of JNA garrisons by the ZNG, incorporating the lifting of the blockade into the campaign objectives. The plan entailed five corps-level campaigns designed to impose an air and naval blockade of Croatia, capture territory populated by Serbs and relieve barracks under ZNG siege. The axes of attack were specified as Gradiška–Virovitica, Bihać–Karlovac–Zagreb, Knin–Zadar and Mostar–Split. Armoured and mechanized forces were tasked with the capture of eastern Slavonia and advances west towards Zagreb and Varaždin.[30] This was identified as the main effort of the campaign.[31] Finally, a land blockade of Dubrovnik was planned, coupled with an advance west towards the Neretva River to support the drive to Split.[30] The plan may have proposed withdrawal of the JNA to Serb-populated areas of Croatia or from the whole of Croatia after the objectives were completed, but sources conflict on that issue.[34]
September offensive
In eastern Slavonia, the JNA responded to the ZNG siege of its garrison in Vukovar, and on 14 September 1991 it deployed troops to relieve the barracks.[35] Independent of that effort, the main thrust of the campaign against Croatia was initially planned to start on 21 September. The southern operational group of the thrust, spearheaded by the 1st Guards Mechanised Division, was expected to lift the ZNG siege of the JNA barracks in Vinkovci, and reach Našice and Slavonski Brod in two to three days. Over the next four to five days, the group was expected to reach the line Okučani–Suhopolje by advancing via the Đakovo–Požega road and the Zagreb–Belgrade motorway, avoiding major population centres. The northern operational group, subordinated to the 12th (Novi Sad) Corps, was to advance from Osijek to Našice and then further west towards Bjelovar.[36] The two operational groups were assigned approximately 57,000 troops and 5,000 supporting personnel.[37] The 17th (Tuzla) Corps was probably tasked with crossing the Sava River—marking the border of Croatia—at Slavonski Brod and Slavonski Šamac to join the westward drive along the motorway, but the crossing never occurred.[35]
The campaign was brought forward by one day to 20 September. The change of schedule caused the JNA 1st Guards Mechanised Division to commit to battle as it arrived in eastern Slavonia with no reconnaissance or preparation. The resulting traffic jam on the
The Banja Luka Corps was tasked with the main axis of advance from Okučani to Daruvar and Virovitica in western Slavonia, and a secondary drive from Okučani towards Kutina.[39] This task was consistent with the line expected to be reached by the main thrust of the JNA advancing from the east in about a week.[36] The Corps had already deployed a battlegroup of the 265th Mechanised Brigade near Okučani to support the advance that started on 21 September, and reached the Papuk Mountains. The Corps received two motorised brigades and one artillery brigade as reinforcements during the advance, but the problems with morale and desertions experienced in eastern Slavonia were also present in the Banja Luka Corps. In one such instance, the 130th Mechanised Brigade, sent as a reinforcement, had been reduced to a 280-strong battalion by 29 September.[40] The JNA was stopped by the ZNG between Novska, Nova Gradiška and Pakrac, even though some Croatian Serb militia units took positions on the Bilogora and Papuk north of Pakrac near Virovitica, and Slatina, with no JNA support.[41]
The JNA Knin Corps, which had already fully mobilised and deployed, started the campaign in northern Dalmatia and southern Lika on 16 September 1991.
Reduced objectives
On 30 September, the general staff of the JNA reduced the objectives of the campaign because it had not followed the initial plan and had become bogged down.[43][47] The reduced objectives called for offensive and defensive actions, the inflicting of decisive defeats on Croatian forces in Dalmatia and eastern Slavonia, and strikes against vital infrastructure in Croatia, to obtain an agreement on the evacuation of besieged JNA facilities. While some units on the ground started to implement the new orders the same day, they did not take effect completely before 4 October.[43] On 3 October, Serbian and Montenegrin representatives in the Yugoslav Presidency declared that they alone had become the acting federal presidency and assumed control of the JNA.[48] Two days later, the JNA requested that the presidency authorize a general mobilization of forces needed for the campaign, but this was refused by Milošević.[49] By 9 October, the JNA effort was considered a failure. Its commanders formally accepted the role forced on the JNA by Milošević and limited its strategic objectives in Croatia to the protection of Serb-populated areas.[31][50]
The JNA effort to relieve its Vukovar barracks turned into a protracted siege, delaying 36,000 troops and a significant proportion of armoured units slated for the thrust towards Zagreb and Varaždin. Vukovar was captured in mid-November but the victory proved
In Banovina, the JNA reached the
On 1 October, the JNA Banja Luka Corps initiated probing attacks in western Slavonia, presaging a major effort employing the bulk of the corps three days later. The advance established defensive positions just outside Novska and Nova Gradiška, and captured Jasenovac on 8 October. Lipik and a part of Pakrac were captured four days later.[58] By that time, the JNA campaign in western Slavonia had lost its momentum.[59]
In northern Dalmatia, the JNA Knin Corps attacked Zadar on 4 October, reaching its outskirts and lifting the ZNG siege of the Šepurine Barracks the next day. The advance was blocked by the ZNG and a truce was agreed on 7 October. Two days later, it was followed by an agreement to evacuate JNA facilities in Zadar, including equipment stored there.[55] Further south, the JNA Titograd Corps and its Military-Maritime District forces advanced from eastern Herzegovina and the Bay of Kotor, and pushed east and west of Dubrovnik on 1 October, placing besieging the city by the end of the month.[60] The JNA was supported by Montenegro's TO in the area.[61] Even though the Croatian troops defending the city were few,[62] the city held out, sustaining increasingly intensive artillery, naval and air bombardment until a ceasefire was agreed in the area on 7 December. As the siege shaped international opinion on the Croatian War of Independence, it became a major contributor to a shift towards the international diplomatic and economic isolation of Serbia and rump Yugoslavia,[63] and resulted in the creation of a perception of Serbia and rump Yugoslavia as an aggressor state.[64]
The JNA attacks on Dubrovnik and Zadar were supported by the Yugoslav Navy, which blockaded the coast on two more occasions.
Croatian counter-offensive
On 8 October,
The most significant results were produced in western Slavonia, where Croatian forces began pushing the JNA away from
The second significant HV offensive was Operation Whirlwind, launched across the Kupa River on 11 December. The HV was tasked with advancing towards Glina but the operation failed after a shallow bridgehead was established within two days.[59] In Lika, battles were fought for individual villages but little progress was made by either side.[72] The JNA captured four villages south of Osijek between 21 November and 16 December but the front lines generally became static.[16][72]
Aftermath
Map showing JNA-held areas of Croatia in January 1992 (red)The JNA campaign in Croatia ended in a stalemate, leading both sides to accept an internationally supervised ceasefire.[73] By late November, the JNA was no longer in a position to make substantial advances, while Milošević refused to pursue objectives that he no longer considered achievable.[31] Between September and December 1991, the HV captured many weapons and significantly increased its capabilities. In mid-January 1992, it commanded 155,772 troops and had 216 tanks, 127 other armoured vehicles and 1,108 artillery pieces at its disposal.[74] Even though JNA positions in western Slavonia were on the brink of military collapse,[71] the HV struggled elsewhere and its munitions stockpiles were depleted, while the UN arms embargo prevented its quick resupply.[75] By the end of 1991, the conflict had killed 6,000 Croatians. Another 23,000 were wounded and 400,000 became internally displaced persons (IDPs).[76] Some sources report that there were as many as 600,000 IDPs.[19][77] The 6,000 killed include 3,761 soldiers.[78] JNA losses were officially reported at 1,279 killed in action, but the figure may have been considerably higher because casualties were consistently under-reported during the war.[79] The HV counter-offensive in western Slavonia created 20,000 Serb refugees. They fled from the area when the JNA ordered the Croatian Serb forces to withdraw,[80] and were subsequently settled in JNA-held Baranja.[81]
In 1991 and early 1992, approximately 18,000 Croatian citizens were missing or held by the JNA or its allies. Approximately 8,000 of these were imprisoned in
The atrocities prompted Germany to grant Croatia diplomatic recognition in mid-November. It overcame opposition to the move from the United Kingdom, France and the United States by late December, and formally recognized Croatia on 23 December 1991. The German decision was followed by recognition from other EC member states on 15 January 1992. The Croatian Serbs in turn declared the establishment of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) on 21 December 1991 in JNA-held areas comprising approximately 30% of Croatian territory.[48][85] The RSK was entirely dependent on Serbia economically and financially.[86]
The battlefield stalemate allowed the implementation of the
Footnotes
- ^ Hoare 2010, p. 117
- ^ Hoare 2010, p. 118
- ^ The New York Times & 19 August 1990
- ^ ICTY & 12 June 2007
- ^ Hoare 2010, pp. 118–119
- ^ Ramet 2006, pp. 384–385
- ^ a b c Hoare 2010, p. 119
- ^ Sell 2002, p. 373
- ^ Armatta 2010, p. 160
- ^ The New York Times & 3 March 1991
- ^ The New York Times & 2 April 1991
- ^ a b c CIA 2002, p. 86
- ^ a b EECIS 1999, pp. 272–278
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 91
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 92
- ^ a b c d Marijan 2012a, p. 110-111
- ^ a b Armatta 2010, p. 165
- ^ CIA 2002, vol. 2, p. 83
- ^ a b Calic 2012, p. 121
- ^ Goldstein 1999, p. 229
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 93
- ^ a b CIA 2002, p. 94
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 94–95
- ^ a b CIA 2002, p. 95
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 401
- ^ a b c CIA 2002, p. 96
- ^ The Independent & 10 October 1992
- ^ Oberschall 2007, p. 107
- ^ Marijan 2008, p. 50
- ^ a b c CIA 2002, p. 97
- ^ a b c d e CIA 2002, p. 98
- ^ Marijan 2012b, p. 264
- ^ Marijan 2012a, p. 120
- ^ CIA 2002, note 45/II
- ^ a b c d e CIA 2002, p. 99
- ^ a b Marijan 2012b, p. 261
- ^ Marijan 2012b, pp. 261–262
- ^ Marijan 2012b, p. 265
- ^ Marijan 2012b, p. 262
- ^ a b Marijan 2012b, p. 266
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 102
- ^ Marijan 2012b, p. 267
- ^ a b c Marijan 2012b, p. 268
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 103
- ^ Gow 2003, p. 156
- ^ Jelavić 2010, p. 177
- ^ a b CIA 2002, pp. 99–100
- ^ a b c Hoare 2010, p. 122
- ^ Marijan 2012b, p. 271
- ^ Burg & Shoup 2000, p. 83
- ^ Macdonald 2002, p. 104
- ^ Sikavica 2000, p. 143
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 101–102
- ^ CIA 2002b, p. 208
- ^ a b c d Marijan 2012b, p. 270
- ^ Marijan 2012a, pp. 109–110
- ^ a b c Marijan 2012a, p. 109
- ^ Marijan 2012b, pp. 269–270
- ^ a b c Marijan 2012a, p. 110
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 103–104
- ^ Pavlović 2005, Note 40
- ^ The New York Times & 9 November 1991
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 104
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 110
- ^ a b Jelavić 2010, pp. 177–178
- ^ Narodne novine & 8 October 1991
- ^ The New York Times & 8 October 1991
- ^ Marijan 2012a, p. 107
- ^ Marijan 2012a, pp. 107–108
- ^ Marijan 2012a, pp. 110–111
- ^ a b Hoare 2010, p. 123
- ^ a b Marijan 2012a, p. 113
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 108
- ^ Marijan 2012a, p. 119
- ^ Marijan 2012a, p. 122
- ^ Schuman 2004, p. 45
- ^ Leutloff-Grandits 2006, p. 8
- ^ Marijan 2008, p. 61
- ^ Cigar 1996, pp. 77–78
- ^ HRW & 13 February 1992, note 28
- ^ HRW & 21 January 1992, p. 297
- ^ Živić 2005, pp. 137–138
- ^ MVA
- ^ Schabas 2006, pp. 3–4
- ^ Ramet 1998, p. 179
- ^ Armatta 2010, p. 163
- ^ a b Armatta 2010, pp. 194–196
- ^ a b c Trbovich 2008, p. 299
- ^ Armatta 2010, p. 196
- ^ UN & 27 November 1991
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 106
- ^ Marijan 2012a, p. 103
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 158
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 157–158
- ^ Jelavić 2010, p. 178
- ^ Trbovich 2008, p. 300
- ^ Hoare 2010, pp. 122–123
References
- Books
- Armatta, Judith (2010). Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Durham, North Carolina: ISBN 978-0-8223-4746-0.
- Calic, Marie-Janine (2012). "Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991–1995". In Ingrao, Charles W.; Emmert, Thomas Allan (eds.). Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative. West Lafayette, Indiana: ISBN 978-1-55753-617-4.
- OCLC 50396958.
- ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
- Burg, Steven L.; Shoup, Paul S. (2000). The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 978-0-7656-3189-3.
- Cigar, Norman (1996). "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991". In Meštrović, Stjepan Gabriel (ed.). Genocide after Emotion: The Post-Emotional Balkan War. London, England: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-12293-1.
- Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. London, England: Routledge. 1999. ISBN 978-1-85743-058-5.
- Goldstein, Ivo (1999). Croatia: A History. Montreal, Quebec: ISBN 978-0-7735-2017-2.
- Gow, James (2003). The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes. London, England: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. ISBN 978-1-85065-646-3.
- Hoare, Marko Attila (2010). "The War of Yugoslav Succession". In Ramet, Sabrina P. (ed.). Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 111–136. ISBN 978-1-139-48750-4.
- Leutloff-Grandits, Carolin (2006). Claiming Ownership in Postwar Croatia: The Dynamics of Property Relations and Ethnic Conflict in the Knin Region. Münster, Germany: LIT Verlag. ISBN 978-3-8258-8049-1.
- Macdonald, David Bruce (2002). Balkan Holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian Victim Centered Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-6467-8.
- Oberschall, Anthony (2007). Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence. London, England: ISBN 978-0-203-94485-1.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. (1998). "Yugoslavia". In Ramet, Sabrina P. (ed.). Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture and Society Since 1939. Bloomington, Indiana: ISBN 978-0-253-21256-6.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building And Legitimation, 1918–2006. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-34656-8.
- Schabas, William A. (2006). The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. ISBN 978-0-521-84657-8. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
- Schuman, Michael A. (2004). Nations in Transition: Croatia. New York: Infobase Publishing. ISBN 978-0-8160-5053-6.
- Sell, Louis (2002). Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. Durham, North Carolina: ISBN 978-0-8223-3223-7.
- Sikavica, Stipe (2000). "The Army's Collapse". In Udovicki, Jasminka; Ridgeway, James (eds.). Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. pp. 131–153. ISBN 978-0-8223-2590-1.
- Trbovich, Ana S. (2008). A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-533343-5.
- Scientific journal articles
- Jelavić, Ante (October 2010). "Međunarodni oružani sukobi na moru" [International armed conflicts at sea]. Naše more, Journal of marine science and technology (in Croatian). 57 (3–4). University of Dubrovnik: 170–178. ISSN 0469-6255.
- Marijan, Davor (June 2008). "Sudionici i osnovne značajke rata u Hrvatskoj 1990–1991" [Participants and the basic characteristics of the war in Croatia 1990–1991]. Journal of Contemporary History (in Croatian). 40 (1). Croatian Institute of History: 47–63. ISSN 0590-9597.
- Marijan, Davor (May 2012). "The Sarajevo Ceasefire – Realism or strategic error by the Croatian leadership?". Review of Croatian History. 7 (1). Croatian Institute of History: 103–123. Hrčak.
- Marijan, Davor (November 2012). "Zamisao i propast napadne operacije Jugoslavenske narodne armije na Hrvatsku u rujnu 1991. godine" [The Conception and Failure of the Offensive Operation of the Yugoslav National Army in September 1991]. Journal of Contemporary History (in Croatian). 44 (2). Croatian Institute of History: 251–275. ISSN 0590-9597.
- Pavlović, Srđa (2005). "Reckoning: The 1991 Siege of Dubrovnik and the Consequences of the "War for Peace"". Spaces of Identity. 5 (1). ISSN 1496-6778. Retrieved 5 March 2013.
- Živić, Dražen (June 2005). "Demografski gubitci Hrvatske vojske tijekom domovinskog rata" [Demographic losses of the Croatian Army during the Croatian War of Independence]. Diacovensia (in Croatian). 13 (1). Catholic Faculty of Theology, J. J. Strossmayer University of Osijek: 117–141. ISSN 1330-2655.
- News reports
- Bellamy, Christopher (10 October 1992). "Croatia built 'web of contacts' to evade weapons embargo". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 November 2012.
- Binder, David (9 November 1991). "Old City Totters in Yugoslav Siege". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 29 July 2012. Retrieved 6 March 2013.
- Engelberg, Stephen (3 March 1991). "Belgrade Sends Troops to Croatia Town". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2 October 2013.
- Sudetic, Chuck (2 April 1991). "Rebel Serbs Complicate Rift on Yugoslav Unity". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2 October 2013.
- "Roads Sealed as Yugoslav Unrest Mounts". The New York Times. Reuters. 19 August 1990. Archived from the original on 21 September 2013.
- "Yugoslav Planes Attack Croatian Presidential Palace". The New York Times. 8 October 1991. Archived from the original on 17 October 2013.
- Other sources
- "Appendix D: Helsinki Watch Letter to Slobodan Milošević, President of the Republic of Serbia and Blagoje Adžić, Acting Minister of Defense, January 21, 1992". War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina (PDF). New York: Human Rights Watch. 21 January 1992. pp. 274–309. ISBN 1-56432-083-9.
- "Appendix E: Helsinki Watch Letter to Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia, February 13, 1992". War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina (PDF). New York: Human Rights Watch. 13 February 1992. pp. 310–357. ISBN 1-56432-083-9.
- "Odluka" [Decision]. ISSN 1333-9273. Archived from the originalon 23 September 2009.
- "Opće informacije o nestalima" [General information on missing persons] (in Croatian). Ministry of Veterans' Affairs (Croatia). Archived from the originalon 27 September 2013. Retrieved 6 May 2013.
- "Resolution 721 (1991)". United Nations Security Council. 27 November 1991.
- "The Prosecutor vs. Milan Martic – Judgement" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 12 June 2007.