Scientific pluralism
Scientific pluralism is a position within the
History
Since the development of
Although earlier pluralistic conceptions of science persisted during the rise of positivism, modern conceptions of scientific pluralism began to emerge in the 1970s.
Varieties of pluralism
Scientific pluralists vary in regard to what aspects of science they believe are not unified. Pluralists who believe in metaphysical differences within the subject matter of science hold that unity of science is inherently impossible. In the words of pluralist Nancy Cartwright, they reject the "fundamentalist doctrine" that "all facts must belong to one grand scheme".
Another focus of pluralism is on the epistemology of science. Some pluralists focus on the difficulties of relating material from different scientific disciplines. Even if reductionist metaphysics are accepted in theory, it may be impossible in practice to explain, for example, large-scale social behaviors by reference to the behavior of subatomic particles, given the amount of information that would be required.[5] Other pluralists do not dismiss the possibility of such an explanation at an epistemological level, but say that given the varied research methods and theoretical models actually used in different disciplines (and sometimes even within a discipline), the burden of proof is on the unifiers to provide empirical evidence of unity across them. In the absence of that evidence, these pluralists believe it makes more sense for scientists to use the methods and models that appear to be most effective for their work, without any special consideration for theories of unity.[5][9][13]
Some proponents of scientific pluralism argue that it should be adopted for social, ethical, and political reasons. For example,
Notes
- J. A. Fodor indicates that the strongest, most reductionist version of the theory is more common in non-philosophers' understanding of the unity of science than among philosophers of science.[2]
References
- ^ Fodor 1974, pp. 97–98.
- ^ Fodor 1974, p. 114n2.
- ^ Ruphy 2016, pp. xi–xii.
- ^ Breitenbach & Choi 2017, pp. 391–393.
- ^ a b c d e Ludwig & Ruphy 2021.
- ^ Suppes 1978, p. 5.
- ^ Suppes 1978, pp. 5–9.
- ^ Harding 2015, pp. 115–116.
- ^ a b Harding 2015, pp. 116–117.
- ^ a b Cat 2017.
- ^ Kellert, Longino & Waters 2006, pp. viii–ix.
- ^ Cartwright 1999, p. 25.
- ^ Kellert, Longino & Waters 2006, p. xxiii.
- ^ Harding 2015, pp. 120–121.
Works cited
- Breitenbach, Angela; Choi, Yoon (July 2017). "Pluralism and the Unity of Science". JSTOR 26370802.
- ISBN 978-0-521-64411-2.
- Cat, Jordi (16 August 2017). "The Unity of Science". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- S2CID 46979938.
- ISBN 978-0-226-24153-1.
- Kellert, Stephen H.; Longino, Helen E.; Waters, C. Kenneth, eds. (2006). Scientific Pluralism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 978-0-8166-4763-7.
- Ludwig, David; Ruphy, Stéphanie (3 November 2021). "Scientific Pluralism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Ruphy, Stéphanie (2016). Scientific Pluralism Reconsidered: A New Approach to the (Dis)Unity of Science. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. ISBN 978-0-8229-4458-4.
- JSTOR 192459.
Further reading
- ISBN 978-0-674-21260-2.
- Longino, Helen E. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-07342-2.