Scientific pluralism

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Scientific pluralism is a position within the

normative
reasons, even if unity were possible in theory.

History

Since the development of

unified science have posited that all scientific investigation shares a common framework. In the strongest versions of these theories, all of the special sciences should be reducible to physics. Therefore all science could in theory follow one shared methodology and be described in a shared jargon, even if in current practice this is not the case due to limitations in the development of human knowledge and technology.[1][a] The specific theories of the Vienna Circle are no longer commonly held, but there are a variety of unities proposed by more recent philosophers.[3][4]

Although earlier pluralistic conceptions of science persisted during the rise of positivism, modern conceptions of scientific pluralism began to emerge in the 1970s.

Varieties of pluralism

Portrait photo of Nancy Cartwright
Stanford School philosopher Nancy Cartwright has written in support of scientific pluralism.

Scientific pluralists vary in regard to what aspects of science they believe are not unified. Pluralists who believe in metaphysical differences within the subject matter of science hold that unity of science is inherently impossible. In the words of pluralist Nancy Cartwright, they reject the "fundamentalist doctrine" that "all facts must belong to one grand scheme".

deterministic behaviors versus those with probabilistic behaviors.[5][10]

Another focus of pluralism is on the epistemology of science. Some pluralists focus on the difficulties of relating material from different scientific disciplines. Even if reductionist metaphysics are accepted in theory, it may be impossible in practice to explain, for example, large-scale social behaviors by reference to the behavior of subatomic particles, given the amount of information that would be required.[5] Other pluralists do not dismiss the possibility of such an explanation at an epistemological level, but say that given the varied research methods and theoretical models actually used in different disciplines (and sometimes even within a discipline), the burden of proof is on the unifiers to provide empirical evidence of unity across them. In the absence of that evidence, these pluralists believe it makes more sense for scientists to use the methods and models that appear to be most effective for their work, without any special consideration for theories of unity.[5][9][13]

Some proponents of scientific pluralism argue that it should be adopted for social, ethical, and political reasons. For example,

marginalized groups to participate, and more opportunity for airing of scientific dissent.[5]

Notes

  1. J. A. Fodor indicates that the strongest, most reductionist version of the theory is more common in non-philosophers' understanding of the unity of science than among philosophers of science.[2]

References

  1. ^ Fodor 1974, pp. 97–98.
  2. ^ Fodor 1974, p. 114n2.
  3. ^ Ruphy 2016, pp. xi–xii.
  4. ^ Breitenbach & Choi 2017, pp. 391–393.
  5. ^ a b c d e Ludwig & Ruphy 2021.
  6. ^ Suppes 1978, p. 5.
  7. ^ Suppes 1978, pp. 5–9.
  8. ^ Harding 2015, pp. 115–116.
  9. ^ a b Harding 2015, pp. 116–117.
  10. ^ a b Cat 2017.
  11. ^ Kellert, Longino & Waters 2006, pp. viii–ix.
  12. ^ Cartwright 1999, p. 25.
  13. ^ Kellert, Longino & Waters 2006, p. xxiii.
  14. ^ Harding 2015, pp. 120–121.

Works cited

  • Breitenbach, Angela; Choi, Yoon (July 2017). "Pluralism and the Unity of Science".
    JSTOR 26370802
    .
  • .
  • Cat, Jordi (16 August 2017). "The Unity of Science". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • S2CID 46979938
    .
  • .
  • Kellert, Stephen H.; Longino, Helen E.; Waters, C. Kenneth, eds. (2006). Scientific Pluralism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. .
  • Ludwig, David; Ruphy, Stéphanie (3 November 2021). "Scientific Pluralism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Ruphy, Stéphanie (2016). Scientific Pluralism Reconsidered: A New Approach to the (Dis)Unity of Science. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. .
  • .

Further reading