Singapore strategy

The Singapore strategy was a naval defence policy of the United Kingdom that evolved in a series of war plans from 1919 to 1941. It aimed to deter aggression by Japan by providing a base for a fleet of the Royal Navy in the Far East, able to intercept and defeat a Japanese force heading south towards India or Australia. To be effective it required a well-equipped base. Singapore, at the eastern end of the Strait of Malacca, was chosen in 1919 as the location of this base; work continued on this naval base and its defences over the next two decades.

The planners envisaged that a war with Japan would have three phases: while the garrison of Singapore defended the fortress, the fleet would make its way from home waters to Singapore, sally to relieve or recapture Hong Kong, and blockade the

The Singapore strategy was the cornerstone of British Imperial defence policy in the Far East during the 1920s and 1930s. By 1937, according to

The

The Singapore strategy was a series of war plans that evolved between the wars in which the basing of a fleet at Singapore was a common but not a defining aspect. Some plans were designed to defeat Japan, while others were to deter aggression.

Although he did not specify a location, Jellicoe noted that the fleet would require a major dockyard somewhere in the Far East. A paper entitled "The Naval Situation in the Far East" was considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence in October 1919. In this paper the naval staff pointed out that maintaining the Anglo-Japanese Alliance might lead to war between the British Empire and the United States. In 1920, the Admiralty issued War Memorandum (Eastern) 1920, instructions in the event of a war with Japan. In it, the defence of Singapore was described as "absolutely essential".^[5] The strategy was presented to the Dominions at the 1923 Imperial Conference.^[25] The authors of the memorandum divided a war with Japan into three phases. In the first phase, the garrison of Singapore would defend the fortress while the fleet made its way from home waters to Singapore. The fleet would sail from Singapore and relieve or recapture Hong Kong. The final phase would see the fleet blockade Japan and force it to accept terms.^[26]

Most planning focused on the first phase, which involved the fortification of Singapore. For the second phase, a naval base capable of supporting a fleet was required. While the United States had constructed a

Estimates of the time for the fleet to reach Singapore after the outbreak of hostilities varied. It had to include the assembly of the fleet, preparations for the voyage and transit to Singapore. The first estimate was 42 days, assuming reasonable warning. In 1938, it was increased to 70 days, with 14 more for provisioning. It was further increased in June 1939 to 90 days plus 15 for provisioning and in September 1939, to 180 days.^[27]

Oil storage facilities were constructed at

The third phase received the least consideration but naval planners were aware that Singapore was too far from Japan to provide an adequate base for operations near Japan. The further the fleet proceeded from Singapore, the weaker it would become.[26] If American assistance was forthcoming, there was the prospect of Manila being used as a forward base.^[34] The idea of invading Japan and fighting its armies was rejected as impractical but the British planners did not expect that the Japanese would willingly fight a decisive naval battle against the odds. They were therefore drawn to the concept of a blockade; from experience they were aware of the impact it could have on an island nation at the heart of a maritime empire and felt that economic pressure would suffice.^[26]

Japan's vulnerability to blockade was studied; with information from the

Enforcement of a close naval blockade would make ships vulnerable to attack by aircraft and submarines.[37] Blockading Japanese ports with small ships was a possibility but this would require the destruction or neutralisation of the Japanese fleet and it was far from certain that the Japanese fleet would place itself in a position where it could be destroyed. A plan was adopted for a more distant blockade, whereby ships bound for Japan would be intercepted as they passed through the East Indies or the Panama Canal. This would not cut off Japanese trade with China or Korea and probably not with the United States. The effectiveness of such a blockade was therefore questionable.^[35]

Rear Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, the Commander in Chief, East Indies Station, noted that the logic was suspiciously circular:

• We are going to force Japan to surrender by cutting off her essential supplies.
• We cannot cut off her essential supplies until we defeat her fleet.
• We cannot defeat her fleet if it will not come out to fight.
• We shall force it to come out to fight by cutting off her essential supplies.^[38]

The 1919 plans incorporated a Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation (MNBDO) which could build and defend a forward base.

Following surveys, a site at Sembawang was chosen for a naval base.^[52] The Straits Settlements made a gift of 2,845 acres (1,151 ha) of land for the site and a sum of £250,000 for construction of the base was donated by Hong Kong in 1925.^[53] The money exceeded the British contribution that year of £204,000 towards the floating dock.^[54] Another £2,000,000 was paid by the Federated Malay States; New Zealand donated £1,000,000.^[55] The contract for construction of the naval dockyard was awarded to the lowest bidder, Sir John Jackson Limited, for £3,700,000.^[56] About 6,000,000 cu yd (4,600,000 m³) of earth were moved to level the ground and 8,000,000 cu yd (6,100,000 m³) of marsh was filled in. The floating dock was constructed in England and towed to Singapore by Dutch tugboats. It was 1,000 ft (300 m) long and 1,300 ft (400 m) wide, making it one of the largest in the world. There would be 5,000 ft (1,500 m) of deep water quays and infrastructure including warehouses, workshops and hospitals.^[57]

To defend the naval base, heavy

An alternative policy was put forward in 1923 by the

By the late 1930s, the Lyons government had become increasingly skeptical of Britain's commitment to the Singapore strategy and Australian security in general. Prime Minister Joseph Lyons refused British requests for two RAAF squadrons to be stationed in Singapore.^[76] In 1938, Lyons told UK High Commissioner Geoffrey Whiskard that he had formed the view that "Britain would not, or could not, offer any substantial defence assistance to Australia". However, in public he continued to press for commitments from British officials.^[77] Lyons was influenced by the views of Hughes, now external affairs minister, who was a critic of the Singapore strategy and advocacy of air power over naval power. In April 1938, Lyons announced a significant expansion of his government's rearmament programme, with funding for the RAAF exceeding that of the army for the first time. In parliament he stated that "complementary to this conception of Empire collective security we should do all that we can to defend ourselves".^[78] In December 1938, further details of the government's "local defence" programme were presented by defence minister Geoffrey Street, including the construction of "mini-Singapore" naval bases at Darwin and Port Moresby which were a response to concerns over a possible Japanese invasion of Australia.^[79]

The Reform Government of 1912–1928, United Government 1928–1931, United-Reform Coalition Government of 1931–1935 and the First Labour Government in 1935–1949 supported the Singapore Strategy. The New Zealand financial contribution was eight annual payments of £125,000, a million pounds in total, rather than the £225,000 annually proposed by the Admiralty.^[80] Expansion of the New Zealand Devonport Naval Base was also proposed and in 1926 the alternative of a third cruiser was considered. Labour, on coming to power in 1935, gave more importance to a local air force, though later Walter Nash accepted the need to keep sea lanes open.^[81] There was little liaison with Australia; in 1938 New Zealand Chiefs of Staff papers were sent to London but not Australia.^[82] By 1936 New Zealand military confidence in the Singapore Strategy was waning; with the possibility of Italy as well as Germany and Japan as enemies, in seemed likely that Britain would also be committed in the Mediterranean.^[83]

With war with Germany now a reality, Menzies sent

In June 1940 Italy joined the war on Germany's side and France was defeated.[87] The Chiefs of Staff Committee reported,

The security of our imperial interests in the Far East lies ultimately in our ability to control sea communications in the south-western Pacific, for which purpose adequate fleet must be based at Singapore. Since our previous assurances in this respect, however, the whole strategic situation has been radically altered by the French defeat. The result of this has been to alter the whole of the balance of naval strength in home waters. Formerly we were prepared to abandon the Eastern Mediterranean and dispatch a fleet to the Far East, relying on the French fleet in the Western Mediterranean to contain the Italian fleet. Now if we move the Mediterranean fleet to the Far East there is nothing to contain the Italian fleet, which will be free to operate in the Atlantic or reinforce the German fleet in home waters, using bases in north-west France. We must therefore retain in European waters sufficient naval forces to watch both the German and Italian fleets, and we cannot do this and send a fleet to the Far East. In the meantime the strategic importance to us of the Far East both for Empire security and to enable us to defeat the enemy by control of essential commodities at the source has been increased.^[88]

In secret talks in Washington, D.C., in June 1939, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral

In July 1941, the Japanese occupied Cam Ranh Bay in French Indochina, which the British fleet had hoped to use on its northward drive, which put the Japanese much closer to Singapore.^[92] As diplomatic relations with Japan worsened, in August 1941, the Admiralty and the Chiefs of Staff began considering what ships could be sent. The Chiefs of Staff decided to recommend HMS Barham be sent to the Far East from the Mediterranean, followed by four Revenge-class battleships that were refitting at home and in the United States; Barham was sunk by a German U-boat in November 1941. Three weeks later the remaining two battleships at Alexandria, HMS Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were seriously damaged by Italian human torpedoes. While no more destroyers or cruisers were available, the Admiralty decided that an aircraft carrier, the small HMS Eagle could be sent.^[93]

Richmond, in a 1942 article in The Fortnightly Review, charged that the loss of Singapore illustrated "the folly of not providing adequately for the command of the sea in a two-ocean war".^[107] He argued that the Singapore strategy had been unrealistic. Privately he blamed politicians who had allowed Britain's sea power to be run down.^[107] The resources provided for the defence of Malaya were inadequate to hold Singapore and the manner in which those resources were employed was frequently wasteful, inefficient and ineffective.^[108]

The disaster had political and military dimensions. In Parliament, Churchill suggested that an official inquiry into the disaster should be held after the war.^[2] When this wartime speech was published in 1946, the Australian government asked if the British government still intended to conduct the inquiry. The Joint Planning Staff considered the matter and recommended that no inquiry be held, as it would not be possible to restrict its focus to the events surrounding the fall of Singapore and it would inevitably have to examine the political, diplomatic and military circumstances of the Singapore strategy over a period of many years. The new Prime Minister Clement Attlee accepted this advice and no inquiry was ever held.^[109]

In Australia and New Zealand, after years of assurances, there was a sense of betrayal.^[85] The Singapore Strategy had permitted Australia to accept sending the Second Australian Imperial Force, its newest ships, and thousands of airmen to aid Britain. The loss of almost a quarter of Australia's overseas soldiers—the equivalent of 100,000 soldiers for Britain or 300,000 for the United States—stunned the country.^[110] According to one historian, "In the end, no matter how you cut it, the British let them down".^[111] The defeat affected politics for decades. In a speech in the Australian House of Representatives in 1992, Prime Minister Paul Keating cited the sense of betrayal,

I was told that I did not learn respect at school. I learned one thing: I learned about self-respect and self-regard for Australia—not about some

knighthoods, and all the rest of the regalia that comes with it.^[112]

A fleet was necessary for the defeat of Japan and eventually a sizeable one, the British Pacific Fleet, did go to the Far East, where it fought with the United States Pacific Fleet.^[113] The closer relations that developed between the two navies prior to the outbreak of war with Japan and the alliance that developed from it afterwards, became the most positive and strategic legacy of the Singapore strategy.^[114]

The Singapore Naval Base suffered little damage in the fighting and became the most important Japanese naval base outside of the home islands.^[115] The 15-inch guns were sabotaged by the British before the fall of Singapore and four of them were deemed beyond repair and scrapped by the Japanese.^[59] The floating dry dock had been scuttled by the British but was refloated by the Japanese. It was damaged beyond repair by a raid by Boeing B-29 Superfortresses in February 1945 and ultimately towed out to sea and sunk in 1946.^[116] The Royal Navy retook possession of the Singapore base in 1945.^[106]

In 1958, the Singapore strategy was revived in the form of

Mastodon called for the deployment of two squadrons of eight Handley Page Victors to Tengah and one of eight Avro Vulcans to Butterworth. The British nuclear stockpile consisted of only 53 nuclear weapons in 1958, most of which were of the old Blue Danube type but plans called for 48 of the new, lighter Red Beard tactical nuclear weapons to be stored at Tengah when they became available, two for each V bomber.^[118] Up to 48 Red Beards were secretly stowed at RAF Tengah, between 1962 and 1971.^[119]

The Royal Navy deployed the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious with Red Beards and nuclear-capable Supermarine Scimitars to the Far East in 1960.^[120] As with the original Singapore strategy, there were doubts as to whether 24 V bombers could be spared in the event of a crisis dire enough to require them, especially after China's acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964.^[121] During the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation in 1963, Bomber Command sent detachments of Victors and Vulcans to the Far East. Over the next three years, four V bombers were permanently stationed there, with squadrons in the United Kingdom rotating detachments. In April 1965, 33 Squadron carried out a rapid deployment of its eight Vulcans to RAAF Butterworth and RAF Tengah.^[122] Air Chief Marshal Sir John Grandy reported that the V bombers "provided a valuable deterrent to confrontation being conducted on a large scale".^[123]

In 1965, racial, political and personal tensions led to Singapore

• Singapore Naval Base
• War Plan Orange