Tito–Šubašić Agreements
Signed | 16 June 1944 |
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Location | Vis, Yugoslavia (now Croatia) |
Signatories |
Signed | 1 November 1944 |
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Location | Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia) |
Signatories |
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The Tito–Šubašić Agreements (
The negotiations and the resulting agreements were supported and promoted by the
The Vis Agreement (Serbo-Croatian: Viški sporazum) was the initial document in the process; it was concluded on the island of
Background
In April 1941, the
On 26–27 November,[6] a pan-Yugoslav assembly – the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ) – was established at the instigation of Tito and the KPJ.[7] The AVNOJ declared itself the future parliament of a new Yugoslav state, affirmed its commitment to forming a democratic federation, denied authority of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, and forbade King Peter II of Yugoslavia from returning to the country.[8] Additionally, the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (Nacionalni komitet oslobođenja Jugoslavije, NKOJ) was established and confirmed by the AVNOJ as an all-Yugoslav executive body.[9]
On 3 June, Tito was evacuated to Bari, after his headquarters in Drvar were overrun in consequence of a German airborne landing in late May 1944. Shortly afterwards, he was transported by destroyer HMS Blackmore to the island of Vis. By 9 June, British and Soviet missions had been established on the island.[10]
Vis Agreement
On 12 April 1944, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill began pressuring Peter II to appoint a former governor of the Banovina of Croatia, Ivan Šubašić, to the position of prime minister of the government-in-exile. Peter II complied on 1 June, and Šubašić accepted the position, returning from the United States where he had been living since 1941. Šubašić met with Tito on the Island of Vis two weeks later.[11] Similarly, Churchill sent a letter to Tito ahead of the meeting, stating the importance the British government placed on a future agreement between him and the government-in-exile.[12]
The meeting produced the Vis Agreement, which declared that it was the will of the signatories to form a coalition government, but that the system of government in Yugoslavia would only be decided on once the war was over. Furthermore, Šubašić accepted the decisions made by the AVNOJ in November 1943, and he recognised the legitimacy of bodies established by the AVNOJ.[11] The question of retaining or abolishing the Yugoslav monarchy was left for after the war.[12] The agreement was signed on 16 June. At the time, Tito said that he was primarily concerned about the liberation of the country – and claimed that the establishment of a communist regime was not a major aim.[13]
Naples Conference and flight to Moscow
Churchill deemed that Tito was not doing enough in return for British support, particularly citing British protection of the Yugoslav island of Vis. His discontent was echoed by the British
A month later, on 12 September, Peter II broadcast a proclamation that called upon national unity and allegiance to Tito.
Belgrade agreement
Shortly afterward, Šubašić returned to Yugoslavia, arriving at Tito’s headquarters in Vršac on 23 October 1944. As the two were scheduled to resume their talks on post-war government, both were sent a joint message from the British and Soviet foreign ministers – Anthony Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov – expressing hope that the talks would result in the establishment of a coalition government.[16] Tito and Šubašić resumed talks on 28 October. On 1 November, British and Soviet mission chiefs were asked to attend the initialling of the draft agreement as witnesses.[16]
In the new agreement, the parties spelled out a detailed plan for a coalition government as envisaged on Vis earlier that year. The agreement initially specified that the new government would have 18 members – 12 drawn from the ranks of the NKOJ and 6 from the government-in-exile. Tito was to be the prime minister, while Šubašić would be his deputy and the foreign minister.
Since Tito’s position was backed by a substantial Partisan force in the country, and Šubašić had no such power to press for a different agenda, the regency is interpreted as a concession by Tito to the government-in-exile, designed to promote good will among the
British diplomats pointed out that the proposed government would actually have 28 voting members (with an additional 10 drawn from the NKOJ) and that half of Šubašić's contingent in the new government supported Tito – giving Tito a 25 to 3 edge. Furthermore, Šubašić went to Moscow on 20 November to seek Stalin's support for the agreement before returning to London. This course of action led Peter II to consider sacking Šubašić, and only Churchill's intervention dissuaded him.[19]
On 7 December, Tito and Šubašić signed two additional agreements dealing with the election of a constituent assembly, the disposition of the property of Peter II, and the regency council. In a meeting held that day, the head of British mission to Yugoslavia Fitzroy Maclean told Tito that the British would only consider diplomatic recognition of his authority if he and Šubašić successfully formed a coalition government.[20]
Regency dispute
In a meeting with Churchill and Eden on 21 December,[21] and in his letters to the British Prime Minister of 29 December 1944 and 4 January 1945, Peter II rejected the proposed regency as unconstitutional. Nonetheless, Churchill pressed the king to accept all decisions of the future Yugoslav government regarding the regency. Regardless, on 11 January the king formally objected to the regency and the AVNOJ having legislative powers, and rejected the Tito-Šubašić Agreement. On 22 January, the king sacked Šubašić for concluding the agreement without consulting him on the matter.[22]
In response, the British sought, and received, United States support for Šubašić to proceed, over the king's objections, with implementation of the agreement with Tito, who was informed of, and accepted, such a proceeding. The British may have been motivated by fear that the USSR might unilaterally recognise the NKOJ as the Yugoslav government.[23] In the period of 25–29 January, Peter II retracted his dismissal of Šubašić after negotiating with him and agreeing that the government-in-exile would resign and Šubašić would be re-appointed with the task of furthering the king's views on his right to appoint the regency.[24]
As the Šubašić-led government was scheduled to return to Belgrade on 7 February, the king proposed a regency consisting of army general and former prime minister Dušan Simović, Juraj Šutej (a Croat in Šubašić’s government), and Dušan Sernec (a Slovene member of the NKOJ). On 5 February, Tito refused to accept Šutej and proposed Ante Mandić (a Croat member of the AVNOJ) instead. The next day, Šubašić opposed Simović’s appointment, citing his decision to surrender to the Axis powers in 1941 without consulting other government ministers. Instead, he proposed to appoint Sreten Vukosavljević, who was a member of his government in the period after the Vis Agreement. The dispute led to a delay in relocating the government.[25]
The Tito–Šubašić agreement was discussed and supported at the Yalta Conference, which issued a communique calling for implementation of the agreement, expansion of the AVNOJ to include members of old Yugoslav parliament who did not collaborate with the Axis powers, and submission of acts of the AVNOJ to ratification by an elected constituent assembly.[26] The Yalta communique was relayed to Tito by Maclean, and Tito accepted it in full. Peter II and Šubašić accepted the communique on 12 February. The king replaced Simović's regency nomination of Vukosavljević with that of Milan Grol, while persisting in nominating Šutej to the council. Tito rejected both appointments.[27]
On 26 February, Tito and Šubašić concluded a further agreement specifying Srnec and Mandić as Slovene and Croat members of the regency council and providing a list of four potential Serb members of the regency for the king to choose from. The king was informed that he had until the end of the week to comply, otherwise his consent would be presumed. Peter II complied and selected Srđan Budisavljević (a former minister in the government-in-exile). The king presented his decision to the president of the AVNOJ, Ivan Ribar, in London on 3 March. The Šubašić government resigned three days later. The regency council, in its only official act, then appointed a 28-member provisional government of Yugoslavia on 7 March, in compliance with the Tito–Šubašić Agreement[28]
Aftermath
In recognition of the new Yugoslav government, British, Soviet, and US ambassadors were posted to Belgrade in the second half of March.[29] Initially, the new government opted to proclaim its anti-fascism, the "brotherhood and unity" of nations living in Yugoslavia, and general humanistic values. However, as the elections scheduled for autumn of 1945 were approaching, Communists were gradually appointed to key positions, and civil rights and freedoms were increasingly curtailed. Also, legislation was introduced to prosecute real and perceived enemies of the people and the state.[30]
On one hand, the government-in-exile and Šubašić meant to limit communist control over the government of post-war Yugoslavia through the agreements with Tito, possibly with British assistance. On the other hand, Tito sought to use the agreements to boost the legitimacy of his claim to power by associating himself with the government-in-exile and the formation of a broad governing coalition. The provisional government established in March 1945 included Tito as the prime minister and Šubašić as the foreign minister, the latter as one of eleven non-communist government ministers.[31] However, only six of the eleven were previously members of the government-in-exile. Out of that six, only three were not supporters of, or not otherwise affiliated with, the Partisans – Šubašić, Šutej, and Grol, all of whom resigned their positions within months – Grol in August and the others in October.[32]
Footnotes
- ^ Vukšić 2003, p. 10.
- ^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 88.
- ^ Vukšić 2003, pp. 13–15.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 113.
- ^ Vukšić 2003, pp. 10–11.
- ^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 114.
- ^ Lukic & Lynch 1996, pp. 71–72.
- ^ Hoare 2013, pp. 183–184.
- ^ Hoare 2013, p. 166.
- ^ Roberts 1973, p. 228.
- ^ a b c d e Ramet 2006, p. 158.
- ^ a b Roberts 1973, p. 231.
- ^ Calic 2019, p. 162.
- ^ Murray 2019, p. 154.
- ^ Murray 2019, pp. 154–155.
- ^ a b Roberts 1973, p. 272.
- ^ Roberts 1973, p. 273.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 167.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 273–274.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 286–287.
- ^ Roberts 1973, p. 288.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 299–301.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 301–302.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 302–303.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 304–305.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 309–310.
- ^ Roberts 1973, p. 312.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 316–317.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 317–318.
- ^ Calic 2019, p. 163.
- ^ Calic 2019, pp. 162–163.
- ^ Roberts 1973, p. 317.
References
- Calic, Marie-Janine (2019). A History of Yugoslavia. West Lafayette, Indiana: ISBN 978-1-55753-838-3.
- Hoare, Marko Attila (2013). The Bosnian Muslims in the Second World War. Oxford, UK: ISBN 978-0-231-70394-9.
- Lukic, Renéo; Lynch, Allen (1996). Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Stockholm, Sweden: ISBN 9780198292005.
- Murray, Chris (2019). "From resistance to revolution: occupied Yugoslavia". In Murray, Chris (ed.). Unknown Conflicts of the Second World War: Forgotten Fronts. Abingdon, UK: ISBN 978-1-138-61294-5.
- ISBN 9780253346568.
- ISBN 978-0-8135-0740-8.
- ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.
- Vukšić, Velimir (2003). Tito's Partisans 1941–45. Oxford, UK: ISBN 1-84176-675-5.