Yugoslav government-in-exile
The Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Exile (
Background
According to economics professor and historian
Until 1929, this state of affairs was maintained by subverting the democratic system of government. In 1929, democracy was abandoned and a
Prince Paul repeatedly attempted to negotiate a political settlement with
On the evening of 3 February 1939, five ministers resigned from the government in response to a Serb nationalist speech made by the Minister of Education, Bogoljub Kujundžić. The five were: the Slovene senate leader, Anton Korošec; the leader of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO), Mehmed Spaho; another JMO politician, Džafer Kulenović; the Slovene Franc Snoj; and the Serb Dragiša Cvetković.[12] Prince Paul then dismissed Stojadinović and appointed Cvetković in his place, with a direction that he reach an agreement with the Croat leader Maček.[13] While these negotiations were ongoing, Italy invaded Albania. In August 1939, the Cvetković–Maček Agreement was concluded to create the Banovina of Croatia, which was to be a relatively autonomous political unit within Yugoslavia. Separatist Croats considered the Agreement did not go far enough, while many Serbs believed it went too far.[14] The Cvetković-led cabinet formed in the wake of the agreement was resolutely anti-Axis,[15] and included five members of the HSS, with Maček as deputy Prime Minister.[16]
Lead-up to invasion
By the time of the German invasion of Poland and subsequent outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Yugoslav Intelligence Service was cooperating with British intelligence agencies on a large scale across the country. This cooperation, which had existed to a lesser extent during the early 1930s, intensified after the Anschluss in 1938. These combined intelligence operations were aimed at strengthening Yugoslavia and keeping her neutral while encouraging covert activities.[17] From the outbreak of war British diplomacy focused on keeping Yugoslavia neutral, which the Ambassador Ronald Campbell apparently still believed possible.[18] In mid-1940, German pressure on the government resulted in the resignation of the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Stanoje Mihaldžić, who had been organising covert anti-Axis activities.[15] In mid to late 1940, British intelligence became aware of coup plotting, but managed to side-track the plans, preferring to continue working through Prince Paul.[19] The Special Operations Executive (SOE) office in Belgrade went to significant lengths to support the opposition to the anti-Axis Cvetković government, which undermined the hard-won balance in Yugoslav politics that government represented. SOE Belgrade was entangled with pro-Serb policies and interests, and disregarded or underestimated warnings from SOE Zagreb and British diplomats in that city, who better understood the situation in Yugoslavia as a whole.[20] In October 1940, Simović was again approached by plotters planning a coup but he was non-committal.[11]
Yugoslavia's situation worsened in October 1940 when
In January 1941, the US placed additional pressure on Prince Paul, urging non-cooperation with Germany.[27] On 14 February, Adolf Hitler met with Cvetković and Yugoslav foreign minister Aleksandar Cincar-Marković, and requested Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact. He also pushed for the demobilisation of the Royal Yugoslav Army,[28] and the granting of permission to transport German supplies through Yugoslavia's territory, along with greater economic cooperation. In exchange he offered a port near the Aegean Sea and territorial security.[29] On 1 March, Yugoslavia was further isolated when Bulgaria signed the Pact and the German army arrived at the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border.[30]
On 4 March, Prince Paul secretly met with Hitler in
Yugoslavia signs the Pact
On 17 March, Prince Paul returned to Berchtesgaden and was told by Hitler that it was his last chance for Yugoslavia to join the Pact, renouncing this time the request for the use of Yugoslav railways in order to facilitate their accession.[30] On 19 March, Prince Paul convened a Crown Council to discuss the terms of the Pact and whether Yugoslavia should sign it.[31] The Council's members were willing to agree, but only under the condition that Germany let its concessions be made public. Germany agreed and the Council approved the terms. Three cabinet ministers resigned on 20 March in protest of the impending signing of the Pact.[30] The Germans reacted by imposing an ultimatum to accept by midnight 23 March or forfeit any further chances.[32] Prince Paul and Cvetković obliged and accepted, despite believing German promises were "worthless".[33] On 23 March, Germany's guarantee of Yugoslavia's territorial security and its promise not to use its railroads were publicised.[30] In the United Kingdom, Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, penned in his diary that the "Yugoslavs seem to have sold their souls to the Devil. All these Balkan peoples are trash."[34]
On 25 March, the pact was signed at the Belvedere palace in Vienna. German radio later announced that "the Axis Powers would not demand the right of passage of troops or war materials," while the official document mentioned only troops and omitted mention of war materials. Likewise the pledge to give Salonika to Yugoslavia does not appear on the document.[33] On the following day, Serb demonstrators gathered on the streets of Belgrade shouting "Better the grave than a slave, better a war than the pact" (Serbo-Croatian Latin: Bolje grob nego rob, Bolje rat nego pakt).[35]
Coup d'état
A
Post-coup government
In the wake of the coup, Simović's new government refused to ratify Yugoslavia's signing of the Tripartite Pact, but did not openly rule it out. Hitler, angered by the coup and anti-German incidents in Belgrade, gathered his senior officers and ordered that Yugoslavia be crushed without delay.
On 30 March, Foreign Minister Momčilo Ninčić summoned the German ambassador Viktor von Heeren and handed him a statement which declared that the new government would accept all its international obligations, including accession to the Tripartite Pact, as long as the national interests of the country were protected. Von Heeren returned to his office to discover a message from Berlin instructing that contact with Yugoslav officials was to be avoided, and he was recalled to Berlin. No reply was given to Ninčić. On 2 April orders were issued for the evacuation of the German embassy, and the German chargé d'affaires advised the diplomats of friendly countries to leave the country.[38] On 3 April, Führer Directive 26 was issued, detailing the plan of attack and command structure for the invasion. Hungary and Bulgaria were promised the Banat and Yugoslav Macedonia respectively and the Romanian army was asked not to take part, holding its position at the countries' border.[39] Internal conflict in Hungary over the invasion plans between the army and Teleki led to the Prime Minister's suicide that same evening. Also on 3 April, Edmund Veesenmayer, representing the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, arrived in Zagreb in preparation for a regime change.[40]
Simović named Maček as Deputy Prime Minister once again in the new government, but Maček was reluctant and remained in Zagreb while he decided what to do. While he considered the coup had been an entirely Serbian initiative aimed at both Prince Paul and the Cvetković–Maček Agreement, he decided that he needed to show HSS support for the new government and that joining it was necessary.[41] On 4 April he travelled to Belgrade and accepted the post,[42] on several conditions; that the new government respect the Cvetković–Maček Agreement and expand the autonomy of the Banovina Croatia in some respects, that the new government respect the country's accession to the Tripartite Pact, and that one Serb and one Croat temporarily assume the role of regents.[43] That same day exiled Croatian politician and Ustaše leader Ante Pavelić called for Croats to start an uprising against the government over his Radio Velebit program based in Italy.[44]
On 5 April the new cabinet met for the first time. While the first two conditions set by Maček were met, the appointment of regents was impracticable given Prince Peter had been declared to be of age. Involving representatives from across the political spectrum, Simović's cabinet was "extremely disunited and weak".[45] It included members who fell into three groups; those who were strongly opposed to the Axis and prepared to face war with Germany, those who advocated peace with Germany, and those that were uncommitted.[46]
Invasion and flight
The Axis invasion of Yugoslavia began on 6 April. The bombing of Belgrade forced the government to seek shelter outside the city.[47] From there, King Peter and Simović planned to leave for exile. Maček, refusing to leave the country, resigned on 7 April and designated Juraj Krnjević as his successor.[47] Maček returned to Zagreb. Three other ministers also refused to leave Yugoslavia: Ivan Andres and Bariša Smoljan of the HSS and Kulenović of the JMO.[47] The government met on Yugoslav soil for the last time on 13 April near Pale. From there they travelled to Nikšić where they were flown out of the country to Athens.[48]
Simović cabinet
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King Peter, all the main leaders of the coup d'état, most of Simović's cabinet and a number of government officials flew out of Yugoslavia to Greece on 14–15 April. After a brief stop in Athens, they travelled on to Jerusalem where they were temporarily accommodated. On 21 June, the king and most of the cabinet arrived in London. Several members of the cabinet that left Yugoslavia did not travel to London, and ended up in the United States or Canada. Some politicians and government officials travelled to Cape Town, South Africa, where they constituted a reserve government of sorts. Bogoljub Ilić, who remained Minister of the Army and Navy and also became Chief of the General Staff in place of Simović, established a new Yugoslav Supreme Command in Cairo. The remnants of the Royal Yugoslav Army and Navy that had escaped the country were concentrated in Palestine and Egypt under his command. The government also appointed a special representative in the Middle East, Jovan Đonović, who was responsible for propaganda and communication with contacts in occupied Yugoslavia.[49]
Although the coup d'état had generated a significant amount of goodwill towards the post-coup government in the West, that spirit had evaporated with the ignominious defeat of the government and armed forces during the invasion. Much of the early effort of the Serb members of the cabinet was focussed on fixing the blame for the defeat on the Ustaše or even on Croats more generally.[50]
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was soon divided by the Axis into several entities.
King Peter II, who had escaped into exile, was still recognized as king of the whole state of Yugoslavia by the Allies. Starting on 13 May 1941, the largely Serbian "Yugoslav Army of the Fatherland" (Jugoslovenska vojska u otadžbini, or JVUO, or Četniks) resisted the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia (the Chetniks later collaborated with the Axis). This anti-German and anti-communist resistance movement was commanded by Royalist General Draža Mihailović. For a long time, the Četniks were supported by the British, the United States, and the Yugoslavian royal government in exile of King Peter II.
However, over the course of the war, effective power changed to the hands of
During his exile, King Peter II was educated at Cambridge University, served in the Royal Air Force and married Princess Alexandra of Greece and Denmark, who was the only child of the late King Alexander I of Greece and Princess Aspasia of Greece and Denmark.
Jovanović cabinet
Jovanović took office as prime minister on 11 January 1942 with the dismissal of Simović. His original appointment as vice-premier in the Simović government had been in recognition of the respect he engendered, and because he was seen as a Serb counterpart to Maček as an overall leader of the Serbs across the country. He was a positivist, non-romantic liberal who was opposed to both fascism and communism, but was not directly connected to any political party. Simović was of course dropped from the cabinet, as was Ilić, who had been Minister of the Army. The latter was replaced by Mihailović, but because he was in Yugoslavia, the government in London was now firmly in the hands of civilians.[51]
Trifunović cabinet
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Purić cabinet
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Šubašić cabinet
Ten days after his nomination, Šubašić fled to the island of Vis in the Adriatic Sea in order to meet with Tito and try to form a coalition government. Tito agreed to postpone a decision on the form of government until the end of the war, and Šubašić, for his part, recognised that only the partisan administration of the Yugoslav territory would receive support. He also promised that the government would include only people who had not previously opposed Tito and his organisation, and that it would concentrate on securing international support. The agreement was signed on 16 June with no consultation by Šubašić, even with the king.
After his return, Šubašić formed a government of five ministers, with two of them proposed by Tito. Mihailovich lost his position as war minister. He refused to recognise the new government and continued to proclaim his loyalty to the king.
On 12 September, the king went on the radio to ask people to support Tito.
Šubašić met with Tito in Belgrade on 1 November. Under their agreement, the King was not authorised to return to the country until a plebiscite was held about the monarchy. After Šubašić returned to London, the king rejected the agreement and replaced Šubašić on 23 January 1945. But under British pressure, the king was compelled to call him back six days later and to accept the principle of a regency.
Two weeks later, Šubašić and his ministers went to Belgrade. A new coalition government was formed on 7 March, in which Tito controlled 20 ministers of 28. This ended the government in exile.
Foreign policy
Armed forces
In exile, the Royal Yugoslav Forces were initially under the command of General
The first unit of the
After the fall of Yugoslavia, 105 personnel of the
The eleven aircraft of the
Prime Ministers
Portrait | Name (Born-Died) |
Term of office | Party | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Start | End | ||||
1 | Dušan Simović (1882–1962) |
27 April 1941 |
12 January 1942 |
Independent (Royal Yugoslav Army )
| |
2 | Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958) |
12 January 1942 |
18 June 1943 |
Independent
| |
3 | Miloš Trifunović (1871–1957) |
18 June 1943 |
10 August 1943 |
People's Radical Party (NRS) | |
4 | Božidar Purić (1891–1977) |
10 August 1943 |
8 July 1944 |
Independent
| |
5 | Ivan Šubašić (1892–1955) |
8 July 1944 |
7 March 1945 |
Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) |
Footnotes
- ^ Tomasevich 1969, pp. 60–62.
- ^ Tomasevich 1969, pp. 61–62.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 76.
- ^ Tomasevich 1969, p. 61.
- ^ Ramet 2006, pp. 79–80.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 87.
- ^ Dragnich 1983, p. 99.
- ^ Hoptner 1963, p. 28.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 22–23.
- ^ Roberts 1987, p. 7.
- ^ a b Onslow 2005, p. 37.
- ^ Singleton 1985, p. 170.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 23.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 24.
- ^ a b Starič 2005, p. 35.
- ^ Ramet 2006, pp. 106–107.
- ^ Starič 2005, p. 33.
- ^ Starič 2005, p. 36.
- ^ Hehn 2005, pp. 368–369.
- ^ Starič 2005, p. 38.
- ^ Roberts 1987, pp. 6–7.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 30.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 31.
- ^ Frank 2001, p. 171.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, p. 2.
- ^ Stafford 1977, p. 401.
- ^ a b Creveld 1973, p. 139.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 32 & 57.
- ^ Presseisen 1960, p. 367.
- ^ a b c d e f Presseisen 1960, p. 368.
- ^ Stafford 1977, p. 402.
- ^ Presseisen 1960, pp. 368–369.
- ^ a b Presseisen 1960, p. 369.
- ^ Stafford 1977, p. 403.
- ^ Ramet & Lazić 2011, p. 18.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, pp. 2–3.
- ^ a b c Trevor-Roper 1964, p. 108.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 50–51.
- ^ Trevor-Roper 1964, p. 109.
- ^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 49.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 47.
- ^ Goldstein 2003, p. 268.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 48.
- ^ Dizdar 2007, p. 588.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 49.
- ^ a b c Tomasevich 2001, p. 50.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 19.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 262.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 264.
- ^ Pavlowitch 1981, pp. 93–94.
- ^ a b c d e Nigel Thomas (1991), Foreign Volunteers of the Allied Forces, 1939–45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing), 34.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Thomas, Foreign Volunteers, 35.
- ^ For a detailed account of their escape, cf. A. D. Divine (1944), Navies in Exile (New York: Dutton).
- ^ A. D. Harvey (2015), "A Slow Start: Military Air Transport at the Beginning of the Second World War", Air Power History 62 (1): 6–15.
References
Books
- ISBN 978-0-521-20143-8.
- Dragnich, Alex N. (1983). The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System. Stanford, California: Hoover Press. ISBN 978-0-8179-7843-3.
- Frank, Tibor (2001). "Treaty Revision and Doublespeak: Hungarian Neutrality, 1939–1941". In Wylie, Neville (ed.). European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents During the Second World War. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 150–191. ISBN 978-0-521-64358-0.
- ISBN 978-953-6045-22-8.
- Hehn, Paul N. (2005). A Low Dishonest Decade : The Great Powers, Eastern Europe, and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930–1941. London, United Kingdom: Continuum International Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-8264-1761-9.
- Hoptner, Jacob B. (1963). Yugoslavia in crisis, 1934–1941. New York, New York: Columbia University Press. OCLC 310483760.
- ISBN 978-0-8147-5520-4.
- Milazzo, Matteo J. (1975). The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-1589-8.
- ISBN 978-1-85065-895-5.
- ISBN 978-0-253-34656-8.
- Ramet, Sabrina P.; Lazić, Sladjana (2011). "The Collaborationist Regime of Milan Nedić". In Ramet, Sabrina P.; Listhaug, Ola (eds.). Serbia and the Serbs in World War Two. London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 17–43. ISBN 978-0-230-27830-1.
- ISBN 978-0-8223-0773-0.
- Singleton, Fred (1985). A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-27485-2.
- OCLC 652337606.
- Tomasevich, Jozo (1975). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.
- Tomasevich, Jozo (2001). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-3615-2.
- *Torkar, Blaz (2018). "The Yugoslav Armed Forces in Exile: From the Yugoslav Royal Guard Battalion to the Overseas Brigades". In Smetana, Vít (ed.). Exile in London: The Experience of Czechoslovakia and the Other Occupied Nations, 1939-1945. Prague: Karolinum. ISBN 978-8024637013.
- Trevor-Roper, Hugh (1964). Hitler's War Directives: 1939–1945. London, United Kingdom: Sidgwick and Jackson. ISBN 978-1-84341-014-0.
Journals
- Dizdar, Zdravko (January 2007). "Bjelovarski ustanak od 7. do 10. travnja 1941" [Bjelovar Uprising, 7 to 10 April 1941]. Časopis za suvremenu povijest [Journal of Contemporary History] (in Serbo-Croatian). 39 (3): 581–609.
- Hadži-Jovančić, Perica (March 2020). "Losing the Periphery: The British Foreign Office and Policy Towards Yugoslavia, 1935-1938". Diplomacy & Statecraft. 31 (1): 65–90. S2CID 214307055.
- Kay, M. A. (1991). "The Yugoslav Government-in-Exile and the Problems of Restoration". East European Quarterly. 25 (1): 1–19.
- Onslow, Sue (March 2005). "Britain and the Belgrade Coup of 27 March 1941 Revisited" (PDF). Electronic Journal of International History (8). University of London: 359–370. ISSN 1471-1443.
- Opačić, Petar (2003), О приступању Југославије Тројном пакту 1941. године [On accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact in 1941] (PDF), Okrugli sto 27. mart 1941: Knez Pavle u vihorima evropske politike [27 March 1941 Roundtable: Prince Paul in the whirlwinds of European policy] (in Serbian), Belgrade: 27. mart 1941
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (1981). "Out of Context: The Yugoslav Government in London, 1941–1945". Journal of Contemporary History. 16 (1): 89–118. S2CID 154800214.
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (1982). "The Foreign Office, King Peter and His Official Visit to Washington". East European Quarterly. 16 (4): 453–66.
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (1984). "Momčilo Ninčić and the European Policy of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, 1941-1943: I". The Slavonic and East European Review. 62 (3): 400–20.
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (1984). "Momčilo Ninčić and the European Policy of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, 1941-1943: II". The Slavonic and East European Review. 62 (4): 531–51.
- Presseisen, Ernst L. (December 1960). "Prelude to "Barbarossa": Germany and the Balkans, 1940–1941". Journal of Modern History. 32 (4). University of Chicago Press: 359–370. S2CID 144699901.
- S2CID 159560969.
- S2CID 150956459.