Zaharije Ostojić
Lieutenant Colonel Zaharije Ostojić | |
---|---|
Lieutenant Colonel | |
Commands held | Chief of staff to Supreme Chetnik Command Chetnik detachments in Herzegovina |
Battles/wars |
While the Chetniks were an anti-
Early life
Zaharije Ostojić was a
To Cairo and back
After the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the government of
Following the subsequent German-led
From the very beginning the Chetnik strategy was to organise and build up their strength, but postpone armed operations against the occupation forces until they were withdrawing in the face of a hoped-for landing by the
Move to Montenegro
After the successful German
In a directive letter dated 30 July 1942, Ostojić urged all Chetnik commanders to "develop the strongest possible oral and written propaganda". He stated that, "the people must be persuaded that the Chetniks are their only friends and that it is from them that they can expect freedom and a happy life" and instructed the Chetniks to "work day and night and maintain the spirit of the people". He wrote, "the hour of freedom is near. Allied aid for the Chetniks is assured, and the whole world is admiring them."
In accordance with the Chetniks' Greater Serbia ideology,
Chetniks of Zaharije Ostojić participated in Chetnik action led by Pavle Đurišić in srezes of Čajniče, Foča, Pljevlja and Priboj in February 1943. against Muslims. On the first day, February 5, of operation at least 31 settlements were partially or fully razed.[35] In a report to Draža Mihailović from February 13, Đurišić claimed that Chetniks killed 1200 fighters and 8000 civilians. While both numbers are somewhat exaggerated, it is undeniable that Chetniks wanted to ethnically cleanse that region.[36] Đurišić and Ostojić had given orders not to harm civilian population prior to operation, however considering that no one was punished for crimes against Muslim civilians, Ostojić's previous remarks about Muslims(to definitely eliminate the Turks) and report to Mihailović, it's clear organisatiors of operation planned to ethnically cleanse the Muslims.[37]
Case White
A few weeks after the conference, Mihailović sent Ostojić to establish a forward headquarters in Kalinovik in south-eastern Bosnia. Ostojić was to command an operation aimed at encircling and destroying Partisan forces in Bosnia, which was to use Chetnik units serving as Italian auxiliaries in Herzegovina and Montenegro, as well as other Chetnik units in the Lika region, northern Bosnia and northern Dalmatia.[38] The plan was predicated on an Allied landing on the Dalmatian coast, which Mihailović believed was imminent. The outline concept was that the Chetniks would set up a corridor through the Italian-occupied zone of the NDH as far as the Partisan liberated area in western Bosnia and Lika, neutralising the Italians through a combination of vague promises, encouraging them to surrender, and disarming them if necessary. The plan was finalised by early December 1942 at Mihailović's headquarters in Montenegro, and operations were planned to commence on 5 January 1943. However, the plan assumed that Mihailović's forces were unified, which they were not, and also that his authority extended to many more Chetniks than it did in reality.[39]
What transpired instead was that the Chetniks that were preparing for the "march on Bosnia" were drawn into closer collaboration with the Axis during the second phase of Case White that took place in the Neretva and Rama river valleys in late February 1943. During this offensive, between 12,000 and 15,000 Chetniks fought alongside Italian forces, and in one case alongside German and Croatian troops, against the Partisans.[40] Despite the fact that the Chetniks were an anti-Axis movement in their long-range goals and did engage in marginal resistance activities for limited periods,[41] their involvement in Case White is one of the most significant examples of their tactical or selective collaboration with the Axis occupation forces.[42] In this instance, the participating Chetniks operated as legalised auxiliary forces under Italian control.[43][44] Ostojić believed that it was actions such as these that would cost the Chetniks the support of the Allies, and he wrote to Mihailović that the Allies would probably have supported the Chetniks had they been more involved in fighting the occupation. Ostojić told Mihailović that his officers also held this view, and proposed that Chetnik collaboration be reconsidered. However, upon receiving Ostojić's message, Mihailović did not even consider changing his strategy.[45]
Rebuffed, Ostojić drew up a plan in accordance with Mihailović's orders, which called for the Chetniks to remain south and east of the Neretva to avoid being outflanked by the Partisans. However, this essentially defensive strategy was rejected by Herzegovinian Chetnik commanders such as Dobroslav Jevđević and Bajo Stanišić, who wished to follow the Axis-led offensive strategy. This placed Ostojić in a very difficult position, with some of his key detachment commanders following the orders of the Italians rather than his, while the Chetniks were reliant on Italian air and artillery support, particularly around Jablanica.[46] Ostojić subsequently changed his mind and supported the Italian offensive plans, launching an attack aimed at preventing the Partisans from retreating from Jablanica to Prozor on 27 February 1943. The attack was indecisive and Ostojić reprimanded the detachment commanders responsible, particularly Stanišić.[47]
During this phase Ostojić first asked Jevđević to obtain more supplies from the Italians, and then when they refused, threatened to declare war on them.[48] By early March, just as the Partisans were forcing a crossing eastwards across the Neretva at Jablanica, Mihailović joined Ostojić. In a letter to one of his other Montenegrin Chetnik commanders, Mihailović stated that he was managing the whole operation through Ostojić, although Mihailović later denied that he was in charge of the operation when questioned during his trial by a Yugoslav court after the war.[40] Mihailović and Ostojić realised that the large concentrations of Chetnik troops in and around Mostar and the nearby bauxite mines were likely to draw German attention, and while they were focused on this issue, the Partisans completed their crossing of the Neretva by mid-March.[49]
Within two weeks of Mihailović's arrival the Partisans forced the Chetniks to withdraw, losing
1943–1944
In July 1943, the Montenegrin Partisan leader Đilas contacted both Ostojić and Baćović to establish their willingness to work jointly against the Axis occupiers, given that a new government-in-exile was about to be established without Mihailović. They reported this contact to Mihailović who threatened to exclude them from his Chetnik organisation if they maintained contact with the Partisans.[54]
In October of 1943 Chetnik troops under command of Ostojić took over Višegrad from NDH and German forces, after which Chetniks massacred Muslim and to lesser extent Croat population of the city. This event has been ignored by post-war Yugoslav historiography because it was an example of successful fight of Chetniks against Axis forces, despite the scale of Chetnik crimes in the town and surrounding villages.[55] Ostojić claimed in a report that killing, pillaging and robbery done by his soldiers happened against his orders, however justified it with recent massacre of few tens of Serbs in near-by villages. He purposely ignores much larger scale of massacres in Višegrad and the fact that killing lasted three days and stopped only because of intervention by Albert Seitz, member of American mission to Chetnik High Quarters.[56]
By September 1944, Ostojić had been promoted to potpukovnik[d], and was the Chetnik area commander in eastern Bosnia. In early September 1944, as Mihailović had been removed as Minister of the Army, Navy and Air Force with the demise of the Purić government-in-exile, Ostojić tried to make contact with Allied forces in Italy, and agreed with Lukačević to issue a proclamation to the people explaining that they were going to attack the Germans. After 12 September 1944, when King Peter called for all in Yugoslavia to rally around Tito, Ostojić and Baćović warned Mihailović that their men were losing their will to fight the Partisans. Concerned that the Russians would hand the Chetniks over to the Partisans, Ostojić then contacted the United States Office of Strategic Services liaison officer with the Chetniks, Colonel Robert H. McDowell, but was unable to arrange for the Chetniks to be placed under American command.[57][58][59]
Retreat and death
After the
From the time he joined Mihailović in northeastern Bosnia, Đurišić was very critical of Mihailović's leadership, and argued strongly for all the remaining Chetnik troops to move to the area of the Ljubljana Gap in modern-day Slovenia. At this point Ostojić and Baćović were also questioning Mihailović's plans.[62] When Mihailović remained unconvinced, Đurišić decided to move to the Ljubljana Gap independent of Mihailović, and arranged for Dimitrije Ljotić's forces already in the Ljubljana Gap to meet him near Bihać in western Bosnia to assist his movement. When he left Mihailović, he was joined by Chetnik ideologue Dragiša Vasić and the Chetnik detachments commanded by Ostojić and Baćović as well as a large number of refugees.[63]
In order to get to Bihać, Đurišić made a safe-conduct agreement with elements of the
Following this defeat and the defection of one of their sub-units to Drljević, Đurišić was induced to negotiate directly with the leaders of the HOS forces about the further movement of the Chetniks towards the Ljubljana Gap. However, this appears to have been a trap, as he was attacked and captured by them on his way to the meeting. According to Tomasevich, exactly what occurred after his capture is not clear, but Baćović, Đurišić, Vasić, and Ostojić were subsequently killed, along with some Serbian Orthodox priests and others.[63][64] The location of Ostojić's grave, if any, is unknown. Both the NDH forces and Drljević had reasons for ensnaring Đurišić and those accompanying him. The NDH forces were motivated by the mass terror committed by Đurišić, Ostojić and others on the Muslim population in Sandžak and south-eastern Bosnia, while Drljević was opposed to Đurišić's support of a union of Serbia and Montenegro which ran counter to Drljević's separatism.[63]
Notes
- U.S. Army brigadier general.[4]
- ^ Equivalent to a U.S. Army colonel.[4]
- ^ Equivalent to a U.S. Army lieutenant general.[4]
- ^ Equivalent to a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel.[4]
Footnotes
- ^ a b Dizdar & Sobolevski 1999, p. 310.
- ^ Williams 2003, p. 54.
- ^ Shelley 2013, p. 94.
- ^ a b c d Niehorster 2013.
- ^ Kurapovna 2009, p. 91.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 8.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, pp. 10–12.
- ^ a b Kurapovna 2009, p. 84.
- ^ Hehn 1971, p. 350, The official name of the occupied territory was the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 27–29.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, pp. 33–34.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 143.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 79.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 125.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 54.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 135.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 140–141.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 154.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 166.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 141.
- ^ Roberts 1973, pp. 38, 57.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 200.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 196 & 198.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 209–216.
- ^ Tomasevich 2001, pp. 189–190.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, p. 96.
- ^ Malcolm 1994, p. 188.
- ^ Hoare 2013, p. 32.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 166–173.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 258–259.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, p. 109.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 171.
- ^ a b Pavlowitch 2007, p. 112.
- ^ Trew 1998, p. 314.
- ^ Živković 2017, p. 927-928.
- ^ Živković 2017, p. 931-932.
- ^ Živković 2017, p. 945.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 233–234.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, pp. 156–157.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, pp. 231–243.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, pp. 103–105.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, p. 182.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 224–225.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, pp. 65–67.
- ^ Redžić 2005, p. 141.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, pp. 122–123.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, p. 124.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 159.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, p. 128.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 248–250.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 250.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 365.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, p. 141.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, pp. 169–170.
- ^ Radanović 2016, pp. 129.
- ^ Radanović 2016, pp. 131, 132.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 395.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 232.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 425–426.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 237.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 255.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 241.
- ^ a b c d e Tomasevich 1975, pp. 447–448.
- ^ Pajović 1987, p. 100.
References
Books
- OCLC 606588245.
- ISBN 978-0-231-70394-9.
- Kurapovna, Marcia Christoff (2009). Shadows on the Mountain: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries that Doomed WWII Yugoslavia. New Brunswick, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0-47061-566-9.
- ISBN 978-0-8147-5520-4.
- Milazzo, Matteo J. (1975). The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-1589-8.
- ISBN 978-86-7125-006-1.
- ISBN 978-1-85065-895-5.
- ISBN 978-0-7146-5625-0.
- ISBN 978-0-8135-0740-8.
- Shelley, Fred M. (2013). Nation Shapes: The Story Behind the World's Borders. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-61069-106-2.
- ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.
- Tomasevich, Jozo (2001). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-3615-2.
- Trew, Simon (1998). Britain, Mihailovic and the Chetniks, 1941-42. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-38976-2.
- Williams, Heather (2003). Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941–1945. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 978-0-299-19494-9.
- Radanović, Milan (2016). Kazna i zločin: Snage kolaboracije u Srbiji. Belgrade: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.
- Živković, Milutin D. (2017). Санџак 1941–1943 [Sandžak 1941–1943] (Doctoral) (in Serbo-Croatian). Belgrade: University of Belgrade. OCLC 1242119546.
Journals
- Hehn, Paul N. (1971). "Serbia, Croatia and Germany 1941–1945: Civil War and Revolution in the Balkans". Canadian Slavonic Papers. 13 (4). University of Alberta: 344–373. JSTOR 40866373.
Websites
- Niehorster, Leo (2013). "Royal Yugoslav Armed Forces Ranks". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 27 February 2016.