Attack on Mers-el-Kébir
Attack on Mers-el-Kébir | |||||||
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Part of the Second World War | |||||||
The battleship Strasbourg under fire | |||||||
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United Kingdom | France | ||||||
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The attack on Mers-el-Kébir (Battle of Mers-el-Kébir) on 3 July 1940, during the
Of particular significance to the British were the five battleships of the
The British attack was condemned in France as an attack on a neutral nation and resentment festered for years over what was considered betrayal by a former ally.[8] The French thought that their assurances were honourable and should have been sufficient. Marshal Philippe Pétain, who was appointed the Prime Minister of France on 16 June, severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on 8 July.
French aircraft retaliated by
Background
French–German armistice
After the
At Italian suggestion, the armistice terms were amended to permit the French fleet temporarily to stay in North African ports, where they might be seized by Italian troops from Libya. The British made a contingency plan, Operation Catapult, to eliminate the French fleet in mid-June, when it was clear that Philippe Pétain was forming a government with a view to ending the war and it seemed likely that the French fleet might be seized by the Germans.[11] In a speech to Parliament, Churchill repeated that the Armistice of 22 June 1940 was a betrayal of the Allied agreement not to make a separate peace. Churchill said, "What is the value of that? Ask half a dozen countries; what is the value of such a solemn assurance? ... Finally, the armistice could be voided at any time on any pretext of non-observance...".[12]
The French fleet had seen little fighting during the Battle of France and was mostly intact. By tonnage, about 40 per cent was in
British–French negotiations
The British tried to persuade the French authorities in North Africa to continue the war or to hand over the fleet to British control. A British admiral visited Oran on 24 June, and
Ultimatum
The most powerful group of French warships was commanded by Admiral
Somerville passed the duty of presenting the ultimatum to a French speaker, Captain Cedric Holland, commander of the carrier HMS Ark Royal. Gensoul was affronted that negotiations were being conducted by a less-senior officer and sent his lieutenant, Bernard Dufay, which led to much delay and confusion.[18] As the negotiations continued, it became clear that agreement was unlikely. The French made preparations for action and 42 aircraft were armed and made ready for take-off.[2] Darlan was at home on 3 July and could not be contacted; Gensoul told the French government that the alternatives were internment or battle but omitted the option of sailing to the French West Indies.[14] Removing the fleet to US waters had formed part of the orders given by Darlan to Gensoul in the event that a foreign power should attempt to seize his ships.[19]
Operation Catapult
Plymouth, Portsmouth and Alexandria
Along with French vessels in metropolitan ports, some had sailed to ports in Britain or to Alexandria in Egypt. Operation Catapult was an attempt to take these ships under British control or destroy them. The French ships berthed in Plymouth and Portsmouth were boarded without warning on the night of 3 July.[20][21] The submarine Surcouf, the largest in the world, had been at Plymouth for the last month.[22] The crew resisted a boarding party and three Royal Navy personnel, including two officers, were killed, along with a French sailor. Other ships captured included the old battleships Paris and Courbet, the destroyers Le Triomphant and Léopard, eight torpedo boats, five submarines and a number of lesser ships. The French squadron in Alexandria (Admiral René-Émile Godfroy) including the battleship Lorraine, the heavy cruiser Suffren and three modern light cruisers, was neutralised by local agreement.[23]
Attack on Mers-el-Kébir
The British force comprised the
The six La Galissonnière-class cruisers at Algiers were summoned but did not reach Mers-El-Kebir in time. The Préfet Maritime at Toulon ordered two submarine groups, A, consisting of L'Espoir, Le Conquérant and Archimède and B, comprising Iris, Vénus, Sultane, Sirène, Pallas and Cérès to assist the French at Oran by attacking British ships, Hood in particular.[16] After receiving orders on 3 July to form a north–south patrol line in the Mediterranean for a distance of 20 nmi (37 km; 23 mi) east of Alboran Island and south of Cape Palos during the night of 6/7 July to protect Oran and attack British ships, the French submarines Archimède, Le Conquérant and L'Espoir got underway from Toulon at 2:45 a.m. on 4 July bound for their patrol area at 15 kn (28 km/h; 17 mph). No contacts were made and the boats were recalled on 5 July when it was discovered that the British ships had returned to Gibraltar.[16] Gensoul ordered the four submarines at Oran, Ariane, Danaé, Diane and Eurydice to take post off the port. The orders to the four French submarines were quickly decoded and London ordered Somerville to act; the boats were unable to close with Force H.[16] Churchill ordered the British ships to open fire at the same time and the British commenced at 5:57 p.m. from 17,500 yd (8.6 nmi; 9.9 mi; 16.0 km).[25]
Provence began its reply within 90 seconds of the British opening fire but the main armament of Dunkerque and Strasbourg was forward of the superstructure and could not immediately be brought to bear because they were tied up at the mole, with their sterns facing the sea.[16] The third British salvo hit Bretagne and a magazine detonated, the ship sinking with 977 of her crew at 6:09 p.m. After thirty salvoes, the French ships ceased fire; Force H altered course to avoid return fire from the French coastal forts but Provence was badly damaged by several hits, Dunkerque was hit by three shells, severely damaged and run aground to avoid sinking, the destroyer Mogador lost its stern and two other destroyers were damaged; their crews running them aground to prevent them from sinking. Four French Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 fighters arrived, outnumbering the British Skuas. Another nine French fighters were spotted at 7:10 p.m. and a dogfight ensued in which a Curtiss H-75 and an M.S.406 were damaged. Three more Curtiss fighters appeared and there was another engagement.[26]
Strasbourg, three destroyers and one gunboat managed to avoid the mines and escape to the open sea, under attack from a flight of Swordfish bombers from Ark Royal. The French ships shot down two Swordfish with anti-aircraft fire, the crews being rescued by the destroyer Wrestler; a French flying boat also bombed a British destroyer.[27] As the British bombing had little effect, at 6:43 p.m. Somerville ordered his ships to pursue. The French aviso (gunboat) Rigault de Genouilly, en route to Oran, met Force H at 7:33 p.m. and steamed towards Hood, only to come under fire from the light cruisers Arethusa and Enterprise at 12,000 and 18,000 yd (5.9 and 8.9 nmi; 6.8 and 10.2 mi; 11 and 16 km) respectively. Hood also fired several 15-inch shells at Rigault de Genouilly and the French ship replied with nineteen 5.5 in (14 cm) shells before being hit by Enterprise and withdrawing.[28] A British aircraft had sighted Danaé and Eurydice shortly before 8:00 p.m. and dropped illuminated floats to guide a British destroyer to them. The destroyer depth-charged the two submarines but they escaped without damage.[16]
Valiant and Resolution fell behind Hood. Somerville had received information that the French naval force from Algiers, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and several destroyers, was steering to rendezvous with Strasbourg. Without Valiant and Resolution, Somerville concluded that by the time his ships came within gunnery range of Strasbourg, shortly after 9:00 p.m., he would be outnumbered by the combined French force and ill-deployed for a night engagement, silhouetted against the evening twilight, giving an advantage to the French gunners. At 8:20 p.m., when Hood had closed to 25 nmi (46 km; 29 mi) from Strasbourg, Somerville called off the pursuit. After another ineffective Swordfish attack at 8:55 p.m., Strasbourg reached Toulon on 4 July.[29][30] The French cruiser force from Algiers missed its rendezvous with Strasbourg but arrived at Toulon on 4 July.[31] During the night of 3/4 July 1940, Ariane, Danaé, Diane and Eurydice patrolled on the surface off Oran in a north–south patrol line and they remained on patrol off Oran until 8:00 p.m. on 4 July, before returning to Oran.[16] On 4 July, the British submarine Pandora encountered Rigault de Genouilly off the Algerian coast, mistook her for a cruiser and sank her.[28] The French Air Force (Armée de l'Air) made reprisal raids on Gibraltar, including a small night attack on 5 July, when many bombs landed in the sea.[32][33]
Actions of 8 July
The British believed that the damage inflicted on Dunkerque and Provence was not serious and on the morning of 8 July raided Mers-el-Kébir again in Operation Lever, with Swordfish aircraft from Ark Royal. A torpedo hit the patrol boat Terre-Neuve, moored alongside Dunkerque, full of depth charges. Terre-Neuve quickly sank and the depth charges went off, causing serious damage to the battleship.[34] Another attack took place on 8 July, when aircraft from the carrier Hermes attacked the Richelieu at Dakar, seriously damaging it.[32][33] When word of the events at Dakar reached Oran, the French submarines Ariane, Diane, and Eurydice got back underway on 8 July to form a patrol line off Cape Falcon, Algeria, in case of another British attack on Oran, which did not occur.[16]
Aftermath
Analysis
Churchill wrote, "This was the most hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful in which I have ever been concerned."[35] Relations between Britain and France were severely strained for some time and the Germans enjoyed a propaganda coup. Somerville said that it was "the biggest political blunder of modern times and will rouse the whole world against us ... we all feel thoroughly ashamed...".[36] The attack revived Anglophobia in France, demonstrated British resolve to continue the war and rallied the British Conservative Party around Churchill (Neville Chamberlain, Churchill's predecessor as prime minister, was still party leader). The British action showed the world that defeat in France had not reduced the determination of the government to fight on and ambassadors in Mediterranean countries reported favourable reactions.[32]
The French ships in Alexandria under the command of Admiral
In 2004, David Brown wrote that foreign opinion was generally favourable to Operation Catapult and that the demonstration of British determination had succeeded.[43] In 2010, Colin Smith wrote that the attack was the first big triumph of Churchill's premiership and that they had been received favourably by the governments of the US, Turkey, Greece and Brazil, with condemnation from Spain and Switzerland. Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, made a diary entry that the Royal Navy retained the "ruthlessness of the captains and pirates of the C16th".[44]
In 2015, George Melton offered a dissenting opinion, and argued that much of the historiography of the attack represented a "Churchillian perspective" that ignored how the British attack on Mers el-Kébir had been a "tactical failure".[45] Melton wrote that the attack was unnecessary, because the French Navy had pledged and planned to scuttle its ships as a matter of honour rather than see them fall into German or Italian hands.[46] The results of the attack were the opposite of what the British intended because it had sunk or put out of action very little of the French fleet, rather than ensure that the fleet was neutralised; prompted French ships that had been dispersed to remote bases in French North Africa, where they were beyond the reach of the Axis, to concentrate at Toulon, where they formed a powerful striking force and were in far greater danger of seizure by Axis forces. The attack united the French Navy and French people in hostility to the British.[47]
The British lost access to the French Empire and French leaders other than Charles de Gaulle and an undeclared Anglo-French conflict over the next few months made the British strategic situation worse.[48] Melton called it a "myth" that the attack had demonstrated British resolve to the United States, something British decision-makers did not discuss prior to the attack and which he wrote could have been more convincingly achieved through an attack on the Italian fleet or a large bombing raid against Germany.[49] Melton suggested that Churchill's anger at France for its capitulation to the Axis and his "obsession" with seizing or sinking the four modern French battleships (Jean Bart, Richelieu, Dunkerque, and Strasbourg) was largely responsible for the attack.[50]
Casualties
Officers | Petty officers |
Sailors, marines |
Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Bretagne | 36 | 151 | 825 | 1012 |
Dunkerque | 9 | 32 | 169 | 210 |
Provence | 1 | 2 | — | 3 |
Strasbourg | — | 2 | 3 | 5 |
Mogador | — | 3 | 35 | 38 |
Rigault de Genouilly | — | 3 | 9 | 12 |
Terre Neuve | 1 | 1 | 6 | 8 |
Armen | — | 3 | 3 | 6 |
Esterel | 1 | 5 | — | 6 |
Total | 48 | 202 | 1,050 | 1,300 |
Fleet Air Arm[52] | — | — | — | 2 |
Subsequent events
British–Vichy hostilities
Following the 3 July operation, Darlan ordered the French fleet to attack Royal Navy ships wherever possible; Pétain and his foreign minister Paul Baudouin over-ruled the order the next day. Military retaliation was conducted by ineffective air raids on Gibraltar but Baudouin noted that "the attack on our fleet is one thing, war is another". As sceptics had warned, there were also complications with the French empire; when French colonial forces defeated de Gaulle's Free French Forces at the Battle of Dakar in September 1940, Germany responded by permitting Vichy France to maintain its remaining ships armed, rather than demobilised.[53][54] On 24 September Gibraltar was bombed by sixty Vichy French aircraft which dropped 45 long tons (50 short tons; 46 t) of bombs and that night, 81 bombers dropped 60 long tons (67 short tons; 61 t) of bombs. The French 2nd Destroyer Division comprising Fougueux, Frondeur, Épée and Fleuret had sailed from Casablanca on 24 September and in the early hours of 25 September encountered the destroyer Hotspur patrolling off Gibraltar. Épée opened fire but its 13 cm (5.1 in) guns broke down after firing fourteen shells, Fleuret did not open fire because it could not get on target and the other French destroyers fired six shots between them. Hotspur returned fire but this was not reported by the French ships.[55]
On 27 September Force H stayed at sea after receiving "a charming message [that] the whole of the Toulon fleet was coming out to have a scrap with us" but the two navies adhered to a tacit understanding that the British did not attack more powerful French forces at sea or ships in port but intercepted other French ships:
Though British commanders had precise instructions regarding the interception of French shipping, discretion might prove the better part of valour if Vichy escorts were liable to inflict serious loss.[55]
In the autumn, the French sent a convoy through the Strait of Gibraltar untroubled, a state of affairs that rarely changed during the Mediterranean Campaign.[55]
Gibraltarian civilians
In early June 1940, about 13,500 civilians had been evacuated from Gibraltar to Casablanca in French Morocco. Following the capitulation of the French to the Germans and the attack on Mers-el-Kébir, the Vichy government found their presence an embarrassment. Later in June, 15 British cargo vessels arrived in Casablanca under Commodore Crichton, repatriating 15,000 French servicemen who had been rescued from Dunkirk. Once the French troops had disembarked, the ships were interned until the Commodore agreed to take away the evacuees, who, reflecting tensions generated after the attack on Mers-el-Kébir, were escorted to the ships at bayonet point, minus many of their possessions.[56]
Case Anton
On 19 November 1942, the Germans tried to capture the French fleet based at Toulon, against the armistice terms, as part of Case Anton, the military occupation of Vichy France by Germany. All ships of any military value were scuttled by the French before the arrival of German troops, notably Dunkerque, Strasbourg and seven (four heavy and three light) modern cruisers. For many in the French Navy this was a final proof that there had never been a question of their ships ending up in German hands and that the British action at Mers-el-Kébir had been unnecessary.[52] Darlan was true to his promise in 1940, that French ships would not be allowed to fall into German hands. Godfroy, still in command of the French ships neutralised at Alexandria, remained aloof for a while longer but on 17 May 1943 joined the Allies.[57]
Orders of battle
Royal Navy
- HMS Hood – battlecruiser – Flagship
- HMS Resolution – battleship
- HMS Valiant – battleship
- HMS Ark Royal – aircraft carrier
- HMS Arethusa – light cruiser
- HMS Enterprise – light cruiser
- HMS Faulknor – destroyer
- HMS Foxhound – destroyer
- HMS Fearless – destroyer
- HMS Forester – destroyer
- HMS Foresight – destroyer
- HMS Escort – destroyer
- HMS Keppel – destroyer
- HMS Active – destroyer
- HMS Wrestler – destroyer
- HMS Vidette – destroyer
- HMS Vortigern – destroyer
French Navy (Marine Nationale)
- Dunkerque – battleship – Flagship
- Strasbourg – battleship
- Bretagne – battleship
- Provence – battleship
- Commandant Teste – seaplane tender
- Mogador – destroyer
- Volta – destroyer
- Le Terrible – destroyer
- Kersaint – destroyer
- Lynx – destroyer
- Tigre – destroyer
- Ariane – submarine
- Danaé – submarine
- Diane – submarine
- Eurydice – submarine
See also
Notes
- ^ The French war fleet was "neutral", as required by the Armistice of 22 June 1940 between Vichy France and Germany.[5][6][7]
- ^
It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives;
(a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans.
(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment.
If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile.
(c) Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans lest they break the
Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies—Martiniquefor instance—where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours.
Finally, failing the above, I have orders from His Majesty's Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German or Italian hands.
— Somerville[17]
Footnotes
- ^ a b Sutherland & Canwell 2011, pp. 21–22.
- ^ a b Sutherland & Canwell 2011, p. 20.
- ^ a b Marder 2015, p. 256.
- ^ Playfair 1959, p. 137.
- ^ Armistice 1940.
- ^ a b Thomas 1997, pp. 643–670.
- ^ Holman & Kelly 2000.
- ^ Chin 2022, p. 103.
- ^ Butler 1971, p. 218.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 2002, p. 57.
- ^ Lacouture 1991, pp. 246–247.
- ^ Hansard, War Situation Archived 14 July 2014 at the Wayback Machine, 25 June 1940, 304–05
- ^ a b Greene & Massignani 2002, p. 56.
- ^ a b c Lacouture 1991, p. 247.
- ^ Bell 1997, pp. 19–20.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 31.
- ^ Butler 1971, pp. 223–224.
- ^ Jameson 2004, pp. 160–161.
- ^ Butler 1971, pp. 224–225.
- ^ Butler 1971, p. 222.
- ^ Roskill 1957, pp. 240, 242.
- ^ Smith 2010, p. 48.
- ^ Smith 2010, pp. 47–56, 93.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 2002, p. 61; Melton 2015, p. 190.
- ^ Brown 2004, p. 198.
- ^ Sutherland & Canwell2011, p. 21.
- ^ Sutherland & Canwell2011, p. 22.
- ^ a b O'Hara 2009, p. 24.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 2002, pp. 59–60.
- ^ Melton 2015, pp. 190, 195.
- ^ Melton 2015, p. 195.
- ^ a b c Playfair 1959, p. 142.
- ^ a b Greene & Massignani 2002, pp. 94–95.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 2002, pp. 60–61.
- ^ Lacouture 1991, p. 246.
- ^ Smith 2010, pp. 86, 88.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 140–141.
- ^ Auphan & Mordal 1976, pp. 124–126.
- ^ Butler 1971, p. 230.
- ^ Smith 2010, p. 92.
- ^ Lacouture 1991, p. 249.
- ^ Smith 2010, p. 404.
- ^ Brown 2004, pp. 204–205.
- ^ Smith 2010, pp. 94, 93.
- ^ Melton 2015, p. 197.
- ^ Melton 2015, pp. 170–171, 174, 177.
- ^ Melton 2015, pp. 200, 195.
- ^ Melton 2015, pp. 202–206.
- ^ Melton 2015, pp. 200–202.
- ^ Melton 2015, pp. 202–203.
- ^ O'Hara 2009, p. 19.
- ^ a b Greene & Massignani 2002, p. 61.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 142–143.
- ^ Smith 2010, p. 99.
- ^ a b c O'Hara 2009, p. 56.
- ^ Bond 2003, p. 98.
- ^ Roskill 1962, pp. 338, 444.
References
Books
- ISBN 978-0-8371-8660-3.
- Bell, P. M. H. Bell (1997). France and Britain, 1940–1994: The Long Separation. France and Britain. London: Longman. ISBN 978-0-582-28920-8.
- Bond, Peter (2003). 300 Years of British Gibraltar: 1704–2004. Gibraltar: Peter-Tan Ltd for Government of Gibraltar. OCLC 1005205264.
- Brown, D. (2004). The Road to Oran: Anglo-French Naval Relations, September 1939 – July 1940. Cass: Naval Policy and History No. 20. London: Taylor and Francis. ISBN 978-0-7146-5461-4.
- Butler, J. R. M. (1971) [1957]. Grand Strategy: September 1939 – June 1941. ISBN 978-0-11-630095-9– via Archive Foundation.
- Chin, Rachel (2022). War of Words: Britain, France and Discourses of Empire during the Second World War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-00-918101-3.
- Greene, J.; Massignani, A. (2002) [1998]. The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (pbk. ed.). Rochester: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-190-3.
- Jameson, William (2004) [1957]. Ark Royal: the Life of an Aircraft Carrier at War 1939-41 (2nd ed.). Penzance: Periscope Publishing. ISBN 1-904381-27-8.
- Lacouture, Jean (1991) [1984]. De Gaulle: The Rebel 1890–1944 (Eng trans. ed.). London: W. W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-02699-3– via Archive Foundation.
- Holman, Valerie; Kelly, Debra (2000). France at war in the twentieth century: Propaganda, myth and metaphor. New York: Berghahn Books. pp. 69–76. ISBN 978-1-57181-701-3.
- LCCN 2015938192.
- Melton, George E. (2015). From Versailles to Mers el-Kébir: The Promise of Anglo-French Naval Cooperation 1919–1940. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-61251-879-4.
- O'Hara, Vincent P. (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-648-3.
- from the original on 28 September 2018. Retrieved 24 November 2017.
- Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-257-3.
- from the original on 27 February 2022. Retrieved 24 November 2017.
- Roskill, S. W. (1962) [1956]. The Period of Balance. from the original on 6 March 2014. Retrieved 24 November 2017.
- Smith, C. (2010) [2009]. England's Last War Against France: Fighting Vichy 1940–1942 (Phoenix ed.). London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-7538-2705-5.
- Sutherland, Jon; Canwell, Diane (2011). Vichy Air Force at War: The French Air Force that Fought the Allies in World War II. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation. ISBN 978-1-84884-336-3.
Journals
- Thomas, Martin (1997). "After Mers-el-Kébir: The Armed Neutrality of the Vichy French Navy, 1940–43". English Historical Review. 112 (447). ISSN 0013-8266.
Primary sources
- "Article 8: La flotte de guerre française", Armistice 1940, France Allemagne, signé à Rethondes le 22 juin 1940 [Armistice 1940, France Germany, signed at Rethondes on 22 June 1940] (in French), 22 June 1940, [Article 8: The French war fleet], archived from the original on 20 April 2019, retrieved 22 May 2023 – via Université de Perpignan
Further reading
- Collier, Paul (2003). The Second World War: The Mediterranean 1940–1945. Vol. IV. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84176-539-6.
- Ehrengardt, Christian-Jacques Ehrengardt; Shores, Christopher J. (1985). L'aviation de Vichy au combat: les campagnes oubliées 3 juillet 1940 – 27 novembre 1942 [The Vichy Air Force in Combat: The Forgotten Campaigns]. Grandes batailles de France. Vol. I. Paris: C. Lavauzelle. ISBN 978-2-7025-0092-7.
- Jenkins, E. H. (1979). A History of the French Navy: From its Beginnings to the Present Day. London: Macdonald and Jane's. ISBN 978-0-356-04196-4.
- Lasterle, Philippe (2003). "Could Admiral Gensoul Have Averted the Tragedy of Mers el-Kebir?". Journal of Military History. 67 (3): 835–844. S2CID 159759345.
- Paxton, R. O. (1972). Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944. New York: Knopf. ISBN 978-0-394-47360-4.
- Rankin, Nicholas (2017). Defending the Rock: How Gibraltar Defeated Hitler. London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 978-0-571-30773-9.
External links
- A plan of the Mers-el-Kébir anchorage, hmshood.org.uk
- Mers-El-Kebir (1979) a French made-for-TV movie
- Churchill's Sinking of the French Fleet (3 July 1940), digitalsurvivors.com
- Churchill's Deadly Decision, episode of Secrets of the Dead describing the attack and the events leading up to it
- Kappes, Irwin J. (2003) Mers-el-Kebir: A Battle between Friends, Military History Online
- Waghorne, Richard (2020) The Most Hateful Decision: Honour, Power, and Will at Mers-el-Kébir, The Critic