Battle of Mycale
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Battle of Mycale | |||||||||
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Part of the Second Persian invasion of Greece and the Greek counterattack | |||||||||
Part of Mount Mycale, viewed from the ruins of Priene | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Greek city-states | Achaemenid Empire | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Artaÿntes[1] Masistes Ithamitres Mardontes † Tigranes † | |||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
40,000 men, 110-250 ships |
60,000 men, 300 ships | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Considerable[2] | Most of the army and all the ships[2] | ||||||||
The Battle of Mycale (
.The previous year, the Persian invasion force, led by Xerxes himself, had scored victories at the battles of
In the summer of 479 BC, the Greeks assembled an army, and marched to confront Mardonius at the
Although the Persian forces put up stout resistance, the heavily armoured Greek
Background
The Greek city-states of Athens and
Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece. However, he died before the invasion could begin.
The Allies initially adopted a strategy of blocking the land and sea approaches to southern Greece.[15] Thus, in August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small Allied army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the vastly outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by a mountain path. Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard, formed of the Spartan and Thespian contingents, was surrounded and annihilated.[16] The simultaneous Battle of Artemisium, consisting of a series of naval encounters, was up to that point a stalemate;[17] however, when news of Thermopylae reached them, they also retreated, since holding the straits of Artemisium was now a moot point.[18]
Following Thermopylae, the Persian army had proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae, before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth.[19] Xerxes wished for a final crushing defeat of the Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning season; conversely the allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy that would guarantee the security of the Peloponnese.[20] The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict.[21]
Following the defeat of his navy at the Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with, according to Herodotus at least, the majority of the army. Herodotus suggests that this was because he feared the Greeks would sail to the Hellespont and destroy the pontoon bridges, thereby trapping his army in Europe.
Mardonius moved to break the stalemate by trying to win over the Athenians and their fleet through the mediation of Alexander I of Macedon, offering peace, self-government and territorial expansion.[25] The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was also on hand to hear the offer, and rejected it:
The degree to which we are put in the shadow by the Medes' strength is hardly something you need to bring to our attention. We are already well aware of it. But even so, such is our love of liberty, that we will never surrender.[25]
Upon this refusal, the Persians marched south again. Athens was again evacuated and left to the Persians. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis. Athens, along with Megara and Plataea, sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatening to accept the Persian terms if not.[26] According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by a guest, Chileos of Tegea, who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered.[27] When the Athenian emissaries delivered an ultimatum to the Spartans the next day, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in fact already en route; the Spartan army was marching to meet the Persians.[28] The Greek city-state alliance, which included the Spartan and Athenian armies, then proceeded northward toward the Persian army led by Mardonius, with the two forces ultimately facing each other in the Battle of Plataea.[29]
Meanwhile, the Athenian navy under
Prelude
When the Persians heard that the Allied fleet was approaching, they set sail from Samos towards the Ionian mainland.[32] According to Herodotus, this was because they had decided in council that they could not beat the Allies in a naval battle.[32] They sent the Phoenician ships away (Herodotus does not explain why), and then sailed to the shore near Mount Mycale.[32] Xerxes had left an army there, under the command of Tigranes, to guard Ionia.[32] The Persians beached their ships, built a palisade around them, and prepared to guard the makeshift fort.[33]
Finding the Persian fleet gone from Samos, the Allies were thrown into uncertainty. Eventually they resolved that they would sail to the mainland, and equipped themselves for a naval battle.[34] However, when the Allies approached Mycale, the Persians did not attempt to engage them, and remained guarding their camp. Leotychides therefore sailed as close to the camp as possible, and had a herald make an appeal to the Ionians:
"Men of Ionia, you who hear us, understand what I say, for by no means will the Persians understand anything I charge you with when we join battle; first of all it is right for each man to remember his freedom and next the battle-cry Hebe: and let him who hears me tell him who has not heard it."[34]
Herodotus suggests that the purpose of this message was twofold; firstly to encourage the Ionians, unbeknownst to the Persians, to fight for the Allies (or at least not to fight against them); or, if the message became known to the Persians, to make the Persians mistrust the Ionians.[34]
Following this appeal, the Allies also beached their ships, and began to prepare to assault the camp.
Herodotus reports that as the Allies approached the Persian camp, rumour spread amongst them of an Allied victory at Plataea;
Opposing Forces
The Persians
The number of Persian ships and men involved with the battle is, as so often in the Greco-Persian Wars, somewhat problematic. It is clear that the Persian fleet did not dare conduct operations against the Greeks, and thus must have been approximately equal to, or smaller than the Greek fleet.[40][41] Herodotus gives the size of the Persian fleet at 300 ships;[41] the Greeks had 378 at Salamis, but must have suffered significant losses, and so they probably also had around 300 in total (though not necessarily all these ships formed part of the allied fleet for 479 BC).[40] The Phoenician ships were dismissed from the Persian fleet before the battle, which reduced its strength further.[32]
Diodorus tells us that to guard the camp and the ships the Persians gathered 100,000 men in total,[42] while Herodotus suggests that there were 60,000 men in the army under the command of Tigranes.[32] Squaring these two accounts, might suggest that there were c. 40,000 men with the fleet. Given that the Persian fleet appears to have been undermanned in the aftermath of Salamis, 200-300 ships would indeed give this number of naval personnel (using Herodotus's standard complement of 200 men per ship).[30] However, this total of 100,000 is probably too high; to accommodate 100,000 men and 200+ ships, the Persian camp would have to have been enormous. Estimates made of Mardonius's huge camp at Plataea, which was planned and built with plenty of time, suggest it might have accommodated 70,000-120,000 men;[43][44][45] it is improbable that such a large camp could have been built at Mycale in the time-frame that Herodotus suggests. It is therefore possible that the 60,000 quoted by Herodotus is actually the total number of Persians present at Mycale; the Persians certainly outnumbered the Allies, emerging from the palisade in confidence after seeing the smaller number of the Allied troops.[36][46]
The Persian force of 60,000 most likely consisted of spearmen and archers from the various contingents of Persians, Medes, and Red Sea Islanders, though a small force of Persian cavalry was also recruited into the army. In addition to the Persians, Medes, and Red Sea Islanders, there were also some contingents of Greek mercenaries in the Persian army at Mycale, but Herodotus wrote that these later defected over to the Greeks during the main battle outside the Persian camp of Mount Mycale.
The Greeks
Numbers of ships and men for the Allies are also somewhat problematic. Herodotus claims that Leotychides had 110 triremes under his command.[47] However, the previous year, the allies had fielded 271 triremes at the Battle of Artemisium, and then 378 at the Battle of Salamis.[48][49] We are also told that the Allies had "command of the sea" after Salamis, which implies that they could at least equal the Persian fleet.[40] Diodorus, on the other hand, tells us the allies had 250 ships, which is more consistent with their force levels of the previous year.[42] These two numbers can be reconciled by assuming that Leotychides had 110 triremes under his command before being joined by Xanthippus and the Athenian ships, after the Allied army had marched out from the Peloponnesus. This is the approach taken by Holland, and gives a naval force which might well match the remnants of the Persian fleet.[36]
Although the Athenians had sent 8,000 hoplites to Plataea,
Strategic & tactical considerations
From a strategic point of view, battle was not necessary for either side; the main strategic theatre was mainland Greece itself. Although destroying the enemy navy would result in a clear strategic advantage for both sides, attempting this risked the loss of their own navy. The actions of the two sides thus reflect more upon their morale and confidence than on any strategic considerations. The Persians, seeing little to gain in battle, demoralised and riven with dissent, thus sought to avoid a naval battle.[32][40][41][42] Conversely, the Allies, who had initially been as nervous of a battle as the Persians,[56] sought to press home their morale advantage once they were informed of the state of the Persian fleet.[31]
Tactically, the Persian fleet should have held the advantage at sea, since the Athenian part of the Greek fleet was, despite their efforts at Artemisium and Salamis, still raw in seamanship.[57] However, whether because of their low morale, or because they were in fact outnumbered, the Persians sought instead the tactical advantage of joining up with the army under Tigranes, and fortifying a position.[31][32] However, when the Greeks chose to fight on land, the Persians then threw away the advantage of their fortifications by emerging to fight the Greeks in the open field.[42] Furthermore, as Marathon and Thermopylae had shown, large numbers conferred little advantage against the more heavily armoured hoplites; thus, as the battle began, it was the Greeks who had the tactical upper hand.[58]
The battle
The Allies seem to have formed into two wings; on the right were the Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians and Troezenians, and on the left were the Spartans with other contingents.[59] The right wing marched across level ground straight towards the Persian camp, whilst the left wing attempted to outflank the Persians by passing through more broken ground.[59] The right wing thus began fighting with the Persians while the left wing was still approaching.[59] Herodotus reports that the Persians fought well at first, but that the Athenians and the contingents with them wished to win the victory before the Spartans arrived, and thus attacked ever more zealously.[59]
Although the Persians stood their ground for a while, they eventually broke and fled to the palisade.[59] The soldiers of the right wing followed them into the camp, at which point many of the Persian army fled from the camp, except the ethnic Persian troops, who grouped together and fought the Allied soldiers who entered the camp.[59] Finally, the left wing arrived, outflanking the camp and falling on the rear of the remaining Persian forces, thereby completing the rout.[36][60]
Herodotus tells us that, on seeing the outcome of the battle hung in the balance, the disarmed Samians had joined in on the side of the allies, doing what they could.[60] This inspired the other Ionian contingents to turn on the Persians as well.[60] At which stage in the battle this happened is not clear; the Samians were presumably not in the main battle line (being disarmed), so it may have been after the Persians retreated to the camp. Meanwhile, the Milesians who were guarding the passes of Mycale also turned on the Persians. At first they misdirected the fleeing Persian contingents so that they ended up back amongst the Allied troops; then, perhaps seeing the outcome of the battle was certain, they began killing the fleeing Persians.[61]
Herodotus does not mention specific figures for casualties, merely saying that losses were heavy on both sides.[60] The Sicyonians in particular suffered, also losing their general Perilaus.[60] On the Persian side, the admiral Mardontes and the general Tigranes were both killed, though Artaÿntes escaped.[60] Herodotus says that a few Persian troops escaped the battle and made their way to Sardis.[62] Diodorus claims that there were 40,000 Persian casualties, and also suggests that the survivors made their way to Sardis.[46]
Aftermath
When the Spartans arrived, the Persian camp was looted and their beached ships destroyed.[63] Returning to Samos they then discussed their next moves.[63] Leotychides proposed that they evacuate the cities of the Ionian Greeks and bring the population to the Greek mainland, since it would be difficult to defend Ionia against further Persian attacks.[63] Xanthippus however vehemently objected to this, since the Ionian cities were originally Greek colonies.[63] The Ionian Greeks later joined the Athenians in the "Delian League" against Persia.[63]
With the twin victories of Plataea and Mycale, the second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover, the threat of a future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried that Xerxes would try again, over time it became apparent that the Persian desire to conquer Greece was much diminished.[64]
After the victory at Mycale, the Allied fleet sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this was already done.
Significance
Mycale and Plataea have great significance in ancient history as the battles which decisively ended the second Persian invasion of Greece, thereby swinging the balance of the Greco-Persian Wars in favour of the Greeks.[66] The Battle of Salamis saved Greece from immediate conquest, but it was Mycale and Plataea which effectively ended that threat.[66] However, neither of these battles are as well known as Thermopylae, Salamis or Marathon. The reason for this discrepancy is not entirely clear; it might however be a result of the circumstances in which the battle was fought. The fame of Thermopylae certainly lies in the doomed heroism of the Greeks in the face of overwhelming numbers;[67] Marathon and Salamis perhaps because they were both fought against the odds, and in dire strategic situations. Conversely, the Battles of Plataea and Mycale were both fought from a relative position of Greek strength, and against lesser odds; perhaps the Greeks were even expecting to win and had certainly seen the opportunity to deal the final blow.[66][68]
Militarily, the major lesson of both Mycale and Plataea (since both were fought on land) was the repeated confirmation of the superiority of the hoplite over the more lightly armed Persian infantry, as had first been demonstrated at Marathon.[69] Taking on this lesson, after the Greco-Persian Wars the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries.[70]
Sources
The main source for the Greco-Persian Wars is the Greek historian Herodotus. He gives an account of the battle of Mycale in Book Nine of his Histories.[71]
The Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus, writing in the 1st century BC in his Bibliotheca Historica, also provides an account of the Battle of Mykale, derived directly from the earlier Greek historian Ephorus. This account is fairly consistent with Herodotus's.[72] Archaeological evidence, such as the Serpent Column, also supports some of Herodotus's specific claims.[73]
See also
- Battle of Plataea
- Battle of Salamis
- Delian League
- Greco-Persian Wars
- Leotychides
- Second Persian invasion of Greece
- Xanthippus
References
- ^ "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, page 373 (V. 1)". Archived from the original on 2012-10-12. Retrieved 2011-06-22.
- ^ a b According to Herodotus
- ^ a b Holland, p47–55
- ^ Holland, p203
- ^ Herodotus V, 105
- ^ a b Holland, 171–178
- ^ Herodotus VI, 44
- ^ Herodotus VI, 101
- ^ Herodotus VI, 113
- ^ Holland, pp206–208
- ^ Holland, pp208–211
- ^ Herodotus VII, 32
- ^ Herodotus VII, 145
- ^ Holland, p226
- ^ Holland, pp255-257
- ^ Holland, pp292–294
- ^ Herodotus VIII, 18
- ^ Herodotus VIII, 21
- ^ Herodotus VIII, 71
- ^ Holland, p303
- ^ a b c d Holland, p333–335
- ^ Herodotus VIII, 97
- ^ Holland, pp327–329
- ^ Holland, p330
- ^ a b c Holland, pp336–338
- ^ Herodotus IX, 7
- ^ Herodotus IX, 6–9
- ^ Herodotus IX, 10
- ^ Herodotus IX, 13-88
- ^ a b c Herodotus IX, 90
- ^ a b c Herodotus IX, 91
- ^ a b c d e f g h Herodotus IX, 96
- ^ Herodotus, IX, 97
- ^ a b c d Herodotus IX, 98
- ^ a b c d Herodotus IX, 99
- ^ a b c d e f Holland, pp. 357–358
- ^ a b Herodotus IX, 100
- ^ Diodorus XI, 35
- ^ Green, p281
- ^ a b c d Diodorus XI, 19
- ^ a b c Herodotus VIII, 130
- ^ a b c d Diodorus XI, 34
- ^ Holland, p343
- ^ Connolly, p29
- ^ Lazenby, p227–228
- ^ a b Diodorus XI, 36
- ^ Herodotus VIII, 131
- ^ Herodotus VIII, 2
- ^ Herodotus VIII, 48
- ^ Herodotus IX, 28
- ^ Holland, p217
- ^ a b Lazenby, p. 46.
- ^ a b Herodotus VII, 184
- ^ Goldsworthy, p. 103.
- ^ BBC 'h2g2' website
- ^ Herodotus VIII, 32
- ^ Holland, p. 278
- ^ Holland, pp194–197
- ^ a b c d e f Herodotus IX, 102
- ^ a b c d e f Herodotus IX, 103
- ^ Herodotus IX, 104
- ^ Herodotus IX, 107
- ^ a b c d e Herodotus IX, 106
- ^ Holland, pp. 358–359
- ^ a b Herodotus IX, 114
- ^ a b c d e f Holland, pp. 359–363
- ^ Holland, pp xvi–xxii
- ^ Holland, pp336–340
- ^ Holland, p358–359
- ^ Xenophon, Anabasis
- ^ "Herodotus, The Histories, Book 9, chapter 97". www.perseus.tufts.edu. Retrieved 2019-08-28.
- ^ Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica, XI, 28–34
- ^ Note to Herodotus IX, 81
Bibliography
Ancient sources
- Herodotus, The Histories Perseus online version
- Ctesias, Persica (excerpt in Photius's epitome)
- Diodorus Siculus, Biblioteca Historica
- Plutarch, Aristides
- Xenophon, Anabasis
Modern sources
- Holland, Tom. Persian Fire. Abacus, 2005 (ISBN 978-0-349-11717-1)
- Green, Peter. The Greco-Persian Wars. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970; revised ed., 1996 (hardcover, ISBN 0-520-20313-5)
- Lazenby, JF. The Defence of Greece 490–479 BC. Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1993 (ISBN 0-85668-591-7)
- Fehling, D. Herodotus and His "Sources": Citation, Invention, and Narrative Art. Translated by J.G. Howie. Arca Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers, and Monographs, 21. Leeds: Francis Cairns, 1989
- Connolly, P. Greece and Rome at War, 1981
- Finley, Moses (1972). "Introduction". Thucydides – History of the Peloponnesian War (translated by Rex Warner). Penguin. ISBN 0-14-044039-9.
- Goldsworthy, A. (2003). The Fall of Carthage. Cassel. ISBN 0-304-36642-0.