Murmansk Initiative
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The Murmansk Initiative (
The initiative tied together economic, environmental, and security issues in the Arctic.[2] Gorbachev's aim was to transform the Arctic Circle from being a military theater to an international zone of peace among the Arctic powers. The initiative was launched as an invitation for disarmament of nuclear weapons and establishment of an East-West dialogue around the Arctic.[3]
The Murmansk speech's goals paralleled Gorbachev's ambitions in previous speeches, like the one in
The Murmansk Initiative was considered a major turning point in the Arctic policy of the Soviet Union (USSR) and represented the application of Gorbachev's "new political thinking" in Northern Europe.[2] It helped guide the foreign policy of the newly-formed Russian government in the Arctic after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
History
Before the end of the 1930s, the Arctic had not been considered a zone of particular strategic interest due to its
Following the end of the Second World War, improvements in air-power and rising tensions between the
For the Soviets, the strategic importance of the Arctic could not be overstated. Murmansk and the
The idea of a nuclear-free Arctic, the first point of Gorbachev’s speech, was not a new one. A formal Soviet proposal had been made in 1958 by then Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, and similar ideas had become popular in the following decades, especially in specific governments and organizations in Nordic countries. Gorbachev had seen these countries as potentially being more responsive to his “new political thinking” and towards the shift toward East-West dialogue, coming off the heels of the Reykjavik Summit of 1986, which Gorbachev would explicitly refer to as a watershed for more peaceful Cold War politics in the Murmansk speech.[8][9]
Overview
On October 1, 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech to the city of Murmansk that marked the beginning of a change in foreign policy that would be called the ‘Murmansk Initiative’.
Proposed nuclear weapons-free zone in the Arctic
At the time of Murmansk speech, the world already had achieved
This was not the first time that a proposal for a nuclear-free zone was put in place in the region. In fact, it was put forward even earlier by then Finnish President - Urho Kekkonen - in 1963, who pushed for a Nordic nuclear-free zone.[18]
Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to start relevant consultations on naval restrictions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. He proposed to hold a meeting in Leningrad to discuss the prohibition of naval activities in mutually agreed zones of international straits and intensive shipping routes in the Arctic.[19] The aim of these discussions was to limit the size and frequency of naval exercises in the European Arctic and to totally ban naval activity in mutually agreed zones, but Gorbachev did not specify the exact location of the zones.[20][21] It is possible that these initiatives were a response to the US Navy’s Forward Maritime Strategy and its increased submarine presence in the Arctic, allowing the United States to have a sizable advantage in the Arctic in the case of an all out war.[22] There had been no large-scale Soviet exercises since 1985 due to budget constraints, so the proposal would have primarily impacted NATO allies. Thus, the proposal was passed off by the Western countries, believing these naval restrictions would have given the Soviets a unilateral advantage.[23]
Resource development
Gorbachev saw cooperation on resource development important to the Soviet Union's economic revival.[24] This was part of a larger project to gain Western technology and capital.[1] Gorbachev suggested setting up joint energy projects in the Barents Sea with Canada, Norway and others.[25] The Norwegians rejected the offshore drilling initiative because of territorial disputes.[24]
Gorbachev was also interested in cooperating with Western companies in terms of mineral extraction in the Kola Peninsula. This was a major shift in Soviet foreign policy, however, it did not lead to joint ventures immediately.[24]
Scientific exploration
Prior to the late 1980s, there was little interaction between the Soviet and Western
Indigenous peoples
The relationship between
Environmental protection
Prior to the Murmansk Initiative, the Soviet Union had a reputation for either ignoring environmental degradation or pursuing isolationist policies. They were not in the practice of pursuing or encouraging international environmental cooperation. Thus Gorbachev’s proposal to increase international environmental cooperation in terms of developing a joint plan for the protection of the Arctic's vulnerable environment, including the monitoring of radiation, departed from the USSR's previous policy decisions.[21]
Northern sea route
Mikhail Gorbachev, on the dependence on the normalization of international relations, promised to open the Northern Sea Route for the passage of foreign vessels with the help of Soviet icebreakers.[27] The Northeast Passage acts as a link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and was seen by the Soviet Union as a crucial strategic and military area. However, as the shortest sailing distance between Northwestern Europe and Northeast Asia, it also had ample potential to provide trade and economic security.[30] Cold War-era arguments which favored a military focus over commercial traffic were increasingly irrelevant given a new Soviet security sphere, and this contributed to the push for the opening of the Northern Sea Route.[31]
Reception
The Murmansk Initiative was heard and received positively throughout the world. It led to a restoring confidence in diplomatic negotiations in the European North which were lost during the Cold War, and laid the foundation for a fundamentally new arena for cooperation.[32]
Domestically, after Gorbachev's speech, the Central Committee on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) adopted Resolution 338 in 1988 titled "On Measures to Accelerate Economic and Social Development of the Murmansk Oblast from 1988-1990 to 2005." The resolution helped to boost Murmansk on the world stage in terms of authorizing new contacts through Sister Cities International and, more locally, allowing the city and its surrounding Oblast to become more involved in discussions involving other Nordic counties in the Cap of the North.
However, Resolution 338 itself was not fully implemented due to a lack of finances and the growing disorganization of the USSR's national economy.[33]
Outcome
Gorbachev’s speech in 1987 sparked the beginning of various reforms intended to achieve the goal of increased cooperation and stability in the Arctic. Although there were no significant reductions in the military sector, other sectors saw reduced tensions and even cooperation in certain ventures.
Demilitarization
Limited demilitarization occurred in the Arctic in the aftermath of the Murmansk Initiative. Many of the demilitarization offers made by the USSR were considered negligible by Western observers.[21] There were three main parts to Gorbachev's proposal for demilitarization: denuclearization, naval arms limitations, and confidence-building measures. The denuclearization initiatives were mostly unsuccessful because of Western suspicions towards the intentions of the USSR and the unwillingness for both the United States and USSR to withdraw nuclear submarines from the region.[20] In a similar manner, Western states considered a naval-arms treaty too advantageous to the USSR to be worth practical consideration. The confidence-building measures were also mostly rejected due to the Nordic countries already establishing a process for such measures.
Despite this, there were some positive demilitarization results that Gorbachev attributed to the Murmansk Initiative: the signing of the INF Treaty, the removal of INFs from areas adjacent to the European North, the elimination of sea-based nuclear missiles in the Baltic Sea, and the reduction in the number of ground troops stationed in both the European part of the USSR as well as in the Warsaw Pact countries by 200,000.[18]
International relations
Relations between the states involved in the Arctic normalized following the Murmansk Initiative. Western states like Norway and Finland were cautiously optimistic about the proposals made by Gorbachev.[21] In fact, Norway and the USSR signed a joint agreement on June 5, 1991, in which they agreed on paying special attention on developing versatile and mutually beneficial cooperation in the Arctic.[34] The non-security proposals put forward by Gorbachev were received relatively enthusiastically and cooperation over development of the Arctic increased, particularly in regards to economic development.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly-formed Russian government co-founded the
Economic outcomes
The Northern Sea shipping route was opened by the Soviet Union on July 1, 1991 to foreign vessels in part as a result of the Murmansk Initiative.[35] Extraction of natural resources like oil and natural gases increased following the Murmansk Initiative due to greater cooperation between the various Arctic states.[24] In particular, the USSR sought to establish a 'special zone' in the Barents Sea that would be open to extraction by the USSR and Norway. While the proposal was initially rejected by Norway, the USSR had established a willingness to cooperate with foreign companies in the sector.[24]
Indigenous peoples
Gorbachev’s remarks on the need for closer “cultural ties” led to closer interaction between various Northern indigenous groups. Until the late 1980s, indigenous peoples had little recourse to discuss various environmental and economic problems they faced within the USSR. With the Murmansk Initiative, indigenous groups were able to participate in conferences like the Inuit Circumpolar Conference held in Greenland in 1989. The participation of Soviet indigenous groups was symbolically important; however, little progress was made in practically improving their situation.[29]
Scientific initiatives
The Murmansk Initiative encouraged further scientific research missions in the Northern Sea and Arctic regions. Gorbachev’s call to action for international cooperation in the Arctic was a catalyst in the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), a non-profit organization composed of international science groups participating in Arctic science research. In 1988, over 500 delegates from the USSR, Canada, the United States, and the five Nordic states gathered in Leningrad for the Conference of Arctic States on Coordination of Scientific Research in the Arctic. Cooperation began in fields of research there were not sensitive, such as geophysics and biology, and gradually even fields like oceanography and resource development were included.[36] This marked the first time the two spheres had merged to collaborate on such an issue. These initiatives demonstrated the success of Gorbachev’s call to desecuritize the Arctic, and helped to facilitate emerging political cooperation in other areas at the time.
See also
References
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- ^ Åtland (2008), p. 293.
- ISBN 978-0-203-99785-7.
- ^ Nuttall (2005), p. 1306.
- ^ Nuttall (2005), pp. 1301–1302.
- ^ Archer, Clive (1988). "Russia's Arctic Dimension". The World Today. 44 (3): 47 – via JSTOR.
- ^ a b Gorbachev, Mikhail (1987). "The Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk" (PDF). Novosti Press Agency: Moscow. p. 1.
- ^ Nuttall (2005), p. 152.
- ^ Gorbachev (1987), pp. 2-3.
- ^ a b Gorbachev (1987), p. 4.
- ^ Gorbachev (1987), pp. 5-6.
- ^ Åtland (2008), p. 289.
- ^ a b c Åtland (2008), p. 297.
- ^ Purver (1988), p. 148.
- ^ Åtland (2008), p. 296.
- ^ a b Fokin, Yury E., and Smirnov, Anatoly I (2012). "Киркенесская Декларация о сотрудничестве в Баренцевом/Евроарктическом регионе: взгляд из России 20 лет спустя [Kirkenes Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents/Euro-Arctic Region: a view from Russia 20 years later]" (PDF). p. 8. Retrieved March 11, 2019.
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: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Fokin & Smirnov (2012), p. 9.
- ^ a b Åtland (2008), p. 298.
- ^ a b c d Purver (1988), p. 149.
- ^ Purver (1988), p. 154.
- ^ Åtland (2008), pp. 298-299.
- ^ a b c d e Åtland (2008), p. 301.
- ^ Åtland (2008), p. 300.
- ^ Åtland (2008), p. 302.
- ^ a b Fokin & Smirnov (2012), p. 10.
- ^ Åtland (2008), pp. 302-303.
- ^ a b Åtland (2008), p. 303.
- ^ Åtland (2008), p. 304.
- ^ Åtland (2008), pp. 304-305.
- ^ Fokin & Smirnov (2012), p. 11.
- ^ Fokin & Smirnov (2012), pp. 10-11.
- ^ Fokin & Smirnov (2012), p. 14.
- ^ Åtland (2008), p. 305.
- ^ Åtland (2008), pp. 301-302.