Operation David
Operation David (1940) | |||||||
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Part of Battle of Belgium | |||||||
British troops of the BEF cross the border into Belgium, 10 May 1940. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
France United Kingdom Belgium | Germany | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Georges Maurice Jean Blanchard Lord Gort | Fedor von Bock |
Operation David was the codename for the deployment of the
Planning
In the interwar period, French military planners had adopted the idea of fortifying France's borders and work on the Maginot Line had started in 1930. In 1932, it had been decided by the Conseil supérieur de la guerre that France's northeastern border should not be fortified; the low-lying land made building suitable structures technically difficult and France had been in a military alliance with Belgium since 1920. Therefore it was decided that France could best be protected against any German aggression in the region by defending Belgium; this had the advantage that any fighting would not be on French soil, thus preserving the important industrial towns in the border area. This strategy received a setback in 1936 when Belgium declared neutrality and abandoned its military alliance with France, meaning that in the event of a German invasion, the two armies could no longer coordinate their defence plans.[1]
The French planners had identified three possible
On deployment to France in September 1939, the BEF, commanded by General Lord Gort, was incorporated into the French 1st Army Group, which was responsible for the defence of France along the Belgian and Luxembourg border from the Channel coast to the west end of the Maginot Line. Also in the group were the First Army (under Général d'armée Georges Maurice Jean Blanchard) and the Ninth Army under Général d'armée André Corap. All these forces were under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief of the North East Front, General Georges.[3] The section of the Franco-Belgian border to be held by the BEF stretched from Armentières westward towards Menin and then south to where the border met the River Escaut (the French name for the Scheldt) at Maulde, forming a salient around Lille and Roubaix.[4] The British began to fortify their sector with trenches, weapons pits and pillboxes, which became known as the Gort Line.[5]
Initially, Maurice Gamelin, the French Commander-in-Chief of the Armies, favoured Plan E, an advance to the Escaut Line and in a directive issued on 24 October 1939, he stated that an advance to the Dyle could only be considered if the 1st Army Group were able to deploy into Belgium before a German attack. Meanwhile, the Belgians had tentatively begun to fortify the Dyle Line, known to them as the K-W Line, which brought about a change in Gamelin's opinion, despite opposition from Georges who was more cautious. On 9 November, a meeting of Allied commanders at Vincennes agreed to the adoption of Plan D, an advance to the Dyle Line, which was confirmed at a meeting of the Supreme War Council on 17 November. The British were dubious about any advance in to Belgium, but given the small size of BEF in comparison to the French armies, Gort felt that he had little option but to agree.[6]
In January 1940, in the
By March 1940, the BEF had doubled in size to 394,165 men since its original deployment. By May 1940 the
Deployment
From 1:00 a.m. on 10 May 1940, the French national headquarters, Grand Quartier Général or GQG, received information from Brussels and Luxembourg that the German invasion was about to begin, and at 4:35 a.m., the German invasion of France and the Low Countries commenced. Gamelin was woken at 6:30 a.m. and ordered the Dyle Plan to start. The codeword "Operation David" initiated the British part of the Dyle Plan. The British vanguard, spearheaded by the armoured cars of the a 12th Royal Lancers, crossed the border at 1 p.m. on 10 May, cheered on by crowds of Belgian civilians who lined their route.[11] The section of the Dyle which had been allocated to the BEF ran from Louvain southwest to Wavre, a distance of some 22 miles (35 kilometres). Gort had decided to man the front line with only three divisions, 3rd Division from II Corps in the north with 1st and 2nd Divisions from I Corps further south,[12] leaving some battalions to defend a frontage double that recommended by British Army field manuals.[13] The BEF had sufficient motor transport to move the three front line divisions in a movement intended to be completed in 90 hours, nearly four days. The remaining BEF divisions were positioned so as to provide defence in depth all the way back to the River Escaut; they were required to march towards their objectives until motor transport became available.[14]
On arrival at the riverbank to the north of Louvain, 3rd Division found that part of their allotted position was already occupied by Belgian troops who refused to move out for their British allies, even though Brooke appealed directly to the
Defence of the Dyle
The first appearance of German forces on the BEF's front was on the afternoon of 14 May when reconnaissance troops of three German infantry divisions arrived in motor cars or on motorcycles. They were apparently unaware of the British positions and in several places approached the Dyle without taking cover, where they were an easy target for small arms fire and artillery. Later in the evening, parts of the line were fired on by German
Events elsewhere
The French Seventh Army drove forward on the northern flank and advanced elements reached Breda on 11 May. They found that the
In Belgium, the Albert Canal defence line was based on the fortress of
On 15 May, the Germans attacked the First Army along the Dyle Line, causing the meeting engagement that Gamelin had tried to avoid. The First Army repulsed the XVI Panzer Corps during the Battle of Gembloux (14–15 May), but GQG realised too late that the attack they were facing was a diversion; the main German attack had come further south, where Army Group B had burst through the lightly defended Ardennes.[26]
Withdrawal to the Escaut
On 16 May, the 1st Army Group was ordered to retreat from the Dyle Line, to avoid being trapped by the German breakthrough against the Second and Ninth armies but on 20 May, the Germans reached Abbeville on the Channel coast, cutting off the northern armies.[27]
The plan for the BEF withdrawal was that under cover of darkness, units would thin-out their front and make a phased and orderly withdrawal before the Germans realised what was happening. The objective for the night of 16/17 May was the Charleroi to
Defence of the Escaut
On the British sector of the Escaut, seven BEF divisions were placed in the front line; they were from the north the 44th, 4th, 3rd, 1st, 42nd, 2nd and 48th divisions. The British divisions were facing nine German infantry divisions, who began their attack on the morning of 21 May with a devastating artillery barrage. Shortly afterwards, infantry assaults started along the whole front, crossing the canalised river either by inflatable boats or by clambering across the wreckage of demolished bridges.[31] Although the Escaut line was penetrated in numerous places, all the German bridgeheads were either thrown back or contained by vigorous but costly British counter-attacks and the remaining German troops were ordered to retire across the river by the night of 22 May. One such British counter-attack near the village of Esquelmes, was led by Lance Corporal Harry Nicholls of 3rd Battalion, Grenadier Guards, who was taken prisoner and later awarded the Victoria Cross.[32]
Withdrawal to the Gort Line
In a meeting between Gort and his corps commanders on 22 May, it was agreed that the Escaut Line could not be held for long and a withdrawal was planned for the following night, 23/24 May. In the meantime, in a chaotic series of meetings at
Starting on 17 May, Gort began to improvise formations in an effort to prevent the BEF's exposed southern flank from Army Group B. These forces used the canal from Gravelines on the coast through Saint-Omer, Béthune and La Bassée, known as the Canal Line. Forward of this line, the town of Arras was being held by a determined British garrison and in order to support them, a modest force led by Gott's only heavy armour, the 1st Army Tank Brigade, attacked south on 21 May. Although the Battle of Arras came as a shock to the Germans, it achieved little in real terms.[34]
The withdrawal from the Escaut went smoothly on the southern end of the line, with light armour again providing an effective rearguard. However, in the far north, 44th Division had difficulty contacting all their units. Since there were no radios below battalion levels and the field telephone lines had been disrupted by heavy shelling and bombing, messages had to be sent by runners or in vehicles, many of which fell victim to enemy fire. For the first time in the campaign, the Germans continued to push forwards at night and the 44th and neighbouring 4th Division had to fight their way out.[35]
Aftermath
On 24 May, the BEF was back where it had started, but now had the enemy behind them as well as in front and were cut off from their supplies; [36] troops had been placed on half-rations on the previous day.[37] Additionally, nearly all of the RAF Air Component had been withdrawn to England, making the provision of air support even more difficult, and moreover, much of the air effort had been diverted to the support the fighting at Boulogne and Calais.[36] The shorter front and better defences at the frontier allowed Gort to move 2nd and 48th Divisions towards Lille to reinforce the defence of the Canal Line.[38] On 25 May with the need to evacuate being evident, Brooke's II Corps was ordered to form a defensive line on the Ypres-Comines Canal, in order to create a protected corridor along which the main body of the BEF could withdraw towards the coast, the start of the Battle of Dunkirk.[39]
The battle honours awarded to participating regiments during Operation David in Belgium include: "Northwest Europe 1940", "Dyle", "Withdrawal to the Escaut" and "Defence of Escaut".[40]
References
- ^ Jackson 2003, pp. 26–27.
- ^ Jackson 2003, pp. 27–28.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, p. 7.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, p. 511.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, p. 172.
- ^ Murland 2016, p. 6.
- ^ Thompson 2009, p. 27.
- ^ Smalley 2015, p. 23.
- ^ Doughty 2014a, p. 11.
- ^ Ellis 2004, pp. 19, 357–368.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, pp. 59–61.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, pp. 512–513.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, p. 78.
- ^ Grehan & Mace 2014, p. 30.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, p. 75.
- ^ Thompson 2009, p. 35.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, pp. 75–76.
- ^ Thompson 2009, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Thompson 2009, p. 40.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, pp. 77–79.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, p. 130.
- ^ Rowe 1959, pp. 142–143, 148.
- ^ Jackson 2003, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Jackson 2003, p. 38.
- ^ Rowe 1959, pp. 140–141.
- ^ Jackson 2003, pp. 38–39.
- ^ Jackson 2003, pp. 48–52, 56.
- ^ Thompson 2009, p. 47.
- ^ Thompson 2009, p. 50-52.
- ^ Thompson 2009, pp. 63–65.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, pp. 521, 156–157.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, pp. 171–172.
- ^ Thompson 2009, pp. 132–136.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2007, p. 177.
- ^ Thompson 2009, pp. 140–143.
- ^ a b Ellis 2004, p. 116.
- ^ Thompson 2009, p. 144.
- ^ Ellis 2004, p. 121.
- ^ Thompson 2009, p. 201.
- ^ Cave 2009, pp. 3–5.
Books
- Cave, Terry, ed. (2009). The Battle Honours of the Second World War 1939–1945 and Korea 1950–1953 (British And Colonial Regiments). Naval and Military Press. pp. 3–5. ISBN 978-1843426943.
- ISBN 978-0-8117-1460-0.
- ISBN 978-1-84574-056-6. Retrieved 29 June 2015.
- Grehan, John; Mace, Martin (2014). The BEF in France 1939-1940: Manning the Front Through to the Dunkirk Evacuation. Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 978-1783462117.
- ISBN 978-0192805508.
- Murland, Jerry (2016). Battle for the Escaut 1940: The France and Flanders Campaign. Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 978-1473852617.
- Rowe, V. (1959). The Great Wall of France: The Triumph of the Maginot Line (1st ed.). London: Putnam. OCLC 773604722.
- Sebag-Montefiore, H. (2007). Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man. London: Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-102437-0.
- Smalley, Edward (2015). The British Expeditionary Force, 1939-40. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 23. ISBN 978-1349504787.
- Smith, Peter (2011). The Junkers Ju 87 Stuka: A Complete History. London: Crecy. ISBN 978-0-85979-156-4.
- Thompson, Julian (2009). Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory. London: Pan Books. ISBN 978-0-330-43796-7.