Operation Steinbock
Operation Steinbock | |||||||
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Part of Air Marshal Sir Roderic Hill inspects the wreckage of a Junkers Ju 188 E-1 belonging to 2. Staffel Kampfgeschwader 6 (Bomber Wing 6) which crashed in Shopland, Essex, 21 March 1944. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
United Kingdom | Germany | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Roderic Hill Frederick Alfred Pile |
Dietrich Peltz Hugo Sperrle | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
~ 25 squadrons | 524 bombers[2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Aircraft 1 destroyed in combat[3] 1,556 civilians killed |
Aircraft 329 destroyed[1] |
Operation Steinbock or Operation Capricorn (
In late 1943, the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive was gathering momentum against Germany. The Allied air forces were conducting a strategic bombing campaign day and night against German industrial cities. In retaliation, Adolf Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to prepare a bombing operation against the United Kingdom. The bombing offensive also served as propaganda value for the German public and domestic consumption. The operation ran parallel to Bomber Command's campaign against Berlin (November 1943 – March 1944).
The Luftwaffe assembled 474
Eventually, the revenge attacks gave way to attempts to disrupt preparations for the impending Allied invasion of France, but Steinbock had worn down the offensive power of the Luftwaffe to the extent it could not mount any significant counterattacks when the
Background
By the end of 1943 the Allied
Genesis of Steinbock
Kammhuber's efforts were damaged by the amateurish leadership style of
At the top of the German High Command (
Göring was also reluctant to allocate resources to the defence of Germany for other reasons. He argued that the German people had survived before there were cities and that the
The strategic dilemma facing the Luftwaffe in the winter of 1943–1944 was a serious one. The
Never before and never again did I witness such determination and agreement among the circle of those responsible for the leadership of the Luftwaffe. It was as though under the impact of the Hamburg catastrophe everyone put aside either personal or departmental ambitions. There was no conflict between the General Staff and the war industry, no rivalry between bombers and fighters; only the common will to do everything in this critical hour for the Defence of the Reich.[16][citation needed]
Milch proposed accelerating fighter production to 2,000 per month. The defence of the Reich was to take priority and the Eastern Front air units would have to cope until the threat from Bomber Command, the American
We were met with a shattering picture. Göring had completely broken down. With his head buried in his arms on the table he moaned some indistinguishable words. We stood there for some time in embarrassment until at last he pulled himself together and said we were witnessing the deepest moments of despair. The Führer had lost faith in him. All the suggestions from which he had expected a radical change in the situation of war in the air had been rejected; the Führer had announced that the Luftwaffe had disappointed him too often, and a change over from the offensive to defensive in the air against England was out of the question.[16][citation needed]
After a time Göring U-turned. Göring announced that the only way to stop such destruction was to initiate heavy retaliatory strikes at the enemy so that they would not dare risk another raid like Hamburg without the fear of similar retribution. Göring gave Peltz the authorisation to pool the necessary resources together for retaliatory action.[18][citation needed]
On 28 November 1943, Generalmajor Peltz was summoned to a conference where Göring officially informed him that he was to be placed in command of a renewed large-scale bombing operation against Britain, and London in particular.[19][20] As the conference ended, Göring asked Peltz if older types such as the Dornier Do 217 were still adequate for bombing operations. Peltz replied that he would be happy with anything that could carry a bomb.[21]
It was hoped that the operation would commence during December, and though this proved unrealistic, by the third week of January 1944 a force approaching 600 aircraft had been amassed by stripping five Kampfgruppen (bomber groups) from the
German forces
Three years after the Blitz, the Luftwaffe still possessed a mix of first-generation
The Do 217 and Ju 88A-4 carried the burden of operations. These designs had been in use for operations over Britain from 1941/42 and had been used extensively by
The two machines mounted adequate defensive firepower – four to six
The German bombers were afforded some protection in the form of the new, mid-VHF band
Apart from the numbers of conventional medium and heavy bombers, the Luftwaffe also employed a number of fast bomber types such as the Ju 88S-1 — a streamlined version of the Ju 88A using unitized BMW 801 radials and omitting the Bola undernose gondola — the
Luftflotte 3, under the command of Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle was to carry out the bulk of the operation. Göring ordered that Luftflotte 2 transfer control of two gruppen (groups) of Kampfgeschwader 30, one from Kampfgeschwader 54, and Kampfgeschwader 76 to Luftflotte 3. II./Kampfgeschwader 6, I./Kampfgeschwader 100 and I./Kampfgeschwader 51 were also sequestered for Steinbock.[33]
Göring ordered that operational strength was to be maintained in the event of an Allied landing in France and to maintain pressure on Britain and that bombers were to carry a mixed ordnance load, consisting of 70 percent incendiaries and 30 percent high explosive bombs—including large 1 t (1.1 short tons) bombs and mines for maximum destruction.[22][33] German bombers were to be well-dispersed and parked in revetments. Dummy airfields were set up in accordance with Göring's orders. The Reichsmarschall was now fully aware of British night fighter intruder operations and the threat of Allied bombing attacks.[33] From June to December 1943, German bomber losses in 17 major attacks in England amounted to 48 aircraft in 948 sorties, a loss rate of 5.06 percent. RAF defences were far stronger than in 1941 and German losses would have been higher if operations not been restricted to coastal rather than inland targets.[34]
Order of battle
The following is a list of the German bomber units ready to participate in Steinbock on 20 January 1944:[35]
Unit | Type | Strength | Serviceable | Location |
---|---|---|---|---|
Stab./Kampfgeschwader 2 | Do 217 | 3 | 3 | Zeist, Netherlands[36] |
I./Kampfgeschwader 2 | Do 217 | 3 | 3 | Eindhoven, Netherlands[37] |
II./Kampfgeschwader 2 | Ju 188 | 35 | 35 | Münster–Handorf, Germany[38] |
III./Kampfgeschwader 2 | Do 217 and Ju 188 | 38 | 36 | Gilze en Rijen, Netherlands[39] |
V./Kampfgeschwader 2 | Me 410 | 27 | 25 | Laon–Athies, Somme, France[40] |
Stab./Kampfgeschwader 6 | Ju 188 | 3 | 3 | Melsbroek, Belgium[41]
|
I./Kampfgeschwader 6 | Ju 188 | 41 | 41 | Chièvres, Belgium[42] |
II./Kampfgeschwader 6 | Ju 88 | 39 | 39 | Le Culot, Belgium[43] |
III./Kampfgeschwader 6 | Do 217 | 41 | 37 | Brussels–Melsbroek, Belgium[44] |
II./Kampfgeschwader 30 | Ju 88 | 36 | 31 | Sint-Truiden, Belgium[45] |
I. & II./Kampfgeschwader 40 | He 177A-3 | 15 | 15 (1 Staffel) | Châteaudun, France[46][47] |
Stab./Kampfgeschwader 54 | Ju 88 | 3 | 3 | Marx, south-west of Wilhelmshaven, Germany[48] |
I./Kampfgeschwader 54 | Ju 88 | 36 | 25 | Wittmund–Jever, Germany[49] |
II./Kampfgeschwader 54 | Ju 88 | 33 | 33 | Marx, south-west of Wilhelmshaven, Germany[50] |
I./Kampfgeschwader 66 | Ju 88, Do 217 and Ju 188 | 45 | 23 | Montdidier, Somme, Avord, Bourges, France[51] |
Stab./Kampfgeschwader 76 | Ju 88 | 5 | 4 | Alt–Lönnewitz[52] |
I./Kampfgeschwader 100 | He 177A-3 | 31 | 27 (2 Staffeln) | Châteaudun, France[53][47] |
Schnellkampfgeschwader 10 | Fw 190 | 25 | 20 |
The composition of the force was never static. Bomber units were disbanded, pulled out for refits and conversions, or redeployed to other theatres of operation as the situation demanded. By mid-March, Peltz's force had 232 serviceable aircraft, as 3./KG 2 was withdrawn for conversion to the Ju 188, while III./KG 30, along with II. and III. Gruppen, KG 6 were redeployed to support the occupation of Hungary.[54]
-
The Ju 88 was still the mainstay of the German bomber force in 1944
-
The Do 217 was also available in numbers for Steinbock
Tactics
The nature of the air war had changed significantly since 1941 and German bomber crews implemented new tactics. In the Blitz, German bombers were dispatched individually rather than in formation. Each Gruppe had been briefed to take off and bomb the target over a period of time extending anywhere up to ten hours. The intention was to place the British Civil Defence Authority and
In 1944, in contrast to British crews who climbed to operating altitude over Britain and maintained it until back in British skies, German crews crossed the English Channel or North Sea at low altitude to designated crossing points in loose formation known as the bomber stream. German crews, like those in RAF Bomber Command, operated the bomber stream tactic in the face of vastly improved night fighter defences. Only then would they ascend to operational altitude. Once this ceiling was reached, the pilot began a shallow diving attitude which was to be maintained beyond the target until the bomber had reached the prearranged minimum. This minimum height was maintained until landing.[55]
Navigational aids were available to crews in 1944. The 1940 original, Knickebein (crooked leg) stations, produced two interlocking beams. The bomber flew along one beam and released the bomb load where the two beams joined. This was followed by X-Verfahren which was also a multi-beam system. X-Verfahren provided information to the pilot and observer as to the distance to the target which culminated in the automatic release of the bombs when overhead. Y-Verfahren was the final system which operated on a single-beam basis. A ground controller monitored the aircraft and transmitted navigational guidance to the crew until the point the bombs were to be released. To further aid German navigation, I./KG 66—a special pathfinder unit—used a number of captured British GEE sets and by 2 January 1944 five of these devices were fitted to the unit's aircraft. The Luftwaffe named the devices Hyperbel Gerät (hyperbola device), but marked them Truhe Gerät (chest device).[55][58]
At the beginning of 1944 a similar navigation aid codenamed Egon was available to the Luftwaffe which was similar to Oboe. A high-powered IFF transponder in the aircraft was activated by pulses transmitted by two Freya radar from stations in France and the Low Countries. A coding device identified each aircraft and their progress was continuously plotted by range and bearing information supplied by the first Freya. Course corrections and flare release orders were usually passed on by R/T. The second Freya interjected to issue bombing instructions when it predicted the bomber was over the target.[59]
Once crews had reached the target area they would find it marked. The first method of target–marking was the Ablauflinie (final approach) method. It was used only when the target was fully visible. The pathfinder would mark the area using incendiary bombs at right angles to the approach and six kilometres from the edge of the planned aiming point. The crews then made a timed bomb-run when level with this (visual) line. The initial waves unloaded incendiaries on the lateral fringes of the target area to supplement the pathfinder flares. If the airspace was semi-over cast or when cloud cover was no greater than 6/10ths, a different tactic was used. Seven alternating white and coloured flares would be released along the approaches. As before, the distance of the line's start point was to be six kilometres from the target area. Each pilot was to use a target marker as their aiming point. The pilot glided to approach and released the bombs via stop-watch; the time of delay was decided at the briefing. This was known as the Leuchtpfad (path of light) method.[55]
The short life-span of sky-marker flares meant the initial layout over the target had to be renewed for successive waves, with a different pattern for each wave. When the bomber wave fell behind or the flare faded pathfinders were briefed to lay a line of coloured flares along a 90 degree angle to the wind direction, after which target-re-illumination would be made in the same colours. If the pattern was incorrectly marked the crew were to release a second flare directly beside it. This was not easy to achieve, prolonged the bomber's orbit over the target area, and increased the pressure on crews.[55]
The weaponry used in Steinbock was similar to that in the RAF armoury.
For Steinbock, bombers were to use the heavy bombs primarily. Bombs of lesser power, such as the 500 kg, were only to be used to bring each aircraft's bomb load to maximum capacity.[63] The Luftwaffe did have some blockbuster weight-class (two short tons/4,000 lb) ordnance designs ready for use: the largest bomb in use at this time was the SC1800. It weighed 1,767–1,879 kg (3,896–4,142 lb) of which 1,000 to 1,100 kg (2,200 to 2,400 lb) was high explosive detonated by an electrical impact fuse. The bomb was specifically designed to destroy buildings and it had a high-pressure blast wave.[64] It was due to be replaced by the SC2000 which weighed in at circa 2,000 kg (4,400 lb) but it was produced in small numbers and no reliable information is available on explosive weight or filling.[65] SC2500s were also known to have been used during Steinbock and were carried by the He 177A-3s used in the campaign.[66][citation needed]
The Lorenz blind-landing equipment had been the basis for the Knickebein although results were disappointing, partly because British countermeasures spearheaded by No. 80 Wing RAF under the command of Edward Addison which inhibited its use as a bombing aid. A similar adaptation of existing equipment in the form of I.F.F sets (FuG 25 and FuG 25a Erstling) brought into existence Egonverfahren, a ground-control procedure for crews on bomber operations. For Steinbock it was made available to the pathfinder unit I./KG 66.[67]
The system was based upon signals radiated by the FuG 25 and picked up by two Freya stations. The operator of the first Freya plotted the course of the bomber and the second Freya took over for the final bomb/flare release run. Operators transmitted information by Morse code using terminology borrowed from the night fighter force. Prior to take-off, crews were given a course and height to the target. The height was rigidly adhered to since it could not be checked by ground control. After take-off the FuG 25 was switched on and the first Freya plotted the aircraft's course using the single letter recognition code transmitted from the bomber. The range and bearing was passed by the Freya operators to the plotting table. The plotting table was a transparent map of the operations area laid on a glass screen. The bomber was represented by a red spot from a projector connected to the Freya. The pathfinder's course could be observed and corrected. Course correction instructions were picked up in the aircraft through a FuG 16 set.[68]
The crew were equipped with a list of twelve orders which were submitted through R/T or W/T (each method having its own specific code) with each code having the same meaning. The twelve codes communicated several different orders which included: informing the crew they were being plotted; change of bearing; degree of bearings (made in multiples of five); port or starboard turns; height; straight and level course; open bombs doors; pre-release signal; bomb or flare release; acknowledgement of signal; return home. The crew responded by switching the set off for three to four seconds to acknowledge receipt of the signal or repeatedly switched off the FuG 25 to indicate they had not received it.[68]
When the British radio counter-measures began to interfere with messages the Luftwaffe broadcast in both W/T and R/T format over two channels. The FuG 16 would handle incoming transmissions from the R/T frequencies and the W/T messages were received by the Peilgerät (PeilG) 6 (codenamed "Alex Sniatkowski")
British defences
The RAF was warned of an impending attack on 23 December 1943 by Ultra. The Germans had been hoping to use V-1 flying bombs but the attack on Kassel in October 1943 had forced the abandonment of the Fieseler factory where the pilot series was constructed. The missile prototypes proved disappointing in tests and RAF intelligence discovered that the Luftwaffe was assembling a large conventional bomber fleet in western Europe for an attack.[69]
In late 1943, the RAF was reorganised and night fighter duties were made the responsibility of Fighter Command (
Fighter Command had sixteen squadrons of
Four night fighter squadrons were still operating AI Mk V sets, in which the pilot had a screen as well as the AI operator, which encouraged him to divert his gaze from scanning the sky for targets. AI Mk V was dependent on the operator to give instructions to the pilot on heading, speed, and altitude to intercept a contact until in visual range.
Tactics
Mosquito and Beaufighter night fighters approached the six o'clock position to attack. The slipstream of the target could complicate the approach by creating turbulence and throw the pilot off his aim if he approached at the same level and more experienced fighter pilots approached from behind and slightly below. The outline of the night fighter could be obscured from the German crew and enable them to avoid the worst effects of the bomber slipstream. It became standard practice for the pilot to close on the bomber and match its speed, then lift the nose and fire ahead of the enemy aircraft so that it flew into the gunfire.[73] Night fighter pilots cooperated with search lights and ground control until the interception could be taken over by the radar operator. From 1942 night fighter–searchlight cooperation was reorganised into a 'box' system. A box of air 44 miles (71 km) wide and 14 miles (23 km) long was created in which a night fighter circled a vertical searchlight beam (or beacon). If a German aircraft entered the box searchlights converged on the raider. The GCI could put the night fighter within a mile of the bomber and the remainder of the interception would be handled by the crew using their AI set. A variation was the Smack Interception method, which had been devised for single-engined fighters without airborne radar. When the intruder was detected, the night fighter was scrambled and orbited the beacon. When the raider neared the area, the beacon would depress by roughly 20 degrees in the direction the fighter was to head in the hope of achieving an interception. The radar equipped-night fighters improved the chances of detecting the enemy and GCI could also help.[74][75]
Order of battle
A list of the squadrons operating Mosquito and Beaufighter night fighters at the time of Steinbock:[76] All units participated in Home Defence, with some also operating as intruder squadrons in support of Bomber Command and also against Steinbock incursions. The following claims were made between 21 January and 29 May 1944.[77]
Unit | Type | Location | Notes | Claims during Steinbock |
---|---|---|---|---|
No. 25 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Acklington | Squadron used mainly for intruder and escort operations supporting Bomber Command.[78] | 17[77] |
No. 29 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Ford and RAF Drem
|
Led by Wing commander George Powell-Shedden. Converted from Beaufighters in May 1943.[79] Transferred to the RAF Second Tactical Air Force on 1 May 1944.[80] | 10[77] |
No. 68 Squadron RAF | Mosquito/Beaufighter | RAF Fairwood Common | Formed on 7 February 1941 and remained on Home Defence duties until disbanded on 20 April 1945.[81] | No claims by Mosquito pilots[77] 4 claims by Beaufighter pilots[82] |
No. 85 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Debden | Led by Wing commander John Cunningham. 85 Squadron was veteran night fighter formation since 1940. | 15[77] |
No. 23 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | Returning from Malta | Returned to England in May 1944 and joined No. 100 Group RAF in June.[83] | No claims[77] |
No. 125 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Hurn | Formed at RAF Colerne on 16 June 1941. Operated as Home Defence and intruder unit.[84] | 10[77] |
No. 151 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Predannack
|
Reformed from day to night fighters, November 1940. It operated in the escort, Home Defence and intruder role.[85] | 10[77] |
No. 219 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Honiley and Colerne | Initially assigned to protecting shipping. On 21 February 1940, was converted to night fighters.[86] | 1[77] |
No. 157 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Predannack | The first unit to be equipped with Mosquito night fighters. Began Home Defence duties on 27 April 1943.[87] | 3[77] |
No. 169 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Little Snoring | Formed at RAF Twinwood on 15 June 1942 as a tactical reconnaissance unit. Converted to night fighting in 1943.[88] | 12[77] |
No. 264 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Church Fenton | An experienced night fighter squadron since 1940. In 1943 and 1944 it flew day and night intruder flights over France and the Bay of Biscay.[89] | 3[77] |
No. 307 Polish Night Fighter Squadron | Mosquito | RAF Drem | Formed on 5 September 1940 from former Polish Air Force personnel, it was a night fighter unit from formation.[90] | 1[77] |
No. 604 Squadron RAF | Beaufighter and Mosquito | RAF Church Fenton | Developed as a night fighter squadron in September 1940. It was one of the first to receive airborne radar. In April it received Mosquitos which operated alongside the older Beaufighters.[91] Transferred to RAF Second Tactical Air Force on 26 April 1944.[80] | 3[77] |
No. 409 Squadron RCAF | Mosquito/Beaufighter | RAF Hunsdon
|
409 Squadron was staffed with Canadian personnel. It was seconded to the RAF Second Tactical Air Force in the intruder role. It participated in Home Defence in 1944 until 30 March when it transferred to the RAF Second Tactical Air Force and re-equipped with Mosquitos.[80] | No claims[77] |
No. 418 Squadron RCAF
|
Mosquito | RAF Ford and RAF Holmsley | 418 was unique among units seconded to the RAF. Though allotted to the intruder role, the squadron was not equipped with airborne radar as it targeted German night fighter airfields. | Two claims[77] 36 claims on intruder sorties[77] |
No. 488 Squadron RNZAF | Mosquito | RAF Colerne and RAF Zeals | Formed on 25 June 1942 as a night fighter unit. It remained on Home Defence until 12 May 1944, when it was allocated to the RAF Second Tactical Air Force.[80] | 15[77] |
No. 96 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Cranage | Led by Wing commander | 23[77] |
No. 125 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Valley | Reformed on 16 June 1941 the squadron was assigned to Home Defence for the duration of Steinbock.[93] | 10[77] |
No. 141 Squadron RAF | Mosquito/Beaufighter | RAF West Raynham | 141 Squadron was a former day fighter squadron converted to night fighters in 1941. It was a veteran formation operating in the intruder capacity. Joined No. 100 Group RAF on 4 December 1943.[94] | 12 claims on intruder operations (two possible claims opposing Steinbock)[77] |
No. 410 Squadron RCAF
|
Mosquito | RAF West Malling | Moved to West Malling in October 1943. Operated exclusively in Home Defence roles in 1943 and 1944.[95] 410 transferred to the RAF Second Tactical Air Force on 12 May 1944.[80] | 15[77] |
No. 515 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Little Snoring | Formed on 1 October 1942. Operated Boulton Paul Defiant and Bristol Blenheim until December 1943. Equipped with Mosquitos at the end of 1943.[96] | 3[77] |
No. 605 Squadron RAF | Mosquito | RAF Bradwell Bay and RAF Manston | Served in India and the Far East from 1942 before returning to Britain. During Steinbock it operated in Home Defence and intruder roles.[97] | 6 intruder claims over Belgium and France[77] A further 6 claims unrelated to Steinbock[77] |
No. 456 Squadron RAAF | Mosquito | RAF Fairwood Common and RAF Ford | Led by Wing commander Keith Hampshire, the squadron's leading night fighter pilot. 456 was a Royal Australian Air Force unit, formed in June 1941 and deactivated in June 1945. | 20 claims against Steinbock operations[77] |
No. 406 Squadron RCAF | Beaufighter | RAF Predannack | The squadron was formed at RAF Acklington on 5 May 1941 (No. 12 Group) to operate as night fighters. | 3[98] |
-
Mosquito NF Mark XIII, HK382 'RO-T', 29 Squadron, at Hunsdon,AI Mk. VIII radarcentimetric radar is fitted
-
A mobile GL Mk. III radar set, capable of gun laying (predictive fire)
The operation
January
2–15 January
The Luftwaffe was already in action on night operations over Britain before Steinbock was formally initiated. The first intrusions into British airspace in 1944 occurred on the night of the 2/3 January. Me 410s from KG 2 and Fw 190s from SKG 10 penetrated into
On the night of the 4/5 January six children and four adults were killed when the Luftwaffe targeted Westcott, Surrey. Five of the attackers were lost, three of them falling to the RAF (85 and 96 Squadrons).[c] German air activity continued from 13 to 15 January. Five more civilians were killed and 33 injured. Two Me 410s, a Ju 188, two Ju 88s and two Fw 190s were lost. Only two of the raiders are known to have fallen to enemy action.[101]
First attack
The first attack on London was mounted on the night of 21/22 January.[102] Just twenty-four hours earlier nearly 800 British bombers had struck Berlin. Codenamed Unternehmen Mars (Operation Mars), sections of the British capital were given codenames after devastated German cities—Berlin, Hamburg, Hannover—to emphasise the retaliatory nature of the operation for the air crews.[102] The first target—Waterloo—was codenamed München (Munich).[103]
Peltz ordered the units, based on 14 airfields from Soesterberg in the Netherlands, St. Trond east of Brussels, Belgium and Montdidier near Paris to operational readiness. Peltz drove to Châteaudun, the forward operating base of I./KG 40 and I./KG 100 equipped with the Heinkel He 177A-3 — committed to their first operations deep into British airspace. There, he notified the senior commanders Geschwaderkommodore (Wing Commanders) Oberst Rupprecht Heyn and Oberstleutnant Bernhard Jope that the attack was to be executed in three waves. Peltz also notified those units in Germany that they were to transfer to their forward bases. They were to return to their forward base after the first sortie but were ordered to relocate to Germany directly after the second to avoid night intruders and Allied bombers.[104]
II./KG 54 and I./KG 76 were an example of this caution, moving out from Marx to Laon and Varrelbusch to Laon respectively. The nomadic methods of the Luftwaffe during Steinbock complicated preparations. Airfield staff were given short notice and insufficient time to prepare airfields to accept the bombers. Only one Ju 188 from KG 2 took part in the first operation because of administrative failings.[104]
The first raid was on München—the Waterloo area of London. The attack was to be carried out using Leuchtpfad tactics—with the target marked with incendiaries. Pathfinders were expected to carry out plotting easily, since the weather forecast the necessary visibility. On the first night Egon and Y-Verfahren were available to pinpoint the target with flares. From Montdidier, Staffelkapitän
Despite the extensive use of Düppel and pathfinders, German navigation errors were rife: only 15 bombers attacked London.
The Luftwaffe lost 18 bombers, three over Britain, seven at sea and eight over Europe.
Second wave
A second wave was dispatched in the early hours of the morning. The weather deteriorated and cloud led to the use of Y-Verfahren—electronic aids—to enable the pathfinders to reach the target area. British counter measures usually disrupted the signals at this point; it is not clear whether British jamming was effective but the first results were repeated. Barely half the 200 bombers crossed the English coast and only 25 were judged to have released their bombs on London.[107]
The experience of I./KG 76, perhaps underlined the problems crews faced on the night. After take-off from Laon/Couvron, their route was fixed at 232° true to a radio beacon (funkfeuer) at
The second wave lost another 18 bombers plus two on non-operational sorties. KG 2 was particularly hard hit, losing six aircraft—four Do 217s, a Ju 188 and an Me 410 and KG 6 lost five. Night fighters were thought to have shot down four bombers and two fell to ground fire; the fate of the others remains unknown.[108][109] Personnel losses amounted to 49 killed and missing in action, five wounded in action and six prisoners of war; the remainder reached German territory uninjured.[106] Fighter Command Mosquito squadrons claimed 10 German aircraft destroyed and two probables on 21/22 January 1944.[110]
The damage done was small: four fires, 74 civilians killed, 12 seriously injured and five wounded.
British reports stated minor damage was done to essential locations. The most serious damage to a factory occurred to Vickers Armstrong, based in Dartford. The factory was producing shells and fuse fillings. Three high explosives destroyed the General Store; destroyed a light fitting shop; destroyed the magnesium stores; severed the gas and sewage mains outside the works and cut the telephone lines. Gas supplies were reduced to 50 percent and two days of production were lost. The Royal Arsenal at Woolwich was also damaged, causing fires. Some railway lines were damaged or threatened by unexploded bombs, which forced speed restrictions of five mph.[114]
Second operation
On 28/29 January 16 Me 410s and 10 Fw 190s made attacks without effect and loss. One Mosquito was lost when it crashed into the sea after an engine caught fire. A Junkers Ju 52 was shot down by a night fighter over Spa, Belgium with the loss of 23 ground personnel belonging to KG 6.[115]
Eight days later, Steinbock was renewed with 11 Gruppen. II./KG 2 made its debut and II. and III./KG 30 participated but would not feature again until 14/15 March. The He 177s of I./KG 40 were permanently withdrawn. In addition I./KG 100 and I./SKG 10 were absent, probably because of their participation the previous night.[116]
I./KG 54 were ordered to attack the districts east of
KG 6 began their operation from Vechta in Germany. II./KG 6 took a path similar to KG 54 with the exception they would head to their normal operating base at Le Culot. The group flew a loose formation and did not reach oxygen-altitude until 90 minutes after take-off. I./KG 76 headed for their Funkfeuer near the German–Dutch border. From there, they used navigational aids. This formation was to return to Varrelbusch in Germany and were to land in France only if bad weather intervened.[116]
Only 15 to 30 bombers from the night's groups struck the target. Nevertheless, the small number of aircraft caused 145 fires—four classified as medium and 141 small—and killed 41 civilians including one soldier on leave. At
Seven KG 6 bombers were lost—with only one crew from 4. Staffel surviving a crash landing in Belgium. KG 2 lost two bombers, KG 40 one, KG 54 four, and KG 66 and KG 76 lost one each. Three were probably downed by night fighters and another was lost to ground fire. 53 airmen were killed or missing and six were captured.[116][119]
Hitler was reportedly outraged that the Luftwaffe failed to find London though it was only 150–200 km (93–124 mi) from German ground control stations while the British were hitting German towns, not just city targets, from 1,000 km (620 mi) away in bad weather. Peltz responded that the failures owed as much to the Luftwaffe's lack of interference-free radio and navigational aids as to untrained crews, and that the British with their
The lack of dedicated pathfinder units also caused navigational problems, as the few aircraft employed in this role were more at risk from electronic counter-measures and fighter interception. The heavy British defences forced the Luftwaffe to fly meandering 'dog-leg' courses and inexperienced German crews quickly got lost. Reconnaissance flights over England had also stopped, which prevented the Luftwaffe from gathering intelligence on British radar and radio frequency bands.[120]
February
Third major attack
The first operation of February occurred on the 3rd and 4th of the month. I./KG 100 and SKG 10 mustered 26 Me 410s and 19 Fw 190s which crossed the Channel between 19:00 and 19:30. They released a mix of SC250 and SC500 bombs and two Fw 190s failed to return. The second wave took off on the night of the 4th from 04:25 with their operation lasting 95 minutes. German propaganda claimed 210 of the 235 bombers struck their targets and caused large fires and the communiqué derided British defences as weak.[121]
The report was exaggerated. British sources showed the attacks to be scattered, with areas as far as
Only 25 of the 190 ton of bombs released fell on London. Fires were started in Hackney,
The Luftwaffe command viewed the night's operation with alarm. Of the 15 bombers lost, only one fell in Britain and one crashed in Belgium. The remaining 11 presumably vanished over the sea. KG 6 bore the brunt of the losses as six of its aircraft were lost and one damaged. KG 2 and KG 54 lost two respectively and KG 6 lost one machine. One of the missing aircraft, Ju 88, 2./KG 54, code B3+EK piloted by
Further failure
On 13/14 February II./KG 54 and SKG 10 were left off the operations roster but all the other 10 groups were available for a large-scale thrust. German sources indicate that 230 crews took part in the night's operation.[125]
Peltz was aware that Steinbock was not materialising as Hitler and Göring had hoped. He personally visited I./KG 100 which had prepared its He 177s as to be mostly operational. He spoke with Geschwaderkommodore Bernhard Jope and his crews for a second time. One aspect of his speech to the crews was to play down the threat of British night fighters. He claimed that only 30 British crews operated against the raid of the 3/4 February and that only a third were under GCI. His remarks were likely a morale booster rather than rooted in fact. It was true that Fighter Command night fighter forces were smaller than its Nachtjagd counterpart defending the continent, but German bombers were arriving in much smaller numbers.[125]
The temperature at Châteaudun was chilly but Peltz observed the He 177s being readied for take-off. Because of the conditions, the ground crews began the cold start procedure. This decision had dire consequences for the operation. One bomber remained grounded because of a burst tyre but the other 13 took off without incident. Within a short time Peltz was informed that eight pilots had aborted the mission because of over-heating engines, which in some instances caught fire.[125]
Around 70 percent of the German force was tracked by the British but once again only 15 of the dispersed bombers hit the London area. On this night the holiday resort of Clacton-on-Sea and St Osyth were badly damaged.[126] A cinema and several commercial premises were destroyed and a farmer lost a large number of livestock: six horses, 30 cows and 17 ewes. They caused 14 medium and 84 small fires, mostly in East Anglia.[125] Casualties in London amounted to one killed and six seriously injured. Overall, there were seven killed, 11 seriously wounded and two missing believed dead amongst the civilian population. Four tons of bombs was dropped on London and 157 in Kent and Essex. The number of bombs counted on land was 57,525—most of which were incendiaries.[125]
10 German bombers were lost—one each to
Returning German pilots reported a steady increase in the concentration of gun fire from anti-aircraft batteries over London although this was not reflected by a noticeable increase in losses. At de-briefing pilots reported they did not take any special evasive action but they avoided areas where heavy concentrations of guns and
Steinbock takes effect
On the night of the 18/19 February the Luftwaffe managed to deliver a successful attack on London. According to British intelligence, 175 crews participated. German sources say 184 bombers reached the target area. The attack heralded almost nightly attacks which lasted until the early hours of 24 February. The degree of material damage and human casualties this night reached an all-time high during Steinbock. It was the most damaging single attack since 31 May/1 June 1941.[128]
Integral to the night's operations were I./KG 100 and II. and III./KG 2. The former unit appears to have been relocated from the
The German bomber stream reached the city and bombed accurately. High explosives fell on
Willesden was badly hit; Dollis Hill, the anti-aircraft battery at Gladstone Park, the Heinz factory at Harlesden, St Cuthbert's, Earls Court, West Hampstead, Kensington were all hit. A bridge at Goldhawk Road tube station was destroyed cutting the London Underground between Latimer Road tube station and Hammersmith until 9 March 1944. The Whitelands College was also damaged and the surrounding borough of Putney was hit by a concentration of incendiaries. Water mains were shattered in Whitehall, Battersea, West Hill, Highbury, Chelsea and Wandsworth. In Chingford, over 200 houses were damaged and in Barnes a chemical plant was destroyed.[129]
The Luftwaffe did not escape unscathed. No. 418 (Canadian) Squadron flew an intruder sortie over France that night. Only 3./KG 54 seem to have suffered from intruder Mosquitos, when it lost two shot down near Laon. German losses amounted to nine: four from KG 66, two from KG 54, one from KG 2 and two from KG 6. The Luftwaffe lost 20 men killed, 12 missing and four wounded.[128]
20/21 February
On 20/21 February the sixth Steinbock attack began.
II./KG 54, I./KG 100, I./KG 54, I. and II./KG 2 rendezvoused over the Dutch coast at the Funkfeuer at
The bombers streamed in loose formation between Harwich, Essex and Hythe, Kent. Barely 20 flares exploded over the capital at 21:30 in a scattered manner. They fell along the line of the Thames and Chiswick. Apart from this meagre effort by I./KG 66, most of the 80 bombers identified by British radar reached the capital. The attack started more than 600 fires, caused by a mixture of incendiaries and SC-type bombs ranging from 500 to 1000. Fulham, Putney and Chiswick bore the brunt and most of the 216 fatalities occurred in those boroughs. Had more of the bombers got through, they may have created a firestorm. Aside from the dead, another 417 people were seriously injured.[131]
Kensington was badly damaged, and
The Luftwaffe lost nine bombers—one to a 25 Squadron Mosquito and two anti-aircraft fire: three from KG 2, four from KG 54, one from KG 66 and KG 6. German propaganda quoted a high figure for participating crews (200), and credited 171 with hitting the target. Before day-break, V./KG 2 sent 21 Me 410s which were supported by 13 SKG 10 Fw 190s. The attackers released incendiaries and SC500 bombs with little effect. One Fw 190 was lost. A second attack was carried out by 11 Fw 190s without effect or loss.[131] 22 German airmen were killed, seven captured and seven wounded.[131] Fighter Command claimed one destroyed, one probably destroyed and two damaged.[131]
22–29 February
On 22/23 February 1944, just a few days following the beginning of the American efforts of the "Big Week" strategic bombing campaign, the Luftwaffe organised 185 German bombers to strike at London. KG 6 and 66 carried the burden, with the former putting up 10 extra crews to cover the loss of II./KG 54 which stood down for the evening. All three Gruppen of KG 6 participated. V./KG 2 committed 15 Me 410s. I./KG 100 managed to ready 14 He 177s for the mission. The bomb loads were entirely SC1000 and SC1800 high explosives in the bombers flown by the more experienced crews; the rest were loaded with four SC1000s. At this stage the He 177 Geschwader has shrunk from a Staffel strength of 14 (2./KG 100) and 11 (3./KG 100), although five had been transferred to I./KG 40. The operational strength of the group had fallen to between 12 and 15, barely half of its strength.[133]
The attack affected Hammersmith,
Peltz ordered another attack for the 23/24 February, after the perceived concentrated (and successful) attack the previous night. I./KG 6 sent to 10 crews of the 130 (German sources say 161) and were to begin their attack at 22:00. I./KG 66 were ordered to mark the target area with white flares which were set to burst at 10,000 ft above the cloud layer. All the formations except III./KG 6, which was flying from Belgium, were routed via Evreux and Le Havre, north to High Wycombe where four red flares would mark a turn to the south east across London. This time the target codename "Hamburg", which placed the centre of the attack in the vicinity of the Isle of Dogs. The target area suggests that the intention was to inflict economic losses by striking at London's docks. Yellow flares marked the bombing run at 11,000 ft, and the run-in would be conducting at an altitude of 13,000 ft (4,000 m); reduced down to 3,500 ft (1,100 m) once the city was cleared.[134]
German formations from KG 2 and KG 6 carried a mixed ordnance SC500s, AB500s, AB1000s and BC50s for the attack. Colchester was hit badly by 1,400 incendiaries which started a large fire in the town centre. 15 properties were destroyed and 99 damaged. 75 fire-engines and two million gallons were needed to extinguish the flames. There was only one casualty in the town and no fatalities.[134]
A total of 185 sorties were flown.[135] Five bombers were lost; one to ground fire and another to a 605 Squadron Mosquito. Amongst the losses this night was Do 217M-1, code U5+DK, Werknummer 56051. At 10,000 ft over London the aircraft was hit by predictive fire from the ground. Pilot Oberfeldwebel Hermann Stemann ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft over Wembley and they were promptly captured. The bomber flew on for 60 miles making a near-perfect forced landing north of Cambridge. The intact bomber enabled British intelligence to examine both it, the FuG 214 tail-warning radar and the ordnance on board.[134] Personnel losses amounted to none killed or missing, four wounded and six captured.[134] Fighter Command claimed one destroyed one probably destroyed this night.[134]
The target of the Luftwaffe on 24/25 February was the Westminster area, in particular the government quarter. I./KG 66 was ordered to aid the bomber stream by dropping white flares timed to ignite at 10,000 ft. British intelligence estimated 135 bombers took part in the operation though German records say exactly 170 crews participated. Some German crews had been trained in new bombing techniques. A small number of bomb-aimers were to use their Lotfernrohr 7 bombsights on individual flares to increase the accuracy of the attack. The attack followed the typical pattern; a northerly course, and a turn to the south east at High Wycombe across London and out across the eastern Channel. Pilots were ordered to reach the coast at 16,000 ft and descend to 13,000 ft over the target.[136]
Most of the 100 tons of bombs fell on London, starting around 250 fires and killing 75 people. Most casualties occurred in the borough of Lambeth. Over 2,000 incendiaries fell on Acton Green where 100 houses were damaged. In Acton and Bedford Park 26 people were killed and another 22 civilians died in Balham. Kew Bridge was damaged and 20 homes destroyed in Southgate. There were also many fires in the Camden Town area of London. Railways were damaged and severe restrictions were placed on freight movements in the following days. Bombs just missed the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) headquarters in Bushy Park and damaged Teddington. Bombs also fell near the home of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay.[137]
The Mosquitos of Fighter Command exacted a toll of German crews this night. Nine German bombers were lost, five were shot down by No. 29 Squadron RAF and one to 488 Squadron. A sixth fell to a night fighter but the squadron responsible cannot be identified. Total Fighter Command claims amounted to six destroyed three probably destroyed and four damaged. KG 2 lost four bombers, KG 66 lost two more, KG 6, KG 54 and KG 100 lost a single bomber each. 14 German airmen were captured, 17 killed, one injured and five missing.[138]
In contrast, the "Big Week" campaign's RAF contribution sent some 700 bombers to Schweinfurt on the same night as the Luftwaffe's Westminster-area raid, while the final American large strategic daytime raid of "Big Week" occurred on the 25th, with some 700 four-engined American "heavies" hitting daylight targets in Germany.
There would be no attack for several days, after the American daytime and RAF nocturnal attacks of the Allies' "Big Week" campaign, but Steinbock suffered a blow on 29 February when Gruppenkommandeur, I./KG 66, Major Helmut Fuhrhop was shot down and killed by RAF Hawker Typhoons from No. 609 Squadron RAF while on a transfer flight from Paris to Dreux in Ju 188 3E+KH, belonging to 1. Staffel. All aboard were killed including his two boxer dogs; Oberfeldwebel Alfred Schubert, Alfons Eichschmidt, Walter Rehfeldt, Wilhelm Schachtshabel and Arnold Büttner.[139]
March
1–15 March
On 2/3 March 1944 Peltz ordered another attack. The year's operations had taken their toll and the bomber groups struggled to make many aircraft airworthy. German propaganda claimed 164 crews took part and 131 hit their designated target area. In reality, it was more likely that 70 crews took off against England.[140]
KG 100 was able to get 2. and 3. Staffeln from I. Gruppe into action with their He 177. These units could field only 15 of the heavy bombers for the night's mission. Most, if not all of the He 177s were loaded with four SC1000s. The formation proceeded to Cherbourg, where the funkfeuer acted as a rallying point for a turn north to Watford, and from that way point, south east to London. The target was Victoria Station and the surrounding area, which were marked by red flares. Assisting the bomber crews on the night were three Knickebein and Sonne stations. They were also afforded lux buoys dropped in the Channel.[140]
The use of Knickebein at this point was questioned by crews. The British had developed countermeasures to jam and disrupt the signal since 1940. Crews were also suspicious of it. Some of the more experienced pilots believed the system was compromised and that the signals allowed RAF night fighters to home in on their position. This belief was pervasive at this time but post-war analysis shows this to be a myth. Navigators preferred to abandon cooperation with the Knickebein stations and proceed to the target by dead reckoning. German airmen were helped to identify the London area by large concentrations of searchlights and anti-aircraft fire.[140]
In the night's operation, the Luftwaffe reported the loss of eight aircraft. Among the losses was one He 177 from 2./KG 100, two Ju 188s and a Ju 88 from KG 2 while KG 54 and KG 6 lost one Ju 88 each. Also worthy of note was the loss of one Ju 88 from KG 101, which participated in the night's bombing. Fighter Command claimed four destroyed and three damaged. The seven claims emanated from 456 (one damaged), 605 (three claims; two damaged and one destroyed) and 151 Squadron (three destroyed).[140]
The heavy bombs caused significant damage considering the size of the German force. 900 houses were damaged and 500 people were made homeless. The Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society building in Woolwich and the Siemens works were hit by 700 incendiaries. The City and Guilds of London Art School was badly damaged by incendiary bombs. A string of other areas were hit: Biggin Hill, Welling, Sidcup, Norwood, Catford, Lewisham and Sanderstead. RAF Kidbrooke was struck by bombs which struck and destroyed several hangars. In Rochester 20 homes were destroyed and 100 damaged. Around 300 people were made homeless in the worst attack on the town during the war.[142]
The following days marked a reduction in the scale of operations, but missions were still flown to maintain what pressure the Luftwaffe could. From 4 to 7 March one Me 410, He 177, Ju 88 and Fw 190 were lost: the last three to enemy action.[143]
14/15 March
On the night of the 14/15 March 1944 bomber crews were briefed to attack London again. This time the target was Whitehall with Buckingham Palace being marked out as a special target. The bombers were ordered to congregate over the North Sea, north west of Rotterdam at 16,400 ft (5,000 m). The attacking force was to cross the coast at Leiston and turn south using Cambridge as a waypoint. Once the bombs had been dropped the pilots were ordered to exit British airspace at Beachy Head. For the first time, the Luftwaffe attempted a diversion during Steinbock. Until this operation, deception was limited to the wholesale use of Düppel. Peltz ordered the Fw 190s of SKG 10 to fly a diversion sortie over Plymouth fifteen minutes ahead of the planned attack. Fw 190 pilots carried flares to encourage the British to think that the port town was the primary target.[143]
The operation was poorly executed; bomber units were prompt in getting airborne and the fighters were late. By the time the Fw 190s were closing on Plymouth the vanguard, if not the bulk, of the conventional German bombers were over the English coast in the north east. The mass use of Düppel was rendered ineffective because of the sheer number of British radar units able to scan the skies. It was quickly determined that the main attack was occurring in the north. British radar operators were suspicious of the small number and high speed of the southern intruders, which alerted them to its diversionary function.[143]
The bombers reached the target and dropped their bombs but little damage was done. In the Belgravia district, some damage was done by exploding high explosives. One notable casualty was Muriel Wright, the girlfriend of Ian Fleming the future novelist, who at that time was serving as a naval intelligence officer. A bomb fell through the roof of her apartment and killed her. She was the only casualty in Westminster. Around 162 tons of bombs were dropped on London. 54 boroughs reported 390 fires. Paddington, Westminster, Marylebone, St Pancras and Bloomsbury were damaged. Bombs also fell in Hyde Park. In Drayton Park, Highbury, in the borough of Islington, 26 people were killed, more than half the night's total fatalities. Two bombs damaged 100 houses in Worthing while there were reports of strafing from German aircraft with incendiary rounds which burnt out a furniture depository.[144]
The Luftwaffe lost 19 aircraft. KG 2 lost three bombers, KG 6 lost two while KG 30 lost six. KG 54 lost one bomber while KG 51 lost two Me 410s. SKG 10 suffered the loss of three Fw 190s. Six are known to have been shot down by Mosquitos and another by ground fire. Four further claims of German aircraft destroyed, plus one probable, were made which cannot be attributed to a particular loss. 33 German airmen were posted as killed in action on the operation, 13 were listed as missing while six were captured.[143]
Steinbock turns to Hull
Peltz turned his attention to Northern England for the 19/20 March operation. Hull became the focus for Steinbock this night. The port city was a commercial seaport on the eastern seaboard. It had been heavily bombed in 1941 after suffering little in the 1939 to 1940 period. The city had seen sporadic attacks in 1942 and 1943.[145] The location of the sea hub near the mouth of the Humber provided a sound geographical reference point for aviators, but German crews faced the prospect of a long, arduous journey over the featureless North Sea.[146]
Peltz committed II./KG 30 to the attack but omitted its sister group from the night's mission because of losses sustained in the previous attack. Only I./KG 6 was committed from that Geschwader. Eight Kampfgeschwader took part in the Hull raid. I. and II./KG 2 and I./KG 100 flew out at three separate points approximately 40 miles apart between Noordwijk,
All the Gruppen took a direct path to
RAF controllers detected activity when a radar set at Orby picked up the use of düppel being dropped 90 miles east of Skegness. The düppel screen was 70 miles long and 50 miles wide and eventually penetrated 10 to 12 miles (16 to 19 kilometres) inland. The weather was clear with clouds between 2,500 and 3,500 ft (760 and 1,070 m). Most of the flares were dropped well to the south, possibly due to incorrect assessments of wind strengths. Most of the HE bombs and 40,000 incendiaries were reported to fall in rural Louth and Spilsby.[147]
The 131 bombers made landfall over north
Nine German bombers failed to return. Two are confirmed to have been shot down by Mosquitos from 307 and 264 Squadrons—which accounted for a He 177 from 2./KG 100 flown by Hauptmann Heinrich Müller and the Do 217 of 2./KG 2 flown by Unteroffizier Hans Jakob respectively. Neither crew survived. Humber anti-aircraft batteries accounted for Hauptmann Walter Schmitt's Ju 188. The 2./KG 66 aircraft crashed north of the
German serviceability rates began to drop since the high figures of January. 2 and 3./KG 2 could field only nine Do 217s between them and seven were ready for operations. II./KG 2 could still field 19 Ju 188s with 12 airworthy and III./KG 2 could commit 18 of the 16 on strength. KG 6 could field 14 of 11 Ju 188s and 27 of 40 Ju 88s; KG 30 31 of 41 Ju 88s; KG 40 12 of 28 He 177s and 8 of 53
Return to London
Steinbock operational records show that 144 aircraft were available to attack London on 21/22 March. 123 were credited with having flown sorties on the night. British intelligence suggests that only 95 crossed the coast into England. The diminishing numbers of bombers available was only a part of Peltz' problem. The campaign was having little to zero effect on the Allied war effort nor upon civilian morale. The Luftwaffe effort was not even yielding short-term gains.[149]
I., II. and III./KG 30 were mustered for operations and fielded 40 crews despite previous losses. They were briefed that the Isle of Dogs in the
The Luftwaffe effort was spread over a large area dissipating the effect. Hammersmith to
The Luftwaffe lost 10 bombers on the night. Of all the airmen to be lost, only six ended up as prisoners and another was injured when crash-landing in France; 40 were posted missing or killed. KG 6 and KG 54 lost three bombers each, KG 30 lost two and KG 51 and KG 66 lost one aircraft each—an Me 410 and Ju 88S-1 respectively. Fighter Command claimed five destroyed and four damaged this night: two for 25 Squadron, one for 456 Squadron, and another two for 488 Squadron. 85 Squadron claimed two damaged and 96 Squadron Mosquito claimed a solitary Fw 190 damaged. A Mosquito night fighter also shot down a He 177 form 3./KG 100 over the Rheine this night with all nine men on board killed.[149]
On the next nights the Luftwaffe resorted to hit-and-run tactics using jabos. From 22 to 24 March three Fw 190s were lost with their pilots from SKG 10 and a solitary Ju 88 from I./KG 66 with the loss of one crew member. One Fw 190 and the Ju 88 fell to night fighters.
The Luftwaffe commenced the 24/24 March operation in the same manner as the other massed raids. The bomber groups were aided by searchlights and star shells at the coast to enable them to form into a stream. In this case, possibly adjusted for weather conditions, the formations would reach a maximum altitude of 16,000 ft (4,900 m) before descending to 15,000 ft for the bomb run. Once completed a descent of 2,000 ft (610 m) was ordered to enable them to build up speed and escape the target area. The codename given to the 143 participating crews was Hamburg—the codename for Whitehall.[150]
Once over England searchlights and anti-aircraft fire were observed to be heavy. The guns were backed by a concentrated effort from searchlight beams that swept the sky looking to catch a German aircraft. Over Croydon, a period of 20 minutes elapsed between the air raid siren sounding and the beginning of the barrage. The attack seemed to be aimed at South Croydon and East Croydon. Thornton Heath also attracted a deluge of heavy bombs and incendiaries. West Norwood was also badly damaged. The latter two regions were sent 28 and 70 fire engines to deal with large conflagrations. The bombing also destroyed a public shelter.[151]
In the city of London the landmark St Dunstan-in-the-West church was damaged by fire. Fleet Street, Essex Street, Fetter Lane, Temple and Middle Temple Hall were damaged by bombs. 56 fire engines were required in this location of the city alone. In Beckenham, 60 fires were counted. The fires were so serious that only a firezone was maintained to contain it. Coulsdon and Purley took 6,000 incendiary hits and 2–3,000 fell on Croydon causing over 80 fires. In Shirley, a direct hit on a Home Guard armoury set an entire street ablaze. Total civilian casualties amounted to 20 dead—16 deaths occurring in Croydon. 78 more were injured.[152]
The Germans lost 17 aircraft this night on operations and a further three on non-operational flights; two from KG 6 and one from KG 30. Of the operational casualties four are known to have been caused by ground-fire and a further two were shot down by night fighters—Wing Commander Keith Hampshire (CO of 456 Sqn RAAF) shot down a 6./KG 6 Ju 88 and Flying Officer E. Hedgecoe accounted for a Ju 88S-1 from 1./KG 66. Three were lost due to engine fires, technical issues or fuel starvation. The fate of the remaining 10 are unknown for certain. German aircrew losses amounted to 21 killed, three wounded, 25 missing and five captured.[153]
Fighter Command night fighters made three additional claims which cannot be matched to a particular loss. Successful night fighter pilot Flight lieutenant Branse Burbridge, of 85 Squadron filed two claims for an enemy destroyed and one probably destroyed on this raid.[153]
Attack on Bristol
Operations against London were suspended for the night of 27/28 March. Despite the failure of the Hull attack, another alternative target was selected by Peltz: Bristol. The city possessed a large seaport at Avonmouth which made it an important embarkation point for materials and supplies shipped over from the United States. The port had become a bastion for storing equipment in the build-up to Operation Overlord and a large portion of the United States Army forces in England were based there. Bristol was specifically chosen with this in mind and Steinbock intended to hinder Allied activities.[154]
The participating groups were dispatched to airfields in north western France. Guernsey was chosen as the rendezvous point for the bomber force and it was marked by a cone of six searchlights. A north west route was maintained and landfall was ordered to be made at Lyme Bay. Over the River Usk, flares were to signal a 90 degree turn to Chepstow, where crews would proceed on a southerly route to Bristol. The bomb run varied according to the unit briefing but was intended to take place in an 11–14,500 ft bracket. I./KG 66 marked the target with flares. Four crews from II./KG 2 assisted these operations by hovering around the target and releasing fresh flares during the attack to keep the target area highlighted, should the initial flares burn out.[154]
Two Knickebein stations were available. One of the beams ran south of Bristol the other intersected it at a point between
Target–marking was poor. Of the 139 bombers dispatched 116 got through the defences and six more bombed alternate targets while 16 aborted the sortie. However, not a single bomb landed on the city and the populace remained oblivious to the attack. British intelligence remained ignorant as to the objective of the attack until German radio announced the city of Bristol had been devastated in a bombing raid. The failure of I./KG 66 to mark the target was major contributing factor in the debacle. Most of the bombs fell across Somerset and several hundred unexploded bombs were reported. These sites caused disruption to road traffic as the devices were found and the area was not fully cleared until the end of the year.[154][155]
The Luftwaffe groups reported the loss of 14 aircraft and one damaged. Four belonged to KG 54 and four to KG 6. kg 2, KG 30 and KG 66 lost two aircraft each. Six were known to have been shot down by an assortment of Beaufighter and Mosquito night fighters. 68, 456, 406 and 219 Squadron pilots were credited with enemy aircraft this night. Two bombers were shot down by ground fire, the remainder failed to return for unknown reasons. Fighter Command made three further claims not attributable to a particular loss. A further claim was made by an anti-aircraft battery at Portland. German casualties amounted to 13 killed, one wounded, 16 missing and 19 captured.[154] Wing Commander Keith Hampshire, commanding 456 Squadron RAAF accounted for two enemy aircraft this night—he achieved three successes during Steinbock.[156]
April
5–26 April
German air groups flew few sorties in the first few days of April but sustained a small number losses on non-operational flights. On 12/13 April 1944 an Me 410 from 3./KG 51 was shot down by
On 18/19 April the Luftwaffe prepared an attack on London using the same approach as the Bristol operation. I./KG 6 and II./KG 2 marked the target area from 8 and 6,000 ft respectively. The bomber stream was ordered to converge on the Funkfeuer at Noordwijk on the Dutch coast. Landfall was marked at Leiston and six Lux buoys were dropped en route to mark the bomber's path. A turning point was ordered at Newmarket. The bomb run was to take place at 10,000 ft (3,000 m) with a gradual descent to Dymchurch and over to Boulogne. Two Knickebein stations at Den Helder and Bergen supported the operations. The Caen, Cherbourg and Morlaix stations were also in use for this operation as the Luftwaffe made greater attempts to improve navigation.[68]
Adequate conditions prevailed but only 53 of the 125 crews crossed the English coast, although most of those did get through to London. The poor showing was probably a result of flares not being released over London or at Newmarket. The raid cost the Luftwaffe 17 bombers—KG 2 lost four bombers (three Ju 188s and a Do 217), KG 6 lost four Ju 88s, KG 54 lost four Ju 88s, KG 51 lost three Me 410s, KG 30, KG 66 and KG 100 each lost an aircraft. Seven bombers were shot down by Mosquitos from
On the night of 23/24 April 1944 Peltz once again targeted Bristol after the previous raid's farcical execution. The Luftwaffe was able to ready 117 bombers for the second operation. II./KG 30 sent all of its three Staffeln to Orly for the attack, but once there, one-third of the aircrews were left behind. The unit was able to maintain its complement of crews at 30, but previous losses meant the number of experienced crews had declined and novice crews were now populating the Staffel. This problem was not uncommon on the Steinbock units. Peltz ordered at least three Knickebein stations to assist the bombers. The bomber stream was assigned an altitude of 16,000 ft (4,900 m) and was to bomb at that level.[157]
As the raid progressed it became clear that the debacle of the first raid was repeating itself. Bristol was not hit. Instead, British radar noted that as the German wave approached the coast, 35 of the German raiders dropped their loads over or next to Poole or Bournemouth. The Luftwaffe suffered the loss of 13 aircraft; KG 2 lost three, KG 6 one, KG 30 three, KG 54 five and KGr 101 lost a single machine. German personnel losses were 33 missing, 12 killed and three captured. Two were certainly shot down by night fighters and one to ground-fire. The fate of the remaining 10 are unknown, however Fighter Command pilots claimed another four which cannot be attributed to a particular loss. 125 Squadron made six claims this night. Wing Commander Hampshire of 456 made another claim as did a No. 406 Squadron RCAF Beaufighter.[158]
By April 1944 the preparations for Overlord were well underway. The Luftwaffe had not been able to observe and counter the Allied buildup. RAF Fighter Command masked the invasion ports from the German reconnaissance units by day. The Germans resorted to using 1./Aufklärungsgruppe 121 (Long Range Reconnaissance Group 121), equipped with Me 410s, to fly from bases near Paris and observe the results of raids by night. These operations failed. Nevertheless, 1./Aufklärungsgruppe 122 (Long Range Reconnaissance Group 121) was ordered to support and record the damage of four consecutive night raids on Portsmouth which began on 25/26 April. The raids also failed, even against a coastal target which was easier to find. The reconnaissance groups lost two Me 410s—one of which fell to Branse Burbridge from 85 Squadron. Other losses were an Fw 190G-3 from 3./SKG 10, two Ju 88s from KG 2, a Ju 88 from the pathfinder I./KG 66 unit, a He 177 from 3./KG 100 plus two Me 410s from 1(F)/121. Fighter Command claimed four further victories — three by 456 Squadron and one from 125 Squadron.[159]
The following night, 26/27 April, seven German aircraft were lost, four claims being made by Fighter Command. For the night of 29/30 April, the Luftwaffe aimed to attack shipping in the harbour. German intelligence had received information confirming the presence in Plymouth of a King George V-class battleship and the ship was to become the focus of the attack. III./KG 100 was ordered from Toulouse to participate. The Do 217K-2s were armed with Fritz X gravity PGM bombs. KG 66 would illuminate the target area and crews were assigned to carry out the bomb-run along the length of the ship. They were not to drop their bombs if they could not locate a target. The formations used a Knickebein station and a Funkfeuer at Rennes for navigation. Heavy mist, a smoke screen and the failure of KG 66 to light the target on time contributed to the failure. 27 civilians were killed in the attack. The attack was costly for KG 100. Gruppenkommandeur (Group Commander) Hauptmann Herbert Pfeffer was killed with his crew after being shot down by Squadron Leader D. J. Williams of 406 Squadron, the latter's second victory that night.[160]
May
From the 3 to 12 May the air offensive came to a halt with the exception of a few sporadic attacks. The Home Office published “Weekly Appreciation of Damage to Key Points and Progress of Repairs”. It concluded that only one serious injury was recorded and no serious damage to the war effort. The small raids cost the Germans five aircraft, two from KG 54 one from KG 100 and another from KG 51. From 10 to 17 May another report shows that around 80 aircraft were tracked over Britain. It concluded that no appreciable damage was done. It recorded 23 casualties; three serious.[161]
In a practical sense Steinbock was over by the end of April 1944. The number of bombers and selected targets had structurally declined. For the first two weeks of May the offensive wound down. The German bomber groups recuperated and were readied for a renewed assault. For example, KG 2 moved III. Gruppe to Lorient, but it had only one Staffel (7) available as an Allied attack on the base at Achmer depleted it.[162]
The Germans had learned from previous errors. Incendiary bombs were discarded in favour of high explosives. Crews were ordered to ignore the fires on the ground as decoys. Bristol was chosen on the night of the 14/15 May as the target. It had thus far, escaped major damage. The pathfinder group I./KG 6 were told, with KG 2, KG 30, KG 66 and KG 100 would muster 150 aircraft for the operation. Guernsey would be the turning point, marked by four searchlights. The return flight would take them to Cap la Hague, then Brétigny.[163]
The Knickebein proved irrelevant and again, to Luftwaffe crews, Bristol confirmed its "bogey" reputation. Only one-third of the crews were tracked by British radar. A few bombs struck Portsmouth and Southampton. Most crews did not find the target. Eleven bombers were lost, four crashing on land. Four fell to RAF night fighters.[163]
Aftermath
Although the 'Baby Blitz' attacks had involved more Luftwaffe aircraft than any other raids on the UK since 1941, the effectiveness of air and ground defences, the relative inexperience of the German bomber crews, and the sheer lack of bomber numbers meant relatively minor damage and few casualties were inflicted. The initial bomber strength was built up at great expense from the operational requirements of the Luftwaffe. Most bombs failed to reach their targets, and those that did represented only a fraction of what was hitting Germany. The choice to not target the assembly areas for Operation Overlord meant that there was no significant impact on the allied time table for the invasion. The raids were ironically to prove more costly for German capabilities than for the British, draining the Luftwaffe of irreplaceable aircrew and modern aircraft and thus reducing the potential air response to Operation Overlord. After the failure of this conventional bombing campaign, the Nazi leadership sought unconventional ways to attack Britain. This desire was to manifest itself in the V-1 cruise missile and V-2 short-range ballistic missile campaigns later that year.
German losses:
270 Junkers Ju 88s[2]
121 Dornier Do 217s[2]
35 Junkers Ju 188s[2]
46 Heinkel He 177As[2]
27 Messerschmitt Me 410s[2]
25 Focke-Wulf Fw 190s[2]
British losses:
7 to unknown causes[3]
1 destroyed by enemy action[3]
5 damaged by enemy action
1 destroyed by friendly fire[3]
14 lost on intruder operations January–May 1944[3]
Civilian casualties:
1,556 killed
References
Notes
- ^ See Aders for the growth and efficiency of German night fighter defences from May 1942 to July 1943.[6] Aders also analyses the use of airborne radar. Two years after the first radar-intercepted victory in the Luftwaffe, only 83 per cent of the night fighter force's strength (or 49 per cent of establishment) was equipped with Lichtenstein radar. Production of sets was well behind and the later SN-2 sets were unusable by late 1943. By the following spring, technical and production improvements made it effective and available in quantity. The 1000th set was built in May 1944.[7]
- ^ Average Bomber Command losses rose from 3.98 percent in January to July 1943 to 5.76 in August to December which reached 7.14 in the later month.[9]
- ^ One Fw 190G-3 was lost from 3./SKG 10; Feldwebel Hermann Heinrich Greeve was killed. KG 2 lost two one Do 217s were their crews. 1./KG 66 lost two Ju 88S-1s with their crews. Three of the four the bomber crews perished.[100]
Citations
- ^ a b Boog, Krebs & Vogel 2001, p. 379.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Boog, Krebs & Vogel 2001, p. 377.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Mackay 2011, pp. 427–430.
- ^ Boog, Krebs & Vogel 2008, p. 420.
- ^ Boog, Krebs & Vogel 2001, p. 380.
- ^ Aders 1978, pp. 55–93.
- ^ Aders 1978, pp. 77–81, 123.
- ^ Aders 1978, p. 83.
- ^ Hooton 1997, p. 129.
- ^ Hooton 1997, pp. 140–142.
- ^ Murray 1983, p. 182.
- ^ Hooton 1997, p. 260.
- ^ Frankland & Webster 1961, pp. 260–261.
- ^ Murray 1983, p. 228.
- ^ a b Murray 1983, p. 229.
- ^ a b Parker 1998, p. 22.
- ^ Murray 1983, p. 180.
- ^ Parker 1998, p. 23.
- ^ a b Beale 2005, p. 312.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 39.
- ^ Murray 1983, p. 250.
- ^ a b Hooton 1997, p. 276.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 9.
- ^ a b c d Mackay 2011, p. 11.
- ^ Griehl 1991, pp. 15–16.
- ^ Griehl 1991, p. 130.
- ^ Hooton 1997, p. 262.
- ^ Griehl 2000, p. 66.
- ^ a b Beale 2005, p. 314.
- ^ Goodrum 2005, p. 153.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 42.
- ^ Griehl 1991, p. 60.
- ^ a b c Mackay 2011, pp. 39–40.
- ^ Wakefield 1999, p. 206.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 43.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 24.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 29.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 31.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 34.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, pp. 34–35.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 61.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 63.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 66.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 67.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 121.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 131.
- ^ a b Griehl & Dressel 1998, p. 129.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 178.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 183.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007, p. 188.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2008, p. 221.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2008, p. 226.
- ^ de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2008, p. 271.
- ^ Beale 2005, p. 317.
- ^ a b c d e Mackay 2011, pp. 43–47.
- ^ Wakefield 1999, p. 54.
- ^ Goodrum 2005, p. 75.
- ^ Griehl 2000, p. 8.
- ^ Wakefield 1999, p. 202.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 36–37.
- ^ Robinson 2013, p. 20.
- ^ Fleischer 2004, p. 109.
- ^ Griehl 1991, p. 159.
- ^ Fleischer 2004, pp. 78, 117, 149, 168–169, 180.
- ^ Fleischer 2004, p. 181.
- ^ Heck 1990, p. 248.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 285–287.
- ^ a b c d e f Mackay 2011, pp. 297–315.
- ^ Jones 2009, p. 42.
- ^ a b c d Mackay 2011, p. 48.
- ^ Dobinson 2001, p. 379.
- ^ Dobinson 2001, p. 280.
- ^ Spooner 1997, p. 70.
- ^ Goodrum 2005, p. 146.
- ^ Price 1977, pp. 131–132.
- ^ Bowman 2005, pp. 168–171.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z Bowman 2005, pp. 175–180.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1840.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1841.
- ^ a b c d e Bowman 2005, p. 50.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1854.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 108, 116, 226, 280.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1839.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1875.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1880.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1899.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1882.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1885.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1745.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1927.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1942.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1862.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1871.
- ^ Bowman 2005, p. 46.
- ^ Bowman 2005, pp. 41–45.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1935.
- ^ Wragg 2007, p. 1915.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 281, 350.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 49–51.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 52.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 57–58.
- ^ a b c d Beale 2005, p. 315.
- ^ Robinson 2013, p. 52.
- ^ a b c Mackay 2011, pp. 59–61.
- ^ a b c Mackay 2011, pp. 66–67.
- ^ a b Mackay 2011, pp. 68–71.
- ^ a b c Mackay 2011, p. 72.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 87–90.
- ^ Ramsey 1990, p. 330.
- ^ Bowman 2005, pp. 175–176.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 81.
- ^ a b Conen 2014, p. 41.
- ^ a b Conen 2014, pp. 43–44.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 81–87.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 96.
- ^ a b c d e Mackay 2011, pp. 98–105.
- ^ Ramsey 1990, p. 321.
- ^ Conen 2014, p. 46.
- ^ Ramsey 1990, pp. 331–332.
- ^ a b Boog, Krebs & Vogel 2008, p. 418.
- ^ a b c d Mackay 2011, pp. 109–112.
- ^ Ramsey 1990, pp. 319–322.
- ^ Conen 2014, p. 51.
- ^ Conen 2014, p. 49.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Mackay 2011, pp. 118–132.
- ^ Conen 2014, p. 52.
- ^ Bowman 2010, p. 87.
- ^ a b c d Mackay 2011, pp. 134–138.
- ^ Conen 2014, pp. 51–64.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 198.
- ^ a b c d e f g Mackay 2011, pp. 144–155.
- ^ Conen 2014, pp. 65–72.
- ^ a b c Mackay 2011, pp. 157–165.
- ^ a b c d e Mackay 2011, pp. 165–172.
- ^ Wakefield 1999, p. 212.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 173–191.
- ^ Conen 2014, pp. 85–88.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 187–192.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 200–202.
- ^ a b c d Mackay 2011, pp. 203–214.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 311.
- ^ Conen 2014, pp. 89–90.
- ^ a b c d Mackay 2011, pp. 214–230.
- ^ Conen 2014, pp. 91–97.
- ^ Wakefield 1999, p. 205.
- ^ a b c d e Mackay 2011, pp. 231–244.
- ^ Goodrum 2005, pp. 153–156.
- ^ Wakefield 1999, pp. 217–218.
- ^ a b c d Mackay 2011, pp. 244–256.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 260–261.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 264–265.
- ^ Conen 2014, pp. 105–106.
- ^ a b Mackay 2011, pp. 265–269.
- ^ a b c d e Mackay 2011, pp. 273–284.
- ^ Wakefield 1999, p. 217.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 267, 281, 283.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 341–350.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 315–350.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 350–355.
- ^ Mackay 2011, pp. 356–366.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 368.
- ^ Mackay 2011, p. 370.
- ^ a b Mackay 2011, p. 372.
Bibliography
- Aders, Gebhard (1978). History of the German Night Fighter Force, 1917–1945. London: Janes. ISBN 978-0-354-01247-8.
- Andrews, William (Fall 1995). "The Luftwaffe and the Battle for Air Superiority: Blueprint or Warning?" (PDF). Air Power Journal. Air University Press: 1–12. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 January 2012.
- Bowman, Martin (2005). de Havilland Mosquito. Crowood Aviation series. Ramsbury, Marlborough, Wiltshire, UK: The Crowood Press. ISBN 978-1-86126-736-8.
- Bowman, Martin (2010). Mosquito Mayhem: de Havilland's Wooden Wonder in Action in World War II. Barnsley, Yorkshire: ISBN 978-1-84884-323-3.
- Beale, Nick (2005). Kampfflieger: 1944–1945 v. 4: Bombers of the Luftwaffe. Classic Publications. ISBN 978-1-903223-50-5.
- ISBN 978-3-42-105507-1.
- ISBN 978-0-19-928277-7.
- Conen, John (2014). The Little Blitz: The Luftwaffe's Last Attack on London. Fonthill Media. ISBN 978-1-78155-308-4.
- ISBN 978-1-87-785347-0.
- Dobinson, Colin (2001). AA Command: Britain's Anti-aircraft Defences of World War II. Methuen Publishing. ISBN 978-0-41376-540-6.
- Delve, Ken (2005). Bomber Command: 1936–1968: An Operational & Historical Record. ISBN 978-1-84415-183-7.
- de Zeng, H.L.; Stankey, D.G.; Creek, E.J. (2007). Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945; A Reference Source. Vol. 1. Ian Allan Publishing. ISBN 978-1-85780-279-5.
- de Zeng, Henry; Stankey, Douglas; Creek, Eddie (2008). Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945; A Reference Source. Vol. 2. Surrey: Ian Allan Publishing. ISBN 978-1-903223-87-1.
- Fleischer, Wolfgang (2004). German Air-Dropped Weapons to 1945. Midland Publishing. ISBN 978-1-85780-174-3.
- Frankland, Noble; Webster, Charles (1961). The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939–1945, Volume II: Endeavour, Part 4. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. pp. 260–261. OCLC 163349883.
- Goodrum, Alastair (2005). No Place for Chivalry: RAF Night Fighters Defend the East of England Against the German Air Force in Two World Wars. London: Grub Street. ISBN 978-1-904943-22-8.
- Griehl, Manfred (1991) [1987]. Do 217-317-417: An Operational Record. Airlife. ISBN 978-1-85-310072-7.
- Griehl, Manfred (2000). German Elite Pathfinders KG 100 in Action. Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1-85367-424-2.
- Griehl, Manfred; Dressel, Joachim (1998). Heinkel He 177 – 277 – 274. Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife Publishing. ISBN 978-1-85-310364-3.
- Hooton, E. R. (1997). Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwaffe. London: Arms & Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-343-1.
- ISBN 978-0-14-195767-8.
- Mackay, Ron (2011). The Last Blitz: Operation Steinbock, the Luftwaffe's Last Blitz on Britain – January to May 1944. Red Kite. ISBN 978-0-9554735-8-6.
- ISBN 978-1-57488-125-7.
- ISBN 978-1-57-488716-7.
- ISBN 978-0-71-100723-9.
- Ramsey, Winston (1990). The Blitz Then and Now, Volume 3. After the Battle; First Editions edition. ISBN 978-0-900913-58-7.
- Robinson, Neil (2013). Adler Gegen England: The Luftwaffe's Air Campaign against the British Isles 1941–45. Airfile Publications. ISBN 978-0-95755-130-5.
- Spooner, Tony (1997). Night fighter ace. Phoenix Mill, Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7509-3473-2.
- ISBN 978-0-71-399566-4.
- Wakefield, Ken (1999). Pfadfinder: Luftwaffe Pathfinder Operations Over Britain. NPI Media Group. ISBN 978-0-75241-692-2.
- Wragg, David (2007). Royal Air Force Handbook 1939-1945. The History Press. ISBN 978-0-7509-4361-1.
Further reading
- Balss, Michael (1999). Deutsche Nachtjagd: Materialverluste in Ausbildung un Einsatz, Ergänzungen zu Personalverlusten in Ausbildung und Einsatz. VDM Heinz Nickel, Zweibrücken. ISBN 978-3-925480-36-2.
- Boiten, Theo (1997). Nachtjagd: the night fighter versus bomber war over the Third Reich, 1939–45. Crowood Press, London. ISBN 978-1-86126-086-4
- Caldwell, Donald & Muller, Richard. (2007) The Luftwaffe over Germany – Defense of the Reich. Greenhill books, MBI Publishing. ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0
- ISBN 1-85260-344-5.
- Griehl, Manfred (1999). German Bombers Over England, 1940–44. Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1-85367-377-1
- Hardy, Michael (1977). The de Havilland Mosquito. Arco Publishing. ISBN 978-0-66804-051-8
- Morrow, John (1976). Building German Airpower, 1909–1914. University of Tennessee Press. ISBN 978-0-87049-196-2
- Robinson, Anthony (1988). Night Fighter: A Concise History of Nightfighting Since 1914. Ian Allan Publishing. ISBN 978-0-71101-757-3