Operation Herkules
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Operation Herkules | |
---|---|
Part of Second World War | |
Type | Invasion |
Location | 35°53′N 14°30′E / 35.883°N 14.500°E |
Planned by | Generalmajor Kurt Student |
Objective |
|
Date | Planned for mid-July 1942 |
Outcome | Cancelled in November 1942 |
Operation Herkules (
Extensive preparations were made for the invasion but the success of other Axis operations – including the Battle of Gazala (26 May to 21 June 1942), the Axis capture of Tobruk on 21 June and Operation Aïda, the pursuit of the Allies into Egypt – led to Herkules being postponed and then cancelled in November 1942.
Origins
The Axis plan to invade Malta had its origin in Italian military studies conducted during the
Axis plans and preparations
Airborne forces
Command of the airborne component of Herkules was given to Generalmajor
The
Amphibious forces
The seaborne assault force comprised 70,000 Italian troops who were to make amphibious landings at two points on the south-eastern side of the island, in
A follow-up convoy would be mainly made up of troops from the Italian XVI Corps: the 26th Infantry Division "Assietta" (9,000 men), the 54th Infantry Division "Napoli" (8,900 men), artillery units (3,200 men) and the remainder of the 10th Armoured Regiment (3,800 men). The 1st Infantry Division "Superga" (9,200 men) plus a battalion of Blackshirts and 1,000 San Marco Marines were to be in position to land on the smaller island of Gozo in the early hours of the second day.
Armoured support for the invasion comprised sixty-four Italian
Landing craft
Lacking enough landing craft for an amphibious assault, the Regia Marina secured plans from the German
German-operated landing craft were sent to Italy via rail for the invasion, including twelve Siebel ferries (catamaran rafts powered by automobile engines driving water screws and armed with 88 mm and 20 mm flak guns), six Type 39 Pionierlandungsboote (carrying 20 long tons (20 t) of cargo, two light vehicles or 45 infantry, unloaded via clamshell doors at the bow), six Type 40 Pionierlandungsboote (a larger version of the Type 39, carrying 40 long tons (41 t) of cargo, three or four light vehicles or 80–90 fully equipped infantry), a company of eighty-one Sturmboote (Type 39 Stormboats, small plywood boats carrying up to six infantrymen and powered by 30 outboard motors) plus an assortment of large inflatable rafts (carrying 25 troops each). Some rafts were powered by outboard motors and others had to be rowed.[4]
The Italians assembled a collection of other naval craft to transport the amphibious forces. These included two former Strait of Messina railway ferries (converted to carry four to eight tanks each); ten passenger ships (800–1,400 men each), six former passenger ferries (400 men each), six cargo ships (3,000 long tons (3,000 t) of supplies each), 30 ex-trawlers (300 men each); five converted minelayers (500 men each) and 74 assorted motorboats (30–75 men each). The Italians also requested the use of 200 additional German Sturmboote to quickly transfer men from ship to shore.[4] The Italian landing flotilla and the supporting ships formed the Special Naval Force (Forza Navale Speciale Admiral Vittorio Tur).
Specialised landing equipment for Herkules included the Seeschlange (Sea Snake), a floating ship-to-shore bridge originally developed by the German Army for Operation Sea Lion. It was formed from a series of joined modules that could be towed into place and act as a temporary jetty. Moored ships could then unload their cargo either directly onto the "roadway" or lower it down onto the Seeschlange via their cranes. The Seeschlange had been tested by the Army Training Unit at Le Havre in the fall of 1941 and was easily transportable by rail.[14]
The Regia Marina had to protect the invasion convoys from attacks by the British Mediterranean Fleet and provide gunfire support during the landings. The force assigned to accomplish this included four battleships (Littorio, Vittorio Veneto, Duilio, and Andrea Doria), four heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers and 21 destroyers. These ships would assemble and sortie from the ports of Messina, Reggio Calabria, Augusta and Cagliari. The two older Andrea Doria-class battleships would carry approximately 200 rounds each for shore bombardment. Italian and German submarines were to scout for and intercept British naval forces attempting to interfere with the seaborne landings. One submarine was to be stationed midway between Sicily and Malta, to act as a guide beacon for the transport aircraft on their way to and from the drop zones.[6]
The Italians were confident they could defeat any daylight incursions by the Mediterranean Fleet, especially given the Luftwaffe's ability to dominate the daytime skies, but there were concerns the Italian fleet would face serious difficulties if the British attacked at night. Lacking ship-borne radar and having neglected night-fighting training and equipment, the Regia Marina had been defeated at the Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941. A similar encounter off Malta might wreak havoc on the slow-moving Axis invasion convoys, leaving the airborne forces cut off and imperilling Axis chances of taking the island.[15]
The Regia Marina had made some efforts to rectify this situation by equipping the battleship Littorio with an experimental E.C.-3/bis Gufo (Owl) radar apparatus in August 1941, but the unit was considered unreliable (not until September 1942 did Littorio receive a standardised production-version Gufo with better performance; this set could detect surface ships at a range of 17 nmi (20 mi; 31 km) and aircraft out to a range of 45 nmi (83 km; 52 mi)). In September 1941, while awaiting production of Italian-made radar units in quantity, the Regia Marina requested from the Kriegsmarine a FuMO 24/40 G DeTe unit for the new destroyer, Legionario (under construction). DeTe units could detect surface ships up to 14 nmi (16 mi; 26 km) away. By March 1942, the set had been delivered and installed and a small group of Italian ratings had been trained in Germany on its use. Operational testing began that spring and by May, the fleet commander Vice-Admiral Angelo Iachino had submitted a report praising its performance.[16]
Maltese defences
In 1942 the garrison of Malta consisted of 15 infantry battalions (11 Commonwealth, 4 Maltese) organised into four brigades totalling 26,000 men. Tank support was provided by the 1st Independent Troop of the Royal Tank Regiment, disembarked in November 1940, which was initially equipped with four
Artillery support came from the 12th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery with twenty-four 25-pounder [3.45 in (88 mm)] field guns, capable of providing fire support out to a range of 6.8 mi (11 km) and covering most of the island while remaining in protected static positions.[17] Malta's fixed defences included nineteen heavy coastal guns (varying in size from 12-inch to 16-inch, although these Victorian era weapons were all decommissioned), 130 smaller coastal guns (6-pounder to 9.2-inch) and 112 heavy and 144 light anti-aircraft guns.[18][1][4]
The smaller coastal guns comprised
[Data in this section taken from Hogg (2002)][19]
- 10 × BL 6 in (150 mm) Mk XXIV, on Mounting, 6 in (150 mm) Mk 5 or 6
- 7 × BL 9.2 in (230 mm)gun Mk X, on Mounting Mk 7
- QF 4.5 in (110 mm)gun Mk II, on Mounting Mk I
- 18 × QF 6 pounder 10 cwt gun(9 × 2)
- ~30 × Ordnance QF 18 pounder
Aftermath
A date near mid-July 1942 was set for the invasion, partly to allow time to bring troops from other front line positions. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel supported the Malta plan and asked Hitler for command of the invasion forces. His reasons for supporting an invasion were to hinder the Allied troops fighting in Africa, as well as to remove the threat to the convoys heading to Italian-German forces with supplies, oil and men, all of which they lacked. He prioritised the attack to such an extent that he was willing to move units from his front for the attack. The head of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, opposed the invasion, fearing it would turn into another near-disaster for his paratroops, as had happened in the airborne assault on Crete.[citation needed] Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring tirelessly promoted Unternehmen Herkules but even he was eventually dissuaded when it became apparent that too many air and ground units had been siphoned off to support the Axis drive into Egypt, diminishing any chance of success. With Hitler lacking faith in the parachute divisions after Crete and in the ability of the Italian navy to protect the invasion fleet from British naval attacks, the plan was cancelled.[20]
References
- ^ a b Greene & Massignani 1998, p. 64.
- ^ a b Bekker 1975, p. 352.
- ^ Green 1979, p. 648.
- ^ a b c d e "Could Royal Navy save Malta?". groups.google.com. 2013. Retrieved 12 August 2013.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 1998, p. 67.
- ^ a b c Greene & Massignani 1998, p. 70.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 1998, p. 66.
- ^ Burtt 2023, p. 113.
- ^ Ref
- ^ Ritgen 1995, p. 7.
- ^ "Esigenza C3 - The Italian Invasion of Malta - Tanks Encyclopedia". Tank Encyclopedia. 2019-03-26. Retrieved 2022-04-24.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 1998, p. 71.
- ^ Marcon 1998, pp. 221–224.
- ^ Schenk 1990, p. 139.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 1998, pp. 71, 209–213.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 1998, pp. 209–213.
- ^ Greene & Massignani 1998, p. 68.
- ^ "The place of Malta in British strategic Policy". University College London. 2002. Retrieved 21 May 2017.
- ^ Hogg 2002, p. 64.
- ^ Stumpf 2001, pp. 656–660.
Bibliography
- Bekker, Cajus (1975). The Luftwaffe War Diaries. Ballantine Books. ISBN 978-0-306-80604-9.
- Boog, H.; Rahn, W.; Stumpf, R.; Wegner, B. (2001). ISBN 0-19-822888-0.
- Stumpf, R. "Part V, The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942–1943: Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean. 2. The Battle of Malta (December 1941–21 May 1942)". In Boog et al. (2001).
- Burtt, John (2023). Operation C3: Hitler's Plan to Invade Malta 1942. Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Books Ltd. ISBN 978-1-39906-576-4.
- Green, William (1979). Warplanes of the Third Reich. New York: Doubleday. ISBN 978-0-356-02382-3.
- Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (1998). The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943. Chatham Publishing. ISBN 978-1-86176-057-9.
- ISBN 978-1-85367-478-5.
- Marcon, Tullio (1998). I Muli del Mare [The Sea Mules]. Storia militare. Parma: Albertelli. ISBN 978-88-87372-02-1.
- Ritgen, Helmut (1995). The Western Front 1944: Memoirs of a Panzer Lehr Officer. ISBN 978-0-921991-28-1.
- Schenk, Peter (1990). Invasion of England 1940: The Planning of Operation Sealion. Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 0-85177-548-9.
Further reading
Books
- Ansel, Walter (1972). Hitler and the Middle Sea. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-0224-7– via Archive Foundation.
- Gabriele, Mariano (1965). Operazione C3: Malta. Roma: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare. OCLC 560391306.
- Heckmann, Wolf (1981). Rommel's War in Africa. Doubleday. ISBN 978-0-385-14420-9– via Archive Foundation.
- ISBN 978-0-521-50971-8.
- Levine, Alan J. (2008). The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines, 1942–43. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-0-8117-3458-5.
- Lucas, Laddie (1994). Malta: The Thorn in Rommel's Side (Large Print ed.). Leicester: Ulverscroft Large Print. ISBN 978-0-7089-3169-1.
- ISBN 978-1-59114-648-3.
- Sadkovich, James J. (1994). The Italian Navy in World War II. Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-313-28797-8.
Journals
- Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (Jan–Feb 1993). "The Summer of '42: The Proposed Axis Invasion of Malta". Command Magazine (20). Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books. ISSN 0198-7313.
Theses
- Vivarelli, A. (2014). Axis and the Intended Invasion of Malta in 1942: A Combined Planning Endeavor (Thesis). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies. OCLC 893913565.