Planned French invasion of Britain (1759)
French invasion of Great Britain | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of Jacobite risings | |||||||
Battle of Quiberon Bay which ended the invasion plans | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Great Britain | France | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Edward Hawke |
Comte de Conflans | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
10,000 regular troops, 30,000+ militia | 100,000 soldiers |
A French invasion of Great Britain was planned to take place in 1759 during the Seven Years' War, but due to various factors (including naval defeats at the Battle of Lagos and the Battle of Quiberon Bay) was never launched. The French planned to land 100,000 French soldiers in Britain to end British involvement in the war. The invasion was one of several failed French attempts during the 18th century to invade Britain.[1]
Background
The
By the beginning of 1759 neither alliance had the advantage, in either the land or sea campaigns. Both France and Great Britain were having serious problems financing the war. In 1759 over 60% of French revenue went to service its debt,[7] causing numerous shortages. The French navy in particular was overstretched[8] and suffered from the lack of a coherent doctrine, exacerbated by the inexperience verging on incompetence of the Secretary of State for the Navy, Nicolas René Berryer, a former chief of police.[9] Meanwhile, Britain's war effort over the first three years of the war had been a failure.[10] From the summer of 1757 the British war effort came under the control of William Pitt, who imposed an assertive and coordinated strategy. It consisted of a naval and colonial effort to expel the French from North America and ruin their maritime trade,[11] while dispersing their efforts between fighting Prussia in Europe and attempting to defend the wide range of French overseas possessions. By early 1759 this was beginning to bear fruit.[12]
Invasion plans
Conception
The invasion was planned by the
Choiseul was interested in the concept of a French invasion of Britain. He perceived that Britain's strength was its naval power. He saw that if a large French force managed to cross the Channel without being intercepted, it could triumph over the relatively weak British land forces. Choiseul initially ignored perceived wisdom that any invasion would have to involve French warships. He believed that trying to bring warships out of the blockaded port at Brest would cause unnecessary delays, and could be disastrous. A mixed force as he saw it would suffer the same fate as the Spanish Armada. A previous attempt by France in 1744 had to be abandoned.
His conception was relatively simple: a massive fleet of flat-bottomed transport craft would carry an army of 100,000 troops across the Channel where they would be landed on the coast of southern England. An essential component of the plan was speed. The French would wait for a favourable wind and cross the Channel quickly. Once they landed, they believed they would easily overpower the small army Britain retained on home soil and end the war. Choiseul managed to overcome opposition in the French cabinet and the invasion was approved as the cornerstone of French strategy for 1759 along with an attempt to capture Hanover.
Jacobite involvement
As part of the scheme the French considered trying to start a
France also sought support from Denmark and Russia to provide troops and naval stores for the expedition, but both declined to participate. Sweden initially agreed to take part in the scheme by sending an invasion force to Scotland, but later backed out of this arrangement. The Dutch Republic, traditionally a British ally but neutral at the time, was deeply alarmed by the French actions, and demanded assurances that the French were not planning to place the pretender Stuart on the British throne, an action they believed would threaten their own security. The French ambassador assured them they were not.[14]
British response
The British were well aware of these developments through a well-established network of
Pitt was committed to despatching expeditions to French colonies around the world, a policy that had proved successful. It had, however, deprived Britain of necessary troops to defend itself from a European invasion. In response to this the government had pushed through a Militia Act which created a large militia to defend Britain. The fighting capabilities of this force were untested, though it provided the British with a much larger force on paper than her regular troops alone. General Ligonier estimated that he would have only 10,000 regular troops immediately available to resist any French landing.[16]
A tight blockade was maintained on major French ports throughout 1759 under the command of Admiral
French preparations
During 1759 the French pressed on with their preparations. Hundreds of the flat-bottomed transport craft were constructed in
Throughout the year, several points of the plan were altered, but it remained the same in essence. In spite of opposition from within the French cabinet (particularly the war minister
In June, French planners agreed that a separate, smaller force would be sent to Scotland to try to gain Jacobite support, and crush British resistance in a pincer movement. The
Raid on Le Havre
A surprise British
Battle of Lagos
In summer 1759, the French Toulon fleet under Admiral La Clue slipped through the blockade and sailed out through the Straits of Gibraltar. They were caught and defeated by a British fleet at the Battle of Lagos in August. Their intended destination had been the West Indies, but the loss of ships and men stretched the French fleet almost to breaking point, and raised questions about the viability of the invasion.
Battle of Quiberon Bay
The invasion plan received a crippling blow in November, when the French Brest Squadron was heavily defeated at the
Meeting at the mouth of Quiberon Bay on 21 November, the two fleets closed in on each other. Conflans initially formed a line of battle and prepared to engage, but then changed his mind and his ships raced to take shelter in the bay. Hawke pursued, taking a high risk in the middle of a violent storm, and captured or drove ashore five French ships. The remainder managed to find shelter in the bay. They were now blockaded in by the British fleet, and most were abandoned and their guns taken off them. Only three ships ever sailed again, a devastating setback to the French Channel fleet. The crushing defeat at Quiberon Bay ended any real hope of a major invasion of the British Isles.[23]
Landing in Ireland
A privateer, François Thurot, sailed from Dunkirk with five ships to provide diversionary support to the invasion. In 1760 he landed on the northern Irish coast and set up a base at Carrickfergus. Had he not repeatedly clashed with the commander of the land expedition, the force might have captured poorly defended Belfast. Having sailed for home, the Royal Navy killed Thurot and destroyed his squadron in the Irish Channel.[24] By this point, the French had abandoned the invasion. However, many French people took heart from Thurot's expedition as it demonstrated that French forces could land in the British Isles. Madame de Pompadour suggested that France would have won at Quiberon, had Thurot been in command instead of Conflans.[25]
Abandonment
With the Brest fleet destroyed at Quiberon Bay, they were now unable to escort the French troops across the Channel. Some now began pressing Choiseul for a return to the original plan of an unescorted crossing, suggesting that the invasion be postponed to early 1760.
1759 was a disastrous year for the French war effort. They suffered severe defeats in Canada, the West Indies, Europe and India. Choiseul was particularly disappointed by the poor performance of the French navy.[26] As word of these disasters poured in, the extent to which France's forces were now stretched became clear. Realising they needed the French forces earmarked for the invasion elsewhere, particularly in Germany to fight Hanover, Choiseul reluctantly called off the invasion.
He remained hopeful that it might still be possible at some future date, but the war situation continued to deteriorate for France during the next few years particularly when Spain entered the war as a French ally in 1761. Choiseul began in 1762 to plan
Aftermath
The French fully abandoned the plan in 1763, when the
See also
Notes, citations and sources
Notes
Citations
- ^ Szabo 2007, p. 406.
- ^ McLynn 2005, p. 6.
- ^ le Moing 2003, p. 9.
- ^ Library of Congress 1755.
- ^ Ériau 2011, p. 40.
- ^ Szabo 2007, pp. 17–18.
- ^ McLynn 2005, p. 65.
- ^ Chaline 2011, p. 17.
- ^ Jenkins 1973, p. 148.
- ^ Anderson 2000, pp. 211–212.
- ^ Middleton 1988.
- ^ Chaline 2011, p. 18.
- ^ McLynn 2005, pp. 82–84.
- ^ McLynn 2005, pp. 240–241.
- ^ McLynn 2005, pp. 232–234.
- ^ McLynn 2005, p. 233.
- ^ McLynn 2005, pp. 236–237.
- ^ McLynn 2005, pp. 231–232, 239–240.
- ^ McLynn 2005, p. 238.
- ^ McLynn 2005, p. 244.
- ^ McLynn 2005, pp. 354–366.
- ^ McLynn 2005, pp. 362–364.
- ^ Anderson 2000, pp. 381–383.
- ^ Rodger 2004, p. 283.
- ^ McLynn 2005, p. 387.
- ^ Murphy pp. 211–12
- ^ Longmate 1993, pp. 182–183.
- ^ Longmate 1993, pp. 183–185.
Sources
- ISBN 9780571205356.
- Chaline, Oliver (2011). "Quiberon Bay, 20 novembre 1759". Les cahiers du Pays de Guérande (in French) (53). Société des Amis de Guérande: 17–29. ISSN 0765-3565.
- La Condamine, Pierre de (2000). Le combat des Cardinaux : 20 novembre 1759, baie de Quiberon et rade du Croisic (in French). La Turballe: L'Esprit large-Éd. Alizés. ISBN 978-2911835032.
- Ériau, Jean-Michel (2011). "La Bataille du Croisic". Les cahiers du Pays de Guérande (in French) (53). Société des Amis de Guérande: 17–29. ISSN 0765-3565.
- Goodman, Elise (2000). The portraits of Madame de Pompadour: Celebrating the Femme Savante. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0520224087.
- Jenkins, E.H. (1973). A History of the French Navy : From Its Beginnings to the Present Day. London: Macdonald and Janeś. ISBN 978-0356041964.
- "The Battle of the Monongahela, 1755". Library of Congress. World Digital Library. 2017. Retrieved 6 July 2019.
- Longmate, Norman (1993). Island Fortress: The Defence of Great Britain, 1603–1945. London: Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0586208465..
- ISBN 978-0099526391.
- Middleton, Richard (1988). "Naval Administration in the Age of Pitt and Anson, 1755-1763". In Black, Jeremy & Woodfine, Philip (eds.). The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century. Leicester: Leicester University Press. pp. 109–127. OCLC 572510434.
- le Moing, Guy (2003). La Bataille navale des Cardinaux: 20 novembre 1759 (in French). Paris: Economica. ISBN 978-2717845037.
- ISBN 978-0713884111.
- Rodger, N. A. M. (1993), The Insatiable Earl: A Life of John Montagu, Fourth Earl of Sandwich, London: Harper Collins
- ISBN 978-0140289848
- Szabo, Franz A. J. (2007). The Seven Years' War in Europe 1756–1763. Harlow, Essex: Longman. ISBN 978-0582292727.