Russo-Persian War (1804–1813)
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Russo-Persian War (1804–1813) | |||||||||
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Part of the Russo-Persian Wars, Russian conquest of the Caucasus and the Napoleonic Wars | |||||||||
This painting by Franz Roubaud illustrates an episode near the Askerna river where the Russians managed to repel attacks by a larger Persian army for two weeks. They made a "living bridge", so that two cannons could be transported over their bodies. | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Russian Empire | Qajar Iran | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Alexander I Ivan Gudovich Pavel Tsitsianov † Pyotr Kotlyarevsky Alexander Tormasov |
Alexander of Georgia |
The Russo-Persian War of 1804–1813
The war ended in 1813 with the Treaty of Gulistan which ceded the previously disputed territory of Georgia to Imperial Russia, and also the undisputed Iranian territories of Dagestan, most of what is modern Azerbaijan, and minor parts of Armenia.
Origins
The origins of the war can be traced back to the decision of Tsar Paul I to annex Eastern Georgia (Kartli-Kakheti) in December 1800.[4] Earlier, in 1783, the Georgian king Heraclius II had signed the Treaty of Georgievsk with Russia, bringing his kingdom under Russian protection and swearing allegiance to Empress Catherine.[5] While Russia had failed to protect Georgia against the assault of Agha Mohammad Khan in 1795, and an expedition against Iran was called off by Tsar Paul, in September 1799 Russia reasserted its protectorate over Georgia at the request of the Georgian king and stationed troops there.[6] From the Iranian perspective, however, Georgia and all the South Caucasus remained integral Iranian territories,[3] and Iran's new shah Fath-Ali Qajar could not accept their loss. Russia's annexation of Georgia in December 1800 was seen as a major threat to Iran's territorial integrity.[7] After Tsar Paul's assassination on 11 March 1801, Tsar Alexander continued Russia's involvement in the region and sought to incorporate the khanates of the eastern Caucasus[b] into his empire. In 1803, the newly appointed governor of the Caucasus, Pavel Tsitsianov, attacked Ganja and captured its citadel on 15 January 1804.[c][d] Ganja's governor, Javad Khan Qajar, was killed, and a large number of the inhabitants slaughtered.[4] On the Iranian side, the capture of Shia Muslim territory was seen as an outright invasion that carried the risk of further losses and the imposition of foreign rule. It provoked a strong emotional reaction and the mobilization of Iran's clergy and educated elite. In fact, Tsitsianov intended to expand Russia's territories further southward into Iran, even beyond the Kur and Aras rivers, if possible.[10] As Elton L. Daniel notes, Fath-Ali Shah saw the Russian threat to Iran's northwestern territories "not only as source of instability [...] but as a direct challenge to Qajar authority."[4]
Unequal forces
The Russians were unable to commit a large portion of their troops to the Caucasus region, because Alexander's attention was continually distracted by simultaneous wars with France, the Ottoman Empire, Sweden and Great Britain. Therefore, the Russians were forced to rely on superior technology, training, and strategy in the face of an overwhelming disparity in numbers. Some estimates put the Persian numerical advantage at five to one. Shah Fath Ali's heir, Abbas Mirza, tried to modernize the Persian army, seeking help from French experts through the Franco-Persian alliance, and then from British experts, in order to address the tactical disparity between the forces.
Outbreak of war and first battles
Having captured Ganja, Tsitsianov turned to the Khanate of Yerevan (Erivan), the territory of which could serve as an invasion route to Tiflis from the south.[11] He used a dispute over the election of the Armenian Catholicos (head of the Armenian Church) as a means to place pressure on the khan of Yerevan, Mohammad Khan Qajar.[12] In the meantime, Fath-Ali Shah sent a letter to Tsitsianov requesting that he leave Tiflis and place Prince Alexander, who had earlier fled to Iran, on the Georgian throne. He warned Tsitsianov that he was raising a large army but stated that he wanted to avoid bloodshed. Tsitsianov sent back a hostile response, prompting the Shah to send Abbas Mirza toward the South Caucasus at the head of an army of 20,000 or 30,000.[13] Abbas Mirza set out for Yerevan from Tabriz on 8 May 1804.[14] Mohammad Khan of Yerevan, caught between the approaching Iranian army and the Russians, offered his submission to Tsitsianov, but the latter responded with more threats and harsh demands.[15] Abbas Mirza arrived in Iranian Armenia and encamped on the Zangi (Hrazdan) River half a league from the city of Yerevan on June 7.[16] Mohammad Khan, hoping for the arrival of the Russians, refused Abbas Mirza's demand to come out of the city and join him, and the two sides fired upon each other.[17] Tsitsianov crossed into the Yerevan Khanate with an army of about 5,000 men, and Abbas Mirza abandoned the siege of Yerevan to confront him on June 24.[18] Abbas Mirza's army, reinforced by local forces, numbered around 40,000.[19]
The first battle between the armies of Tsitsianov and Abbas Mirza occurred at
Despite these ineffective forays, the Russians held the advantage for the majority of the war, due to superior troops and strategy. Russia's inability, however, to dedicate anything more than 10,000 troops to the campaign allowed the Persians to mount a fairly respectable resistance effort. The Persian troops were of a low grade, mostly irregular cavalry.
War
In early 1805 the Shoragel sultanate was taken by the Russians. This was a small area at the junction of Georgia, the Yerevan Khanate, and Turkey and included the militarily important town of Gyumri. On 14 May, the Karabakh Khanate submitted to the Russians, and on 21 May the Shaki Khanate did the same. In response to the loss of Karabakh, Abbas Mirza occupied the Askeran Fortress at the mouth of a valley leading from the plain southwest to Shusha, the capital of Karabakh. The Russians responded by sending Koryagin to take Shahbulag Castle. Abbas Mirza marched north and besieged the place. On hearing of the approach of another army under Fath Ali, Koryagin slipped out at night and headed for Shusha. He was caught at the Askeran gorge but not defeated. More Russian troops relieved the blockade of Koryagin and Shusha. Seeing that the main Russian force had pushed far to the southeast, Abbas Mirza made a wide swing north and besieged Ganja. On 27 July, 600 Russian infantry routed his camp at Shamkir.
In September, a naval attack on Baku failed. In November, Tsitsianov marched east toward Baku, en route to accepting the submission of the Shirvan Khanate (27 December). On 8 February 1806, he was murdered while accepting the surrender of Baku. Russian honor was restored by Glazenap, who marched from north of the mountains and took Derbent, Quba, and Baku (technically Baku surrendered to Bulgakov). Ivan Gudovich replaced Tsitsianov as viceroy. In December, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia.
Troops were moved west to deal with the Turks, a truce was made and Nibolshin was left to guard the frontier. Fighting resumed in 1808 when Russia took Echmiadzin. Abbas Mirza was defeated south of Lake Shirvan; as a result, Nakhichevan, or some part of it, was occupied. In September 1808, Gudovich attacked Yerevan. The assault failed, withdrawal became necessary and 1,000 men, mostly sick and wounded, froze to death on the retreat. Escape was only possible because Nibolshin and Lissanevich defeated a "vast horde" of Persians. Gudovich resigned and was replaced by Alexander Tormasov. In 1809, Fath Ali was driven back from Gyumri and Abbas Mirza from Ganja. In 1810 Abbas Mirza tried to invade Karabakh but was defeated at Meghri on the Aras River.
In early 1812, Persia invaded Karabagh. They occupied Shahbulag Castle, which the Russians later recaptured. They attacked a Russian battalion at "Sultan-Buda" using European-style infantry and a few British officers. After a day of fighting the Russians surrendered. Russia responded to this unusual defeat by moving Pyotr Kotlyarevsky, the hero of Akhalkalaki, from the Turkish to the Persian front.
In the summer of 1812, just as Napoleon was preparing to invade Russia, the Russians made peace with the Ottoman Empire and Russian troops in Caucasia turned to Persia. On 19 October, Kotlyarevsky ignored the cautious Ritishchev's orders, crossed the
Thirteen years later, in another Russo-Persian War fought from 1826 to 1828, Persia tried to regain its territory. It was defeated and lost the khanates of Yerevan and Nakhichevan, roughly corresponding to modern Armenia.
Anglo-French diplomacy in Persia
Although this Russo-Persian War was in many respects a continuation of a struggle for supremacy in
The rise of French influence in Persia, viewed as the prelude to an attack on India, had greatly alarmed the British, and the Franco-Russian rapprochement at Tilsit conveniently provided an opportunity for a now isolated Britain to resume its efforts in Persia, as reflected in the subsequent missions of
Then, in the third and final twist to this story,
In February 1812, Nikolay Rtishchev assumed command of the Russian forces and opened peace negotiations with the Persians. Ouseley and his representative at the talks, James Morier, acted as intermediaries and made various proposals to Rtishchev, but they were not accepted. In August, Abbas Mirza resumed hostilities and captured Lankaran. After news arrived that Napoleon had occupied Moscow, the negotiations were suspended (September 1812). Then, on 31 October 1812, while Ritischev was away in Tbilisi, the general Peter Kotliarevski launched a surprise night attack on the Persian encampment at Aslanduz, which resulted in the complete rout of the army of Abbas Mirza and the death of one of the British supporting officers (Christie). As it also became increasingly apparent that Napoleon's offensive in Russia had failed disastrously, the Russians were emboldened to pursue a more aggressive campaign in the Caucasus. In early 1813, the Persian fortress at Lankaran fell and its garrison was annihilated, enabling the Russians to occupy most of Talesh again. Although Fath Ali Shah and Abbas Mirza wanted to fight on after these setbacks, they eventually had to yield to Ouseley, who assured the Shah that either the Russians would make territorial concessions, or the British would continue the subsidy they had promised.[4]
1813: Treaty of Gulistan
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Russia fought on two frontiers: against the Ottomans between 1806 and 1812; and against the Persians from 1804 to 1813. Both frontiers were concluded via treaties: the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 with the Ottoman Empire; and the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 that lasted until 1826 when Russian troops, acting outside of the control of Tsar Nicholas I, occupied Mirak. Under the Gulistan treaty, Russia was acknowledged as the power in control of the South Caucasus; western and eastern Georgia and the Muslim khanates until Baku and Quba were placed under Russian administration.[29]
Assessment and aftermath
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Although Russia was recognized as a dominant power over the Caucasus, the success of the Treaty of Gulistan was overshadowed by the threat of the Ottomans. The Treaty of Bucharest was in favor of the Ottoman Empire which had claimed the territories that Russia conquered during the war: Poti and Anapa, which were Black Sea port cities, as well as Akhalkalaki. Still, the conditions of sovereignty were comparatively stable in these years. In the complex political map of the South Caucasus, Russia had the means to control the region through defensive lines.[29]
According to Firuz Kazemzadeh:
The defeat of Napoleon enabled Russia to allocate greater resources to the Caucasus front. The difference between well-drilled, well-equipped, disciplined armies and the tribal levies of Abbas Mirza was decisive. At Aslanduz on the Aras, 2,260 Russians under General P. S. Kotlyarevsky fought a two-day battle with 30,000 Persians under Abbas Mirza, killing 1,200 enemy soldiers, and capturing 537 at a loss to themselves of only 127 dead and wounded. Though on occasion the Persians fought well, for instance at Lankaran, where the same Kotlyarevsky lost 950 of 1,500 men under his command and was himself permanently disabled, the war was obviously lost.[30]
Notes
- ^ Also called the Russo-Iranian War of 1804–1813.[3]
- ^ Iranian provinces that passed in and out of Iranian control over the course of the eighteenth century, but which were always viewed as Iranian territories.[8]
- ^ All dates old style (12 days behind the Gregorian calendar)
- ^ Tsitsianov's goal was to secure the territory between Georgia and the Caspian Sea. He used as justification the fact that the khans of Ganja had sometimes recognized Heraclius II's overlordship in the second half of the eighteenth century; he also referred to Georgian possession of Ganja and its vicinity during the reign of Queen Tamar (r. 1184–1213).[9]
- ^ Tsitsianov reported that 2,329 able-bodied men had made it back to Tiflis.[27] According to Iranian sources, the Russians lost 4,000 men during the retreat, while the Iranians suffered 1,000–2,000 dead.[28]
References
- ^ Goldstein 1992, p. 72.
- ^ Dowling 2014, pp. 728–729.
- ^ a b Pourjavady 2023.
- ^ a b c d Daniel 2001.
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1991, p. 328.
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1991, pp. 329–330.
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1991, pp. 330–331.
- ^ Hambly 1991, pp. 145–146.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 45, 48.
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1991, pp. 331–332.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, p. 61.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 61–65.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 66–67.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, p. 68.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 69–70.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, p. 70.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 70–71.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 71–72.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 72–73.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 76–80.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 80–81.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021 presents parallel accounts based on Iranian and Russian sources, respectively, on pp. 80–83 and 84–98.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 91–94.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, p. 94.
- ^ See the parallel Persian and Russian accounts, respectively, in Bournoutian 2021, pp. 82–83 and 94–98.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, p. 98.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, p. 98, note 145.
- ^ Bournoutian 2021, pp. 82–83.
- ^ a b King 2008, pp. 30–31.
- ^ Kazemzadeh 1991, pp. 334.
Sources
- Atkin, Muriel (1980). Russia and Iran, 1780–1828. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 978-0-8166-0924-6.
- ISBN 978-90-04-44515-4.
- Daniel, Elton L. (2001). "Golestān Treaty". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica, Online Edition. Encyclopædia Iranica Foundation. Retrieved 22 June 2024.
- Dowling, Timothy C. (2014). Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio. ISBN 978-1-59884-948-6.
- Dubrovin, N. История войны и владычества русских на Кавказе, volumes 4–6. SPb, 1886–88.
- Goldstein, Erik (1992). Wars and Peace Treaties: 1816 to 1991. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-07822-9.
- Hambly, Gavin R. G. (1991). "Iran during the reigns of Fath 'Alī Shāh and Muhammad Shāh". In ISBN 978-0521200950.
- ISBN 978-0521200950.
- King, Charles (2008). The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. ISBN 978-0-19-517775-6.
- Pourjavady, Reza (2023). "Russo-Iranian wars 1804-13 and 1826-8". Christian-Muslim Relations. A Bibliographical History Volume 20. Iran, Afghanistan and the Caucasus (1800-1914). Brill.
Further reading
- ISBN 978-0755637379.