Saladin in Egypt
Egypt before Sultan Saladin
The Fatimid Caliphate that had ruled in Egypt since 969 was on the verge of total disintegration in the period before Saladin's arrival. The challenges that faced the state were extensive and touched on every aspect of life in Egypt. The condition of Fatimid Egypt can be best segmented into three areas: political, social, and economic.
Political
Power in the Fatimid Caliphate ultimately rested with the caliph. Over the years, however, true power had shifted into the office of the
Any remaining power the caliphs may have had was shattered when the last adult caliph,
Social
The official doctrine of the Fatimid state was
In addition to this mounting religious pressure the ever unstable nature of Egyptian political life forced elites in every field (administrative, poetic, legal, etc.) into tight knit social circles often susceptible to purges when rival factions seized power. This resulted in the deaths of many of Egypt's most talented people, contributing to the free fall of the Fatimid state.
Economic
Perhaps the only part of Egypt before Saladin that can be referred to as successful was its economy. Since ancient times the fertile banks of the Nile had made Egypt the bread basket of the Eastern Mediterranean. The tombs of the Pharaohs served as man made gold mines to the Fatimids, who actively stripped the wealth of these ancient tombs to support their projects. The final lynch pin in Egypt's successful economy was the growth of trade. Trade routes extended as far as India with goods from the East funnelling through upper Egypt on their way to Europe and the Middle East, contributing to the extensive growth of trade cities like Damietta and Alexandria. For once the weakness of the Fatimid state served as an advantage as people of all religious backgrounds capitalized on all aspects of the thriving trade and succeeded in creating a surprisingly successful financial system. This strong economy and financial system provided the Egyptian viziers like Ibn Ruzzik with the ability to wield amazing funds in both internal and international politics.
Campaigns in Egypt
Nur al-Din had long sought to intervene in Egypt especially after missing his opportunity when Tala ibn Ruzzik successfully brought the country under control, blocking his ambitions for nearly a decade. Thus, Nur al-Din closely watched the events of 1163 with his reliable general Shirkuh waiting for an appropriate opportunity to bring the country under his control. Before the campaigns it would be hard to find a figure more obscure than Saladin, but by their end he would emerge as one of the most prominent figures in the Medieval Middle East.
Campaign of 1163
In Syria, Shawar easily convinced Nur al-Din to support his cause in Egypt. Nur al-Din was motivated partially by his long standing desire to gain control over Egypt and partially by a desire to block further military adventures by Amalric. Nur al-din sent the head of his army Shirkuh (who in turn took his nephew, Saladin, with him) to accompany Shawar back to Egypt and return him to power. The force set out in May 1163 and quickly entered Cairo where they deposed Dirgham. Once Dirgham had been overthrown, however, it quickly became clear that Shawar was not going to uphold his agreement, neither paying tribute to Nur al-Din nor giving Shirkuh's troops the fiefs he had promised. Shawar then entered into negotiations with Amalric in an attempt to garner support against his former benefactor.
Campaign of 1167
The ambitious Shirkuh was discontented with the result of the 1163 campaign and began preparing for a new invasion of Egypt. Shawar was aware of Shirkuh's intentions and entered into negotiation with Amalric to renew their alliance in the event of Shirkuh's invasion. In late 1166 and early 1167, Shirkuh, again with Saladin, attacked Egypt with Nur al-Din's support. Amalric and Shawar quickly mobilized against Shirkuh's coming force. Shirkuh managed to avoid Amalric's army in the open and travel south into Egypt and use the west bank of the Nile to stave off an attack from the combined forces of Amalric and Shawar. Finally in March 1167 the allies forced a battle which Shirkuh won, despite heavy losses to both sides. Shirkuh then proceeded to Alexandria where the largely Sunni population opened their gates to him and offered support. Amalric and Shawar quickly regrouped, however, and closed on Alexandria. Not willing to be trapped with his main army in Alexandria, Shirkuh left the city, leaving Saladin and a small force to defend it. The allies quickly subjected the city to a vicious siege. In his first major military position, Saladin managed to organize a continued defense of the city and maintain the support of the population, despite great suffering brought on by the long siege. Shirkuh remained largely inactive in the countryside, failing to attack either the besieging army or the garrisoned city of Cairo, which held the Fatimid Caliph. Ultimately a peace treaty was negotiated between Shirkuh and the allies with the agreement that Amalric and Shirkuh would withdraw their forces in exchange for payments and amnesty would be granted to the people of Alexandria (Shawar was only held from retribution on the city after it was made part of the peace agreement and Amalric promised protection to the city). Saladin stayed in the Crusader camp during these negotiations in which he sought to assure the terms protecting Alexandria.[15][16]
Campaign of 1168
Facing internal pressures stemming from his unpopular alliance with Amalric, Shawar tried to negotiate with Nur al-Din to keep Shirkuh from attacking Egypt for a third time. It was Shawar who found himself betrayed, however, when Amalric attacked Egypt in 1168. Amalric quickly captured the city of Bilbays in early November and massacred the population that had frustrated him twice in 1163.
Saladin's Vizierate
The ascension to the vizierate was clearly a defining moment in his life. He married for the first time. The Fatimid State he inherited was every bit as unstable as the one Shawar had seized, but Saladin faced the additional challenge of being a foreign occupier. This challenge was increased because Saladin's overlord, Nur al-Din, knew little of his deceased emir's nephew, other than that he was from the famously ambitious Ayyubid family. Thus Saladin's time as vizier can best be judged as trying to repair the political and social situation is Egypt while under constant scrutiny from Nur al-Din, who believed that the addition of Egypt's resources to his Syrian empire as one of the final steps towards completing his jihad against the Crusader States.
Political
Saladin almost immediately faced challenges from the established pro-Fatimid military and civilian elites, who feared that the presence of a foreign Sunni vizier would result in the destruction of their dynasty. A conspiracy against Saladin by these elites formed in 1169 centered around the black
Social
Though he did not disband the Fatimid Caliphate until 1171 Saladin actively sought to spread Sunnism as soon as he became the vizier. He established numerous
Ruler of Egypt
With the Fatimid Caliphate gone, Saladin now found himself the ruler of Egypt, though still a subordinate of the distant Nur al-Din. Nur al-Din, in turn, did not find himself satisfied with Saladin for a number of reasons. The greatest of these was his displeasure with the size of Saladin's tribute payments, which he had expected to be much larger. This issue was intensified by the fact that Nur al-Din had sought to advance Shirkuh, not Saladin and, with Ayyub dead, Nur al-Din felt that he had no control over the younger ruler and became ever more convinced that Saladin would attempt to become independent. The extent to which Saladin may have intentionally underpaid Nur al-Din is unknown, but it is likely that the tombs of the Pharaohs were finally running dry after being so heavily tapped by previous viziers. Saladin continued to actively avoid any personal meeting with Nur al-Din, who may very well have removed him from power. There is little doubt that Saladin's actions looked suspicious as he continued his reforms across Egyptian society, including the elimination of many taxes in contradiction with Islamic law, and began construction of a formidable navy. However, Nur al-Din was not alone in facing ambitious underlings. As other Ayyubids amassed power in Egypt, they too wished to gain territory, wealth, and glory. Among these were his nephew
Notes
- ^ a b Canard 1965, pp. 857–858.
- ^ a b Canard 1965, p. 858.
- ^ Lev 1999, p. 53
- ^ Lev 1999, p. 55
- ^ Maalouf 1984, p. 161
- ^ Möhring 2005, p. 23
- ^ Canard 1965, p. 859.
- ^ a b Canard 1965, p. 857.
- ^ Canard 1965, pp. 850–852.
- ^ Lev 1999, pp. 116–117
- ^ Lev 1999, p. 16
- ^ Möhring 2005, pp. 23–24
- ^ Maalouf 1984, p. 163
- ^ Möhring 2005, p. 24
- ^ Möhring 2005, pp. 25–26
- ^ Shaddad 2002, pp. 42–43
- ^ Lev 1999, pp. 59–60
- ^ Möhring 2005, p. 27
- ^ Möhring 2005, p. 29
- ^ Lev 1999, pp. 80–81
- ^ Lev 1999, pp. 49–50
- ^ a b Möhring 2005, p. 31
- ^ Maalouf 1984, p. 171
- ^ Lev 1999, p. 85
- ^ Lev 1999, pp. 97–101
- ^ Shaddad 2002, pp. 48–49
- ^ Maalouf 1984, pp. 174–175
Bibliography
- OCLC 495469475.
- ISBN 978-0-521-61636-2.
- Ehrenkreutz, Andrew S. (1972). Saladin. Albany: State University of New York Press. ISBN 0-87395-095-X.
- ISBN 978-3-406-66163-1.
- Maalouf, Amin (1984) [1983]. Les croisades vues par les Arabes [The Crusades Through Arab Eyes]. trans. Jon Rothschild. London: Al Saqi Books. OCLC 12081005.
- Möhring, Hannes (2008) [2005]. Saladin, der Sultan und seine Zeit, 1138–1193 [Saladin: the Sultan and His Times, 1138–1193]. trans. David S. Bachrach, intro. Paul M. Cobb. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. OCLC 192109774.
- Yusuf ibn Rafi ibn Shaddād, Bahā' ad-Dīn (2002) [1228]. The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin. Richards, D.S. (trans.). Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 0-7546-3381-0.
- Lev, Yaacov (1991). State and Society in Fatimid Egypt. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 90-04-09344-3.
- Lev, Yaacov (1999). Saladin in Egypt. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 90-04-11221-9.
Further reading
- Holt, P.M. (1986). The Age of the Crusades: the Near East from the eleventh century to 1517. A History of the Near East. Vol. 2. trans. Richards, D.S. New York: Longman. OCLC 11517525.
- Ibn al-Athir, Izz al-Din (2008). The chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the crusading period from al-Kamil fi'l-tarikh. Vol. 2. trans. Richards, D.S. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing. OCLC 74356392.
