Sayf al-Dawla
Sayf al-Dawla سيف الدولة | |
---|---|
Banu Taghlib | |
Dynasty | Hamdanid |
Father | Abdallah ibn Hamdan |
Religion | Twelver Shi'ism |
ʿAlī ibn ʾAbū'l-Hayjāʾ ʿAbdallāh ibn Ḥamdān ibn Ḥamdūn ibn al-Ḥārith al-Taghlibī.
The most prominent member of the
Sayf al-Dawla is well known for his role in the Arab–Byzantine wars, facing a resurgent Byzantine Empire that in the early 10th century had begun to advance into the Muslim-controlled territories on its eastern border. In this struggle against a much more numerous and well-resourced enemy, Sayf al-Dawla launched raids deep into Byzantine territory and scored a few successes, for which he was widely celebrated in the Muslim world. The Hamdanid ruler generally held the upper hand until 955. After that, the new Byzantine commander, Nikephoros Phokas, and his lieutenants spearheaded a sustained offensive that broke Hamdanid power. The Byzantines annexed Cilicia, and even occupied Aleppo itself briefly in 962. Sayf al-Dawla's final years were marked by military defeats, his own growing disability as a result of disease, and a decline in his authority that led to revolts by some of his closest lieutenants. He died in early 967, leaving a much weakened realm, which by 969 had lost Antioch and the Syrian littoral to the Byzantines and had become a Byzantine tributary.
Sayf al-Dawla's court at Aleppo was the centre of a vibrant cultural life, and the literary cycle he gathered around him, including the great
Life
Origin and family
Sayf al-Dawla was born on 22 June 916 (17
The Taghlib had long been prominent in the area of
Hamdan was defeated by the Abbasids in 895 and imprisoned with his relatives, but his son
Despite the coup's failure and his death, Abdallah had been able to consolidate his control over Mosul, becoming the virtual founder of a Hamdanid-ruled emirate there. During his long absences in Baghdad in his final years, Abdallah relegated authority over Mosul to his eldest son, al-Hasan, the future Nasir al-Dawla. After Abdallah's death, al-Hasan's position in Mosul was challenged by his uncles, and it was not until 935 that he was able to secure confirmation by Baghdad of his control over Mosul and the entire Jazira up to the Byzantine frontier.[13][14]
Early career under Nasir al-Dawla
The young Ali began his career under his brother. In 936, al-Hasan invited Ali to his service, promising him the governorship of
In the meantime, al-Hasan became involved in the intrigues of the Abbasid court. Since the murder of al-Muqtadir in 932, the Abbasid government had all but collapsed, and in 936 the powerful governor of
Al-Hasan initially supported Ibn Ra'iq, but in 942 he had him assassinated and secured for himself the post of amir al-umara, receiving the honorific (
The Hamdanids' success proved short-lived. They were politically isolated, and found little support among the Caliphate's most powerful vassals, the
Establishment of the Emirate of Aleppo
Like other parts of the Abbasid empire, the collapse of Abbasid authority during the 'Anarchy at Samarra' led to a period of rival warlords competing for control of Syria. From 882, the region was ruled by the semi-autonomous
Syria came under the control of another Egypt-based strongman,
It was in this context that Sayf al-Dawla turned his attention to Syria. The previous years had seen a series of personal humiliations, with defeats in the field by Tuzun followed by his failure to persuade al-Muttaqi to nominate him as amir al-umara. It was during the latter attempt that he also had one of his rivals, Muhammad ibn Inal al-Turjuman, assassinated. As Thierry Bianquis writes, following the failure of his brother's designs in Iraq, Sayf al-Dawla's turn to Syria was "born of resentment when, having returned to Nasibin, he found himself under-employed and badly paid".[8] Nasir al-Dawla seems to have encouraged his brother to turn to Syria after Husayn's failure there, writing to Sayf al-Dawla that "Syria lies before you, there is no one in this land who can prevent you from taking it".[26] With money and troops provided by his brother, Sayf al-Dawla invaded northern Syria in the wake of al-Ikhshid's departure.[24] He gained the support of the local Bedouin tribe of Banu Kilab, and even the Kilabi governor installed by al-Ikhshid in Aleppo, Abu'l-Fath Uthman ibn Sa'id al-Kilabi, who accompanied the Hamdanid in his unopposed entrance into the city on 29 October 944.[26][27][28]
Conflict with al-Ikhshid
Al-Ikhshid reacted, and sent an army north under Abu al-Misk Kafur to confront Sayf al-Dawla, who was then besieging Homs. In the ensuing battle, the Hamdanid scored a crushing victory. Homs then opened its gates, and Sayf al-Dawla set his sights on Damascus. Sayf al-Dawla briefly occupied the city in early 945, but was forced to abandon it in the face of the citizens' hostility.[26] In April 945 al-Ikhshid himself led an army into Syria, although at the same time he also offered terms to Sayf al-Dawla, proposing to accept Hamdanid control over northern Syria and the Thughur. Sayf al-Dawla rejected al-Ikhshid's proposals, but was defeated in battle in May/June and forced to retreat to Raqqa. The Egyptian army proceeded to raid the environs of Aleppo. Nevertheless, in October the two sides came to an agreement, broadly on the lines of al-Ikhshid's earlier proposal: the Egyptian ruler acknowledged Hamdanid control over northern Syria, and even consented to sending an annual tribute in exchange for Sayf al-Dawla's renunciation of all claims on Damascus. The pact was sealed by Sayf al-Dawla's marriage to a niece of al-Ikhshid, and Sayf al-Dawla's new domain received the—purely formal—sanction by the caliph, who also re-affirmed his laqab soon thereafter.[26][29][30]
The truce with al-Ikhshid lasted until the latter's death in July 946 at Damascus. Sayf al-Dawla immediately marched south, took Damascus, and then proceeded to
For the Ikhshidids, the maintenance of Aleppo was less important than southern Syria with Damascus, which was Egypt's eastern bulwark. As long as their control over this region was not threatened, the Egyptians were more than willing to allow the existence of a Hamdanid state in the north. Furthermore, the Ikhshidids realized that they would have difficulty in asserting and maintaining control over northern Syria and Cilicia, which were traditionally oriented more towards the Jazira and Iraq. Not only would Egypt, threatened by this time by the Fatimid Caliphate in the west, be spared the cost of maintaining a large army in these distant lands, but the Hamdanid emirate would also fulfill the useful role of a buffer state against incursions both from Iraq and from Byzantium.[26][29][32] The agreement of 945 was reiterated, with the difference that the Ikhshidids were no longer obligated to pay tribute for Damascus. The frontier thus established, between Jaziran-influenced northern Syria and the Egyptian-controlled southern part of the country, was to last until the Mamluks seized the entire country in 1260.[29][33]
Sayf al-Dawla, who returned to Aleppo in autumn, was now master of an extensive realm: the north Syrian provinces (
Arab tribal revolts
Aside from his confrontation with the Ikhshidids, Sayf al-Dawla's consolidation over his realm was challenged by the need to maintain good relations with the restive native Arab tribes.
In his relations with them, Sayf al-Dawla benefitted from the fact that he was an ethnic Arab, unlike most of the contemporary rulers in the Islamic Middle East, who were Turkic or
After winning recognition by the Ikhshidids, Sayf al-Dawla began a series of campaigns of consolidation. His main target was to establish firm control over the Syrian littoral, as well as the routes connecting it to the interior. The operations there included a difficult siege of the fortress of
Finally, in spring 955 a major rebellion broke out in the region of Qinnasrin and Sabkhat al-Jabbul, which involved all tribes, both Bedouin and sedentary, including the Hamdanids' close allies, the Kilab. Sayf al-Dawla was able to resolve the situation quickly, initiating a ruthless campaign of swift repression that included driving the tribes into the desert to die or capitulate, coupled with diplomacy that played on the divisions among the tribesmen. Thus the Kilab were offered peace and a return to their favoured status, and were given more lands at the expense of the Kalb, who were driven from their abodes along with the Tayy, and fled south to settle in the plains north of Damascus and the Golan Heights, respectively. At the same time, the Numayr were also expelled and encouraged to resettle in the Jazira around Harran.[34][36] The revolt was suppressed in June, in what Bianquis calls "a desert policing operation perfectly planned and rigorously executed". It was only Sayf al-Dawla's "feelings of solidarity and his sense of Arab honour", according to Bianquis, that prevented the revolt from ending with the "total extermination, through warfare and thirst, of all the tribes".[36]
The suppression of the great tribal revolt marked, in the words of Kennedy, "the high point of Sayf al-Dawla’s success and power",
Wars with the Byzantines
Through his assumption of control over the Syrian and Jaziran Thughur in 945/6, Sayf al-Dawla emerged as the chief Arab prince facing the Byzantine Empire, and warfare with the Byzantines became his main preoccupation.[24] Indeed, much of Sayf al-Dawla's reputation stems from his unceasing, though ultimately unsuccessful war with the Empire.[23][41]
By the early 10th century, the Byzantines had gained the upper hand over their eastern Muslim neighbours. The onset of decline in the Abbasid Caliphate after the Anarchy at Samarra was followed by the
The Byzantine advance evoked a great emotional response in the Muslim world, with volunteers, both soldiers and civilians, flocking to participate in the jihad against the Empire. Sayf al-Dawla was also affected by this atmosphere, and became deeply impregnated with the spirit of jihad.[36][37][47] The rise of the Hamdanid brothers to power in the frontier provinces and the Jazira is therefore to be regarded against the backdrop of the Byzantine threat, as well as the manifest inability of the Abbasid government to stem the Byzantine offensive.[48][49] In Kennedy's assessment, "compared with the inaction or indifference of other Muslim rulers, it is not surprising that Sayf al-Dawla's popular reputation remained high; he was the one man who attempted to defend the Faith, the essential hero of the time".[50]
Early campaigns
Sayf al-Dawla entered the fray against the Byzantines in 936, when he led an expedition to the aid of
Failures and victories, 945–955
After establishing himself at Aleppo in 944, Sayf al-Dawla resumed warfare against Byzantium in 945/6. From then until the time of his death, he was the Byzantines' chief antagonist in the East—by the end of his life Sayf al-Dawla was said to have fought against them in over forty battles.
Hamdanid efforts against Byzantium were further crippled by the dependence on the Thughur system. The fortified militarized zone of the Thughur was very expensive to maintain, requiring constant provisions of cash and supplies from other parts of the Muslim world. Once the area came under Hamdanid control, the rump Caliphate lost any interest in providing these resources, and the scorched earth tactics of the Byzantines further reduced the area's ability to feed itself. Furthermore, the cities of the Thughur were fractious by nature, and their allegiance to Sayf al-Dawla was the result of his charismatic leadership and his military successes; once the Byzantines gained the upper hand and the Hamdanid's prestige declined, the cities tended to look out only for themselves.[61] Finally, Sayf al-Dawla's origin in the Jazira also affected his strategic outlook, and was probably responsible for his failure to construct a fleet, or to pay any attention at all to the Mediterranean, in stark contrast to most Syria-based polities in history.[34][51]
Sayf al-Dawla's raid of winter 945/6 was of limited scale, and was followed by a prisoner exchange.[51] Warfare on the frontiers then died down for a couple of years, and recommenced only in 948.[62] Despite scoring a victory over a Byzantine invasion in 948, he was unable to prevent the sack of Hadath, one of the main Muslim strongholds in the Euphrates Thughur, by Leo Phokas, one of the sons of the Byzantine Domestic of the Schools (commander-in-chief) Bardas Phokas.[51][62][63] Sayf al-Dawla's expeditions in the next two years were also failures. In 949 he raided into the theme of Lykandos but was driven back, and the Byzantines proceeded to sack Marash, defeat a Tarsian army and raid as far as Antioch. In the next year, Sayf al-Dawla led a large force into Byzantine territory, ravaging the themes of Lykandos and Charsianon, but on his return he was ambushed by Leo Phokas in a mountain pass. In what became known as the ghazwat al-musiba, the 'dreadful expedition', Sayf al-Dawla lost 8,000 men and barely escaped himself.[51][64]
Sayf al-Dawla nevertheless rejected offers of peace from the Byzantines, and launched another raid against Lykandos and Malatya, persisting until the onset of winter forced him to retire.
Byzantine ascendancy, 956–962
Sayf al-Dawla's victories brought about the replacement of Bardas by his eldest son,
In spring 956, Sayf al-Dawla pre-empted Tzimiskes from a planned assault on Amida, and invaded Byzantine territory first. Tzimiskes then seized a pass in Sayf al-Dawla's rear, and attacked him during his return. The hard-fought battle, fought amid torrential rain, resulted in a Muslim victory as Tzimiskes lost 4,000 men. At the same time, Leo Phokas invaded Syria and defeated and captured Sayf al-Dawla's cousin Abu'l-'Asha'ir, whom he had left behind in his stead. Later in the year, Sayf al-Dawla was obliged to go to Tarsus to help repel a raid by the Byzantine
In 960, Sayf al-Dawla tried to use the absence of Nikephoros Phokas with much of his army on his
Illness, rebellions and death
In 963, the Byzantines remained quiet as Nikephoros was scheming to ascend the imperial throne,
Thus, in 961, the emir of Tarsus,
Despite his illness and the spreading famine in his domains, in 963 Sayf al-Dawla launched three raids into Asia Minor. One of them even reached as far as
The year 965 also saw two further large-scale rebellions within Sayf al-Dawla's domains. The first was led by a former governor of the coast, the ex-Qarmatian Marwan al-Uqayli, which grew to threatening dimensions: the rebels captured Homs, defeated an army sent against them and advanced up to Aleppo, but al-Uqayli was wounded in the battle for the city and died shortly after.[72][78] In autumn, a more serious revolt broke out in Antioch, led by the former governor of Tarsus, Rashiq ibn Abdallah al-Nasimi. The rebellion was obviously motivated by Sayf al-Dawla's inability to stop the Byzantine advance. After raising an army in the town, Rashiq led it to besiege Aleppo, which was defended by Sayf al-Dawla's ghilman, Qarquya and Bishara. Three months into the siege, the rebels had taken possession of part of the lower town, when Rashiq was killed. He was succeeded by a Daylamite named Dizbar. Dizbar defeated Qarquya and took Aleppo, but then departed the town to take control over the rest of northern Syria.[78][81] The rebellion is described in the Life of Patriarch Christopher of Antioch, an ally of Sayf al-Dawla. In the same year, Sayf al-Dawla was also heavily affected by the death of two of his sons, Abu'l-Maqarim and Abu'l-Baraqat.[72]
In early 966, Sayf al-Dawla asked for and received a short truce and an exchange of prisoners with the Byzantines, which was held at Samosata. He ransomed many Muslim captives at great cost, only to see them go over to Dizbar's forces. Sayf al-Dawla resolved to confront the rebel: carried on his litter, he returned to Aleppo, and on the next day defeated the rebel's army, helped by the defection of the Kilab from Dizbar's army. The surviving rebels were ruthlessly punished.
Cultural activity and legacy
"Firm resolutions happen in proportion to the resolute,
and noble deeds come in proportion to the noble.
Small deeds are great in small men's eyes,
great deeds, in great men's eyes, are small.
Sayf al-Dawlah charges the army with the burden of his zeal,
which large hosts are not strong enough to bear,
And he demands of men what only he can do—
even lions do not claim as much."
Start of the victory ode on the recapture of Hadath in 954, composed by al-Mutanabbi (translation Geert Jan van Gelder)[90]
Sayf al-Dawla surrounded himself with prominent intellectual figures, most notably the great poets
Sayf al-Dawla was also unusual for 10th-century Syria in his espousal of
Sayf al-Dawla played a crucial role in the history of the two cities he chose as his capitals, Aleppo and Mayyafariqin. His choice raised them from obscurity to the status of major urban centres; Sayf al-Dawla lavished attention on them, endowing them with new buildings, as well as taking care of their fortification. Aleppo especially benefited from Sayf al-Dawla's patronage: of special note is the great palace (destroyed in the Byzantine sack of 962) in the suburb of Halba outside Aleppo, as well as the gardens and
Political legacy
Sayf al-Dawla has remained to modern times one of the best-known medieval Arab leaders. His bravery and leadership of the war against the Byzantines, despite the heavy odds against him, his literary activities and patronage of poets which lent his court an unmatched cultural brilliance, the calamities which struck him towards his end—defeat, illness and betrayal—have made him, in the words of Bianquis, "from his time until the present day", the personification of the "Arab chivalrous ideal in its most tragic aspect".[4][101][102]
Sayf al-Dawla's military record was, in the end, one of failure: he lost much of his territory to the Byzantines and, soon after his death, the rump emirate of Aleppo became a Byzantine vassal and an object of dispute with the Fatimids.[85][89] In retrospect, the Hamdanids' military defeat was inevitable, given the disparity of strength and resources with the Empire.[51] This weakness was compounded by the failure of Nasir al-Dawla to support his brother in his wars against Byzantium, by the Hamdanids' preoccupation with internal revolts, and the feebleness of their authority over much of their domains. As Whittow comments, Sayf al-Dawla's martial reputation often masks the reality that his power was "a paper tiger, short of money, short of soldiers and with little real base in the territories he controlled".[103] The defeat and expulsion of several Arab tribes in the great revolt of 955 also had unforeseen long-term consequences, as it left the Kilab as the dominant tribe in northern Syria. Associating themselves with the Hamdanids as auxiliaries, the Kilab managed to infiltrate the local cities, opening the path to their takeover of the emirate of Aleppo under the Mirdasid dynasty in the 11th century.[36]
Several distinguished officials served as his viziers, starting with Abu Ishaq Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Karariti, who had previously been in Abbasid employ. He was succeeded by Abu Abdallah Muhammad ibn Sulayman ibn Fahd, and finally by the celebrated Abu'l-Husayn Ali ibn al-Husayn al-Maghribi.[87] In the position of qadi of Aleppo, the Hamdanid emir dismissed the incumbent, Abu Tahir Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Mathil, and appointed Abu Husayn Ali ibn Abdallah al-Raqqi in his stead. When the latter was killed by the Byzantines in 960, Ibn Mathil was restored, and later succeeded by Abu Ja'far Ahmad ibn Ishaq al-Hanafi.[87] Though fiscal and military affairs were centralized in the two capitals of Aleppo and Mayyafariqin, local government was based on fortified settlements, which were entrusted by Sayf al-Dawla to relatives or close associates.[36]
The picture presented by his contemporaries on the impact of Sayf al-Dawla's policies on his own domains is not favourable. Despite the Hamdanids' origins among the Arab Bedouin, the Hamdanid emirate of Aleppo was a highly centralized state on the model of other contemporary Islamic polities, relying on a standing, salaried army of Turkic ghilman and Daylamite infantry which required enormous sums. This led to heavy taxation, as well as massive confiscation of private estates to sustain the Hamdanid military.[102][104] The 10th-century chronicler Ibn Hawqal, who travelled the Hamdanid domains, paints a dismal picture of economic oppression and exploitation of the common people, linked with the Hamdanid practice of expropriating extensive estates in the most fertile areas and practising a monoculture of cereals destined to feed the growing population of Baghdad. This was coupled with heavy taxation—Sayf al-Dawla and Nasir al-Dawla are said to have become the wealthiest princes in the Muslim world—which allowed them to maintain their lavish courts, but at a heavy price to their subjects' long-term prosperity.[87] According to Kennedy "even the capital of Aleppo seems to have been more prosperous under the following Mirdasid dynasty than under the Hamdanids",[102] and Bianquis suggests that Sayf al-Dawla's wars and economic policies both contributed to a permanent alteration in the landscape of the regions they ruled: "by destroying orchards and peri-urban market gardens, by enfeebling the once vibrant polyculture and by depopulating the sedentarised steppe terrain of the frontiers, the Hamdanids contributed to the erosion of the deforested land and to the seizure by semi-nomadic tribes of the agricultural lands of these regions in the 11th century".[87]
Notes
- ^ Full name and genealogy according to the Syrian historian Ibn Khallikan (d. 1282): ʿAlī ibn ʾAbū'l-Hayjāʾ ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥamdān ibn Ḥamdūn ibn al-Ḥārith ibn Lūqman ibn Rashīd ibn al-Mathnā ibn Rāfīʿ ibn al-Ḥārith ibn Ghatif ibn Miḥrāba ibn Ḥāritha ibn Mālik ibn ʿUbayd ibn ʿAdī ibn ʾUsāma ibn Mālik ibn Bakr ibn Ḥubayb ibn ʿAmr ibn Ghanm ibn Taghlib.[1]
- ^ Apart from Sa'd al-Dawla, only a daughter, Sitt al-Nas, survived her father.[87]
- ^ For a full list of the scholars associated with Sayf al-Dawla's court, cf. Bianquis 1997, p. 103 and Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, Vol. I, pp. 86ff., and Supplement, Vol. I, pp. 138ff.
References
- ^ Ibn Khallikan 1842, p. 404.
- ^ a b c d e Canard 1971, p. 126.
- ^ Özaydin 2009, p. 35.
- ^ a b c d Bianquis 1997, p. 103.
- ^ a b Kennedy 2004, pp. 265–266.
- ^ Bonner 2010, pp. 313–327.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 265–266, 269.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Bianquis 1997, p. 104.
- ^ a b Kennedy 2004, pp. 266–267.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 266, 268.
- ^ Canard 1971, pp. 126–127.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 267–268.
- ^ a b c Canard 1971, p. 127.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 268.
- ^ Bianquis 1997, pp. 104, 107.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 192–195.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 195–196.
- ^ a b Kennedy 2004, p. 270.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 270–271.
- ^ Humphreys 2010, pp. 535–536.
- ^ Humphreys 2010, pp. 536–537.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 286–287.
- ^ a b c d Humphreys 2010, p. 537.
- ^ a b c d e f Canard 1971, p. 129.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 196, 312.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Bianquis 1997, p. 105.
- ^ Bianquis 1993, p. 115.
- ^ a b c d Özaydin 2009, p. 36.
- ^ a b c Kennedy 2004, p. 273.
- ^ Bianquis 1998, pp. 113–114.
- ^ Bianquis 1998, pp. 114–115.
- ^ Bianquis 1998, pp. 114, 115.
- ^ Bianquis 1997, pp. 105, 107.
- ^ a b c d Kennedy 2004, p. 274.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 273–274.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Bianquis 1997, p. 106.
- ^ a b c d e f Humphreys 2010, p. 538.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 269, 274–275.
- ^ McGeer 2008, pp. 229–242.
- ^ Madelung 1975, pp. 234–235.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 275.
- ^ Toynbee 1973, pp. 110–111, 113–114, 378–380.
- ^ Whittow 1996, pp. 310–316, 329.
- ^ Toynbee 1973, pp. 121, 380–381.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 479–484.
- ^ Whittow 1996, pp. 317–322.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 277–278.
- ^ a b Kennedy 2004, p. 276.
- ^ Whittow 1996, p. 318.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 278.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Bianquis 1997, p. 107.
- ^ a b Treadgold 1997, p. 483.
- ^ Whittow 1996, pp. 318–319.
- ^ Ter-Ghewondyan 1976, pp. 84–87.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 483–484.
- ^ Whittow 1996, pp. 319–320.
- ^ Whittow 1996, pp. 320, 322.
- ^ Bianquis 1997, pp. 106–107.
- ^ a b Whittow 1996, p. 320.
- ^ a b Kennedy 2004, p. 277.
- ^ McGeer 2008, pp. 244–246.
- ^ a b Whittow 1996, p. 322.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 488–489.
- ^ a b Treadgold 1997, p. 489.
- ^ a b c Treadgold 1997, p. 492.
- ^ On the nature of these reforms, cf. Whittow 1996, pp. 323–325
- ^ The description of this ceremony survives in De Ceremoniis, 2.19. McCormick 1990, pp. 159–163
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 492–493.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, p. 493.
- ^ Bianquis 1997, pp. 107–108.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, p. 495.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Bianquis 1997, p. 108.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 495–496.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 277, 279.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 496–497.
- ^ a b c Whittow 1996, p. 326.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 498–499.
- ^ a b c d Kennedy 2004, p. 279.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, p. 499.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 500–501.
- ^ Bianquis 1997, pp. 108–109.
- ^ a b Bianquis 1997, pp. 108, 109.
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 501–502.
- ^ Bianquis 1997, pp. 103, 108, 109.
- ^ a b c Kennedy 2004, p. 280.
- ^ El Tayib 1990, p. 326.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Bianquis 1997, p. 109.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 280–282.
- ^ a b Whittow 1996, pp. 326–327.
- ^ van Gelder 2013, p. 61.
- ^ Humphreys 2010, pp. 537–538.
- ^ Kraemer 1992, pp. 90–91.
- ^ a b Larkin 2006, p. 542.
- ^ Hamori 1992, p. vii.
- ^ Ahmad 2003, p. 179.
- ^ Kraemer 1992, p. 90.
- ^ El Tayib 1990, pp. 315–318, 326.
- ^ Bianquis 1997, pp. 103–104.
- ^ Moosa 1987, p. 264.
- ^ Amabe 2016, p. 64.
- ^ Humphreys 2010, pp. 537–539.
- ^ a b c Kennedy 2004, p. 265.
- ^ Whittow 1996, p. 334.
- ^ Amabe 2016, p. 57.
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- OCLC 490638192.
- ISBN 978-0-19-215253-4.
- ISBN 0-8047-2630-2.
- ISBN 978-0-8147-3826-9.
- ISBN 978-0-520-20496-6.
Further reading
- Ayyıldız, Esat (2020). "El-Mutenebbî'nin Seyfüddevle'ye Methiyeleri (Seyfiyyât)" [Al-Mutanabbī’s Panegyrics to Sayf al-Dawla (Sayfiyyāt)]. BEÜ İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi (in Turkish). 7 (2): 497–518. S2CID 228935099.
- OCLC 247435034.
- OCLC 715397763. Retrieved 19 July 2012.
- OCLC 715397763.
- Garrood, William (2008). "The Byzantine Conquest of Cilicia and the Hamdanids of Aleppo, 959–965". Anatolian Studies. 58: 127–140. S2CID 162596738.
External links
- "al-Mutanabbi to Sayf al-Dawla". Princeton Online Arabic Poetry Project. Retrieved 17 July 2012.