Strategic reset

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Strategic reset was a policy framework designed to stop counterproductive U.S. engagement in a fragmenting Iraq and to strengthen the United States' stance throughout the Middle East. In military terms, "reset" refers to "a series of actions to restore units to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with future mission requirements."[1]

The proposal advocates harnessing U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic power to protect critical

internal and external conflicts in Iraq
. The plan for strategic reset entails four key measures:

The framework was set forth in a 2007 report by the Center for American Progress, a progressive think tank based in Washington, D.C.[2]

Background

The

June 25, 2007
.

In 2007, when retired

Afghanistan
, he wrote:

  • "What I found in discussions with current and former members of this administration is that there is no agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region. ... [A]fter thoughtful discussions with people both in and outside of this administration, I concluded that the current Washington decision-making process lacks a linkage to a broader view of the region and how the parts fit together strategically."[4]

Citing Gen. Sheehan, the report gives examples from what are described as seven years of relative progress in the Middle East (1994–2000) followed by seven years of setbacks (2001–2007), such as:[5]

U.S. strategy in Iraq in 2007 relied on Iraqi political progress, increased numbers of U.S. troops in the country, and diversification of tactics for political and economic support.[6] While proponents of strategic reset supported diversification, particularly as it regards "situat[ing] the strategy in a regional approach,"[6] they strongly oppose sending more U.S. troops to Iraq, and they maintain that the "fundamental premise of Bush's surge strategy—that Iraq's leaders will make key decisions to advance their country's political transition and national reconciliation—is at best misguided and clearly unworkable."[7]

In 2006, the bipartisan

policy to the inevitable decentralization of Iraqi politics.[12]

In 2007, The Washington Post described as "strategic reset" a proposal by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that took the form of "an unusually detailed public explanation of the new American effort to create a de facto alliance between Israel and moderate Arab states against Iranian extremism."[13]

Principles of the strategic reset framework

Advocates of strategic reset maintain that the current administration's misjudgments regarding Iraq policy have jeopardized the United States'

Al Qaeda.[14]

Adapting to Iraq's fragmentation

Since 2005, Iraq's major sectarian conflicts have continued to generate violence at high levels, and Iraq has failed to engineer a political solution to the problems that fuel them.

parliament.[18] According to the CAP, "Iraq's leaders fundamentally disagree on what kind of country Iraq is and should be, and Iraq's political transition has not succeeded in bridging these divides. This lack of political consensus among Iraq's leaders has resulted in a violent struggle for power."[17]

Stopping unconditional arming of security forces

Karabilah after an IED
was found in a girls school

Under the strategic reset framework, one immediate response to the political

$20 billion into building a national army and police force that does not have the unity and support of its own leaders."[19]
Supporters of the strategic reset see two dangers in allowing the current policy of arming and training these security forces to continue: the first danger is that the U.S. is providing weaponry to opposing sides of a
civil war. For example, Matthew Yglesias, writing for The Atlantic
, has said,

The second danger arises from the fact that the majority of Iraq's security forces are Shi'a who constitute "some of the closest allies of America's greatest rival in the Middle East—Iran."[21]

Decentralization

A second response to fragmentation in Iraqi politics is decentralization of U.S. policy and power structure in Iraq. The strategic reset framework calls for reassignment of personnel from the

displaced persons, and bring U.S. personnel into closer working relationships with local Iraqi institutions.[22]

Phased military redeployment

Phased redeployment is the strategic reset framework's second mainstay. The plan calls for the U.S. immediately to announce "that it does not intend to maintain permanent military bases or forces in Iraq" and to initiate a new deployment structure allowing forces currently serving in Iraq to rotate home, while incoming troops conduct counterterrorism missions from locations such as Turkey, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. A temporary force of 8,000–10,000 should remain in northern Iraq until 2009, but virtually all other troops are to leave Iraq by September 2008.[23] Redeployment is crucial to the reset strategy chiefly because of its potential to undermine terrorism: proponents argue that U.S. military presence in Iraq gives Al-Qaeda a powerful recruiting tool, as well as ideological justification for continued violence. The most damaging blow the U.S. can deal to such organizations in Iraq, they argue, is to withdraw. Ayman al-Zawahri said on May 5, 2007, that a proposed U.S. redeployment would "deprive us of the opportunity to destroy the American forces which we have caught in a historic trap."[24]

The reset would remove U.S. troops from Iraq while preserving the ability to strike terrorist targets there and elsewhere. The "post-redeployment U.S. force structure in the Middle East would include: an

Security and diplomacy

The plan combines

redeployment with initiatives to promote security and diplomacy in the Middle East
. These include:

Arab–Israeli conflict

Israeli West Bank barrier

Strategic reset requires that U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve the

anti-American sentiment,[31] enhanced American participation in the peace process would leave the U.S. in a stronger political position regionally. The strategy calls for President Bush to appoint a Middle East envoy and two senior ambassadors as an initial step in this direction.[32]
Further key steps would include:

Criticisms

David Gooden, writing for the

Des Moines Register, has criticized the proposal as "imperial liberalism," claiming that "[F]oreign military occupations are the root cause of Islamic terrorism" and that "[t]he Center for American Progress' plan for a 'strategic reset' will not achieve a lasting or a just peace."[34]

See also

References

  1. ^ "Readiness Committee Written Statement." Brigadier General Charles A. Anderson
  2. ^ Center for American Progress: "Strategic Reset" retrieved 27 June 2007
  3. ^ www.americanprogress.org retrieved 27 June 2007
  4. ^ "Why I Declined to Serve.” Washington Post, 16 Apr 2007 qtd. in CAP
  5. ^ CAP Report
  6. ^ a b Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq
  7. ^ Center for American Progress
  8. ^ Iraq Study Group Report Archived 2009-06-01 at the Wayback Machine pp 6–7, retrieved 28 June 2007
  9. ^ Iraq Study Group Report Archived 2009-06-01 at the Wayback Machine p 7, retrieved 28 June 2007
  10. ^ CAP "Strategic Reset" p 6 retrieved 28 June 2007
  11. ^ CAP "Strategic Reset" p 30 retrieved 28 June 2007
  12. ^ CAP "Strategic Reset" p 10 retrieved 28 June 2007
  13. ^ "Rice's Strategic Reset." Washington Post 26 Jan 2007
  14. ^ CAP retrieved 28 June 2006
  15. ^ Brookings Institution retrieved 28 June 2007
  16. ^ Today's Zaman retrieved 28 June 2007
  17. ^ a b CAP report p 5 retrieved 28 June 2007
  18. ^ "Sunni Leaders Angry Over Arrest Warrant." Houston Chronicle 26 June 2007
  19. ^ CAP report pp 16–18 retrieved 28 June 2007
  20. ^ "Strategic Reset," The Atlantic Online, 25 Jun 2007 retrieved 29 June 2007
  21. ^ CAP report pp 13–14 retrieved 28 June 2007
  22. ^ CAP report p 22 retrieved 28 June 2007
  23. ^ CAP report pp 27–29
  24. ^ "New Tape: Al Qaeda No. 2 Wants 200,000-300,000 U.S. Dead in Iraq". ABC News. Archived from the original on 2023-06-09.
  25. ^ CAP report p 29
  26. ^ CAP report p 33
  27. ^ "Why Iraq's Kirkuk Is Vital," Wall Street Journal 27 June 2007
  28. ^ CAP report p 36
  29. ^ United Nations press release
  30. ^ CAP report p 5
  31. ^ "Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World" Archived 2006-09-07 at the Wayback Machine Middle East Review of International Affairs
  32. ^ CAP report p 42
  33. ^ CAP report p 44
  34. ^ "Imperial liberalism on display: 'progressive' think-tank calls for 'redeployment'" Des Moines Register, 26 Jun 2007

External links