Battle of Carrhae

Battle of Carrhae
Part of Roman-Parthian Wars
Map of the Battle of Carrhae
Date 53 BC Location Near Carrhae (Harran ), Upper Mesopotamia Result Parthian victory[a][1]
Belligerents
Roman Republic	Parthian Empire
Commanders and leaders
Marcus Licinius Crassus † Publius Licinius Crassus † Gaius Cassius Longinus	Surena Silaces
Strength
36,000–43,000 men 28,000–35,000 legionaries 4,000 cavalry 1,000 Gallic cavalry 4,000 light infantry	10,000 1,000 cataphracts 9,000 horse archers
Casualties and losses
30,000 20,000 killed[2] 10,000 captured 5,000–10,000 escaped	Unknown, but minimal

The Battle of Carrhae (Latin pronunciation:

His death ended the First Triumvirate. The following four-year period of peace between the remaining two members of the Triumvirate, Julius Caesar and Pompey, argues against the view that Crassus had been a peacekeeper within the group and supports the views of most Roman historians that friction between Crassus and Pompey had always been a greater cause of tension than that between Caesar and Pompey.

Background

Triumvirate

The war in Parthia resulted from political arrangements intended to be mutually beneficial for

Meanwhile, in Parthia, a war of succession had broken out in 57 BC after King Phraates III had been killed by his sons Orodes II and Mithridates IV, who then began fighting each other over the throne. In the first stage, Orodes emerged victorious and appointed his brother as king of Media (his de facto governor) as a compromise.^[5] However, another armed clash made Orodes force Mithridates to flee to Aulus Gabinius, the Roman proconsul of Syria.^[6] Gabinius sought to interfere in the succession dispute on behalf of Mithridates so that Rome could make him its puppet king and seize control of Parthia in the process. However, Gabinius abandoned his plans and opted to intervene in Ptolemaic Egyptian affairs instead.^[5]

Mithridates proceeded to invade Babylonia on his own with some initial success but was soon confronted by the army of the Parthian commander Surena.^[6]

Gabinius's successor, Crassus, also sought to ally himself with Mithridates and invaded Parthia's client-state Osroene in 54 BC but wasted most of his time in waiting for reinforcements on the Balikh River's left bank while Surena besieged, defeated and executed Mithridates in Seleucia on the Tigris. Orodes, now unopposed in his own realm, marched north to invade Rome's ally Armenia, where King Artavasdes II soon defected to the Parthian side.^[5]

Crassus's preparations

The notoriously wealthy Marcus Crassus was around 62 when he embarked on the Parthian invasion. Greed is often regarded by the ancient sources, particularly his biographer

Another factor in Crassus's decision to invade Parthia was the expected ease of the campaign. The Roman legions had easily crushed the numerically superior armies of other eastern powers such as Pontus and Armenia, and Crassus expected Parthia to be an easy target.^[11]

Carrhae

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Location of the Battle of Carrhae

Cicero, however, suggested an additional factor: the ambitions of Marcus's son, the talented Publius Crassus, who had commanded successful campaigns in Gaul under Caesar. Upon his return to Rome as a highly decorated officer, Publius took steps to establish his own political career. Roman sources view the Battle of Carrhae not only as a calamity for Rome and a disgrace for Marcus Crassus but also as a tragedy that cut short Publius Crassus's promising career.^[12]

Some Romans objected to the war against Parthia. Cicero calls it a war nulla causa ("with no justification") on the grounds that Parthia had a treaty with Rome.

Despite protests and dire omens, Marcus Crassus left Rome on November 14, 55 BC.[15] Publius Crassus joined him in Syria during the winter of 54–53 BC and brought with him the thousand Celtic cavalry troopers from Gaul who remained loyal to their young leader until their death.

Invasion of Parthia

Crassus arrived in Syria in late 55 BC and immediately set about using his immense wealth to raise an army. According to Plutarch, he assembled a force of seven legions for a total of about 28,000 to 35,000 heavy infantry.^[16] He also had about 4,000 light infantry, and 4,000 cavalry, including the 1000-strong Gallic cavalry that Publius had brought with him.^[17] With the aid of Hellenic settlements in Syria and the support of about 6,000 cavalry from Artavasdes, the Armenian king, Crassus marched on Parthia. Artavasdes advised him to take a route through Armenia to avoid the desert and offered him reinforcements of a further 10,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry.^[18]

Crassus refused the offer and decided to take the direct route through Mesopotamia and to capture the great cities in the region. In response, the Parthian king, Orodes II, divided his army and took most of the soldiers, mainly foot archers with a small amount of cavalry, to punish the Armenians himself. He sent the rest of his forces, an all-cavalry force under the command of

After being informed of the presence of the Parthian army (which numbered roughly 10,000), Crassus's army panicked. Crassus' commanding general, Cassius, recommended that the army be deployed in the traditional Roman fashion, with infantry forming the centre and cavalry on the wings. At first, Crassus agreed, but he soon changed his mind and redeployed his men into a hollow square, each side formed by twelve cohorts.^[22] That formation would protect his forces from being outflanked but at the cost of mobility. The Roman forces advanced and came to a stream. Crassus's generals advised him to make camp and to attack the next morning to give his men a chance to rest. Publius, however, was eager to fight and managed to convince Crassus to confront the Parthians immediately.^[23]

The Parthians went to great lengths to intimidate the Romans. Firstly, they beat a great number of hollow drums and the Roman troops were unsettled by the loud and cacophonous noise. Surena then ordered his cataphracts to cover their armour in cloths and advance. When they were within sight of the Romans, they simultaneously dropped the cloths and revealed their shining armour. The sight was designed to intimidate the Romans.^[24]

Though Surena had originally planned to shatter the Roman lines with a charge by his

The Romans repeatedly advanced towards the Parthians to attempt to engage in close-quarters fighting, but the horse archers were always able to retreat safely and loosed Parthian shots as they withdrew. The legionaries then formed the testudo formation by locking their shields together to present a nearly-impenetrable front to missiles.^[26] However, that formation severely restricted their ability in melee combat. The Parthian cataphracts exploited that weakness and repeatedly charged the Roman line, which caused panic and inflicted heavy casualties.^[27] When the Romans tried to loosen their formation to repel the cataphracts, the latter rapidly retreated, and the horse archers resumed shooting at the legionaries, who were now more exposed.^[26]

Crassus now hoped that his legionaries could hold out until the Parthians ran out of arrows.

Once Publius and his men were sufficiently separated from the rest of the army, the Parthian cataphracts confronted them while the horse archers cut off their retreat. In the ensuing combat, the Gauls fought bravely, but their inferiority in weapons and armor was evident. They eventually retreated to a hill, where Publius committed suicide while the rest of his men were slaughtered, with only 500 being taken alive.[29]

Crassus, unaware of his son's fate but realising that Publius was in danger, ordered a general advance. He was confronted with the sight of his son's head on a spear. The Parthian horse archers began to surround the Roman infantry and shot at them from all directions. Meanwhile, the cataphracts mounted a series of charges that disorganised the Romans.

The Parthian onslaught did not cease until nightfall. Crassus, deeply shaken by his son's death, ordered a retreat to the nearby town of

Four Roman cohorts got lost in the dark and were surrounded on a hill by the Parthians, with only 20 Romans surviving.[31]

The next day, Surena sent a message to the Romans and offered to negotiate with Crassus. Surena proposed a truce to allow the Roman army to return to Syria safely in exchange for Rome giving up all territory east of the Euphrates. Surena either sent an embassy to the Romans by the hills or went himself to state he wanted a peace conference on an evacuation.^[32][33]

Crassus was reluctant to meet with the Parthians, but his troops threatened to mutiny otherwise.^[34] At the meeting, a Parthian pulled at Crassus's reins and sparked violence in which Crassus and his generals were killed.

After his death, the Parthians allegedly poured molten gold down his throat in a symbolic gesture mocking Crassus's renowned greed.

Rome was humiliated by this defeat, which was made even worse by the fact that the Parthians had captured several Legionary Eagles.^[39] It is also mentioned by Plutarch that the Parthians found the Roman prisoner-of-war who most resembled Crassus, dressed him as a woman, and paraded him through Parthia for all to see. This was a direct attack on Roman military culture, as the Parthians ordered the other Roman prisoners to hail this false Crassus as Imperator while on parade, a direct mockery of a Roman triumph.^[40]

Orodes II, with the rest of the Parthian Army, defeated the Armenians and captured their country. However, Surena's victory invoked the jealousy of the Parthian king, who ordered Surena's execution. Following Surena's death, Orodes II sent his son Pacorus on an unsuccessful military campaign into Roman Syria.

The Battle of Carrhae was one of the first major battles between the Romans and Parthians. It was the victory that led Parthia to invade Syria and Armenia several times, with varying successes. Rome also realised that its legionaries could not effectively fight against Parthian cavalry unsupported in open terrain.^[41]

In the 1940s, Homer H. Dubs, an American professor of Chinese history at the University of Oxford, hypothesized that the people of Liqian were descended from these prisoners. The prisoners, Dubs proposed, were resettled by the Parthians on their eastern border and may have fought as mercenaries at the Battle of Zhizhi between the Chinese and the Xiongnu in 36 BC. Chinese chroniclers mention the use of a "fish-scale formation" of soldiers as well as a double wooden palisade structure, which Dubs believed referred to the testudo formation and a defensive tactic that was unique to the Romans. To date, no artifacts that might confirm a Roman presence, such as coins or weaponry, have been discovered in Zhelaizhai, and Dubs' theories have not been accepted by the vast majority of historians.^[42]

Rob Gifford, commenting on the theory, described it as one of many "rural myths".^[43] Alfred Duggan used the possible fate of the Roman prisoners as the kernel of his novel Winter Quarters, which suggested that they were employed as frontier guards on the eastern border of the Parthian Empire.^[44]

Legacy

The capture of the golden aquilae (legionary battle standards) by the Parthians was considered a grave moral defeat and evil omen for the Romans. When he was assassinated, Caesar was planning a retaliatory war. It was said that there would have been harsh retribution if Caesar won because the surviving son of Crassus would be among the Roman forces.^[45]

However, the fall of the

Several historians note the lapse of time between Crassus's death and the outbreak of civil war. Gaius Stern has claimed that the death nearly cut the links the First Triumvirate enjoyed with the blue-blooded aristocracy, leaving the entire state vulnerable to the friction that eventually turned into civil war.[47] Thus, an immediate effect of the battle may have been the elimination of certain private checks and balances (such as Crassus's relationship to Metellus Pius Scipio) that had kept a lid on political tensions.

In a regional context, however, the battle had little negative impact for Rome in the long-term as the following retaliatory

References