Roman–Parthian War of 58–63
Roman–Parthian War of 58–63 | |||||||||
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Part of the Roman–Parthian Wars | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Commagene • Pontus |
Kingdom of Armenia Parthian Empire | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo Tigranes VI of Armenia Lucius Caesennius Paetus |
Tiridates I of Armenia Vologases I of Parthia | ||||||||
Units involved | |||||||||
30,000 Legionaries (6 Legions) | 18,000 Cavalry | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
11,000 dead or surrender | 3,000 dead |
History of Armenia |
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Timeline • Origins • Etymology |
The Roman–Parthian War of 58–63 or the War of the Armenian Succession[3] was fought between the Roman Empire and the Parthian Empire over control of Armenia, a vital buffer state between the two realms. Armenia had been a Roman client state since the days of Emperor Augustus, but in 52/53, the Parthians succeeded in installing their own candidate, Tiridates, on the Armenian throne.
These events coincided with the accession of
The conflict ended soon after, in an effective stalemate and a formal compromise: a Parthian prince of the
Background
Ever since the expanding
In the same year, in Rome, Emperor Claudius died and was succeeded by his stepson Nero. The Parthian encroachment in an area regarded as lying within the Roman sphere of influence worried the Roman leadership, and was widely seen as a major test of the new emperor's ability.[9] Nero reacted vigorously, appointing Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, a general who had distinguished himself in Germania and now served as governor of Asia, to supreme command in the East.[10]
Diplomatic maneuvers and preparations
Corbulo was given control over two provinces,
Initially, the Romans hoped to resolve the situation by diplomatic means: Corbulo and
In the meantime, Tiridates, backed by his brother, refused to go to Rome, and even engaged in operations against those Armenians whom he deemed were loyal to Rome.[17] Tension mounted and finally, in the early spring of 58, war broke out.
Outbreak of the war — The Roman offensive
Corbulo had placed a large number of his auxiliaries in a line of forts near the Armenian frontier under a former
Having drilled his army for two years, Corbulo, despite this misadventure, was ready. He had three legions at his disposal (
The war thus far had featured mostly skirmishing along the Roman–Armenian border. Corbulo tried to protect the pro-Roman Armenian settlements from attack, and simultaneously retaliated against the Parthians' supporters. Given that Tiridates avoided confrontation in a pitched battle, Corbulo divided his force, so that they could attack several places simultaneously, and instructed his allies, Kings
Tiridates reacted by sending envoys to ask why he was under attack, since hostages had been given. To this, Corbulo reiterated the demand to seek the recognition of his crown from Nero.
Fall of Artaxata
Corbulo now resolved to directly attack Tiridates' fortified strongholds. Not only were they instrumental in controlling the surrounding country and sources of revenue and soldiers, but in addition, a threat to them might force Tiridates to risk a pitched battle, since, in the words of historian A. Goldsworthy, "a king who could not defend communities loyal to him [...] lost prestige."[23] Corbulo and his subordinates successfully stormed three of these forts, including Volandum (possibly modern Iğdır),[24] "the strongest of all in that province" according to Tacitus, within a day with minimal casualties, and massacred their garrisons. Terrified by this display of Roman might, several towns and villages surrendered, and the Romans prepared to move against the northern Armenian capital, Artaxata.[21]
This forced Tiridates to confront the Romans with his army, as they approached Artaxata. The Roman force, reinforced by a vexillatio of X Fretensis, marched in a hollow square, with the legions supported by auxiliary horsemen and foot archers. The Roman soldiers were under strict orders not to break formation, and despite repeated probing attacks and feigned retreats by the Parthian horse archers, they held together until nightfall.[25] During the night, Tiridates withdrew his army, abandoning his capital; its inhabitants promptly surrendered and were allowed to leave unmolested, but the city was torched, since the Romans could not spare sufficient men for garrisoning it.[26]
Fall of Tigranocerta
In 59, the Romans marched to the south, towards Tigranocerta, Armenia's second capital city. On their way, Corbulo's men punished those who withstood or hid from them, while leniency was shown to those who surrendered.[27] In the harsh, dry terrain of northern Mesopotamia, the army suffered from lack of provisions, especially water, until they reached the more fertile areas near Tigranocerta. During that time, a plot to murder Corbulo was uncovered and suppressed. Several Armenian nobles who had joined the Roman camp were implicated and executed.[28] According to a story provided by Frontinus, when the Roman army arrived at Tigranocerta, they launched the severed head of one of the conspirators into the city. By chance, it landed right where the city council was assembled; they immediately decided to surrender the city, which was consequently spared.[29] Shortly after, an attempt by the Parthian army under king Vologases to enter Armenia was blocked by Verulanus Severus, the commander of the auxiliaries.[30]
The Romans were now in control of Armenia, and they promptly installed its new king,
Parthian counterattack
The Romans were well aware that their victory was still fragile, and that as soon as the Parthian king had dealt with the Hyrcanian rebellion, he would turn his attention to Armenia. Despite Vologases' reluctance to risk an all-out conflict with Rome, in the end, he was forced to act when Tigranes raided the Parthian province of
In response, Corbulo sent the legions IV Scythica and XII Fulminata to Armenia, while he detailed the three other legions under his command (III Gallica, VI Ferrata and XV Apollinaris) to fortify the line of the river Euphrates, fearing that the Parthians might invade Syria. At the same time, he petitioned Nero to appoint a separate legate for Cappadocia, with the responsibility for conducting the war in Armenia.[34]
Parthian siege of Tigranocerta
Monaeses meanwhile entered Armenia and approached Tigranocerta. Tigranes had taken care to gather supplies, and the city was well-fortified and garrisoned with Romans and Armenians alike. The siege was largely undertaken by the
In the meantime, the new governor (proconsul) of Cappadocia had arrived, in the person of
Battle of Rhandeia
Paetus nonetheless appeared confident of victory, and followed the Parthian declaration of war and capture of Tigranocerta with his own invasion of Armenia,[42] while Corbulo remained at Syria, further strengthening the fortifications in the Euphrates frontier.[43] Paetus had only two legions with him, IV Scythica and XII Fulminata,[39] and advanced towards Tigranocerta. A few minor forts were taken, but a lack of supplies forced him to withdraw westwards for the winter.[42]
The Parthians had originally intended to invade Syria, but Corbulo put on a convincing display of military might, building a strong flotilla of ships equipped with
Corbulo in the meantime had been aware of the danger faced by his colleague, and put part of his forces on standby, but he did not march to join Paetus, and some accused him of delaying in order to reap more glory from rescuing him.
The two Roman forces met on the banks of the Euphrates near
Corbulo's return and peace settlement
Rome, meanwhile, appears to have been largely unaware of the real situation in Armenia. Tacitus acidly records that "trophies for the Parthian war and arches were erected in the center of the
Corbulo reordered his forces, withdrawing the defeated and demoralized IV Scythica and XII Fulminata legions to Syria, leaving X Fretensis to guard Cappadocia, and leading his veteran III Gallica and VI Ferrata to Melitene, where the invasion army was to be assembled. To these he also added V Macedonica, which had remained in Pontus throughout the previous year and not been tainted by the defeat, the newly arrived XV Apollinaris, and large numbers of auxiliaries and contingents of the client kings.[54]
After his army crossed the Euphrates, following a route opened up by Lucullus over a hundred years before, he received envoys from Tiridates and Vologases. At the approach of such a large force, and aware of Corbulo's ability as a general, the two Arsacids were anxious to negotiate. Indeed, Corbulo, no doubt on instructions from Nero, reiterated the old Roman position: if Tiridates would accept his crown from Rome, then renewed war could be averted.[55] Tiridates readily agreed to negotiations, and Rhandeia, the scene of last year's Roman defeat, was agreed upon as a meeting place. To the Armenians, this place was intended as a reminder of their strength, while Corbulo agreed to it because there he hoped to expunge the earlier disgrace, by peace or war.[56] Once there, Corbulo put Paetus' son, who served under him as a legate, in charge of a party that was to gather the remains of the Roman soldiers and ensure them a proper burial. On the agreed day, both Tiridates and Corbulo, each accompanied by 20 horsemen, met between the two camps.[57] Tiridates agreed to travel to Rome and seek confirmation of his crown from Nero. In sign of this agreement, a few days later, both armies put on a display, arrayed in full parade gear. Tiridates approached the Roman camp, where a statue of the Emperor Nero had been erected upon a raised platform, and placed his royal diadem at its feet in submission.[58]
Aftermath
In 66, Tiridates visited Rome to receive his crown and was lavishly received by Nero, who used the occasion to boost his own popularity. He ordered the gates of the Temple of Janus to be shut, thus declaring that peace reigned throughout the Roman Empire.[59]
Nero celebrated this peace as a major achievement: he was hailed as
As for Corbulo, he was honoured by Nero as the man who had brought this "triumph" to be, but his popularity and influence with the army made him a potential rival. Together with the involvement of his son-in-law
The war had also demonstrated to the Romans that the defensive system in the East, as put in place by Augustus, was no longer adequate. Thus the following years saw a major reorganization of the Roman East: the client kingdoms of Pontus and Colchis (in 64 AD),
References
- ^ Bournoutian 2006, p. 41.
- ^ Marciak 2017, pp. 359–360.
- ISBN 9780190620462. Retrieved 23 December 2016.
- ^ a b Bivar (1983), p. 85
- ^ a b Bivar (1983), p. 80
- ^ Bivar (1983), p. 76
- ^ a b Bivar (1983), p. 79
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XII.50–51
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XIII.6
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XIII.7–8
- ^ Goldsworthy (2007), p. 309
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XIII.8
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XIII.9
- ^ Bivar (1983), p. 81
- ^ Goldsworthy (2007), p. 311
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XIII.35
- ^ a b c d Tacitus, Annales XIII.37
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XIII.36
- ^ Goldsworthy (2007), p. 312
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XIII.38
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XIII.39
- ^ Goldsworthy (2007), p. 314
- ^ Goldsworthy (2007), p. 315
- ^ Southern (2007), p. 301
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XIII.40
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XIII.41
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XIV.23
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XIV.24
- ^ Frontinus, Strategemata, II.9.5
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XIV.26
- ^ Goldsworthy (2007), pp. 305–306
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.1
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.2
- ^ Goldsworthy (2007), pp. 318–319
- ^ Goldsworthy (2007), p. 319
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.4
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.5
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XV.6
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XV.7
- ^ Goldsworthy (2007), p. 320
- ^ Sartre (2005), p. 61
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XV.8
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XV.9
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XV.10
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.11
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.12
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.13–14
- ^ Cassius Dio, Historia Romana LXII.21
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.14–15
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.16
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XV.17
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.18
- ^ a b Tacitus, Annales XV.25
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.26
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.27
- ^ Cassius Dio, Historia Romana LXII.22
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.28
- ^ Tacitus, Annales XV.29
- ^ Shotter (2005), p. 39
- ^ Cassius Dio, Historia Romana LXII.23.4
- ^ Wheeler (2007), p. 242
- ^ Festus, Breviarium, XX.1
- ^ Farrokh (2007), p. 150
- ^ Shotter (2005), pp. 40–41
- ^ Shotter (2005), pp. 69–70
- ^ Cassius Dio, Historia Romana LXIII.17.5–6
- ^ Shotter (2005), p. 72
- ^ Wheeler (2007), p. 243
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