Byzantine civil war of 1341–1347
Byzantine civil war of 1341–1347 | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Byzantine–Turkish wars | |||||||||
| |||||||||
Belligerents | |||||||||
Principality of Karvuna | |||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
(1344–1345) |
The Byzantine civil war of 1341–1347, sometimes referred to as the Second Palaiologan Civil War,
As the chief aide and closest friend of Emperor Andronikos III, Kantakouzenos became regent for the underage John V upon Andronikos's death in June 1341. While Kantakouzenos was absent from Constantinople in September the same year, a coup d'état led by Alexios Apokaukos and the Patriarch John XIV secured the support of Empress Anna and established a new regency. In response, Kantakouzenos' army and supporters proclaimed him co-emperor in October, cementing the rift between himself and the new regency. The split immediately escalated into armed conflict.
During the first years of the war, forces of the regency prevailed. In the wake of several anti-aristocratic uprisings, most notably that of the
The consequences of the prolonged conflict proved disastrous for the Empire, which had regained a measure of stability under Andronikos III. Seven years of warfare, the presence of marauding armies, social turmoil, and the advent of the Black Death devastated Byzantium and reduced it to a rump state. The conflict also allowed Dušan to conquer Albania, Epirus and most of Macedonia, where he established the Serbian Empire. The Bulgarian Empire also acquired territory north of the Evros river.
Background
In 1341, the Byzantine Empire was in a state of turmoil, and despite the restoration of the Empire's capital to
The only son of a former governor of the Byzantine holdings in the
Unlike Andronikos II, who had disbanded the Byzantine army and navy, and who favoured monks and intellectuals, Andronikos III was an energetic ruler who personally led his forces in military campaigns.
A war with Serbia in 1331–1334 proved less successful for the Emperor when several towns in Macedonia were captured by the Serbs, led by the renegade Syrgiannes Palaiologos. These gains were only curtailed when the assassination of Syrgiannes and the threat of a Hungarian invasion forced the Serbian ruler, Stefan Dušan, to seek a negotiated settlement.[13] The subsequent peace treaty concluded between Andronikos III and Dušan was important for the future of Byzantine-Serbian relations. For the first time, the Byzantines recognized the extensive gains the Serbs had made at the Empire's expense in the central Balkans during Andronikos II's reign. In the aftermath of the pact, Dušan also moved his seat, and with it his realm's centre of gravity, south to Prilep.[14]
Although the loss of Asia Minor proved irreversible, successes in Epirus and Thessaly led to a consolidation of the Empire in the Greek-speaking lands of the southern Balkans. Andronikos III and Kantakouzenos planned further campaigns to recover the
Kantakouzenos' regency: June–September 1341
Following a short illness, on the night of 14–15 June 1341 the emperor Andronikos III died at the relatively early age of 45, possibly due to chronic malaria.[15] His nine-year-old son John (John V) was the obvious successor, but he had not been officially proclaimed or crowned as co-emperor.[16] This left a legal vacuum, and raised the question of who would lead the Empire's government.[17]
According to Byzantine custom, the empress-dowager automatically headed any regency. Nevertheless, despite the lack of any formal appointment, Kantakouzenos placed Andronikos III's sons and the Empress-dowager
Nevertheless, opposition to Kantakouzenos began to coalesce around three figures: the Patriarch, a forceful man determined to have a voice in the governance of the Empire, the Empress-regent, who feared that Kantakouzenos would dispossess her son, and last but not least
In Donald Nicol's opinion, had Kantakouzenos remained at Constantinople, his authority might have remained secure. As the megas domestikos and regent however, he had the duty of dealing with the Empire's various enemies, who sought to take advantage of Andronikos' death. Dušan had invaded Macedonia, the Emir of Saruhan raided the coasts of Thrace, and Tsar Ivan Alexander of Bulgaria threatened war.[22] In July Kantakouzenos left the capital at the head of the army, leaving control of the government to Apokaukos, whom he still believed loyal to him. Kantakouzenos' campaign proved successful. He persuaded Dušan to withdraw and repulsed the Turkish raiders, while Ivan Alexander, threatened by a fleet from the Emirate of Aydin, renewed his peace treaty with Byzantium.[17][23] To crown this success, Kantakouzenos received an embassy of the Latin barons of the Principality of Achaea in the Morea. They expressed readiness to surrender the country in exchange for a guarantee of their property and rights. It was a unique opportunity, as Kantakouzenos himself recognized in his memoirs, since if successful, the Catalan-controlled Duchy of Athens was bound to follow, consolidating Byzantine control over Greece.[24][25]
At this point Kantakouzenos received grave news from Constantinople. In late August Apokaukos attempted a coup and tried to kidnap John V. Having failed, he fled to his fortified house at
Outbreak of the war: Autumn 1341
Kantakouzenos' second departure proved a great error. Back in the capital, his enemies moved in his absence. Apokaukos gathered a group of high-ranking aristocrats around him, including men such as the
As the first groups of his partisans fleeing the capital arrived at Demotika, Kantakouzenos, by his own account, tried to negotiate with the new regency, but his approach was rebuffed.[29] Finally forced to take decisive action, on 26 October 1341, the army (2,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, according to Gregoras) and his supporters, largely drawn from the land-holding aristocracy, proclaimed Kantakouzenos Emperor. Although he still presented himself officially as a junior colleague to John V, and claimed to be only acting in the boy's name, having staked his claim on the throne, he had effectively started a civil war.[30][31] Kantakouzenos still hoped that negotiation might resolve the situation, but all his envoys were imprisoned and he and his supporters excommunicated by Patriarch John XIV. On 19 November 1341, the regency responded to Kantakouzenos' proclamation as Emperor with the formal coronation of John V.[32][33]
Reaction to Kantakouzenos' proclamation caused a rift in Byzantine society, with the rich and powerful land-holding magnates (traditionally called the dynatoi, the 'powerful ones')[34] who dominated the countryside quickly rallying to support him, while the ordinary population, often living in abject conditions and suffering under oppressive taxation, supported the Empress-dowager and the Patriarch.[35][36] Apokaukos was especially quick to capitalize upon this division and foment popular dislike for the aristocracy, by widely publicizing the immense wealth confiscated from Kantakouzenos' and his supporters' houses and estates.[37] In the words of Donald Nicol, "it was against him [Kantakouzenos] and everything that he stood for as a millionaire and landowning aristocrat that the people rose up. 'Kantakouzenism' became their war cry, the slogan of their discontent".[38]
Thus the battle lines of the civil war were drawn up between urban and rural factions. The cities, dominated by the middle-class civil bureaucracy and merchant class (the "people of the market"), favoured a more mercantile economy and close relations with the
Polarization of this nature was not new in the Byzantine Empire. Evidence of competition between the landed aristocracy and the city-based middle classes in the political, economic and social spheres has been attested since the 11th century, but the scale of the conflict that erupted in 1341 was unprecedented. This class conflict was mirrored in the breakaway Byzantine Empire of Trebizond as well, where a pro-imperial and pro-Constantinopolitan urban faction confronted the provincial landholding aristocracy between 1340 and 1349.[40] The more conservative and anti-Western tendencies of the aristocrats, and their links to the staunchly Orthodox and anti-Catholic monasteries, also explain their increased attachment to the mystical Hesychasm movement advocated by Gregory Palamas, whose views were mostly opposed in the cities.[41] Although several significant exceptions leave the issue open to question among modern scholars, in the contemporary popular mind (and in traditional historiography), the supporters of 'Palamism' and of 'Kantakouzenism' were usually equated.[42] Kantakouzenos' eventual victory also meant the victory of Hesychasm, confirmed in a synod in Constantinople in 1351. Hesychasm eventually became a hallmark of the Orthodox church tradition, although it was rejected by the Catholics as a heresy.[30][43]
The first manifestation of this social division appeared in
Kantakouzenos seeks Dušan's aid: 1342
When heavy snowfall rendered campaigning impossible during the following winter, Kantakouzenos instead sent envoys, including an embassy of monks from
At the same time, the regency's army campaigned in Thrace, formally taking possession of towns secured by popular revolt. With Thessalonica barred against him, his supply lines to Thrace cut, and desertions having reduced his army to 2,000 men, of whom half belonged to Hrelja, Kantakouzenos was forced to withdraw north to Serbia, where he hoped to secure the aid of Stefan Dušan. Soon after, Hrelja also deserted Kantakouzenos and joined the regency, hoping to gain control of Melnik for himself.[51] In July 1342, Kantakouzenos met Dušan near Pristina. The Serbian ruler appeared initially reluctant to form an alliance. Nevertheless, under pressure from his nobles, especially the powerful Jovan Oliver, he could not afford to miss this unique opportunity to expand south. Desperately in need of Serbian aid, Kantakouzenos apparently agreed that the Serbs could keep any town they took, despite his own later account to the contrary. According to Nikephoros Gregoras, the Serbs claimed all of Macedonia west of Christopolis (Kavala), except for Thessalonica and its environs. The only concession Kantakouzenos secured was that an exception be made for those towns that surrendered to him in person. To seal the pact, Kantakouzenos' younger son, Manuel, was to be wed to the daughter of Jovan Oliver, although after Dušan later broke the alliance, the marriage did not take place.[52] Hrelja too acceded to the pact, in exchange for the surrender of Melnik by Kantakouzenos' garrison. After Hrelja's death later that year, Melnik was seized by Dušan.[53]
In late summer 1342, Kantakouzenos, accompanied by several Serbian magnates, marched into Macedonia at the head of a Greek and Serbian force, intending to break through to his wife, who still held out at Demotika.
In late fall, Empress Anna twice sent embassies to Dušan trying to convince him to surrender Kantakouzenos, but the Serbian ruler, seeking to extract more profit from their alliance, refused.[58] Kantakouzenos' fortunes began to improve when a delegation of the nobles of Thessaly reached him and offered to accept his authority. Kantakouzenos appointed his relative John Angelos as the province's governor. Although in effect a semi-independent ruler, Angelos was both loyal and effective. He soon brought Epirus — which he had governed in Andronikos III's name in 1340 — into the Kantakouzenist camp, and even made gains in Thessaly at the expense of the Catalans of Athens.[59] Another effort by Kantakouzenos to break from Serbia into Macedonia failed before Serres.[60] In the meantime, Kantakouzenos' wife Irene called upon the aid of the Bulgarians to help relieve the blockade of Demotika by the regency's army. Ivan Alexander dispatched troops, but although they clashed with the regency's forces, they made no effort in assisting the city, instead pillaging the countryside.[61]
Kantakouzenos resurgent: 1343–1345
At this point, Kantakouzenos' position was greatly strengthened by the intervention of his old friend,
Meanwhile, Kantakouzenos and his army camped outside Thessalonica, hoping to take the city through the aid of his supporters within the walls. Apokaukos arrived at the head of the Byzantine fleet to aid the Zealots, pinning Kantakouzenos down in Macedonia between Thessalonica and Dušan's possessions. Once again Umur of Aydin came to Kantakouzenos' assistance with a fleet carrying some 6,000 men, whereupon Apokaukos and his ships fled from the superior Turkish navy. Nevertheless, a reinforced Thessalonica was able to hold out against a siege by Kantakouzenos and Umur.[64] Although he had failed to take Thessalonica, the presence of his Turkish allies allowed Kantakouzenos to turn his attention towards Thrace. In late 1343 he left his son Manuel as governor of Berroia and western Macedonia and marched towards Demotika, relieving the city and seeing his wife for the first time in almost two years. On his way to Demotika, Kantakouzenos had seized a number of fortresses in Thrace, although another siege of Peritheorion failed. He followed up with a successful campaign that took Komotini and other fortresses in the Rhodope area.[65] Over the next couple of years, the towns and forts of Thrace came over to Kantakouzenos' camp one by one, but at great cost, as his mainly Turkish troops repeatedly plundered the countryside.[66] The shifting tide of the war did not go unnoticed in the opposing camp. In late 1344, several prominent personalities defected to Kantakouzenos, including John Vatatzes, a general and relative by marriage to both the Patriarch and Apokaukos, the Patriarch of Jerusalem Lazaros, and, most importantly, Manuel Apokaukos, son of the megas doux and governor of Adrianople.[67]
"The king [Dušan] was insatiable, revelling in the civil wars of the Romans and considering this time the most advantageous to him and the greatest gift of fortune. Wherefore he descended like a flame and was spreading over the Roman cities and land, continuously enslaving them on his way, since there was nothing that could resist his assaults."
At the same time, the regency's alliance with Dušan was paying dividends for the Serbian ruler alone, as he had free rein to plunder and occupy all of Macedonia and Epirus. By the end of 1345, only Thessalonica, held by the Zealots, Serres and the surrounding region, which remained loyal to the regency, along with Berroia, which still held out under Manuel Kantakouzenos, remained outside Serbian control.[69]
These developments placed the regency in considerable difficulties. In spite of Apokaukos' adroit management of the state's finances, the devastation caused by the prolonged wars had emptied the treasury. In August 1343, Empress Anna was forced to pawn the crown jewels to Venice for 30,000 ducats. In addition, Turkish ravages in Thrace led to a scarcity of food in Constantinople.[70] Hoping for Western aid, Anna appealed to the Pope, promising the submission of herself, John V, Apokaukos and even the Patriarch to his authority, and began persecuting the pro-Kantakouzenists and anti-Western Palamists.[71]
In 1344, the regency concluded a further alliance with Bulgaria, which required the surrender of Philippopolis (
Kantakouzenos and Umur raided Bulgaria, and then turned against Momchil. The latter had exploited the power vacuum in the Rhodope, an effective no man's land between the Serbs, Bulgarians and Byzantines, to set himself up as a quasi-independent prince, supported by a substantial force of around 5,000 men. On 7 July 1345, the two armies clashed at Peritheorion. Momchil's army was crushed, and he himself fell in the field.[73] Soon afterwards, Dušan arrived before Serres and laid siege to the city. Rejecting demands by Kantakouzenos to withdraw, a clash appeared inevitable until the murder of Alexios Apokaukos in Constantinople forced Kantakouzenos to direct his attention there.[76]
Last years of the war: 1345–1347
In early 1345, Kantakouzenos sent
When Kantakouzenos heard the news he marched towards Constantinople, urged by his supporters, who expected that the death of Apokaukos would result in the collapse of the regency. Kantakouzenos was more sceptical, and indeed the Patriarch and Empress Anna quickly brought the situation under control.
In September 1345, after a long siege, Serres fell to Dušan. The Serbian ruler, who by now controlled about half of the pre-1341 Byzantine realm, was spurred by this success to lay his own claim on the Byzantine throne. Consequently, on
For the regency, the situation had become desperate. Empress Anna's requests for aid from foreign powers proved unsuccessful, as both Orhan and the
By the summer of 1346, Kantakouzenos stood on the verge of victory. He left Thrace under the control of his son Matthew and moved on to Selymbria, close to Constantinople.[90] He did not attack the capital, but waited for almost a year for the city to surrender. In his memoirs, he explains that he did not want to turn his Turks on the city, although contemporaries such as Gregoras accused him of indecision and of needlessly prolonging the war.[91]
As the months passed, and the privations in Constantinople increased, the pro-Kantakouzenos faction in the capital grew as the Empress refused even to consider negotiations. Twice agents were sent to assassinate Kantakouzenos, but they failed. The Empress eventually fell out with Patriarch John Kalekas, who was deposed in a synod on 2 February 1347. On the same night, supporters of Kantakouzenos opened the disused
Peace settlement and Kantakouzenos' reign
On 8 February 1347, the war formally ended with an agreement making Kantakouzenos senior emperor for ten years, after which he and John V would reign as equals. Kantakouzenos also promised to pardon anyone who had fought against him.
Despite the moderation and clemency shown by Kantakouzenos in this settlement, it did not gain universal acceptance. Supporters of the
After 1347, John VI Kantakouzenos tried to revive the Empire, but met with limited success. Aided by the depopulation brought by about by the
Steadily deteriorating relations between Matthew Kantakouzenos, who now ruled eastern Thrace, and John V Palaiologos, who had taken over Matthew's former domain in western Thrace, led to yet another internal conflict.
Consequences
"Upon the death of the young Andronikos [III], the worst civil war that the Romans had ever known broke out. It was a war that led to almost total destruction, reducing the great Empire of the Romans to a feeble shadow of its former self."
Memoirs of John Kantakouzenos, Book III.[106]
The civil war proved a critical turning point in the history of the Byzantine Empire. In the words of the Byzantinist Angeliki Laiou, "after the end of the second civil war, Byzantium was an empire in name only",[107] while according to Eva de Vries-Van der Velden, it marks "the point of rupture between the 'decline' and 'the fall' of the Byzantine Empire".[108]
The Byzantines' division and reliance on foreign troops, especially the Serbs and Turks, encouraged the latter's expansionism. Stefan Dušan in particular proved adept in exploiting the civil war to expand his state at Byzantium's expense.[30][109] Aside from huge territorial losses, the prolonged conflict exhausted the Byzantine state's resources, as it brought "anarchy to the cities and devastation to the countryside" (Alice-Mary Talbot). Thrace, the largest contiguous territory remaining in the Empire, suffered such destruction that, along with Constantinople, it became dependent on grain imported from Bulgaria and the Crimea.[30][110] Trade had stopped, and the treasury contained, in the words of Gregoras, "nothing but the atoms of Epicurus". Kantakouzenos had exhausted his own personal fortune, and Empress Anne had left the Empire heavily indebted to the Venetians. The war also led to the collapse of the centralized imperial administration in the provinces, causing control of the Thracian countryside to shift to a manorial system run by the local magnates. Despite their considerable wealth, the magnates, through exemptions or outright evasion, managed to avoid paying taxes to the imperial government.[111] In addition, the arrival in 1347 of the Black Death and its recurrent outbreaks further reduced the Empire's tax and recruitment base, curtailing its ability to reverse the Serbian territorial gains.[112]
Along with the renewal of the civil war in 1352, these factors destroyed any chance of even a modest recovery similar to that experienced under Andronikos III.
References
- ^ Reinert 2002, pp. 263, 265.
- ^ Bartusis 1997, p. 67; Nicol 1993, p. 93
- ^ Bartusis 1997, pp. 87–91; Nicol 1993, pp. 156–161
- ^ a b Nicol 1993, pp. 157–161, 167.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 155.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 168.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 186.
- ^ a b Nicol 1993, p. 185.
- ^ Bartusis 1997, pp. 91–92; Laiou 2002, p. 25; Nicol 1993, pp. 169–171
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 178–181; Soulis 1984, pp. 8–10; Bartusis 1997, pp. 92–93
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 171–172.
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 174–175.
- ^ Bartusis 1997, p. 92; Soulis 1984, pp. 6–8
- ^ Soulis 1984, p. 8.
- ^ Lascaratos & Marketos 1997, pp. 106–109.
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 185–186.
- ^ a b Bartusis 1997, p. 94.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 186; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, pp. 62–63; Soulis 1984, p. 10
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 186–187; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, pp. 63–64
- ^ de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, pp. 64–67.
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 45–48; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, pp. 63–66
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 188; Fine 1994, pp. 292–293; Soulis 1984, pp. 10–11
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 188.
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 50–51.
- ^ Soulis 1984, p. 11.
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 51–52.
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 53–55; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 67; Weiss 1969, pp. 33–36
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 54–55.
- ^ Nicol 1996, p. 55.
- ^ a b c d e Kazhdan 1991, pp. 467–468.
- ^ Bartusis 1997, p. 95; Nicol 1993, p. 191; Fine 1994, p. 294; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 67
- ^ Nicol 1996, p. 60.
- ^ de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 68.
- ^ on the dynatoi in Palaiologan times, cf. de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, pp. 53–58
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 191–192.
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 294.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 192.
- ^ Nicol 1979, p. 22.
- ^ Oikonomides 1988, pp. 327–329; Treadgold 1997, pp. 815–816; Jeffreys, Haldon & Cormack 2009, p. 290
- ^ Treadgold 1997, pp. 815–816.
- ^ Oikonomides 1988, pp. 329–331; Treadgold 1997, p. 815
- ^ Kazhdan 1991, pp. 468, 923; Jeffreys, Haldon & Cormack 2009, pp. 289–290
- ^ Nicol 1979, pp. 39–41, 85.
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 192–194; Nicol 1996, pp. 58–60; Fine 1994, p. 294
- ^ de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 69.
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 294–295.
- ^ Nicol 1996, p. 61.
- ^ Bartusis 1997, p. 95; Nicol 1996, p. 62; Soulis 1984, p. 13
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 295; Nicol 1996, p. 62; Soulis 1984, p. 14; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 69
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 295–296; Nicol 1993, p. 195; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 69
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 294–297; Nicol 1993, p. 196; Soulis 1984, pp. 14–15; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 70
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 297–298; Soulis 1984, pp. 15–18
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 299–300; Soulis 1984, pp. 17, 21
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 196; Fine 1994, p. 295
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 196; Fine 1994, p. 300; Soulis 1984, p. 19; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 70
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 301; Soulis 1984, p. 19
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 65–66; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, pp. 70–71
- ^ Nicol 1996, p. 65; Fine 1994, pp. 300–301
- ^ Nicol 1996, p. 65; Fine 1994, pp. 301–302; Soulis 1984, pp. 20–21
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 65–66.
- ^ de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 71.
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 295; Bartusis 1997, p. 96; Nicol 1996, pp. 66–67
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 302; Soulis 1984, pp. 21–23; Treadgold 1997, p. 768
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 67–68; Soulis 1984, pp. 22–23; Treadgold 1997, p. 768
- ^ Soulis 1984, pp. 23–24; Treadgold 1997, p. 768
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 200; Fine 1994, p. 303
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 70–71.
- ^ Soulis 1984, p. 26.
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 301, 304; Soulis 1984, pp. 24–25
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 199–200.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 198; Treadgold 1997, p. 768
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 304, 307; Soulis 1984, p. 24
- ^ a b Fine 1994, p. 304; Soulis 1984, p. 24
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 303–304; Soulis 1984, pp. 24–25
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 303–304; Treadgold 1997, p. 768
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 305; Nicol 1993, p. 202; Soulis 1984, pp. 25–26
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 71–73.
- ^ Reinert 2002, pp. 263, 265, 270.
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 201–202.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 202; Fine 1994, p. 308
- ^ Nicol 1996, p. 74; de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, pp. 108–109
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 202–203.
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 74–75; Soulis 1984, pp. 26–30
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 75–76; Soulis 1984, p. 33
- ^ Nicol 1996, pp. 76–78.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 203.
- ^ Bartusis 1997, p. 96.
- ^ Bartusis 1997, p. 97; Nicol 1993, pp. 205–206; Soulis 1984, p. 33
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 206; Treadgold 1997, p. 770
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 205–206.
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 308; Nicol 1993, p. 206
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 206–207.
- ^ Nicol 1996, p. 81.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 207; Soulis 1984, p. 34
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 308; Treadgold 1997, p. 771
- ^ Nicol 1996, p. 82.
- ^ Nicol 1993, p. 210.
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 215–216; Fine 1994, pp. 308–309, 321–322
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 309.
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 320; Soulis 1984, p. 35
- ^ Bartusis 1997, pp. 98–99; Treadgold 1997, pp. 773–774
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 323–324; Soulis 1984, pp. 42–46; Treadgold 1997, p. 774
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 325–326; Soulis 1984, pp. 49–51; Treadgold 1997, pp. 775–776
- ^ Fine 1994, p. 326.
- ^ Fine 1994, pp. 326–327; Treadgold 1997, pp. 775–778
- ^ Nicol 1996, p. 45.
- ^ Laiou 2002, p. 26.
- ^ de Vries-Van der Velden 1989, p. 61.
- ^ Reinert 2002, p. 267.
- ^ Bartusis 1997, p. 98; Fine 1994, p. 321
- ^ Bartusis 1997, p. 98; Fine 1994, p. 321; Nicol 1993, p. 219; Treadgold 1997, p. 770
- ^ Nicol 1993, pp. 216–218; Reinert 2002, pp. 265, 267; Treadgold 1997, p. 773
- ^ Reinert 2002, pp. 265, 267; Treadgold 1997, p. 777
- ^ Laiou 2002, pp. 26–28.
- ^ Jeffreys, Haldon & Cormack 2009, p. 291.
- ^ Bartusis 1997, p. 98; Kazhdan 1991, p. 1410; Nicol 1993, pp. 130–131
Sources
- Bartusis, Mark C. (1997), The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society 1204–1453, University of Pennsylvania Press, ISBN 978-0-8122-1620-2
- de Vries-Van der Velden, Eva (1989), L'élite byzantine devant l'avance turque à l'époque de la guerre civile de 1341 à 1354 (in French), Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, ISBN 978-90-5063-026-9
- ISBN 0-472-08260-4.
- ISBN 978-0-19-925246-6
- ISBN 0-19-504652-8.
- ISBN 978-0-88402-332-6
- Lascaratos, J.; Marketos, S. (1997), "The fatal disease of the Byzantine Emperor Andronicus III Palaeologus (1328–1341 A.D.)", PMID 9068444
- ISBN 978-0-521-22438-3
- ISBN 978-0-521-43991-6.
- ISBN 978-0-521-52201-4
- ISBN 978-0-902566-19-4
- Reinert, Stephen W. (2002), "Fragmentation (1204–1453)", in ISBN 978-0-19-814098-6
- Soulis, George Christos (1984), The Serbs and Byzantium during the reign of Tsar Stephen Dušan (1331–1355) and his successors, ISBN 978-0-88402-137-7
- ISBN 0-8047-2630-2.
- Weiss, Günter (1969), Joannes Kantakuzenos – Aristokrat, Staatsmann, Kaiser und Mönch – in der Gesellschaftsentwicklung von Byzanz im 14. Jahrhundert (in German), Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz