Korean nationalist historiography

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Shin Chaeho
(1880–1936), the earliest proponent of Korea's nationalist historiography

Korean nationalist historiography (

Shin Chaeho (1880–1936). In his polemical New Reading of History (Doksa Sillon), which was published in 1908 three years after Korea became a Japanese protectorate, Shin proclaimed that Korean history was the history of the Korean minjok, a distinct race descended from the god Dangun that had once controlled not only the Korean peninsula but also large parts of Manchuria
. Nationalist historians made expansive claims to the territory of these ancient Korean kingdoms, by which the present state of the minjok was to be judged.

Shin and other Korean intellectuals like

Joseon Korea's scholar-bureaucrats, which they blamed for perpetuating a servile worldview centered around China, and Japanese colonial
historiography, which portrayed Korea as historically dependent and culturally backward.

The work of these prewar nationalist historians has shaped postwar historiography in both

Korean unification. In the process of trying to reject Japanese colonial scholarship, Korean nationalist historians have adopted many of its premises. Shin Chaeho's irredentist
claims over Manchuria, however, have not made it into the mainstream.

Korean nationalist historiography was welcomed by both the left and right sides of South Korea in the 20th century, but in the 21st century, the Korean nationalist historiography was increasingly associated with leftist nationalism, which was critical of anti-communist conservatism.[1][2]

Historical context

Joseon Korea
, which opened Korea to foreign trade.

The late nineteenth century was a time of domestic crises and external threats for

Meiji Japan — used military force to try to open Korea to trade.[3] The Japan–Korea Treaty of 1876 opened three Korean ports to commerce and granted Japanese merchants extraterritoriality in these ports.[4] This unequal treaty prompted even more foreign interventions, as it turned Korea into a target of rivalry between imperialist powers.[5] One crucial issue was whether Korea was a sovereign state or a Chinese dependency.[6] Despite Joseon's status as a tributary of Ming (1368–1644) and then Qing (1644–1911) China — which implied the sending of tribute missions and a ritually inferior position of the Korean king vis-à-vis the Chinese emperor — Korea could also dictate both its domestic and foreign policies, creating an ambiguous situation that frustrated western powers.[7]

To appease tensions, China and Japan signed the

Sino-Japanese War, which was fought over who would control the Korean peninsula.[10] The war ended with a resounding Japanese victory confirmed by the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), which forced China to recognize the independence of Joseon Korea. But Korea's escape from the China-centered world order simply cleared the way for Japanese imperialist domination.[11]

History of Korean nationalist historiography

Precursors (before 1895)

During the later half of the Joseon dynasty (1392–1897), many scholars became disenchanted with Sinocentrism and became more conscious of Korea's uniqueness and independence.[12] This trend became known as the silhak ("pragmatic learning") movement. The most important pre-1895 precursor to the rise of nationalist historiography was the erosion of Sinocentrism during the silhak movement.

Non-Sinocentric historiographical ideas began to arise in the works of the scholars

Chinese Classics alone. Park Ji-won lamented that the prevailing Korean historians of his day were beholden to Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucian framework, which placed China at the center of the international system.[14] He provided a fresh perspective on the historical territory of Korea as extending beyond the Yalu river into Manchuria.[15] Yi Kyu-gyŏng appealed to intellectuals to write a comprehensive history of Korea within the interpretative framework of independent national identity.[16]

The most representative silhak historiographical work is

Seongho Yi Ik's (1681–1763) Dongsa Gangmok ("Essentials of the History of the Eastern Country"), which although written in a neo-Confucian framework, demonstrates a more critical than apologetic tone towards the early Joseon dynasty and its establishment.[17]

1895–1945

1895–1905

Contemporary Korean historians trace the roots of nationalist historiography to the

national consciousness among Koreans, partly through historical education.[18] In 1899 the newspaper translated into vernacular Korean an essay "On Patriotism" that Chinese journalist and historian Liang Qichao had recently published in Japan.[19] But such calls for "Korean political unity and racial solidarity" in turn-of-the-century newspapers were censored by Japanese colonial authorities.[20] The Tongnip Sinmun was thus forced to close later in 1899. Japanese authorities also suppressed private schools that tried to promote patriotism through the teaching of Korean history, language, and customs.[20]

Pan-Asianist view that Koreans and Japanese, as members of the "yellow race," were allies in a struggle against the "white race," was more salient in Korean newspapers than portrayals of Koreans as racially distinct from the Japanese.[24]

Japanese colonial historiography

Mainstream Japanese historiography arose out of a fusion of Western historiography, as introduced by the German

Susanoo, the brother of Emperor Jimmu, and Empress Jingū had ruled or invaded Silla (Korea).[25][27] Such views of Korea's historical subjugation to Japan became widely accepted in Japanese scholarship,[28] and integral to Japan's national history,[27] as it was presented in other books of Japan's Meiji era (1868–1912), such as Ōtori Keisuke's Chōsen kibun 朝鮮紀聞 (1885), and Hayashi Taisuke's 林泰輔 Chōsenshi 朝鮮史 (1892), made similar arguments.[29] Another theme in Japanese historical scholarship on Korea was Korea's backwardness, which was first argued by the economist Tokuzō Fukuda in 1902, who said that Joseon was equivalent to Japan in the Heian period (794–1185).[28]

From the time of the

Korean culture.[29] A popular portrayal of Koreans in Japanese historiography was that of the sadaejuui, or as being extremely servile to foreign powers, particularly China.[31]

Shin Chaeho and Korean nationalist historiography

The polemicist

Shin Chaeho (1880–1936) found both Confucian historiography and Japanese colonial scholarship unsatisfactory on political, rather than academic, grounds, and proposed instead the Korean "race" (minjok) as an alternative subject of analysis.[32][33] Shin believed that Koreans of his time had a "slavish mentality" as a result of centuries of historical, political, and cultural dependence on China, and he prescribed as a cure an identification with the Korean nation and the state, so that this community could be goaded to collective political activism.[33]

In both North and South Korea, Shin Chaeho is credited as the first historian to make the

Mount Baekdu (Changbai) on the Chinese side of the border, he published Korean nationalist tracts in exile until his death in 1936.[35][36]

Among the new intellectual currents influencing Koreans during Japanese rule, a version of

Shin Chaeho, Choe Nam-seon, and Park Eun-sik. Liang taught that the world was divided between peoples who were expansionist and influential, such as the Anglo-Saxons and Germans, and those peoples who were weak and insignificant.[37] The themes of struggle for existence (saengjŏn kyŏngjaeng), survival of the fittest (yangyuk kangsik) and natural selection (ch'ŏntaek) inspired not only Shin's own historical views, but also those the Korean "self-strengthening movement" (chagang undong), which operated in similar terms to that in China and in Japan.[38] Shin was also influenced by Liang's "Methods for the Study of Chinese History" (Zhongguo lishi yangjiufa, 1922), from which many of Shin's methods derive.[39] He wrote his own history of Korea which broke from Confucian tradition, whose purveyors he decried as "effete" and disconnected from Korea's "manly" tradition going back to the ancient "Korean" expansionist kingdom of Goguryeo.[40] Shin felt that Confucian historiography, and especially that of Kim Bu-sik and his alleged pro-Silla bias, suppressed a valid Korean claim to Manchurian territory, which not only had Goguryeo possessed,[38] but Shin conceived as a central stage of Korean history, and a measure of the minjok's strength.[41] Moreover, it was the act of writing history that caused Koreans not to rise up and conquer Manchuria again, according to Shin, resulting in a "great country becoming a small country, a great people becoming a small people".[42] Yet he also criticized the shin sach'e textbooks after the Confucians, who nonetheless treated Japan sympathetically, translated Japanese historical works, and reflected the Japanese worldview.[32][38] He also criticized Pan-Asianism as a guise for Japanese expansionism and regarded East Asia as a mere geographic unit, rather than a basis for solidarity.[43] As a result, his new history focused on both "national struggle" rather than on the rise and fall of political dynasties, and emphasizing Korea's separateness from China and Japan, as he argued that historiography "should promote national spirit and independence".[44] The fellow historians Park Eun-sik (1859–1925) and Chang Chi-yŏng likewise attempted to rectify the "slave literary culture" (noyejŏk munhwa sasang) of the yangban to reflect historical Korea's supposed martial tradition.[45]

After the Japanese annexation, some Korean intellectuals chose to retreat into a life of glorifying Korea's cultural expanse in the past, rather than active collaboration or open resistance with the new authorities.

Shindan minsa 神檀民史).[55] Because of Japanese censorship, the writing of nationalist histories was conflated with anti-colonial resistance.[56]

Korean historians charge Japanese colonialist historiography of four main distortions: of giving a leading role to Chinese, Manchurian, and Japanese actors in the history of Korea (t'ayulsŏngron); of portraying Korean society as stagnant and even pre-

Yi Ki-baek summarizes Japanese colonialist historiography as stemming from the assumptions of "stagnation, nondevelopment, peninsula particularism, and unoriginality".[57]

After Shin's death, historians who wrote in his tradition would be called "New Nationalists" (shin minjokchuŭi) of the "Korean Studies" movement. In the 1930s, alternative schools emerged, including Marxist historiography and a Western-based, scientific approach (Chindan hakhoe).[58] The scholars from the Chindan hakhoe (Chindan Academic Society), including Yi Pyŏng-do, Yi Sang-baek, Kim Sang-gi, and Kim Sŏk-hyŏng, were trained at universities in Japan or at Keijō Imperial University in Seoul and published in Japanese journals, following objective Rankean ideas that challenged Japanese colonial historiography.[59] On the other hand, the New Nationalists included figures such as Chŏng In-bo (鄭寅普) and An Chae-hong (安在鴻), the first of which had a classical Chinese education, rather than at a social science department at a university in Korea or Japan. They emphasized "independent self-spirit" (chashim), in contrast to neo-Confucian and Western-style scholarship, which represented for Chŏng a "dependent spirit (t'ashim).[60]

After World War II

The

Korean unification was a historical imperative.[65]

North Korea

After independence in 1945, the "far more militant" nationalist tone in North Korean historical scholarship, as compared to South Korean historiography, allows such scholarship to be categorized as nationalist, rather than Marxist.

Yi Kwang-su, and Choe Nam-seon.[34]

There are likewise similarities—although unacknowledged because of the Kim

personality cult— between Kim's emphasis juche (chuch'e) self-reliance ideology and Shin's idea of "autonomous spirit" (chuch'e ŭi chŏngsin) and denigration of servile sadaejuui. It is also from these concepts where Inter-Korean charges and countercharges of "dependence" originate.[70] The geographical location of Kim's government in northern Korea has helped it to promote nationalist histories featuring Goguryeo and other Manchurian states to shore up its own legitimacy.[71] The most authoritative history in North Korea, the Chosŏn t'ongsa (1977 edition) justifies its disproportionate treatment of Goguryeo, especially relative to the traditionally-venerated contemporaneous Silla, "because the Korean people were strongest under the [Goguryeo] rules".[72]

The Chosŏn t'ongsa also challenges the traditional view of "

Communist Manifesto, which begins "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles", a standard North Korean history text reads, "Human history is a history of struggle of the people for Chajusŏng [ko] [autonomy or independence]". According to Charles K. Armstrong, this conception of history is more similar to Shin Chaeho's conception of the "I" versus the "non-I" than to Marxism.[75]

This history writing denied the influences of Chinese civilization on Korea, and called for a correction of ancient Korean history based on the

Imperial Chinese tributary system.[77] Tasan himself was an advocate of a "people-oriented" (minbon) theory of history. A 1970 speech by Kim's son Kim Jong Il to the Workers' Party of Korea emphasized that "we should ensure that things of the past are shown or taught to our people so as to contribute to their education in socialist patriotism" (sahoe chuŭi chŏk aeguk chuŭi).[77]

South Korea

Korean nationalist historiography has dominated the field of

Lee Ki-baek called a "colonial view of Korean history", to which Japanese and foreign scholars supposedly still subscribed.[79] One such "colonial view" was that the Goryeo dynasty (918–1392) was stagnant, which nationalist historians studied Goryeo institutions to try to refute with evidence of dynamism and change.[57] But there are more than twice the number of articles and monographs on the Joseon than there are for Goryeo, since South Korean historians assume that there was a potential fundamental, irreversible change from traditionalism to modernism during that time. This change, so say historians like Choe Yŏng-hŭi, which inhibited by the various Japanese invasions from the 16th century and ultimate annexation, which they blame for social instability and armed banditry.[80] Kim Chol-choon, writing in 1970, evaluated the state of South Korean historiography as lacking a "critical spirit".[81] In 1978, nationalist historian Kang Man'gil challenged the existing periodization of South Korean history into "colonial" and "postliberation" blocs, instead suggesting that the second half of the 20th century should be characterized as one of "division", preceding the creation of a unified, ethnic Korean state. His attack on the "colonial" Korean historiography proposed a new "self-determining historiography" (chuch'ejŏk sagwan).[82] Since the 1970s, fringe elements in the South Korean historical community have also tried to resurrect Shin's irredentist focus on Manchuria. The normalization of China–South Korea relations and visits to Koreans in China have increased interest in the region, although efforts at "Recovering the Ancient Lands", as one irredentist author puts it, are marginal in the public sphere.[83]

The official History of the Republic of Korea portrayed the Korean people as center-stage in their own "liberation" against a small number of collaborators, giving the

democratization of South Korea in 1987, scholars continue to publish nationalist histories, and the hegemonic portrayal of Japanese rule as oppressive to Korean culture has not changed, although a few Korean scholars have questioned the "collaboration-resistance" dichotomy.[86] From the 1980s to Kim Dae-jung's presidency in 1998, most South Korean historians of collaborationism agreed with the idea that "the nation's history was kidnapped" at independence "by a clique of pro-Japanese stooges", who were shielded by the United States Army Military Government in Korea and Syngman Rhee from the Anti-Traitors Investigation Committee.[87] Recent political campaigns such as the establishment of a presidential commission in 2005 to identify and shame collaborators have entrenched national history as the dominant form of historiography.[88] The state retains the most powerful purveyor of historical memory in South Korea, launching for example a campaign in 2010 to "remember with the people the proud history of establishing simultaneously national sovereignty, democracy and economic development, something unique in the world", a self-legitimizing narrative that excludes the history of the Korean War and Korean democracy activists against the South Korean state.[89] However, some historians of the South Korean New Right, such as Lee Young-hoon, are challenging the nation-centered history by proposing a state-centered history which promotes patriotic pride (aegukshim, 愛國心) for South Korea's economic accomplishments rather than shame for the failure of unifying Koreans.[90] Im Chihyŏn is another contemporary advocate, though of different ideological background, for the "democratization" (minjuhwa 民主化) of historiography by its liberation from the "monolithic nation" paradigm. He is critical, however, of South Korea's democratic governments' efforts to reconcile (kwagŏ ch’ŏngsan) the state's past of White Terror.[90]

Postcolonial South Korean nationalist historians also sought to divide Koreans during the Japanese administration into categories of self-serving collaborator or self-sacrificing nationalist resisters.[31] The first major challenge to the hegemonic state-endorsed, nationalist historiography came not from a Korean but from the American Bruce Cumings, who wrote the 1981 book Origins of the Korean War.[85] Cumings recalled facing heavy resistance to his revisionist historiography including, "that the mere mention of the idea that Japan somehow 'modernized' Korea calls forth indignant denials, raw emotions, and the sense of mayhem having just been, or about to be committed."[91]

Themes

The writings of Shin Chaeho outlined the themes for later nationalist historiography, including the ancientness and distinctiveness of Koreans; the long history of Koreans warding off "foreign aggression"; and the portrayal of Koreans "as an essential part of world history".[53]

The Korean minjok

The main goal of Korean nationalist historiography (minjok sahak) in South Korea since 1945 was to write "a new racial history of Korean independence" that would refute earlier Japanese scholarship on Korea (Ilchesagwan).[78] The idea of a Korean race, or people, entered into Korean vocabulary in the late 1890s with the word minjok. Prior to the 19th century, according to Carter Eckert, "there was little, if any, feeling of loyalty toward the abstract concept of 'Korea' as a nation-state, or toward fellow inhabitants of the peninsula as 'Koreans'". Loyalty to village, family, and king took precedence for ordinary people, while Korean elites considered themselves as members of a "cosmopolitan civilization centered on China".[92]

The coming of the

Daejonggyo (Dangun-worship) scripture.[95]

Ancientness and Inner Asian connection

Nationalist historiography considers the

Chinese characters, used exclusively to write the Korean language until recently, are relegated to footnotes in academic journals or excluded completely.[101] Historical periodization in North Korea is concerned with proving the "superiority and advancedness" of Korean civilization by "pushing the beginning of each historical stage as far back as possible".[66]

Korean nationalist historiography is connected with "popular archaeology" in

super-culture.[106] However, according to Chizuko Allen, Choe did not examine the local cultures of any countries besides Korea, China, and Japan, and based this theory on phonetic similarities of geographical features.[105] Choe's Purham culture theory has since been adopted by the independence activist and "Korean Studies movement" leader An Chae-hong.[107]

Revised Korean founding myth

Around the mid-

Susanoo.[32] To Shin, Dangun was both the founder of the Korean minjok and the first Korean state (kuk), and thus the necessary starting point for Korean history.[36] In response to a challenge by the Japanese scholars Shiratori Kurakichi and Imanishi Ryū of Dangun as a fabrication by the author of the Samguk yusa, nationalist historian Choe Nam-seon attacked Japanese mythology as being built upon fabrications.[50]

By focusing on a mythological god which founded a "sacred race" (shinsŏng chongjok), Korean nationalist historiography seeks to portray ancient Korea as a golden age of "gods and heroes" where Korea's cultural achievements rivaled those of China and Japan.

Mount Changbai (Baekdu in Korean) on the Sino-Korean border as a part of Korean heritage, by virtue of connection with the mythical Dangun. Changbai, however, was already claimed by the Manchus of China's Qing dynasty since the 17th century for their origin myth,[115][116] as well as by the Mongols, and the mountains are considered sacred in Han Chinese culture as well.[117] This nationalist identification of Changbai/Baekdu with Koreans was cemented by the operation of Korean independence movement partisans operating from the Chinese border and retroactively legitimized with reference to the history of the Gojoseon and Balhae states.[115] The Chinese civilizational connection to ancient Korea continues to be attacked by North Korean historians, who allege that the history of Gija Joseon was "viciously distorted by the feudal ruling class, the sadaejuui followers, and the big-power chauvinists".[74]

Relationship with China and Japan

Distinctiveness from

Buyeo (Fuyu) people of Manchuria and ended their development as the core of the Goguryeo people.[119]

In nationalist historiography, Korea is valorized as having an indigenous culture separate from those of China and Japan. Evidence of Chinese cultural influence on Koreans, as well as of common ancestral origins for Koreans and Japanese, is denounced as an "evil plot" of "Japanese imperialistic historiography" (Ilche sagwan) to "annihilate the Korean people" (minjok malsal).

graduation between Chinese and barbarian.[49] Archaeologists in both North and South Korea have claimed, contrary to earlier scholarship, that Korea experienced a Bronze Age culture separate from that of China, with artifacts resembling those in Siberia and Manchuria.[66]

Superiority over

Korea is alternatively portrayed in nationalist historiography as being continually victimized throughout history by China and Japan, but remaining morally, racially, and culturally superior to them, since they—and more recently, Western powers—tried and "failed to suppress Korea's national spirit".[111] Shin Chaeho's work shows the influence of Social Darwinism by portraying history as a racial struggle between the "Buyeo" (Korean) minjok with that of the Xianbei, Chinese, Mohe, and Jurchen over territory.[99] He praised historical figures who preserved or extended "Korean" control over Manchuria, and shamed those who did not, such as Muyeol of Silla. As a result, the search for heroes of the former led his Doksa Sillon to focus more on ancient, rather than recent history.[41] Various self-designations for Koreans in the minjok struggle include "the good race" (sŏnmin) and "the chosen or delivered people" (paedal).[121] In postcolonial North and South Korean historiography, there is a tendency to emphasize the "superiority" (ususŏng) and "advancedness" (sŏnjinsŏng) of Korea's historical development.[66]

Nationalist historiography celebrates various victories of "Koreans" over "foreigners" including the

Korean-Jurchen wars (1107), Mongol invasions of Korea (1231–73), and Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598).[111] Accordingly, military heroes such as Eulji Mundeok of Goguryeo—and indeed all the generals of the Three contemporary kingdoms of Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla—are assigned a common, "national" identity of Korean. In the words of John Duncan, however, it is "extremely unlikely" that the people of those kingdoms would identify with "a larger, 'Korean' collectivity that transcended local boundaries and state loyalties".[122] Yi Sang-ryong, who argued that history "raised the dignity of the country and fostered patriotism" (kungmin chŏngshin) claimed that during the "northern history" of Koreans in Manchuria, from the time of Dangun to Balhae, the Sushen (Suksin) and Japanese people were subordinate to Dangun.[123]

Shin Chaeho has also argued for the existence of

Mongoloids", reflecting nationalist historiography's fixation on prehistorical racial roots.[124] For Shin, the founding of Korea by such an antique figure as Dangun proved that Korea was more ancient that China; that Dangun colonized China proving that Korea was superior to China; and that mythical Chinese emperors and sages were really "Korean".[125] Shin also reconceived the "Great Plan" (Hungfan chin ch'ou 洪範九疇) given by Jizi of Gija Joseon as being made by "a man of [Joseon]", turning China into an importer of Korean civilization, opposite to the traditional view.[49]

Historical territory

Owning and transcending the peninsula

In his seminal work

Korean Peninsula both towards the outer limits of "Manchuria" and to that of the "racially defined nation" (minjok).[35] By defining Korean history as that of the minjok, he could argue that Goguryeo, Silla, and Baekje, despite frequent wars between each other, were "of the same minjok and consequently of the same history".[112] However, the conception of a Korean nation as being bounded by the Yalu and Tumen rivers was reinforced by Confucian histories of Joseon that did not confer legitimacy on dynasties that held such extreme northern territory.[126] Shin Chaeho particularly resented this confinement, considering the fall of Goguryeo and the loss of "Korean" control over its extrapeninsular territory as the beginning of the minjok's decline.[127] He wrote: "When the Korean minjok obtains Manchuria, the Korean minjok is strong and prosperous. When another [Eastern or Northern] minjok obtains Manchuria... then Korea [Han'guk] enters that... [Eastern or Northern] minjok's sphere of power.... This is an iron rule that has not changed for four thousand years",[128] a sentiment with which a large number of contemporary Koreans agree.[129] In this lament, Shin found common cause with Imperial Japanese historians of the Mansenshi school, who wished to portray the Korean peninsula and the Asian continent as inseparable, but with the obverse goal of undermining ideas of Korean independence.[128][130] Not only did Shin, but also the fellow nationalist historian Park Eun-sik consider Manchuria the foundation on which to build a powerful "Greater Korea".[131]

At the same time, however, nationalist historiography presupposes that any polity inhabiting the Korean peninsula was "Korean"; and that all of the inhabitants of the peninsula were unchangingly and homogeneously "Korean" for "5000 years". E. Taylor Atkins criticizes these assumptions as "no less questionable than those that Japanese colonial scholars brought", and as contributing to modern territorial disputes with China and Japan.[31] Historical study of Jeju Island, Ulleungdo, and the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo), commensurate with their conception as Korean since the late Joseon, served the timely needs of maritime defense.[132]

Interpretation of Balhae as Korean

During the mid-Joseon dynasty,

Buyeo kingdom (Chinese: Fuyu, another Manchurian state) from Korean history.[36] He interpreted Balhae's defeat by the Khitan-led Liao dynasty as having caused "half of our ancestor [Dangun]'s ancient lands... [loss] for over nine hundred years".[41] North Korean scholars—and more recently some in the South—have recently tried to incorporate Balhae history as an integral part of Korean history by challenging the view of Unified Silla as the unification of Korea. According to this narrative, Goryeo was the first unification of Korea, since Balhae still existed while occupying former Goguryeo territory north of the Korean peninsula.[66][75]

Denial of ancient Han dynasty presence

The demonization of Japanese historical and archaeological findings in Korea as imperialist forgeries owes in part to those scholars' discovery of the

independent Korean state" of Lelang, which existed between the 2nd century BCE until the 3rd century CE.[66][75] The traditional view of Lelang, according to them, was expanded by Chinese chauvinists and Japanese imperialists.[66]

Claims on Liaodong and other Chinese territories

Shin Chae-ho drew on

Yi Kyu-gyŏng believed that the Liaodong Peninsula was "irrefutably" ancient Korean territory because the Korean name for Liaodong was Samhan (Korean: 삼한; Hanja: 三韓), or "Three Korean States".[16] Nationalist scholars asserted Korean ownership of Liaodong and the surrounding area based on the Chinese dynastic History of Liao and History of Jin.[139] However, mainstream acceptance of claims to Manchurian territory in Korea occurred only when the Empire of Japan expanded into north and northeast China. Colonial Japanese scholars such as Iwakichi Inaba, Shiratori Kurakichi, Torii Ryūzō, Imanishi Ryū, and Ikeuchi Hiroshi declared that there was one unified "Manchurian-Korean history" (Mansen-shi).[140]

The South Korean Yun Nae-hyŏn proposed in 1985 that Gojoseon lasted for two thousand years from before 2333 BCE, stretching from

Burma as included in the territory of the Korean minjok.[42] Yi Sang-ryong made a number of arguments in common with Shin, Kim Kyohŏn and Park Eun-sik: that the Manchu people were actually Korean; that the Four Commanderies of Han were located in Liaodong and not "Korean" territory; and that some portion of Korean history should be centered in Manchuria, with the goal of creating a greater Joseon state which included the territory.[123] Shin argued that the "trends in geographical history" portended future Korean control over former Goguryeo territories, and advocated Korean emigration to "relight" (chunggwang) the lost history of Dangun.[142] As a result of peasant uprisings, famines, and Imperial Japanese encouragement, Korean immigration to Manchuria soared from 1860, reaching 400,000 Koreans by 1920; 900,000 by 1931, and over two million by 1945.[143]

Korean nationalist historiography which holds the subjugation of Manchuria by Korean dynasties as glorious has clashed with contemporary Chinese nationalism, which regard the territory as a Chinese borderland (bianjiang).[129] Chinese historians even object to the name "Manchuria", which evokes a historical independence used to justify imperial powers' attempted separation of that territory from China. Accordingly, they believe that the proper name is "China's Northeast" (dongbei).[129] The Goguryeo controversies around 2002 reflected nationalist sentiment in both China and Korea, stimulated by state-affiliated scholars and institutes from both sides which argued about whether Goguryeo should be considered part of Chinese or Korean history.[129]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ "독재가 없었으면 경제 발전도 없다? 위험한 착각". Pressian. 11 March 2015.
  2. 한겨레
    . 17 March 2022. Retrieved 1 March 2023.
  3. ^ Ebrey, Walthall & Palais 2006, pp. 433 (rebellions starting in 1862) and 437 (military pressure from westen powers and Japan).
  4. ^ Ebrey, Walthall & Palais 2006, p. 438.
  5. ^ Ebrey, Walthall & Palais 2006, p. 438 (the 1876 treaty "opened the door not only to trade but to foreign interference and a world of trouble"); Em 1999, p. 352 ("imperialist rivalry over Korea").
  6. ^ Ebrey, Walthall & Palais 2006, p. 437.
  7. ^ Larsen 2008, pp. 31–32 (tribute missions and ritual inferiority) and 37 ("like the Ming, the Qing virtually never interfered with Korean domestic affairs"; "dependent-yet-autonomous status"); Ebrey, Walthall & Palais 2006, p. 437 ("One of the reasons for the use of violence by the French and Americans was the frustration caused by the ambiguity over who was responsible for the conduct of foreign relations under the tributary system").
  8. ^ Ebrey, Walthall & Palais 2006.
  9. ^ Em 1999, p. 344.
  10. ^ Larsen 2008, p. 272.
  11. ^ Schmid 2002, p. 10.
  12. ^ Shin 2000, p. 5
  13. ^ Shin 2000, p. 7
  14. ^ a b Shin 2000, p. 11
  15. ^ a b Shin 2000, p. 10
  16. ^ a b c Shin 2000, p. 12
  17. ^ Kim 1970, p. 5
  18. ^ a b c Pai 2000, p. 7.
  19. ^ Tikhonov 2010, pp. 83–84.
  20. ^ a b Pai 2000, p. 8.
  21. ^ Shin 2006, pp. 29–30.
  22. ^ Huh 2001, pp. 41 and 43.
  23. ^ Huh 2001, p. 58.
  24. ^ Shin 2006, p. 27.
  25. ^ a b c Em 1999, p. 346
  26. ^ Em 1999, p. 348
  27. ^ a b c Schmid 2000a, pp. 962–963
  28. ^ a b c d e Ch'oe 1980, pp. 17–18
  29. ^ a b c d e f Han 1992, p. 77
  30. ^ a b Doak 2001, pp. 98–99
  31. ^ a b c Atkins 2010, pp. 84–85
  32. ^ a b c Han 1992, pp. 69–70
  33. ^ a b Robinson 1984, p. 122
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References

Works cited

Further reading
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