Operation Brasstacks
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Operation Brasstacks | |
---|---|
Type | Indian Army Military exercise |
Planned | General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, CoAS |
Planned by | Western Army Command Southern Command |
Target | Southern Pakistan |
Date | 18 November 1986 – 6 March 1987 |
Executed by | Indian Army |
Outcome | Exercises were halted; Pakistan redeployment its armed forces Cricket diplomacy defused the threat |
Operation Brasstacks was a major combined arms military exercise of the Indian Armed Forces in the Indian state of Rajasthan. The operation took place from November 1986 to January 1987 near Pakistan border.[1][2]
As part of a series of exercises to simulate the operational capabilities of the Indian armed forces, it was the largest mobilization of Indian forces on the
The
Background
Indian Strategic overview
After the
The scale of the operation was bigger than any
The magnitude and large scale of the exercise led to Pakistani fears that India was displaying an overwhelming conventional superiority and was planning to invade Pakistan and dismember it by
It is theorised by author Robert Art and others that the Brasstacks crisis was not an inadvertent and accidental crisis caused by Pakistan's misinterpretation of a large scale Indian Army exercise, confined mainly to the vast Rajasthan desert sector, as provocative.[11] In this theory, General Sunderji's strategy was to provoke Pakistan to respond and this would provide India with an excuse to implement existing contingency plans to go on to the offensive against Pakistan and destroy its atomic bomb projects in a series of preventive strikes.[11]
Pakistan strategic response
After the success of the
When Brasstacks was executed, Pakistan quickly responded with maneuvers of its own forces, first mobilizing the entire
The situation could have potentially lead to a war between a de facto nuclear weapon state (India—who had already conducted a nuclear test in 1974, Smiling Buddha, and a state known to have nuclear infrastructure, that was believed to be developing nuclear weapons at that time (Pakistan).[9]
1987 Pakistan atomic alert
In January 1987, Pakistan had put its nuclear installations on high alert, and the crisis atmosphere was heightened.
Aftermath
Cricket diplomacy
The tensions diminished in March 1987, with an agreement by the two nations to withdraw 150,000 troops in the Kashmir area, followed by a second agreement to withdraw more troops in the desert area that was signed the same month.[6] While negotiating the withdrawal accord, India vowed to proceed with Brasstacks, asserting that Pakistan had no reason to feel provoked.[6] India did delay the beginning of the last stage of the operation until the following week, while the latest withdrawal agreement was being negotiated.[6] To prove its intentions were peaceful, India took the unusual step of inviting diplomats and journalists to observe the operation separately.[6] Pakistani Foreign Service officers, senior diplomats and statesmen were those who were invited.[6] According to an unnamed Western diplomat, "This was not a third-world army. This was a modern army, fully competent for any mission, easily as good as the Chinese, the Koreans or the French."[6]
Pakistan's President Zia visited India in February 1987, having been invited to see a cricket match between the two countries.[12] Zia's estimation was that he and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi could meet quite cordially, but could not agree on substantive issues.[12]
Effects and legacy
According to the Indian Army, Brasstacks was only an exercise and not supposed to be a provocative one. The media, particularly the Western media, was involved after this and intense diplomatic manoeuvres followed preventing any further escalation in hostilities. On multiple occasions, General Sunderji maintained that: "This was, is and always has been a training exercise. I can't answer why there have been misperceptions about it in some quarters."[6] India repeatedly accused Pakistan of continuing scientific research on atomic bombs; Pakistan continued to sharply reject the claims. A few days later, A. Q. Khan also rejected any statements issued regarding atomic bomb development, and has since said "his comments were taken out of context."[6]
The real motives behind the exercise remain disputed. In 1999, a former senior Indian Army officer, Lieutenant-General P. N. Hoon, remarked that the operation had mobilized the entire Indian Army to Pakistan's eastern border.
Sources
- Sunil Dasgupta, "Operation Brasstacks," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1996 (book review noting previous coverage of the operation).
References
- ISBN 978-1-57607-713-9.
- ^ a b c d Brigadier-General Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi of Pakistan Army Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering (29 October 2011). "India Toying With Dangerous Cold Start War Doctrine – Analysis". Euroasia Review. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
- ^ a b c d e f GS. "Brass Tacks". Global Security.org. Global Security. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
- ^ a b c d Shafik H. Hashmi, Professor Emeritus of Political Science Georgia Southern University (6 March 2012). "The Nuclear Danger in South Asia". Pakistan Link News. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
- ^ a b c d e Mahar Regiment. "General Krishnaswamy Sundarji". Bharat-Rakshak. Archived from the original on 27 May 2013. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Steven Weisman, Special to the New York Times (6 March 1987). "ON INDIA'S BORDER, A HUGE MOCK WAR". The New York Times, 1987. pp. html. Retrieved 1 November 2012.
- ^ a b Abdullah, Sannia (Winter 2012). "Cold Star in Strategic Calculus" (google docs). IPRI Journal XII. 1 (27). Islamabad Policy Research Institute: 6–8. Retrieved 1 November 2012.
- ^ a b c d Miranda, Jewella C (5 August 1999). "Interview with General PN Hoon". The Redcliff Review. The Rediff Interview. Retrieved 1 November 2012.
- ^ ISBN 81-7764-402-5. Retrieved 1 November 2012.
- ISBN 978-9971-69-443-2.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-7425-5669-0.
- ^ a b SPECIAL REPORT. "PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD DURING THE ZIA REGIME". Pakistan Defence Journal. Retrieved 1 November 2012.
External links
- Singh and Gilani Confer at Match, Israel National News, 30 April 2011
- General Krishnaswamy Sundarrajan, Geocities, 26 October 2009
- Rediff interview by PN Hoon
- Brass Tacks, Global Security
- Pakistan and Nuclear Proliferation, Arifa Khan, 20 June 1996