Operation Niagara
Operation Niagara | |
---|---|
Part of the Republic of Vietnam | |
Result | U.S estimate: 9,800–13,000 PAVN killed [1] |
Operation Niagara was a U.S.
Niagara I
During the last four months of 1967 a series of fierce border battles erupted in South Vietnam that cast a shadow on what had been a positive year for U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. Beginning in mid-September, PAVN began the continuous shelling of a Marine outpost located at
In January 1968, the recently installed electronic sensors of
It was at this point that the U.S. commander in Vietnam, General
Inter-service rivalry
Westmoreland and his deputy commander for air operations, General William W. Momyer (who was also commander of the Seventh Air Force) had been awaiting exactly such an opportunity. PAVN forces would be massing in a single geographic area in divisional strength in a remote unpopulated region where there would be no restrictions on bombing missions. Westmoreland gave Momyer the responsibility of coordinating all air assets during the operation to support Khe Sanh. This caused problems for the Marines, however, who possessed their own aviation squadrons and operated under their own close air support doctrine. They were reluctant to relinquish authority to an Air Force general.
General Westmoreland commanded forces only in geographical South Vietnam and in its air space (through the Seventh Air Force). The bombing campaign against North Vietnam was controlled by
On January 19, Westmoreland passed his request for Air Force control up to the chain of command to CINCPAC, Admiral
Niagara II
On 21 January the PAVN opened a continuous artillery barrage directed at Khe Sanh. It was also the launch day for Operation Niagara II. The Marine
Thus began what many considered the most concentrated application of aerial firepower in the history of warfare.
B-52 strikes supporting the Marines were originally restricted by the Marine commander, Colonel David E. Lownds, to bombing no closer than two miles from his front lines. The PAVN utilized this gap to move forward and "grab the enemy by the belt" and avoid the bombing. Momyer demonstrated the effectiveness of the Stratofortress as a tactical platform by bringing the B-52 strikes safely to within three-quarters of a mile of the base and the restriction was lifted.[2]: 179 One PAVN prisoner reported that three-quarters of his entire regiment was lost to one B-52 raid alone.[2]: 179
Even though Westmoreland was concentrating an unprecedented amount of firepower against PAVN forces in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, he feared that it might not be enough. For the first time, the American commander seriously considered the use of a tactical nuclear weapon. In 1976, he revealed that "Although I established a small secret group to study the subject, Washington so feared that some word of it might manage to reach the press that I was told to desist."[5]
During January, PAVN and the Marines contested the outlying hills for control of the high ground and carried out daily artillery and mortar duels. On 7 February, however, North Vietnamese infantry, backed by Soviet-built PT-76 tanks, overran the Special Forces border camp at Lang Vei, only seven miles west of Khe Sanh Combat Base. This was the first instance of the use of armor by PAVN during the conflict. Although the North Vietnamese continued to probe the American's defenses, the attack on Lang Vei was the last major effort by PAVN.
Canberra bombers operated by No. 2 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force also flew close air support missions as part of Operation Niagara.[6]
Riddle of Khe Sanh
During the campaign, the USAF had flown 9,691 sorties and dropped 14,223 tons of bombs. The Marine Corps's aviation wing flew 7,098 sorties and carried 17,015 tons of mixed munitions. Naval aviation (even though concurrently conducting the bulk of Operation Rolling Thunder missions over the DRV) contributed 5,337 sorties and 7,941 tons of bombs.[1]: 297 By the end of March the PAVN had begun to withdraw from the area. General Westmoreland, accepting Air Force estimates that claimed 9,800–13,000 PAVN troops killed or wounded, considered American air superiority to be an important contributor to the battle.[7]
References
This article incorporates public domain material from the Air Force Historical Research Agency
- ^ ISBN 9780395550038.
- ^ ISBN 9780939526093.
- ^ ISBN 9781410220608.
- ISBN 9781508416906.
- ISBN 9781474217989.
- ^ "No. 2 Squadron RAAF". Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 6 October 2014. Retrieved 4 October 2017.
- ISBN 9780939526062.
Sources
- Littauer, Raphael and Norman Uphoff, eds, The Air War in Indochina. Boston: Beacon press, 1972.
- Morocco, John, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1975. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985.
External links
A film clip "Airpower at Khe Sanh" is available for viewing at the Internet Archive