War of the flags
War of the flags | |||||||
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Part of the Vietnam War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
North Vietnam Viet Cong |
South Vietnam United States (until 28 January) | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
ARVN claimed: 5000+ | unknown |
The War of the flags (also known as Landgrab '73) was a phase of fighting throughout South Vietnam lasting from 23 January to 3 February 1973 as the forces of North and South Vietnam each sought to maximize the territory under their control before the ceasefire in place agreed by the Paris Peace Accords came into effect on 27 January 1973. The fighting continued past the ceasefire date and into early February. South Vietnamese forces made greater territorial gains and inflicted significant losses on the North Vietnamese forces.
Background
At the end of the
sectors, totalling around 10% of South Vietnam.The
Battle
I Corps
By late October 1972 the ARVN had
South and west of Quảng Trị the PAVN B5 Front forces prevented any expansion of the ARVN Airborne Division's positions into the hills south of the Thạch Hãn River and against the Thạch Hãn River line itself. The PAVN built up their defenses in the highlands north of the Thạch Hãn River and west of Quảng Trị. Elements of the PAVN 304th Division were shifted to this sector, and additional antiaircraft units were brought into the B5 Front, so that by the end of January elements of at least 11 antiaircraft regiments were deployed in northwestern Quảng Trị Province.[2] In late January 1973 elements of the PAVN 263rd SAM Regiment, equipped with SA-2 missiles, deployed to the former Khe Sanh Combat Base. The regiment had four firing battalions, each equipped with four to six launchers and one support battalion. The regiment was apparently deployed to protect the PAVN logistics hub of the
: 31Further south in Thừa Thiên Province, on 24 January elements of the 803rd Regiment, 324B Division moved into the lowlands south of Camp Evans and north of Huế. On 25 January artillery and ground attacks began against ARVN positions around Huế. Between 27 January and 3 February elements of the 803rd Regiment attempted to interdict Highway 1 in the vicinity of the An Lo bridge. The PAVN captured a number of hamlets before being ejected by ARVN forces, losing over 200 killed. South of Huế, the PAVN 5th and 6th Regiments attacked the lowlands around Phu Bai Combat Base, gaining temporary control of several hamlets before being ejected and losing 175 killed.[2]
In the PAVN's Military Region 5 which was responsible for Quảng Nam, Quảng Tín and
In Quảng Nam Province, Front-4 had completed its preparations for the attacks by 22 January, including having the 575th Artillery Battalion move rockets into four firing positions for attacks against
In Quảng Tín Province the PAVN
In Quảng Ngai Province between 23 and 26 January VC forces infiltrated into assembly areas in the lowlands and on 27 January attacked throughout the lowlands, rocketing the provincial and district capitals, interdicting Highway 1 and overrunning several
II Corps
The southern part of PAVN Military Region 5 included
Fighting started in northeast Bình Định on 23 January 1973, when elements of the PAVN 12th Regiment, 3rd Division, moved from bases in the
Although the PAVN/VC seemed to enjoy great chances for success in Bình Định and Phú Yên Provinces, it was clear by the first week of February that they had failed to achieve any significant gains and the PAVN/VC forces had incurred extremely heavy losses.[2]: 24
The PAVN's B3 Front included
Preparations for occupying the villages and hamlets in the highlands began on 20 and 21 January when elements of both PAVN divisions, the 10th and 320th, began attacks to tie down ARVN defenders. On 20 January the 320th Division attacked Đức Cơ Camp and by the next day controlled the camp. On 27 January the 24th and 28th Regiments, 10th Division attacked Polei Krong and Trung Nghia, forcing the ARVN 85th Ranger Border Defense Battalion to withdraw from Polei Krong on the 28th.[2]: 24
On 26 January, in coordination with the Polei Krong and Trung Nghia attack, the 95B Regiment, 10th Division, seized Highway 14 where it traversed the Chu Pao Pass and held on until 10 February. Farther south, in Darlac Province, a bridge on Highway 14 near Buôn Hồ was destroyed and several hamlets infiltrated. Contact with Ban Me Thuot by way of Highway 14 was interrupted until about 14 February. The VC Gia Lai Provincial Unit closed Highway 19 at the Pleiku-Bình Định border and maintained the block until 4 February. South of Pleiku City, elements of the 320th Division were successful in closing Highway 14 temporarily. Pleiku City itself received repeated attacks by 122mm rockets on 28 January, but damage was light.[2]: 25
The PAVN/VC failed to hold the occupied villages and sustained heavy losses and their military effectiveness decreased significantly. The most important gain was the recapture of Đức Cơ in time to receive the ICCS, this achievement aside, by mid-February the military balance in the highlands was generally the same as it had been at the end of December 1972.[2]: 25
PAVN Military Region 6 included five South Vietnamese provinces, the mountain provinces of Tuyen Duc and
III Corps
The PAVN's Eastern Nam Bo Region was roughly the same as South Vietnam's III Corps (Bình Tuy,
At the end of the first two weeks in January, ARVN III Corps began an attack into the Saigon River corridor and advanced all the way to Tri Tam in the Michelin Rubber Plantation. PAVN/VC losses were estimated in excess of 400 killed. The damage and disruption caused in enemy bases in the
The number and intensity of attacks by fire significantly increased from 23 through 25 January. Widespread attacks by fire and assault began on the 26th and 27th against ARVN and RF/PF outposts, mostly on those located in defense of major lines of communication. Among those hit were
The PAVN/VC attained some short-term successes, about 144 hamlets were reported contested at one lime or another during the period 23–29 January 1973. Nevertheless, by 3 February only 14 hamlets remained under PAVN/VC control, and four days later all hamlets in the region were back under control of South Vietnamese forces. The line-of-communication interdictions were also short lived; all major roads were open by 1 February.[2]: 26
In keeping with the PAVN goal of political control, terrorist attacks during the brief campaign were few, apparently on the theory that widespread terrorism would antagonize the people. As it was, in most instances the people would leave their hamlets as the PAVN/VC forces entered and return only when South Vietnamese forces had ejected the PAVN/VC. The PAVN's political objectives were not achieved, the attempt to seize Tây Ninh never approached success, and RF/PF forces were able to clear the PAVN/VC from out lying hamlets with only minimal assistance from the ARVN. The cost of the campaign for the PAVN/VC was heavy; over 2,000 PAVN/VC troops were killed and 41 captured. A large proportion of the casualties occurred in VC forces; they were weak at the beginning and weaker still at the end.[2]: 26
IV Corps
On 15 January the ARVN and RF/PF forces launched Operation Dong Khoi, a six-day operation throughout the Mekong Delta, early successes led to the operation being extended for six more days. PAVN/VC losses of over 2,000 killed and disruptions in deployment and logistical activity seriously affected the PAVN's ability to launch a significant offensive. The areas the PAVN planned to capture in the Delta were those having the greatest potential for subsequent exploitation and expansion. In the northern Delta, they considered the border area with Cambodia from
PAVN Military Region 2 included eight of the Delta provinces; in the north, Châu Đốc, which contained the PAVN base in the
In Định Tường Province, despite a heavy concentration of PAVN main force units in the center of the province (the 5th and 6th Divisions, the E1, 6th, DT1 and 320th Regiments, and possibly elements of the 174th Regiment), the level of activity was surprisingly low. Even on 28 and 29 January, when the number of attacks approximately doubled, the weight of the attacks remained low. Although ground contact was made with elements of the 174th Regiment in the area known as Tri Phap, these contacts subsided after the ceasefire, probably attributable to high PAVN casualties.[2]: 26–7
In eastern Định Tường and Gò Công Provinces a prisoner reported that main forces, including the PAVN 88th and 24th Regiments, were to break down into small units and conduct political activity among the population. This tactic was to create the impression that the local forces were everywhere throughout the Delta and would support PAVN political activity. The troops had instructions to limit the use of heavy weapons and thus gain more credibility as local guerrillas. Local South Vietnamese forces responded effectively to this campaign and the PAVN achieved no significant gains.[2]: 27
The PAVN's Military Region 3 included the nine provinces of the lower Delta. Kiên Giang, on the Cambodian border. was the northernmost. The Delta capital and the headquarters for the ARVN IV Corps was at
As elsewhere in the Delta, activity in MR 3 increased sharply on 23 January. Well over half of the incidents reported were harassments and attacks by fire against South Vietnamese posts. In the northwest, the PAVN 1st Division sent troops across the frontier from Cambodia with the apparent purpose of having them in position for the kickoff of operations at the time of the ceasefire. Documents captured in sharp fighting near Hà Tiên in northwestern Kiên Giang were identified as belonging to a battalion of the 52nd Regiment, 1st Division and subsequent interrogation of a captured prisoner confirmed the battalion's presence as well as those of the regimental headquarters and a second battalion. The prisoner described the regiment's low morale; many of the soldiers had recently been released from military hospitals. and the general health or the unit was low. The regiment's mission was to occupy the Hà Tiên area and show the VC flag prior to the ceasefire. Combined operations employing the
The PAVN's 44th Sapper Regiment, also subordinate to the 1st Division, began operations in the Seven Mountains of Châu Đốc on 15 January with attacks by fire against South Vietnamese posts. The 44th moved into the Seven Mountains near Tri Tôn on 23 January to occupy as much territory and gain control of as much population as possible, but ARVN counter-operations again prevented any significant successes. The third element of the PAVN 1st Division, the 101D Regiment, apparently remained in its base in the Seven Mountains and contributed only with attacks by fire.[2]: 27
The highest level of PAVN activity in MR 3 occurred in Chương Thiện Province. Four PAVN regiments were available to converge on the province capital,
Attacks were widespread to the far south, primarily against RF/PF outposts and district towns, but in no case did the situation change markedly from that before the campaign got under way. The activity appeared to crest by midday on 28 January, and a general uneasy quiet followed. During the campaign at least 125 hamlets came under PAVN attack, but no more than 20 were ever being contested at anyone time. No main lines of communication were ever threatened and all major roads and canals remained open to traffic. Assassinations and other terrorism lagged. Nowhere in the Mekong Delta did the PAVN make any significant or lasting gain. In the face of the highly successful Operation Dong Khoi, the PAVN apparently realized that major territorial acquisitions were impossible.[2]: 27
Aftermath
The operations of late January and early February 1973 followed the patterns established in October 1972 when a ceasefire had appeared imminent, except that the PAVN waited until much closer to the date of the ceasefire to start the campaign. Otherwise, the objectives and techniques were substantially the same: main force units generally defended the territory already under control and attacked to fix ARVN regulars in their bases, while local PAVN/VC units entered the hamlets.[2]: 31
Throughout South Vietnam, the campaign between 28 January and 9 February cost the PAVN/VC over 5,000 killed in exchange for little alteration in the situation that existed in mid-January. By 9 February, only 23 of more than 400 hamlets attacked were still reported as contested. U.S. observers at MACV in Saigon attributed the PAVN's failures to tactical errors, the limited capabilities of the local forces and an outstanding performance by the South Vietnamese. The PAVN had erred in delaying pre-ceasefire operations in the expectation that the South Vietnamese would be deterred in counterattacking by the presence of ICCS observers. The PAVN committed their other important strategic mistake by breaking down the local forces into small units and attacking at so many places. thereby reducing the staying capacity of any local unit. The ARVN and local RF and PF were able to react deliberately against these hamlet challenges and to eliminate them one by one. The PAVN's local forces were decimated and never recovered. South Vietnamese forces had clearly learned much of the PAVN's strategy and objectives from October 1972 and had planned accordingly. The campaign demonstrated that South Vietnam's armed forces could probably hold their own against the force the North had at that time on the southern battlefields, and that the military balance in South Vietnam was close to even.[2]: 31–2
References
This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army Center of Military History.
- ISBN 9781594035722.
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- ^ ISBN 9781555716257.