12th (Eastern) Infantry Division
12th (Eastern) Infantry Division | |
---|---|
Active | 7 October 1939 – 11 July 1940 |
Country | United Kingdom |
Branch | Territorial Army |
Type | Infantry |
Size | Division |
Engagements | Second World War * Battle of France |
Commanders | |
Notable commanders | Roderic Petre |
The 12th (Eastern) Infantry Division was an
It was intended that the division would remain in the United Kingdom to complete training and preparation, before being deployed to France within twelve months of the war breaking out. The division was dispersed to defend Kent and guard strategically important and vulnerable locations. In France, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was suffering from a manpower shortage among rear-line units. To boost morale, provide additional labour for the rear echelon of the BEF, and acquire political capital with the French Government and military, the division was sent to France in April 1940, leaving behind most of its administration and logistical units as well as its heavy weapons and artillery. The men were assigned to aid in the construction of airfields and pillboxes. General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), secured a promise from the commander of the BEF, General Lord Gort, that the division would not be used in action owing to it being untrained and incomplete.
When Germany
Background
During the 1930s, tensions increased between Germany and the United Kingdom and its allies.[1] In late 1937, German policy towards Czechoslovakia became hostile. During 1938, Germany demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland, the border areas of Czechoslovakia that were primarily inhabited by German-ethnic people. These demands led to an international crisis. To avoid war, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met with German chancellor Adolf Hitler in September and brokered the Munich Agreement. The agreement averted a war and allowed Germany to annex the Sudetenland.[2] Although Chamberlain had intended for the agreement to further a peaceful resolution of issues, relations between the two countries soon deteriorated.[3] On 15 March 1939, Germany breached the terms of the agreement by invading and occupying the remnants of the Czech state.[4]
On 29 March, British
History
Formation
On 7 October, the 12th (Eastern) Infantry Division became active. The division took control of the
The 35th Brigade consisted of the 2/5th, the 2/6th, and the 2/7th Battalions,
Initial service and transfer to France
The war deployment plan for the TA envisioned its divisions being sent overseas, as equipment became available, to reinforce the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) that had already been dispatched to Europe. The TA would join regular army divisions in waves as its divisions completed their training, the final divisions deploying one year after the war had begun.[20] In October 1939, Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, General Walter Kirke, was tasked with drawing up a plan, code named "Julius Caesar", to defend the United Kingdom from a potential German invasion.[c] As part of this plan, the division was assigned to defend northern Kent.[22] In addition, its forces were dispersed to guard strategically important locations known to be vulnerable points.[23][24]
In early 1940, the division became caught up in an effort to address manpower shortages among the BEF's rear-echelon units.[d] More men were needed to work along the line of communication, and the army had estimated that by mid-1940 it would need at least 60,000 pioneers for engineering and construction tasks.[26] The lack of such men had taxed the Royal Engineers (RE) and the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps (AMPC), and had also impacted frontline units that had to divert men from training to help construct defensive positions along the Franco-Belgian border.[27][28] To address this issue, it was decided to deploy untrained territorial units as an unskilled workforce, thereby alleviating the strain on the existing pioneer units and freeing up regular units to complete their training.[29][30] As a result, the decision was made to deploy the 12th (Eastern), 23rd (Northumbrian), and the 46th Infantry Divisions to France. Each division would leave their heavy equipment and most of their logistical, administrative, and support units behind. In total, the elements of the three divisions that were transported to France amounted to 18,347 men.[31][e] The divisions were to aid in the construction of airfields and pillboxes. The intent was that by August their job would be completed and they could return to the United Kingdom to resume training before being redeployed to France as front-line soldiers.[33] The Army believed that this diversion from guard duty would also raise morale.[28] Lionel Ellis, the author of the British official history of the BEF in France, wrote that while the divisions "were neither fully trained nor equipped for fighting ... a balanced programme of training was carried out so far as time permitted".[34] Historian Tim Lynch commented the deployment also had a political dimension, allowing "British politicians to tell their French counterparts that Britain had supplied three more infantry divisions towards the promised nineteen by the end of the year".[30]
General Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, opposed this use of these divisions. He reluctantly caved to the political pressure to release the divisions, having been assured by General Sir John Gort (commander of the BEF) that the troops would not be used as frontline combat formations.[35] The 12th left the United Kingdom on 20 April 1940, arrived in France two days later, and was placed under the direct command of the BEF.[15]
German invasion of France
On 10 May 1940, the
Once the Allied commanders realised that the German crossing of the Meuse had turned into a breakthrough, the BEF and French armies began a fighting withdrawal from Belgium back to France. On 17 May, the 12th (Eastern) Infantry Division was ordered to assemble around
Demise of the division
The 12th (Eastern) Infantry Division was widely dispersed across four areas, unable to support each other, and this further eroded the division's limited fighting power. The 35th Brigade took up positions along the eastern side of
The German 1st Panzer Division reached Péronne during the evening of 18 May. They crossed the canal and attempted to carry on their advance, but the 7th RWK and their four field guns stopped them. Fighting continued until dark, when the Germans fell back into Péronne and the 7th RWK fell back to Albert.[46] The next day saw no German activity along the division's front. On 20 May, the 12th (Eastern) Infantry Division was engaged in a series of isolated battles. The 1st Panzer Division advanced on Albert and overran the 7th RWK. It then moved towards Amiens and destroyed the 37th Brigade's 7th Sussex in the process. The 6th Panzer Division reached Doullens and was held up by the 36th Brigade for two and a half hours, before they overwhelmed the brigade. The 2nd Panzer Division arrived at Abbeville and occupied the town after defeating the 35th Brigade.[47] Ellis wrote that the 12th Division "had practically ceased to exist", as a result of the fighting that saw the "whole tract of country between the Scarpe and the Somme" fall into German hands, and left the way to the English Channel open.[48]
The German XXXXI Panzer Corps war diary reported that the 6th Panzer Division was "only able to gain ground slowly and with continual fighting against an enemy who defended himself stubbornly".[48] Historians have praised the division for delaying the German advance for several hours, despite being under-equipped, un-prepared and fighting against unfavourable odds.[49] The historian Gregory Blaxland was more critical, and wrote "it was both tragic and wasteful to have committed these men of little training but great spirit to battle at such hopeless disadvantage."[50] Both Blaxland and the historian Julian Thompson cited the praise delivered upon these battalions by the Germans, in their war diaries. However, they argued that the British Army had not heeded the lessons of the invasion of Poland nor given enough thought into how infantry should counter tanks. They believe had the battalions been concentrated and placed in more defensible positions, such as behind the Canal du Nord, they would have held greater tactical value and delayed the Germans longer than they achieved. The BEF had intended to deploy the 12th Division behind this canal, but this intention was not acted upon prior to the division being dispersed.[51][52] Blaxland highlighted that the overall lack of training within the territorial soldiers should not have been an issue, as all levels of command were held by regular soldiers who should have been able to impress their greater experience upon the recruits.[50] Thompson noted, however, "it has to be borne in mind that a delay of even one hour was of huge benefit" to the BEF.[52]
Most of Petreforce suffered a similar fate. The 23rd (Northumbrian) Division was overrun by the 8th Panzer Division on 20 May.[53][54] Meanwhile, the 5th Infantry Division and the 50th (Northumbrian) Motor Division had taken up positions in Arras, and the 5th Division took command of the garrison. On 25 May, Petreforce was officially abolished.[55] The remnants of the 12th Division were evacuated back to England. The 36th Brigade evacuated via Dunkirk, and the rest of the division was largely evacuated via Cherbourg during Operation Aerial.[56] Divisional casualty information is sparse. The 35th Brigade started the campaign with 2,400 men, and was reduced to 1,234 after their encounter with the 2nd Panzer Division.[57] Within the 36th Infantry Brigade, the 6th RWK was reduced from 578 men to 75, and the 605 strong 5th Buffs was reduced to 80.[58]
Disbandment
As soon as the Allied troops returned from France, the British Army began implementing lessons learnt from the campaign. This involved the decision to abandon the two-brigade motor division concept and for the basic infantry division to be based around three brigades.[59][60][f] This entailed the break up of four second-line TA divisions to reinforce depleted formations and aid in transforming the Army's five motor divisions into infantry divisions.[59][60][g] Consequently, the 12th (Eastern) Infantry Division was disbanded on 11 July, and its units dispersed.[15]
The 35th Infantry Brigade (along with the 113th Field Regiment and the 67th Anti-Tank Regiment) were transferred to the
Order of battle
12th (Eastern) Infantry Division (1939–40):[15]
35th Infantry Brigade[75]
- 2/5th Battalion, Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)
- 2/6th Battalion, Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)
- 2/7th Battalion, Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)
36th Infantry Brigade[76]
- 2/6th Battalion, East Surrey Regiment (left 25 October 1939)
- 6th Battalion, Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment
- 7th Battalion, Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment
- 5th Battalion, Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment) (from 25 October 1939)
37th Infantry Brigade[69]
- 5th Battalion, Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment) (left 25 October 1939)
- 6th Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment
- 7th (Cinque Ports) Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment
- 2/6th Battalion, East Surrey Regiment (from 25 October 1939)
Divisional Troops[15]
- 12th (Eastern) Divisional artillery, Royal Artillery
- 113th (Home Counties) Field Regiment
- 114th (Sussex) Field Regiment
- 118th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery
- 67th Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery
- 12th (Eastern) Divisional Engineers, Royal Engineers
- 262nd Field Company
- 263rd Field Company
- 264th Field Company
- 265th (Sussex) Field Park Company
- 12th (Eastern) Divisional Signals, Royal Corps of Signals
See also
- List of British divisions in World War II
- British Army Order of Battle (September 1939)
Footnotes
- British Government decided, territorial soldiers could be deployed overseas for combat. (This avoided the complications of the First World War-era Territorial Force, whose members were not required to leave Britain unless they volunteered for overseas service.)[6][7][8][9]
- ^ British battalion numbering nomenclature used fractions to signify when a battalion had created a second line unit. The number prior to the fraction detailed the 'line', and the number after was the parent battalion. For example, if the 1st Battalion formed a second line unit, it would be called the 2/1st etc.[18]
- 6,000 such troops), and at least one division of 15,000 troops to be used in an amphibious assault.[21]
- ^ By the end of April, 78,864 men were employed on lines-of-communication duties; 23,545 were allocated to headquarters, hospitals, and other rear-echelon duties; 9,051 were allocated as drafts; 2,515 had not been assigned a role; and 6,859 were supporting the Advanced Air Striking Force. Around 10,000 men who were assigned to railway and other construction tasks to support the lines of communication were included in these figures.[25]
- ^ For comparison, the 1939 war-establishment (the on-paper strength) of a three-brigade infantry division was 13,863 men.[32]
- infantry tanks. Any gap created would then be exploited by mobile divisions, and the territory thus captured would be secured by the fast-moving motor divisions. These tactics would transform the attack into a break-through, while maintaining mobility.[61] By 1940, five such divisions had been formed within the TA: the 1st London, the 2nd London, the 50th (Northumbrian), the 55th (West Lancashire), and the 59th (Staffordshire) Motor Divisions.[62][63] French wrote that the motor division "matched that of the German army's motorized and light divisions. But there the similarities ended." German motorised divisions contained three regiments (comparable to British brigades) and were as fully equipped as a regular infantry division, while the smaller light divisions contained a tank battalion. The motor division, fully motorised and capable of transporting all their infantry, contained no tanks and was "otherwise much weaker than normal infantry divisions" or their German counterparts.[62]
- ^ The two-brigade strong 23rd (Northumbrian) Division was disbanded on 23 June. One brigade was transferred to the 50th (Northumberland) Motor Division as part of their transition into an infantry formation, while the other was eventually transferred to the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division to bring it up to full strength.[64] The 66th Infantry Division was disbanded on 3 June, with one brigade transferred to the 59th (Staffordshire) Motor Division to finalise its re-organisation, and the other was initially attached to another transiting motor formation, the 1st London Division.[65] On 7 August, the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, destroyed in France, was re-created by the re-designation of its second-line duplicate, the 9th (Highland) Infantry Division.[66]
Citations
- ^ Bell 1997, pp. 3–4.
- ^ Bell 1997, pp. 258–275.
- ^ Bell 1997, pp. 277–278.
- ^ Bell 1997, p. 281.
- ^ a b c Gibbs 1976, p. 518.
- ^ Allport 2015, p. 323.
- ^ French 2001, p. 53.
- ^ Perry 1988, pp. 41–42.
- ^ Simkins 2007, pp. 43–46.
- ^ Messenger 1994, p. 47.
- ^ a b Messenger 1994, p. 49.
- ^ a b c d Perry 1988, p. 48.
- ^ French 2001, p. 64.
- ^ a b Levy 2006, p. 66.
- ^ a b c d e f Joslen 2003, p. 56.
- ^ Chappell 1987, p. 21.
- ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 56, 282, 284, 286.
- ^ Story 1961, p. 9.
- ^ "No. 34171". The London Gazette. 18 June 1935. p. 3928., "No. 34419". The London Gazette. 20 July 1937. p. 4668., "No. 34511". The London Gazette. 17 May 1938. p. 3196.
- ^ Gibbs 1976, pp. 455, 507, 514–515.
- ^ Newbold 1988, p. 40.
- ^ Newbold 1988, p. 47.
- ^ Chaplin 1954, p. 116.
- ^ Martineau 1955, p. 219.
- ^ Ellis 1954, pp. 19 and 21.
- ^ Perry 1988, p. 52.
- ^ Rhodes-Wood 1960, pp. 29, 228.
- ^ a b Jones 2016, p. 228.
- ^ Ellis 1954, pp. 19, 21.
- ^ a b Lynch 2010, p. 52.
- ^ Ellis 1954, p. 19; Lynch 2010, p. 52; Joslen 2003, pp. 56, 62, and 75.
- ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 131 and 133.
- ^ Collier 1961, p. 83.
- ^ Ellis 1954, p. 21.
- ^ Lynch 2010, p. 52; Smalley 2015, p. 75; Murland 2016, Chapter Four: "Massacre of the Innocents 19–20 May 1940".
- ^ Weinberg 1994, p. 122.
- ^ Weinberg 1994, pp. 123–125.
- ^ Weinberg 1994, pp. 126–127.
- ^ Ellis 1954, pp. 59, 65, 77.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, pp. 129–131.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, p. 131.
- ^ Joslen 2003, p. 131; French 2001, pp. 38–39; Thompson 2009, p. 69; Lynch 2010, p. 98.
- ^ a b Ellis 1954, pp. 77–79.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, p. 138.
- ^ Thompson 2009, p. 73.
- ^ Ellis 1954, p. 78.
- ^ Ellis 1954, p. 80.
- ^ a b Ellis 1954, p. 81.
- ^ Ellis 1954, p. 81; Fraser 1999, p. 61; Horne 2007, p. 561; Lynch 2010, p. 52.
- ^ a b Blaxland 1973, p. 130.
- ^ Blaxland 1973, pp. 117, 130.
- ^ a b Thompson 2009, p. 77.
- ^ Thompson 2009, pp. 81–82.
- ^ Rissik 2004, pp. 37–42.
- ^ Ellis 1954, pp. 131, 139.
- ^ Martineau 1955, p. 233; Haswell 1967, p. 129; Langley 1972, p. 104; Sebag-Montefiore 2006, pp. 137–138.
- ^ Lynch 2010, p. 121.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, pp. 137–138.
- ^ a b French 2001, pp. 189–191.
- ^ a b Perry 1988, p. 54.
- ^ French 2001, pp. 37–41.
- ^ a b French 2001, p. 41.
- ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 37, 41, 61, 90, 93.
- ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 79–82, 301.
- ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 93–94, 97, 362.
- ^ Joslen 2003, p. 55.
- ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 37, 56, 282.
- ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 41–42, 101, 284.
- ^ a b Joslen 2003, p. 286.
- ^ Joslen 2003, p. 41.
- ^ Joslen 2003, p. 505.
- ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 60–61.
- ^ Morling 1972, pp. 211, 225–234.
- ^ Lord & Watson 2003, p. 153.
- ^ Joslen 2003, p. 282.
- ^ Joslen 2003, p. 284.
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