Academic skepticism

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Skeptics in Raphael's School of Athens painting. 1. Pythodorus 2. Arcesilaus of Pitane 3. Carneades of Cyrene 4. Pyrrho of Elis 5. Timon of Phlius 6. Theodorus the Atheist of Cyrene

Academic skepticism refers to the

Stoics, particularly their dogma that convincing impressions led to true knowledge. The most important Academics were Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Philo of Larissa. The most extensive ancient source of information about Academic skepticism is Academica, written by the Academic skeptic philosopher Cicero
.

Overview

Greek

dogmatism. Mental imperturbability (ataraxia) was the result to be attained by cultivating such a frame of mind.[1]

Around 266 BCE,

new Academy, although some ancient authors added further subdivisions, such as a middle Academy. Following the death of the Pyrrhonist Timon of Phlius, the Platonic Academy became the primary advocate of skepticism until the mid-first century BCE.[4] While early Academic skepticism was influenced in part by Pyrrho,[5] it grew more and more dogmatic until Aenesidemus, in the first century BCE, broke with the Academic skeptics and adopted Pyrrhonism, denouncing the Academy as "Stoics fighting against Stoics."[6]

The Academics did not doubt the existence of

Phaedo,[8] in which Socrates discusses how knowledge is not accessible to mortals.[9]

While the objective of the Pyrrhonists was the attainment of

Stoics.[1] They acknowledged some vestiges of a moral law within, at best but a plausible guide, the possession of which, however, formed the real distinction between the sage and the fool.[7] Slight as the difference may appear between the positions of the Academics and the Pyrrhonists, a comparison of their lives leads to the conclusion that a practical philosophical moderation was the characteristic of the Academics[7] whereas the objectives of the Pyrrhonists were more psychological. The second-century Roman historian Aulus Gellius
described the distinction between the Academic skeptics and the Pyrrhonists as follows:

"...the Academics apprehend (in some sense) the very fact that nothing can be apprehended, and they determine (in some sense) that nothing can be determined, whereas the Pyrrhonists assert that not even that seems to be true, since nothing seems to be true."[10]

Arcesilaus

Up to Arcesilaus, the Platonic Academy accepted the principle of finding a general unity in all things, by the aid of which a principle of certainty might be found.[11] Arcesilaus, however, broke new ground by attacking the very possibility of certainty and denied the possibility of even the Socratic minimum of certainty: "I cannot know even whether I know or not."[11]

The doctrines of Arcesilaus, which must be gathered from the writings of others,

agnostic attitude.[13]

Carneades

Carneades of Cyrene, the most important of the Academic skeptics

The next stage in Academic skepticism was the moderate skepticism of Carneades, which he said owed its existence to his opposition to Chrysippus.[11]

To the Stoic theory of perception, the phantasia kataleptike, by which they expressed a conviction of certainty arising from impressions so strong as to amount to science, he proposed the doctrine of

acatalepsia, which denied any necessary correspondence between perceptions and the objects perceived.[11] All our sensations are relative, and acquaint us, not with things as they are, but only with the impressions that things produce upon us. Experience, he said, clearly shows that there is no true impression. There is no notion that may not deceive us; it is impossible to distinguish between false and true impressions; therefore the Stoic phantasia kataleptike must be given up. There is no phantasia kataleptike ("criterion") of truth. Carneades also assailed Stoic theology and physics. In answer to the doctrine of final cause, of design in nature, he pointed to those things which cause destruction and danger to man, to the evil committed by men endowed with reason, to the miserable condition of humanity, and to the misfortunes that assail the good man. There is, he concluded, no evidence for the doctrine of a divine superintending providence. Even if there were orderly connexion of parts in the universe, this may have resulted quite naturally. No proof can be advanced to show that this world is anything but the product of natural forces.[14]

Knowledge being impossible, a wise man should practice

on suspension of judgment," were made use of by Cicero.[15]

Philo of Larissa

In Philo of Larissa, we find a tendency not only to reconcile the internal divergences of the Academy itself, but also to connect it with parallel systems of thought.[11] In general, his philosophy was a reaction against the skeptic or agnostic position of the middle and new Academy in favor of the dogmatism of Plato.[16] Philo of Larissa endeavored to show that Carneades was not opposed to Plato, and further that the apparent antagonism between Platonism and Stoicism was because they were arguing from different points of view. From this syncretism emerged the eclectic middle Platonism of Antiochus of Ascalon, the last product of Academic development.[11]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ a b c  One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the public domainChisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Scepticism". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 24 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 306–309.
  2. ^ Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" I.33.232
  3. ^ Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" I.33.225–231
  4. OCLC 715184861
    . Pyrrhonism, in whatever form it might have taken after Timon's death in 230 BCE, was utterly neglected until Aenesidemus brought it back to public attention
  5. ^ Thorsrud 2014, p. 45.
  6. ^ Thorsrud 2014, pp. 102–103.
  7. ^ a b c  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domainSmith, William, ed. (1870). "Arcesilaus". Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology.
  8. Phaedo, 64–67
  9. ^ Veres, Máté (2009). "Carlos Lévy, Les Scepticismes; Markus Gabriel, Antike und moderne Skepsis zur Einführung". Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science. 6 (1): 107.: 111 
  10. OCLC 635311697
    .
  11. ^ a b c d e f g  One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the public domainChisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Academy, Greek". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 1 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 105–106.
  12. ^ Cicero, Acad. i. 12, iv. 24; De Orat. iii. 18; Diogenes Laertius iv. 28; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii. 150, Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 233
  13. ^ a b  One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the public domainChisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Arcesilaus". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 2 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 342.
  14. ^ a b c  One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the public domainChisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Carneades". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 5 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 363–364.
  15. ^  One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the public domainChisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Clitomachus". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 6 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 531.
  16. ^  One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the public domainChisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Philo of Larissa". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 21 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 413.

References

External links