Battle of Sinop
Battle of Sinop | |||||||
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Part of the Crimean War | |||||||
The Battle of Sinop by Alexey Bogolyubov | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Russian Empire | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Pavel Nakhimov |
Osman Pasha (POW) Adolphus Slade | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
6 steamers [2] |
7 frigates, 3 corvettes, 2 steamers [2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
37 killed, 229 wounded [3] |
3,000 killed[3] 1 frigate sunk, 1 steamer sunk, 6 frigates grounded, 3 corvettes grounded, ~2 shore batteries destroyed [4] | ||||||
The Battle of Sinop, or the Battle of Sinope, was a
The Russian navy had recently adopted
The one-sided battle contributed to the decision of
Prelude
On 4 October 1853, around 2 months before the battle, in response to the Russian occupation of
Hostilities began officially on 4 October, with a principal theater in Europe and another in the Caucasus. Sultan Abdulmecid ordered an immediate offensive to drive back the Russians and demonstrate Ottoman might before Ottoman finances totally collapsed.[10] The offensive along the Danube met with mixed success, but the Ottoman land attack into the Russian Caucasus was relatively successful. By the end of October, the Russian Caucasus Corps was in danger of being surrounded.[11] Turkish ships trafficking gunpowder to the Circassians were in contravention of the Straits Convention, which international law was sworn to uphold. The Russians told the Austrian Consul that they were legitimately entitled to seek redress for this act of piracy. Furthermore Russia claimed that two Customs House men had been murdered at Tiflis. The tsar needed no further incentive to react.
Despite the Ottoman declaration of war, the naval aspect was mostly uneventful until November, when the Vice Admiral Osman Pasha was forced to dock at Sinop during a storm on the
Unable to interdict the convoy, Russian naval elements remained in
Initial Ottoman activity in the Black Sea had been allowed to proceed unhindered, but as the situation of the Russian Caucasus Corps deteriorated, St. Petersburg was forced to act. Adm. Pavel Nakhimov was ordered to muster the Russian navy and interdict the Ottomans. From 1–23 November Russian squadrons were dispatched into the Black Sea to establish control. Two Ottoman steamers, the Medzhir Tadzhiret and the Pervaz Bahri, were captured by the Russians in short engagements. Russia was able to establish operational control of the sea lanes but storms forced Nakhimov to send back most of his force for repair. Left with only a frigate, a steamer and three ships of the line, Nakhimov continued the search for Osman and the convoy. On 23 November, Osman's flag was sighted returning and then entering the harbor at Sinop. Nakhimov immediately deployed his ships to blockade the harbor and sent his only frigate to retrieve as many reinforcements as could be found.[14]
On 30 November, Vice Admiral Fyodor Novosiliski rallied six more ships to Nakhimov, completing the blockade force in a loose semi-circle. Additional steamers were expected, but Nakhimov decided to act before the Ottomans could be reinforced by additional ships. For his part, Osman had been well aware of the Russian presence since 23 November, but felt his ships were safe in harbor. Sinop had substantial harbor defenses and forts with interlocking fields of fire and ample cannon.[14] Osman did little to break the weak Russian blockade, even allowing many of his crews to disembark.[14]
Battle
Three Russian
Admiral Nakhimov decided with his officers that they would attack the Ottoman fleet sheltered at Sinop. Strengthened by the squadron of Vice Adm. Novosilsky, Nakhimov consolidated over 700 cannon in six ships of the line, two frigates and three armed steamers.[citation needed] The Ottoman forces included seven frigates, three corvettes and two armed steamers. The Russians planned to deploy their ships in two columns that would advance to within close range of the enemy vessels before dropping anchor and opening fire. Under Nakhimov's command, the 84-gun ship Imperatritsa Maria was the first to engage when she fired on the 44-gun Ottoman flagship Auni Allah.[16]
On 30 November the Russian squadron entered the harbor from the northwest in a triangular formation. Nakhimov maneuvered his fleet so that the Ottoman vessels were between the Russian ships and Sinop's harbor defenses, shielding his own force and exposing the Ottomans to potential friendly fire. Nakhimov spaced his battleships evenly in two lines, covering the entire harbor with interlocking fields of fire. Russian gunners began to score hits on all the Ottoman targets. The projectile shells fired for the first time from Russian guns immediately set the wooden Ottoman ships on fire. Panic-stricken sailors found firefighting efforts difficult amidst continued fire and almost constant shrapnel.[citation needed] After about 30 minutes of combat the Ottoman flag frigate Auni Allah was shot full of holes and ran aground when her anchor cable was cut. Imperatritsa Maria then attacked and disabled the 44-gun frigate Fazli Allah, which caught fire. Meanwhile, the other Russian ships damaged the Nizamie and Damiad. The Ottoman corvette Guli Sephid and frigate Navek Bakhri exploded.[16]
Only one Ottoman vessel, the 12-gun
Aftermath
When telegraph reports of the battle reached Russian authorities in St. Petersburg, the reaction was jubilant. The untested and widely hated
The reaction in the Ottoman capital of Constantinople ranged from concern to total panic. Russia had annihilated a vital convoy and now had operational control over the Black Sea. The destruction of the harbor defenses opened the door to Russian invasion and suddenly the entire Samsun and Trabzon Coast was now at risk. Moreover, the Russian violation of the British/French mandate for the war meant that the actions of Russia could no longer be predicted and Russia might not be fighting with one hand tied behind its back.[17] Subsequent policy was directed toward the Anglo-French and the comprehensive military agreement that Istanbul had been trying to avoid.[citation needed] The Porte wanted to prevent war at all cost, but its strategy had failed, and now an Allied campaign against the Russians seemed inevitable.
"She [Turkey] hears from all sides that the occupation of the Principalities by Russia constitutes a cause of war; and she has not only put herself into a state of respectable defence, but she has appealed with perfect success to the zeal of her Mussulmen and to the loyalty of her Christian subjects."[18]
The attack was treated by external powers as unjustified and caused a wave of
During the Crimean War which followed, all Russian ships of the line and frigates involved in this battle were lost at Sevastopol.
Sinop was presented by the media as not so much a battle but an ambush, but its results were nonetheless important to the practice of
However, until 1853 no navy had made comprehensive use of shell-firing guns in a live combat environment. Indeed, many experts disparaged the new weapons and the larger ships required to carry them as too heavy for naval warfare. The results of Sinop were clear and showed that the new weapons were effective. As a result, an arms race ensued with participant nations desperately looking for ways to up-gun existing ships and incorporate the shell-firing guns into new ironclad vessels.[22]
Order of battle
Russian Empire
- Velikiy Knyaz Konstantin, ship of the line, 120 guns
- Tri Sviatitelia, ship of the line, 120 guns
- Parizh, 120 guns, ship of the line, transferred flagship
- Imperatritsa Maria, ship of the line, 84 guns, flagship
- Chesma, ship of the line, 84 guns
- Rostislav, ship of the line, 84 guns
- Kulevtcha, frigate, 54 guns
- Kagul, frigate, 44 guns
- Odessa, steamer, 4 guns
- Krym, steamer, 4 guns
- Khersones, steamer, 4 guns
- Source:[23]
Ottoman Empire
- Avni Illah, frigate, 44 guns (grounded)
- Fazl Illah, frigate, 44 guns (originally the Russian Rafail, captured during the war of 1828–29) (burned, grounded)
- Nizamieh, frigate, 62 guns (grounded after losing two masts)
- Nessin Zafer, frigate, 60 guns (grounded after her anchor chain broke)
- Navek Bahri, frigate, 58 guns (exploded)
- Damiat, frigate, 56 guns (Egyptian) (grounded)
- Kaid Zafer, frigate, 54 guns (grounded)
- Nejm Fishan, corvette, 24 guns
- Feyz Mabud, corvette, 24 guns (grounded)
- Kel Safid, corvette, 22 guns (exploded)
- paddle frigate, 30 guns (retreated to Istanbul)
- Erkelye, steamer, 10 guns
- Source:[2]
Citations
- ^ a b Mikaberidze 2011, p. 837.
- ^ a b c Tucker 2009, p. 1209.
- ^ a b Anderson 1952, p. 580.
- ^ Arsenyev & Petrushevsky 1900.
- ^ a b c d Tucker 2011, p. 323.
- ^ Pitt 2015, p. 54.
- ^ Pitt 2015, p. 52.
- ^ Small 2014, pp. 11–13.
- ^ Small 2014, p. 17.
- ^ Small 2014, pp. 5–7.
- ^ "The 1853-1856 Crimean War and Deep Contradictions in the International Order". 18 July 2022.
- ^ Tucker 2011, p. 2013.
- ^ Spilsbery 2005.
- ^ a b c Erkan 2009.
- ^ Royle, T., Crimea (London, 1999), 94-95
- ^ a b Small 2014, pp. 45–47.
- ^ Admiral Stratford to Lord Clarendon, 5 October 1853 in Royle, p.80 n5.
- ^ a b c Bloy 2014.
- ^ Badem 2010, p. 142.
- ^ Seymour, Ambassador to the Court of St Petersburg to Lord Clarendeon, 26 December 1853 in Royle, Crimea, p.97 n6.
- ^ a b c Sondhaus 2000.
- ^ Tucker 2011, p. 1209.
References
- OCLC 1015099422.
- Badem, Candan (2010). The Ottoman Crimean War (1853–1856). Brill.
- Bloy, Marjie. "The Crimean War: Immediate Causes". victorianweb.org. Archived from the original on 6 September 2014. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
- Erkan, Aydin Osman (2009). Turn My Head to the Caucasus: The Biography of Osman Ferid Pasha.
- "History of the Russian Navy, Chapter 8: Sinop". RUSnet. 1996. Archived from the original on 9 September 2020.
- Mikaberidze, Alexander (2011). Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia. Vol. 1. ABC-CLIO.
- Pitt, Lieutenant Commander William M. (1971). "The Use of Seapower in Countering the Strategy of Interposition". Google Books. The United States Naval War College. Archived from the original on 25 January 2021. Retrieved 2 August 2020.
- Small, Hugh (2014). The Crimean War: Queen Victoria's War with the Russian Tsars. Tempus.
- Sondhaus, Lawrence (2000). Naval Warfare, 1815–1914. New York: Routledge.
- Spilsbery, J. (2005). The Thin Red Line: An Eyewitness History of the Crimean War. London.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - Tucker, Spencer C. (2009). A Global Chronology of Conflict: From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East. ABC-CLIO.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2011). Battles that Changed World History. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9781598844290. Archivedfrom the original on 25 January 2021. Retrieved 2 August 2020.
- Arsenyev, Konstantin; Petrushevsky, Fyodor (1900). Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary (in Russian). Vol. XXX. Сим — Слюзка. Friedrich A. Brockhaus (St. Petersburg). pp. 48–49. Retrieved 2 September 2023.
General reference
- Baş, Ersan (2007). Çeşme, Navarin, Sinop Raids and Their Consequences. Istanbul: Sea Printing House. ISBN 978-975-409-452-7.
External links
- Media related to Battle of Sinop at Wikimedia Commons
- Istanbul Naval Museum