Battle of Albulena
Battle of Albulena | |||||||
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Part of the Albanian–Ottoman Wars (1432–1479) | |||||||
Engraving of an Albanian assault on the Turkish camp during the battle | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
League of Lezhe | Ottoman Empire | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Skanderbeg | ) | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
8,000[2] | 50,000-80,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Minor |
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The Battle of Albulena, also known as the Battle of Ujëbardha, was fought on 2 September 1457 between
Skanderbeg had been the leader of the Albanians for over a decade and had seen many victories over the Ottoman armies. However, after his unsuccessful
The Ottomans arrived in late May 1457 and marched through the
The victory strengthened the morale of the Albanians. There were few, if not any, officers and soldiers who deserted afterwards. The Battle of Albulena has been seen as Skanderbeg's most brilliant victory over the Ottomans. However, it also marked the high point of the Albanian resistance, beginning a new phase in Skanderbeg's quarter-century long war which would include its fiercest Ottoman invasions. Even though Skanderbeg himself had died in January 1468, the war would drag on until 1478 and later in the same year the main Albanian fortress at Krujë fell, finally effecting the annexation of Skanderbeg's Albania by the Ottoman Empire.
Background
Skanderbeg's resources were worn out after over a decade of continuous war. Alfonso and the pope could not provide for him fully, while Venice continued to undermine Skanderbeg. The latter considered war with Skanderbeg since he maintained his alliance with Aragon. Relations with the Italian state worsened further when Lekë Dukagjini, Skanderbeg's elusive ally in the north, captured Dagnum.[9] Even though Skanderbeg did not participate in this, Venice used it as a casus belli to launch an expedition against Skanderbeg. War never started but Albanian-Venetian relations sunk to their lowest point. The Venetian rectors continued to provoke Skanderbeg at a time when he had grown relatively weak due to his nephew and one of his most important officers, Hamza Kastrioti, deserting and joining the Ottomans.[10] Hamza had become dissatisfied with Skanderbeg's growing power and, upon being received by the sultan, was offered control over much of Albania once conquered.[11][12] Stung by the betrayal, Skanderbeg offered an ultimatum to Venice where they had to halt their provocations or begin war.[10] Since a crusade was anticipated against the Ottomans, Venice did not want to seem pro-Ottoman and eased their stance towards Albania.[13]
Campaign
By the end of May 1457, a large Ottoman army was seen approaching Albania. Skanderbeg sent a letter to Calixtus informing him of the Ottoman arrival and the dire need for military aid.
Skanderbeg's "disappearance"
The Ottoman army did not march into Albania in one group. The first detachments to arrive were the Akıncı who marched through Dibër. Skanderbeg stalled this force's advance, but, once the main force arrived, the Albanians were not able to offer further resistance and withdrew. Realizing that both Ottoman commanders, Isak bey and Hamza, were familiar with the Albanian terrain and his tactics, Skanderbeg decided to adopt a new means of engagement.[2] Normally, he would lure his enemy into a trap and then ambush them. His new tactic was very similar to his normal; however, he chose to approach it in a different manner.[15] To make it impossible to be followed, Skanderbeg split his forces into several groups and ordered their respective commanders to march through the forests and mountains in different directions and to never assemble or assault the Ottomans unless instructed to do so. The Albanian warriors were supplied by the locals and supply depots set throughout the mountains as they marched.[15]
The Ottomans marched through
Due to Skanderbeg's "disappearance," rumors began to spread that he had fled since he was unable to confront the Ottomans and that his men had betrayed him. This was further upheld by the Venetians in Durazzo (Durrës).[17] Isak bey and Hamza continued to be wary, however, and their reconnaissance forces reached as far north as Scutari (Shkodër). Skanderbeg remained in the mountains throughout July and August. It is not known with certainty what his army did while in the mountains, but he planned to wear the Ottomans out by forcing them to wait and to make them believe that he had been decisively defeated. Skanderbeg then sent Gjergj(George) Pjetri to Rome as an ambassador to give the Pope the impression that Albania had been decisively conquered and that aid was necessary to force the Ottomans out of Albania.[18] On 17 September 1457, Calixtus notified Skanderbeg that he had sent Johan Navarre to help fund the crusade.[19] By the time he arrived, however, the situation had already changed.[20]
Battle
The local population remained faithful to Skanderbeg and did not reveal his whereabouts. Isak bey and Hamza grew confident that Skanderbeg had been defeated and had thus began to withdraw. When he judged the time right, Skanderbeg gave the signal for the army, which had up until then been in separate groups, to assemble without being seen by the Ottomans. The army gathered by the hills at Tumenishta – as the weakest point in the Ottoman camp was in this direction – and on 2 September 1457, it was split again into three groups to assault the Ottoman camp.[20] With some of his most trusted men, he climbed to a high peak to scout on the Ottoman camp and saw that the Ottomans were resting. He descended with his chosen band to eliminate any watching guards, but one saw Skanderbeg and fled into the camp yelling that Skanderbeg had arrived. In order to maintain the surprise, Skanderbeg ordered his men to get ready for battle.[21][22]
With the accompaniment of loud noise made from metallic tools and weapons being clapped together, the Albanians charged into the Turkish camp. The Ottomans were caught by surprise and, despite their large numbers, were terrified by the fury of the Albanian assault, thinking they were attacking in larger numbers than they actually had.
Aftermath
The battle of Albulena was significant for the southern resistance against the Ottoman Empire. Franz Babinger, a historian of the Ottoman Empire, describes the battle as Skanderbeg's most brilliant victory.[1] The battle of Albulena strengthened the morale of Skanderbeg's men who afterwards rarely, if at all, deserted his army as Hamza had.[25] Hamza himself was sent as a prisoner to Naples in Alfonso's realm after being captured. An Ottoman envoy was sent to ransom the standard bearers and forty of the distinguished prisoners. The envoy also tried to settle for a truce between Mehmed and Skanderbeg, but the latter responded that he would only accept if Svetigrad and Berat, which had been lost in 1448 and 1450 respectively, were restored to his state.[26] Seeing that Mehmed would not accept such terms, Skanderbeg strengthened his garrisons in the area around Svetigrad.[27] The victory still bought Albania and Italy time; in 1460, Mehmed and Skanderbeg signed an armistice that lasted three years.[28] This gave Skanderbeg the opportunity to land in Italy and help out Alfonso's son, Ferdinand I of Naples, who had been crowned after his father had died.[29] The battle thus opened a new phase in the Ottoman-Albanian war which saw the high-water mark of the Albanian resistance and the fiercest Ottoman invasions of Albania in the war.[25] The war would last until the fall of Krujë in 1478.[30]
The Albanian feminine first name Albulena, originating as a reference to the battle, is still in use today.
Notes
- ^ a b c d Babinger p. 152.
- ^ a b c Frashëri p. 347.
- ^ Elsie p. 162.
- ^ Runciman p. 46.
- ^ a b Frashëri p. 338.
- ^ Frashëri p. 339
- ^ a b Frashëri p. 341.
- ^ Setton p. 174.
- ^ a b Frashëri p. 342.
- ^ a b Frashëri p. 343.
- ^ a b Frashëri p. 345.
- ^ Hodgkinson p. 146.
- ^ Frashëri p. 344.
- ^ a b Frashëri p. 346.
- ^ a b c d Frashëri p. 348.
- ^ a b c Hodgkinson p. 147.
- ^ a b c Frashëri p. 349.
- ^ Frashëri p. 350.
- ^ Setton p. 194.
- ^ a b Frashëri p. 351.
- ^ a b Franco p. 320.
- ^ a b Hodgkinson p. 148.
- ^ a b Frashëri p. 352.
- ^ Hodgkinson p. 149.
- ^ a b Frashëri p. 356.
- ^ Hodgkinson p. 150.
- ^ Hodgkinson p. 151.
- ^ Sugar p. 67.
- ^ Setton p. 231.
- ^ Hodgkinson p. 220.
Bibliography
- Babinger, Franz (1978), Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time, Princeton University Press, ISBN 0-691-01078-1
- Elsie, Robert (2004), Historical Dictionary of Kosova, Scarecrow Press, ISBN 0-8108-5309-4
- Franco, Demetrio (1539), Comentario de le cose de' Turchi, et del S. Georgio Scanderbeg, principe d' Epyr, Altobello Salkato, ISBN 99943-1-042-9
- Frashëri, Kristo (2002), Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu: jeta dhe vepra, 1405–1468 (in Albanian), Botimet Toena, ISBN 99927-1-627-4
- ISBN 978-1-873928-13-4
- Runciman, Steven (1990), The Fall of Constantinople 1453, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-39832-0
- ISBN 978-0-87169-127-9
- Sugar, Peter (1983), Southeastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804, University of Washington Press, ISBN 0-295-96033-7