Haywood S. Hansell
Haywood S. Hansell | |
---|---|
Hilton Head, South Carolina | |
Buried | |
Allegiance | ![]() |
Service/ | ![]() |
Years of service | 1928–1946 1951–1955 |
Rank | ![]() |
Commands held | 3rd Bombardment Wing 1st Bombardment Wing XXI Bomber Command |
Battles/wars | World War II |
Awards | Distinguished Service Medal Silver Star Legion of Merit Distinguished Flying Cross Air Medal |
Haywood Shepherd Hansell Jr. (September 28, 1903 – November 14, 1988) was an American general officer in the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) during World War II, and later the United States Air Force. He became an advocate of the doctrine of strategic bombardment, and was one of the chief architects of the concept of daylight precision bombing that governed the use of airpower by the USAAF in the war.
Hansell played a key and largely unsung role in the strategic planning of air operations by the United States. This included drafting both the strategic air war plans (AWPD-1 and AWPD-42) and the plan for the
Hansell also held combat commands during the war, carrying out the very plans and doctrines he helped draft. He pioneered strategic bombardment of both Germany and Japan, as commander of the first
Childhood
Hansell was born in
Shortly after his birth, the family was stationed in
Education
Hansell entered Sewanee Military Academy, near Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 1916, where he acquired the lifelong nickname "Possum." Although his biographers offer a number of explanations behind the nickname, the most likely is that his facial features gave him the appearance of a possum.[8] At Sewanee he developed a fondness for English literature. As a senior Hansell rose to cadet captain and developed a reputation as a martinet. His harshness with the Corps of Cadets, combined with an excessive number of demerits acquired while the school was temporarily quartered in Jacksonville, Florida, following a fire, led to his reduction to cadet private.[5][9]
Partly as a result of this humiliation, Hansell declined an appointment to the
From 1924 to 1928 he attempted without success to find employment as a
Personality and family
Short in stature and slightly built, Hansell worked at being an athlete, becoming proficient in
While stationed at Langley Field, Virginia, Hansell met his wife, Dorothy "Dotta" Rogers, a teacher from Waco, Texas, where they were married in 1932. He fathered three children, son "Tony" (Haywood S. Hansell III, born in 1933), daughter Lucia (1940), and son Dennett (1941). While frequent absences, long working hours, and Hansell's autocratic nature severely stressed their marriage during World War II,[18] they remained married for 56 years until his death in 1988. Hansell's eldest son continued the family military tradition, graduating from the United States Military Academy in 1955, becoming a colonel in the United States Air Force,[nb 2] and marrying Olivia Twining, the daughter of General Nathan F. Twining.[19]
Early Air Corps career
Pursuit pilot
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a5/Roundel_of_the_United_States_%281919%E2%80%931941%29.svg/170px-Roundel_of_the_United_States_%281919%E2%80%931941%29.svg.png)
On February 23, 1928, Hansell was appointed a flying cadet. He completed primary and basic flying schools at
Hansell's first duty assignment was with the
In August 1931, Hansell was transferred to
Disciple of strategic airpower
Hansell was promoted to first lieutenant on October 1, 1934, and entered the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field as a student in the comprehensive 845-hour, 36-week course,[24] studying not only air tactics and airpower theory, which comprised more than half of the curriculum, but also tactics of other services, combined (joint) warfare, armament and gunnery, logistics, navigation and meteorology, staff duties, photography, combat orders, and antiaircraft defenses.[24] Among his instructors was Captain George, now director of the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy. George's classes were half lecture, half free discussion and conceptualizing, with George or his assistant Capt. Odas Moon expounding theories and having the students critically examine them for flaws and alternative ideas, debates that continued beyond the classroom as well.[25][26]
Making up the 59 members of his class were five majors, 40 captains, 13 first lieutenants including himself, and one second lieutenant. In addition to 49 Air Corps officers were four Army officers, one from each of that service's combat arms, two
Hansell became a member of a group known as the "
In September 1938, still a first lieutenant, Hansell entered the
After duty in the Public Relations Section, OCAC from July 1 to September 5, 1939, he became assistant Executive Officer, OCAC to Ira Eaker from September 6 to November 20, 1939. In November 1939 he created, with Major Thomas D. White, the Intelligence Section, Information Division, OCAC.[32] Hansell was its Officer in Charge, Air Corps Intelligence from November 21, 1939, to June 30, 1940; and its Chief, Operations Planning Branch, Foreign Intelligence Section from July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1941.[33] He was promoted to major on March 15, 1941.[34]
In the Air Intelligence Section, Hansell became responsible for setting up strategic air intelligence and analysis operations, creating three sections: analysis of foreign air forces and their doctrines, analysis of airfields worldwide including climate data, and preparation of target selection for major foreign powers. Much of the work was accomplished despite hindrance from the War Department's G-2 office, which felt that such analysis was not "proper military intelligence."[35] Development of sources of information for such analyses also was primitive, and he used his assignment to OPB to recruit a number of civilian economic experts who had recently been commissioned in the military. Hansell also created contacts among Royal Air Force officers stationed in Washington, D.C. to enhance his sources.[36]
On July 7, 1941, Hansell went to
AWPD-1
"It is far beyond my ability to adequately describe the frustrations, disappointments, fragile hopes, determination, and soaring zeal that were mixed in the cauldron to make AWPD-1 and the plans modifying it. The frantic efforts to meet deadlines, the disagreements, the uphill fight against entrenched and hostile opinion, the dedicated crusade for the new role of air power, the slumbering dread that we might be wrong—that we might persuade our leaders to take a path that would lead to disaster—put a heavy burden on all of us."
Haywood S. Hansell – The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir[38]
On July 12, 1941, Hansell, just returned from London, was recruited by Harold George to join the
Hansell's responsibility in the plan, designated AWPD–1, was information on German targets. Arnold had given George nine days to write the plan, which would be "Annex 2, Air Requirements" to "The Victory Program," a plan of strategic estimates involving the entire U.S. military.[42]
Beginning on August 4, 1941, they drew up the plan in accordance with strategic policies promulgated earlier that year, outlined in the
Hansell's contribution to the plan was based on a serious mistake, however. As had most observers, Hansell assumed that the Nazi economy was working at maximum capacity, when in fact it was still at 1938 levels of production, an error that led to an underestimation of the numbers of sorties, bomb tonnage, and time required for bombing to have a decisive effect.[45] However, a more significant error in planning, the omission of long-range fighter escorts for the bombers, seriously affected the strategic bombing campaign that later took place. Hansell deeply regretted the omission but noted that it reflected the best available information at the time on fighter aircraft capabilities, which was that any means then available to extend range would also seriously degrade a fighter's air combat performance.[45] Hansell wrote, "Failure to see this issue through proved one of the Air Corps Tactical School's major shortcomings."[46]
A lack of knowledge about the capability of radar to create an effective centralized early warning system also contributed to the over-reliance on the self-defense capabilities of bombers.[47] However Hansell also argued that ignorance of radar was fortuitous in the long run.[48] He surmised that had radar been a factor in making doctrine, many theorists would have reasoned that massed defenses would make all strategic air attacks too costly, inhibiting if not entirely suppressing the concepts that proved decisive in World War II and essential to the creation of the United States Air Force.[49]
World War II service
Planning duties
Following the entry of the United States into World War II, Hansell received a rapid series of promotions, to
Hansell, at the request of Major General
On August 26, 1942, he was recalled to USAAF Headquarters to head the planning team for AWPD–42, a revision of the air strategy plan in light of ongoing crises in the war, completing it in 11 days.[55] Even though the Navy rejected the plan outright (because it did not participate in its writing)[56] and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not accept it, presidential advisor Harry Hopkins recommended to Roosevelt that he follow the precepts unofficially, which was done.[57] Hansell then returned to England, where he was ironically tasked with diverting a large portion of the strategic bomber force to the Twelfth Air Force to support Operation Torch.[58]
Combat wing commander in Europe
On December 5, 1942, Hansell received his first combat command, the
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/97/B-17.jpg/220px-B-17.jpg)
Hansell commanded the 1st Wing during six critical months when the B-17 force, with only four inexperienced groups, struggled to prove itself. Among the combat doctrines that Hansell developed himself or approved were use of the defensive combat box formation, detailed mission standard operating procedures, and all aircraft bombing in unison with the lead bomber, each designed to improve bombing accuracy.[66]
Hansell recognized the most serious flaws in the daylight precision bombardment theory, that:
- Radar early warning and the lack of long-range escort fighters made deep penetration raids by massed bombers too costly to achieve strategic goals until a means of air superiority was attained, and that
- German industry, rather than being fragile and fixed, proved to be resilient and mobile.[67]
These factors later influenced his planning of similar daylight raids against Japan.
Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive"
United States Strategic Bombing Survey[68]
On March 23, 1943, he headed up a committee of USAAF and RAF commanders to draw up a plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO).[69] Despite the fact that it altered the target system priorities outlined in AWPD-42, and changed the overall goal of the offensive from knocking Germany out of the war using airpower to one of preparing for the invasion of Europe, Hansell approved the designation of the German aircraft industry as its most important target and the destruction of the German Luftwaffe as its top priority. Hansell wrote the final draft of the CBO plan himself. Although Hansell did not personally participate in later strategic bombing operations against Germany, he had been instrumental in setting in motion the plans and policies that led to the near total destruction of German war industry.[70]
He continued to fly combat missions at the same rate as his group commanders, with his final mission to
B-29 operations planning
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8c/B-29_Bomber_on_a_long_range_mission_in_late_1945.jpg/250px-B-29_Bomber_on_a_long_range_mission_in_late_1945.jpg)
In October 1943, General Hansell was appointed chief of the Combined and Joint Staff Division, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, located at Headquarters USAAF.
Hansell accompanied President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs aboard the
Hansell drew up the tactical doctrine, SOPs, and the
B-29 commander
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4b/Briefing_for_attack_on_Tokyo_November_1944.jpg/170px-Briefing_for_attack_on_Tokyo_November_1944.jpg)
On August 28, 1944, Arnold made Hansell commander of the XXI Bomber Command, despite misgivings among several senior leaders that while a superb staff officer, he did not have the "temperament" to be a combat commander. Aware of Arnold's legendary impatience, deputy AAF commander General Barney Giles, who was doubtful that Hansell could accomplish the task given him—setting up an effective air campaign in a brief period using an untried aircraft—obtained a commitment from Arnold that he would not relieve Hansell in only a few months.[80] However Hansell's tenure was threatened from the start because his replacement on the Air Staff, Major General Lauris Norstad, did not support the concept of daylight precision bombing,[81] instead advocating massive destruction of Japanese cities by firebombing, a tactic that had been promoted in AAF planning circles as early as November 1943. Fire raids on Japan were rapidly gaining widespread acceptance among AAF leaders, including Arnold, both to defeat Japan before an invasion was mounted and to satisfy a perception that the American public wanted revenge for three bloody years of war.[82] Hansell, however, opposed the tactic as both morally repugnant and militarily unnecessary.[83]
XXI Bomber Command arrived on
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/bc/29th_Bombardment_Group_North_Field_Guam_1945.jpg/220px-29th_Bombardment_Group_North_Field_Guam_1945.jpg)
High altitude daylight B-29 raids against the Japanese aircraft industry began November 24, 1944 with operation
On January 6, 1945, Norstad visited Hansell's headquarters and abruptly relieved him of command, replacing him with LeMay.[nb 14] Hansell was offered the option of commanding XX Bomber Command while it transitioned to Guam, then becoming LeMay's deputy.[91] Although he and LeMay were friends, LeMay had been Hansell's subordinate in England, and Hansell declined the offer.[92] While all the command problems factored into his relief, the main reasons were Hansell's persistence in daylight precision attacks, reluctance to night firebombing, Norstad's view that Hansell was an impediment to instituting incendiary attacks, and a perception by Arnold and Norstad that the public relations effort by XXI Bomber Command had been unsatisfactory in preparing the American public for such attacks.[93]
Hansell left Guam on January 21, 1945. Unknown at the time, his precision daylight attacks had succeeded, first in Japan's immediate and inefficient dispersion of its aircraft engine industry,[94] and later in terms of actual destruction caused by the final raid under his command.[95][96] A more immediate legacy of his command was his creation, in conjunction with the U.S. Navy, of an effective air-sea rescue system that saved half of all B-29 crews downed at sea in 1945.[97]
Impact on strategic doctrine
Hansell outlined an alternate strategy for defeating Japan, using precision bombing as its basis, that he believed would have also succeeded by November 1945 while obviating the need for area bombing using
"in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."
United States Strategic Bombing Survey[102]
Historian and Hansell biographer Dr. Charles Griffith concluded that Hansell sacrificed his command of the B-29 force and his later career on principle, adhering to the idea that precision rather than area bombing was not only more moral, but more effective as a strategy.
Conrad Crane took a somewhat different stance, arguing that despite the
Hansell lectured on the theory of precision air attack throughout his life, particularly at the
Retirement
Following his removal from command on Guam, Hansell at his own request received a B-29 training assignment on February 15, 1945, command of the 38th Flying Training Wing at
Hansell took early retirement due to a loss-of-hearing disability, retiring with the rank of brigadier general on December 31, 1946. He held positions as vice president of
He was recalled to active duty on July 15, 1951, by
Hansell worked for
Awards and decorations
Hansell's decorations include:
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U.S. Air Force Command Pilot Badge | ||
USAAF Technical Observer Badge | ||
Army Distinguished Service Medal
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Silver Star | Legion of Merit |
Distinguished Flying Cross | Air Medal | Army Commendation Medal
|
American Defense Service Medal | American Campaign Medal | campaign star
|
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal with bronze campaign star |
World War II Victory Medal
|
National Defense Service Medal |
Air Force Longevity Service Award
with four bronze oak leaf clusters |
Honorary Commander of the Order of the British Empire (United Kingdom)[112] |
Order of Merit of the Italian Republic degree unknown (Italy)[112] |
Notes
- Footnotes
- ^ According to Banning, p. 98, William Andrew Hansell was enrolled at LaGrange Military Academy when the 35th Alabama was formed from its faculty and cadets, and served as its adjutant and a lieutenant in Company B. He resigned in 1862 to become a captain of CSA Engineers.
- F-4 Phantom pilot with the 80th TFS in Japan. He followed in his father's footsteps by instructing at the Air Command and Staff College, and then holding staff positions in Strategy and Doctrine, with a tour as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff-Plans, Headquarters USAF. Col. Hansell retired in 1985 and died in 2004. General Hansell's granddaughter, Lt. Col. Jennifer T. (Hansell) Perry, a USAF Security Forcesofficer, is the seventh generation to serve in the military, fourth generation career officer, and third generation Air Force. Per West-Point.org and obituary, San Antonio Express-News, December 6, 2004.
- ^ Sometimes incorrectly seen as "Three Men on a Flying Trapeze".
- ^ The team in 1932 consisted of Chennault, Hansell, and Sgt. John H. "Luke" Williamson. When Hansell left the team, he was replaced by Sgt. William C. "Billy" McDonald. The two sergeants later became flight instructors in China.
- ^ Harold Lee George's reputation as a bombardment proponent was such that he was known in the service as "Bomber George" to distinguish him from Harold Huston George, a peer of nearly identical age and service experience, whose status as an ace during World War I and career in fighter units resulted in his moniker of "Pursuit George."
- ^ The future USMC generals were Lawson Sanderson, who commanded Pappy Boyington's air group in World War II, and future Director of Marine Aviation William J. Wallace. Wallace commanded all combat support aviation on Okinawa, including USAAF squadrons.
- ^ The 3rd Bombardment Wing was later redesignated the 98th Bomb Wing of the Ninth Air Force.
- ^ Hansell's predecessor was Laurence Kuter, who had been transferred to North Africa as part of "Torch".
- ^ Armstrong did not command the wing long, injured in a fire in his quarters in July.
- ^ The invasion, a pet project of CNO Admiral Ernest J. King, had tentatively been set for early 1946, if at all.
- ^ Strong resistance by the Japanese during the seizure of the Marianas and subsequent low construction priorities assigned by the Navy resulted in up to two months' delay in the deployment of two additional wings scheduled to begin operations in December 1944 and January 1945. (Craven and Cate, Vol. 5, pp. 515–522, 569)
- Robert C. Richardson, Jr., and by low priorities assigned to the buildup of Hansell's facilities in the Marianas by Nimitz's staff in favor of roads and naval installations, despite XXI BC being the only force on the islands conducting continuous combat operations. (Craven And Cate, Vol. 5, pp. 533–534, and 542).
- ^ Only one B-29 was lost on the mission, rammed in the tail by a damaged interceptor. (Craven and Cate, Vol. 5, p. 559).
- ^ Norstad and Hansell had worked closely together before Hansell's assignment to XXI BC and were personal friends. (Craven and Cate, Vol. 5, p. 567)
- ^ Fogerty, Historical Study 91, specifically states Williams Field, not Kirtland, as is often seen.
- Citations
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.25.
- ^ a b Griffith, The Quest, p.24.
- ^ Nash, Howard P (1904). Georgia Pi. S.A.E. p. 95. Retrieved May 31, 2009 – via Internet Archive.
georgia william andrew hansell.
{{cite book}}
:|work=
ignored (help) - ISBN 9780788411335. Retrieved May 31, 2009.
- ^ a b Benton, They Served Here, p.31.
- ^ a b Griffith, The Quest, p.26.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.26–27.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.23, quoting The Atlanta Journal-Constitution June 6, 1943.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.28.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.29.
- ^ "ANAK Graduates, 1920–1929". Retrieved June 2, 2009..
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.30–31.
- ^ a b c Benton, They Served Here, p.32.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.24 and 121.
- ^ a b Griffith, The Quest, p.34.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.91.
- ^ Morrison, Point of No Return, p.194.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.99–100, 131.
- ^ "National Aviation Hall of Fame: Nathan F. Twining". Retrieved June 2, 2009.
- ^ Fogerty, Robert P. (1953). "Biographical Data on Air Force General Officers, 1917-1952, Volume 1 – A thru L" (PDF). Air Force Historical Research Agency. pp. 752–756. USAF historical studies: no. 91. Archived (PDF) from the original on August 31, 2021. Retrieved November 9, 2021.
- ^ a b Griffith, The Quest, p.32.
- ^ Hansell, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, p.20.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.35.
- ^ a b Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, p.8.
- ^ Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, p.22.
- ^ Shiner, The Coming of the GHQ Air Force, p. 111.
- ^ Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, pp. 72–73.
- ^ a b Griffith, The Quest, p.46.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.47.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.57–58.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.58–62.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.60.
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan, p.25.
- ^ a b c d Fogerty, Historical Study 91.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.61.
- ^ a b Griffith, The Quest, p.63.
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir, p.24.
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir, p.112.
- ^ Hansell, Haywood S (1972). The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, Higgins-McArthur, p. 6.
- ^ Nalty, Reaction to the war in Europe, pp.187.
- ^ Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907–1960, p. 109.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.66.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.75.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.78.
- ^ a b c Griffith, The Quest, p.77.
- ^ Hansell,The Air Plan That Defeated Germany p.22.
- ^ Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, pp.63–65.
- ^ Greer, p.60.
- ^ Tate, The Army and its Air Corps, p. 163.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.83.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.84–85.
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir, p.57.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.92.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.93–94.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.95.
- ^ Watson, George M, Jr. (1997). "Building Air Power", Winged Shield, Winged Sword, p.234.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.99.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.100.
- ^ Maurer, Combat Units, p. 414.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.102.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.103.
- ^ Maurer, Combat Units, p. 374.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.106.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.111.
- ^ Freeman, The Mighty Eighth, p. 23.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.108–109.
- ^ Miller, Masters of the Air, pp. 40 and 144.
- ^ "United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War) 30 September 1945". Hyper-War. Retrieved July 14, 2008.
- ^ Hansell,The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, p. 157
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.117–118.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.118.
- ^ Benton, They Served Here, p. 33.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.130.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.131–132.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.133.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.134.
- ^ Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagaski, June 1944 to August 1945, p. 19.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.140–143.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.146.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.155.
- ^ Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagaski, June 1944 to August 1945, p. 104.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.151, 169, and 182.
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan, p.270.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.160-162, 190.
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir, p.181.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.172.
- ^ Frisbee, John L. (1983). "Valor: the Loneliness of Command". AIR FORCE Magazine. 66 (July). Retrieved January 13, 2011.
- ^ Nalty, Victory over Japan, pp.350.
- ^ Morrison, Point of No Return, p.201.
- ^ Morrison, Point of No Return, p.150.
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir, p.214.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.189.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.192–193.
- ^ United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War) Government Printing Office (1946), p.16.
- ^ a b Morrison, Point of No Return, p.199.
- ^ Nalty, "Victory over Japan", p.351.
- ^ Nalty, "Victory over Japan", p.353.
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir, pp.268–270.
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir, pp.264.
- ^ Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power, p.309
- ^ Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir, p.270
- ^ "United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War) 1 July 1946". Hyper-War. Retrieved July 15, 2008.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.193 and 199.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.204.
- ^ a b Griffith, The Quest, p.205.
- ^ Crane, p.157.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.209.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.195.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, pp.207–208.
- ^ "Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr". U.S. Air Force. Retrieved July 1, 2014.
- ^ Griffith, The Quest, p.208.
- ^ a b c Fowler, Glenn (November 16, 1988). "Haywood Hansell Jr. Dies at 85; Supervised World War II Bombing". New York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2009.
References
- Benton, Jeffrey C. (1999). They Served Here: Thirty-Three Maxwell Men. ISBN 1-58566-074-4.
- Crane, Conrad C. (1993). Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II. ISBN 0-7006-1103-7.
- Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James Lea, eds. (1953). The Army Air Forces in World War II Volume V: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagaski, June 1944 to August 1945. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Freeman, Roger A. (1993). The Mighty Eighth. ISBN 0-87938-638-X.
- Futrell, Robert F. (1989). Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907–1960, Vol. I. Air University Press. ISBN 1-58566-029-9.
- Griffith, Charles (1999). The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II. ISBN 1-58566-069-8. Archived from the originalon November 1, 2013. Retrieved October 31, 2013.
- Hansell, Haywood S. (1986). The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir. ISBN 0-912799-39-0.
- Hansell, Jr, Haywood S. (1972). The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler. Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur/Longino and Porter. ISBN 0-405-12178-4. Retrieved July 14, 2008.
- Maurer, Maurer (1983). Air Force Combat Units of World War II. Office of Air Force History. ISBN 0-912799-02-1
- Miller, Donald (2007). Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-7432-3544-0.
- Morrison, Wilbur H. (1979). Point of No Return: The Story of the 20th Air Force. Times Books. ISBN 978-0-8129-0738-4.
- Nalty, Bernard C. (1997). "Reaction to the war in Europe". Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force. Vol. I. ISBN 0-16-049009-X.
- Nalty, Bernard C. (1997). "Victory over Japan". Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force. Vol. I. ISBN 0-16-049009-X.
- Sherry, Michael S. (1989). The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-04414-3.
- Shiner, John F. (1997). "The Coming of the GHQ Air Force". Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force. Vol. I. ISBN 0-16-049009-X.
- Tate, Dr. James P. (1998). The Army and its Air Corps: Army Policy Toward Aviation 1919–1941. ISBN 0-16-061379-5.
- USAF Historical Studies
- No. 89: Greer, Thomas H. (1985). The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917–1941 (PDF). Maxwell Air Force Base: Center For Air Force History. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 13, 2013. Retrieved November 10, 2010.
- No. 91: Fogerty, Dr Robert O. (1953). Biographical Data on Air Force General Officers 1917–1952 (PDF). Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University. Retrieved October 20, 2006.
- No. 100: Finney, Robert T. (1955). History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920–1940 (PDF). Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University. Retrieved March 9, 2009.