Kataeb Regulatory Forces

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Kataeb Regulatory Forces
قوات الكتائب النظامية
LeadersWilliam Hawi, Bachir Gemayel, Amine Gemayel
Dates of operation1961–1980
Group(s)Kataeb Party, Lebanese Front
HeadquartersAchrafieh, Karantina (Beirut), Bikfaya
Size15,000 fighters
AlliesLebanon Lebanese Army
Army of Free Lebanon (AFL)
Guardians of the Cedars (GoC)
Tyous Team of Commandos (TTC)
Al-Tanzim
Tigers Militia
Marada Brigade
Lebanese Youth Movement (MKG)
Israel Israel Defense Forces (IDF) (Until 1982)
OpponentsLebanon Lebanese National Movement (LNM)
Tigers Militia
Marada Brigade
Lebanese Arab Army (LAA)
Amal Movement
Lebanon Lebanese Army
State of Palestine Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
State of Palestine Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)
Syria Syrian Army
Battles and warsLebanese Civil War (1975–1990)
Preceded by
8,000 fighters

The Kataeb Regulatory Forces – KRF (

Tel al-Zaatar
.

Origins

Bashir Gemayel and William Hawi supervising the training of Kataeb militiamen at Tabrieh, 1972.

The Phalange party militia was not only the largest and best organized political paramilitary force in

Lebanese-American glass industrialist, who led them during the 1958 civil war. Fighting alongside the pro-government forces in support of President Camille Chamoun,[1] the Phalangists defended the Matn District, a traditional Phalangist stronghold centered at the town of Bikfaya – the Gemayel family's feudal seat –, and kept the main roads connecting Beirut to that territory open, where the Gemayels held numerous commercial interests.[2][3]

Disbanded in January 1961 by order of the Kataeb Party's Political Bureau, Hawi created in their place the Kataeb Regulatory Forces. In order to coordinate the activities of all Phalange paramilitary forces, the Political Bureau set up the Kataeb War Council (

Maghaweer) and a "Combat School" was secretly opened at Tabrieh in the Keserwan District;[3]
another special unit, the "Bashir Gemayel brigade" – named after Pierre Gemayel's youngest son, Bashir – was formed in the following year, absorbing the old PG company in the process.

Military structure and organization

William Hawi with KRF junior commander Amine Gemayel at Tel al-Zaatar, 1976.

By April 1975 the Kataeb Regulatory Forces (KRF) were able to muster 5,000 militiamen, a total which included 2,000 full-time uniformed fighters backed by some 3,000 irregulars, originally armed with obsolete firearms. However, some sources place the total of RF fighters higher, around 8,000,

Greek-Catholics and Armenians
in its ranks.

The KRF was re-organized and expanded in May 1975, and new specialized units were raised – a Signals battalion (Arabic: Silah al-Ishara), an armoured battalion (a.k.a. 2nd Armoured Battalion; Arabic: Silah al-Moudara'a) led by Joseph Elias, a battalion-sized women's section (Arabic: Nizamiyyat) led by Jocelyne Khoueiry, and an artillery group (Arabic: Silah al-Madfa'aiya) led by Antoine Bridi.[6] To maintain law and order in the areas under Phalangist control at Beirut and elsewhere, in 1976 a 1,000-strong Police unit, the Kataeb Security Detachments or "Sections Kataeb de Securité" (SKS) in French was formed and commanded by Raymond Assayan. The Phalangists practiced conscription in the areas they controlled, drafting eligible young men to swell its ranks,[7] and by January 1976 the KRF had increased to 10,000–15,000 men and women, this number including civilian recruits and deserters from the Lebanese Army.[8] According to other sources, the KRF regular forces comprised more than 3,000 full-time uniformed fighters by mid-1978.[6]

KRF militia units operated mainly in

Druze militias – played a key part in the formation on 21 October 1976 of the Israeli-backed informal "Army for the Defense of South Lebanon" or ADSL (French: Armée de Défense du Liban-Sud or ADLS),[9] later to become known as the "Free Lebanese Army" (FLA), the predecessor of the South Lebanon Army (SLA).[10]

After Hawi was killed in action at Tel al-Zaatar by a Palestinian sniper on 13 July 1976, he was replaced by

Lebanese Forces.[11][12][13][3] On August that year, he moved the Kataeb War Council from the Kataeb Party's offices in Achrafieh to his new Headquarters situated in an abandoned hospital at the Karantina neighborhood located east of the Port of Beirut.[14]

List of KRF Commanders

KRF junior commanders

Other KRF personnel

Weapons and equipment

Prior to the war, the Kataeb militia initially received covert support from the Lebanese Army, Egypt and Jordan, and from well-connected right-wing sympathisers in Spain, France, Belgium, Britain, and West Germany. Weapons were procured in the international black market or directly from eastern bloc countries, namely Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; from January 1976 onwards they were secretly financed and armed by Israel, though they also received some aid from Syria. The collapse of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in January 1976, coupled by the massive influx of Israeli military aid, enabled the KRF to be re-equipped with a variety of modern small-arms and heavy weapons seized from LAF barracks and ISF Police stations or supplied by the Israelis.[16] Besides providing training, weapons and ammunition, the Lebanese Army also lent to the KRF sophisticated mobile communications equipment.[17]

Small-arms

Phalangist militiamen were provided with a variety of small arms, comprising

Zastava M70, Chinese Type 56, Romanian Pistol Mitralieră model 1963/1965
, Bulgarian AKK/AKKS and former East German MPi-KMS-72 assault rifles).

Several models of handguns were used, including

MAB PA-15, Star 30M, and Star A, B, B Super and P pistols
.

Squad weapons consisted of

rocket launchers, whilst crew-served and indirect fire weapons comprised M29 81mm light mortars, plus B-10 82mm, B-11 107mm and M40A1 106mm recoilless rifles (often mounted on technicals). Soviet PTRS-41 14.5mm anti-tank rifles
were used for heavy sniping.

Armoured and transport vehicles

A predominately light infantry force, the KRF raised early in 1975 a mechanized corps made of

Sport utility vehicles (SUV), Chevrolet C-20 Scottsdale light pickup trucks, GAZ-66,[29] Chevrolet C-50 medium-duty, Dodge F600 medium-duty and GMC C4500 medium-duty trucks, and GMC C7500 heavy-duty cargo trucks;[27] a number of Chevrolet/GMC G-Series third generation vans were used as military ambulances.[30]

The Phalangists' own modest armored force of five homebuilt armored cars employed in October 1975 at the

armored personnel carriers,[28] Panhard AML-90 armored cars,[38][39][27][40][41][42] Staghound armoured cars,[43][44][45][46] and Cadillac Gage V-100 Commando cars.[38][47]
This enabled the quick expansion of the KRF armoured corps to brigade strength, further augmented by a consignment of twenty ex-Israeli
M3/M9 Zahlam half-tracks, plus a number of BTR-152 APCs captured from the Syrians or supplied by Israel.[52][53][54]

Artillery

Their artillery corps was equally expanded after obtaining a number of British QF Mk III 25 Pounder field guns,[27][55] French Mle 1950 BF-50 155mm howitzers, Soviet M1938 (M-30) 122 mm howitzers, British Bofors 40mm L/60 anti-aircraft guns[26][28] and Soviet AZP S-60 57mm anti-aircraft guns.[56] Soviet ZPU (ZPU-1, ZPU-2, ZPU-4) 14.5mm,[30] Yugoslav Zastava M55 20mm[30][55] and ZU-23-2 23mm AA autocannons (mostly mounted on technicals and heavier transport trucks)[28] were employed in the direct fire support role. In addition to field artillery and AA autocannons, the KRF also employed SNEB 68mm (2.7-inch) unguided rocket projectiles fired from locally-built eight-tube Multiple rocket launchers installed on Technicals.[57][58] These artillery pieces and rocket systems were either seized from LAF stocks, acquired on the black market or even provided by Israel and Syria.[52]

Administrative organization and illegal activities

Marounistan stretched from East Beirut to Bcharre.

The Phalange was the first Lebanese faction to carve out its own

Canton in late 1976, designated variously as the East Beirut canton, "Christian Country", "Maronite enclave" or "Marounistan". Covering a surface of 2,000 square kilometers, the Canton comprised the Matn District, most of the Keserwan District, along with East Beirut, and the coastal districts of Jounieh, Amsheet, Byblos and parts of Batroun.[59]

Considered by many analysts as the best organized of all militia "fiefs" in the whole of Lebanon, it was administrated by a network of Phalangist-controlled business corporations headed by "Chef" Boutros Khawand, which included the GAMMA Group brain-trust, the DELTA computer company, and the SONAPORT holding. The latter run since 1975 the legal commercial ports of Jounieh and Beirut, including the infamous clandestine "Dock Five" (French: Cinquième basin), near the Karantina KRF's HQ, from which the Phalange extracted additional revenues by levying illegal taxes and carried out drug-trafficking and arms-smuggling operations.[60][61][62]

The Canton was also served by a clandestine-built airstrip, the

Pierre Gemayel International Airport, opened in 1976 at Hamat, north of Batroun,[63] and had its own radio station, "The Voice of Lebanon" (Arabic
: Iza'at Sawt Loubnan) or "La Voix du Liban" (VDL) in French, set up in that same year.

Controversy

William Hawi with Kataeb militiamen at Tel al-Zaatar, 1976.

Stubborn and ruthless fighters with a reputation for

Bashir Gemayel ambushed a PLO funeral cortege heading for Damascus when it passed through the Christian village of Kahale in the Aley District, killing ten people and wounding an even greater number, mostly Palestinians.[65][66][67]

Apart from being implicated in the early

East Beirut[71][72][73][74]
and drove 50,000 others out between December 1975 and January 1976.

During July–August of that same year, the Phalangists participated alongside its allies, the

Tel al-Zaatar at the Muslim-populated slum districts and adjacent Palestinian refugee camps of East Beirut, and at the town of Dbayeh in the Matn District.[75][76]

The Kataeb RF was equally involved in atrocities committed against rival Christian militias' and their leaders, namely the

Furn esh Shebbak and Ain el-Rammaneh districts in East Beirut, and for the town of Akoura in the Byblos District.[81]

Sporadic clashes with the Lebanese government military and security forces also occurred. During the blockade of Tel al-Zaatar on 11 January 1976, KRF militiamen fired on a Lebanese Army relief convoy that was trying to enter the camp, killing two regular soldiers.

East Beirut and forced a hasty withdrawal of all Army units from the area.[84][85]

The KRF in the 1975–76 Civil War

During the 1975–76 phase of the Lebanese Civil War, the Kataeb Regulatory Forces' own mobilization and street action skills allowed the Phalangists to become the primary and most fearsome fighting force in the Christian-conservative camp.[86][3] In Beirut and elsewhere, Phalange' militia sections were heavily committed in several battles against Lebanese National Movement (LNM) leftist militias and suffered considerable casualties,[16] notably at the Battle of the Hotels in October 1975[87][88] where they fought the Al-Mourabitoun and the Nasserite Correctionist Movement (NCM), and later at the "Spring Offensive" held against Mount Lebanon in March 1976.[89]

In January 1976, the

Syrian military intervention of June 1976 and better coordinate the military operations of their respective militias, Christian militia leaders agreed to form on 31 August that year a joint military command (a.k.a. the "Command Council") whose new collective name was the 'Lebanese Forces'.[90][91]

Reversals and re-organization 1977–79

From the very beginning, it became clear that the Lebanese Front's Command Council was dominated by the

Bashir Gemayel,[3] who sought to unify the various Christian militias by using the LF to build a new power base for himself, distinct from that of the Phalange or any of the other traditional rightist parties.[92] From 1977 Bashir implemented the controversial "unification of the rifle" policy, on which his KRF units destroyed those smaller militias who had refused to be absorbed voluntarily into the new structure, though not without factional quarreling and setbacks.[93]

The Phalangists' failure to absorb or destroy the rival

Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADLP or Ramgavar Party) and the Armenian Social Democratic Party (ASDP or Hunchak Party) – remained fiercely neutral and successfully rebuffed any attempts to be incorporated into the LF, even though the KRF kept them under strong pressure by shelling the Armenian-populated quarters of Bourj Hammoud, Camp Marash and Nabaa in East Beirut.[96]

In between, the KRF lent discreet backing to the

East Beirut.[98]

Consolidation and dissolution 1980–81

Notwithstanding the heavy blow inflicted by the Koura disaster on the Phalangists' political and military prestige, their unification policy continued unabated. In July 1980

Lebanese Forces (LF) militia as the dominant Christian force.[3]

Force 75

The Force 75 (

East Beirut
, participating in the final phase of the Tel al-Zaatar battle on July–August 1976.

Commanded by Sami Khoueiry, former head of the "Bashir Gemayel Brigade",[102] and headquartered at the upper Matn town of Jdeideh, the militia was directly dependent of the Phalange regional committee headed by Amine Gemayel and enjoyed a considerable autonomy from the KRF War Council in Beirut.[13]

Raised in 1975–76 with material help from the

Lebanese Army and trained by the then Colonel Ibrahim Tannous,[103] the Force 75 was financed by a small network of private business companies that included the ASU, colloquially known as the "Amin Special Unit" (Arabic: وحدة أمين الخاصة | Wahdat 'Amin al-Khasa), which excelled in extracting revenues from local traders in the form of paid services and protection rackets.[102]

By December 1980, the Force 75 aligned 3,000 uniformed fighters

Heavy machine-guns, recoilless rifles and AA autocannons
. That same month, however, the militia was forcibly disarmed by the newly constituted Lebanese Forces (LF) on Bashir's orders and in January 1981 its members were absorbed into the LF structure.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Rabinovich, The war for Lebanon (1989), p. 62.
  2. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 36.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g Tony Badran, Lebanon's Militia Wars in Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (2009), p. 38.
  4. ^ El-Kazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon (2000), p. 303.
  5. ^ Saghieh, Ta'rib al-Kata'eb al-Lubnaniyya: al-Hizb, al-sulta, al-khawf (1991), p. 163.
  6. ^ a b c Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 48.
  7. ^ Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 239.
  8. ^ McGowan, Roberts, Abu Khalil, and Scott Mason, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 157.
  9. ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975–1985) (2012), p. 43.
  10. ^ "Chamussy (René) – Chronique d'une guerre: Le Liban 1975–1977 – éd. Desclée – 1978". 17 June 2012.
  11. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 52.
  12. ^ Rabinovich, The war for Lebanon (1989), p. 64.
  13. ^ a b Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 45.
  14. ^ Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 46.
  15. ^ "La Confession négative". 14 February 2009.
  16. ^ a b c Rabinovich, The war for Lebanon (1989), p. 63.
  17. ^ Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military operations in selected Lebanese built-up areas (1979), pp. 42–45.
  18. ^
    Shotgun News
    .
  19. ^ a b c d e f g h "Lebanese Forces : The Weapons: Sub Machine Guns (SMG)". 3 March 2016. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 23 November 2022.
  20. ^ McNab, Soviet Submachine Guns of World War II: PPD-40, PPSh-41 and PPS (2014), p. 68.
  21. ^ Thompson, The G3 Battle Rifle (2019), p. 29.
  22. ^ Rottman, US Grenade Launchers – M79, M203, and M320 (2017), p. 22.
  23. ^ Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2003), p. 26.
  24. ^ Kassis, Véhicules Militaires au Liban/Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2012), p. 60.
  25. ^ Neville, Technicals: Non-Standard Tactical Vehicles from the Great Toyota War to modern Special Forces (2018), p. 14.
  26. ^ a b c d Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2003), p. 30.
  27. ^ a b c d e Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2003), p. 28.
  28. ^ a b c d Kassis, Véhicules Militaires au Liban/Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2012), p. 57.
  29. ^ Kassis, Invasion of Lebanon 1982 (2019), p. 248.
  30. ^ a b c Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2003), p. 27.
  31. ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 32.
  32. ^ Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2003), pp. 28–29.
  33. ^ Sex & Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), p. 80.
  34. ^ Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military operations in selected Lebanese built-up areas (1979), Appendix D, D-4.
  35. ^ Zaloga, Armour of the Middle East Wars 1948–78 (1981), pp. 33; 39, Plate G1.
  36. ^ Kassis, Véhicules Militaires au Liban/Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2012), pp. 40; 59.
  37. ^ Sex & Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), p. 64.
  38. ^ a b Zaloga, Armour of the Middle East Wars 1948–78 (1981), p. 33.
  39. ^ Hamizrachi, The Emergence of South Lebanon Security Belt (1984), pp. 55–89.
  40. ^ Badran, Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (2010), pp. 50–52.
  41. ^ Kassis, Véhicules Militaires au Liban/Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2012), pp. 56–58.
  42. ^ "LEBANON ... Scale 1/35: PANHARD IN TALL EL-ZAATAR". 7 May 2009.
  43. ^ a b Kassis, 30 Years of Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2003), p. 29.
  44. ^ Fortin, T17E1 Staghound Armored Car – Le char sur roues, Trucks & Tracks Magazine (2007–2008), pp. 62–63; 65.
  45. ^ Sex & Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), pp. 59–60.
  46. ^ "Staghound crusader des kataeb au 1/72". tsahal.miniature.pagesperso-orange.fr.
  47. ^ Kassis, Véhicules Militaires au Liban/Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2012), pp. 54–55.
  48. ^ Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military operations in selected Lebanese built-up areas (1979), Appendix D, D-3.
  49. ^ Zaloga, Armour of the Middle East Wars 1948–78 (1981), pp. 33; 39–40, Plate H1.
  50. ^ Kassis, Véhicules Militaires au Liban/Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2012), p. 62.
  51. ^ Sex & Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), p. 63.
  52. ^ a b Pepin, Steelmasters magazine 113 (2012), p. 24.
  53. ^ Kassis, Véhicules Militaires au Liban/Military Vehicles in Lebanon (2012), pp. 58–60.
  54. ISSN 1957-4193
    , p. 79.
  55. ^ a b Cooper & Santana, Lebanese Civil War Volume 1: Palestinian diaspora, Syrian and Israeli interventions, 1970-1978 (2019), p. 50.
  56. ^ Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military operations in selected Lebanese built-up areas (1979), pp. 16–21, 32–36, 52; Appendix A, A-10, Table 3; Appendix D, D-5.
  57. ^ Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military operations in selected Lebanese built-up areas (1979), Appendix A, table A-11.
  58. ^ Cooper & Sandler, Lebanese Civil War Volume 2: Quiet before the Storm, 1978-1981 (2021), p. 16; Plate i.
  59. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 57.
  60. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), pp. 58–59.
  61. ^ Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 47.
  62. ^ Traboulsi, Identités et solidarités croisées dans les conflits du Liban contemporain; Chapitre 12: L'économie politique des milices: le phénomène mafieux (2007), parte III.
  63. ^ Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (2001), p. 179.
  64. ^ Randall, The Tragedy of Lebanon (2012), pp. 133–134.
  65. ^ Arab World, 26–27 March (1970), pp. 3 and 2–3.
  66. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 47.
  67. ^ Randall, The Tragedy of Lebanon (2012), p. 116.
  68. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 48.
  69. ^ Kassir, La Guerre du Liban: De la dissension nationale au conflit régional (1994), p. 103.
  70. ^ Kassir, La Guerre du Liban: De la dissension nationale au conflit régional (1994), p. 134.
  71. ^ Randal, The Tragedy of Lebanon (2012), pp. 84–87.
  72. ^ Brunnquell & Couderc, Joseph Saadé: Victime et Bourreau. (1994), pp. 117–119.
  73. ^ Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State (1998), p. 371.
  74. ^ Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (2001), p. 79.
  75. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), pp. 49–52.
  76. ^ "The Facts: AG and Tal el Za3tar – Page 2 – the Orange Room – forum.tayyar.org". forum.tayyar.org. Archived from the original on 27 July 2011. Retrieved 6 June 2022.
  77. ^ Katz, Russel, and Volstad, Armies in Lebanon (1985), p. 8.
  78. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), pp. 55; 58.
  79. ^ Hoy and Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception (1990), p. 302.
  80. ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 79; 100.
  81. ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 90.
  82. ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 43.
  83. ^ Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975–1985) (2012), p. 62.
  84. ^ Kechichian, The Lebanese Army: Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980s (1985), p. 25.
  85. ^ Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 122.
  86. ^ Abraham, The Lebanon war (1996), p. 195.
  87. ^ Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military operations in selected Lebanese built-up areas (1979), p. 6.
  88. ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 29.
  89. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 50.
  90. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), pp. 52–55.
  91. ^ Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), pp. 45–46.
  92. ^ Rabinovich, The war for Lebanon (1989), p. 71.
  93. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), pp. 53–55.
  94. ^ Mardelli, Middle East Perspectives: From Lebanon (2012), p. 390.
  95. ^ "MP Keyrouz slams OTV's program on Ehden massacre". Now Lebanon. 16 June 2008. Archived from the original on 24 June 2018. Retrieved 9 April 2013.
  96. ^ Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), p. 166.
  97. ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 72–73.
  98. ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 82–83.
  99. ^ Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), p. 58.
  100. ^ O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 103.
  101. ^ Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), pp. 53–54.
  102. ^ a b Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 51.
  103. ^ Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 57.
  104. ^ Menargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 56.

References

Further reading

External links
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