Naval operations in the Dardanelles campaign
Naval operations in the Dardanelles campaign | |||||||
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The final moments of the French battleship Bouvet, 18 March 1915 | |||||||
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The naval operations in the Dardanelles campaign (17 February 1915 – 9 January 1916) took place against the
The naval operations were defeated by the Ottoman defenders, mainly through use of naval mines. The Allies conducted the Gallipoli campaign, a land invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula to eliminate the Ottoman artillery along the straits before resuming naval operations. The Allies also passed submarines through the Dardanelles to attack Ottoman shipping in the Sea of Marmara.
Background
Dardanelles Strait
The mouth of the strait is 2.3 mi (3.7 km) wide with a rapid current emptying from the Black Sea into the Aegean. The distance from Cape Helles to the Sea of Marmara is about 41 mi (66 km), overlooked by the heights on the Gallipoli peninsula and lower hills on the Asiatic shore. The passage widens for 5 mi (8.0 km) to Eren Keui Bay, the widest point of the strait at 4.5 mi (7.2 km), then narrows for 11 mi (18 km) to Kephez Point, where the waterway is 1.75 mi (2.82 km) wide and then broadens as far as Sari Sighlar Bay. The narrowest part of the strait is 14 mi (23 km) upstream, from Chanak to Kilid Bahr at 1,600 yd (1,500 m), where the channel turns north and widens for 4 mi (6.4 km) to Nagara Point. From the point, the passage turns north-east for the final 23 mi (37 km) to the Sea of Marmara. The Ottomans used the term "fortress" to describe the sea defences of the Dardanelles on both sides of the waterway from the Aegean approaches to Chanak. In 1914 only the defences from the entrance of the straits and 4 mi (6.4 km) from the north end of Kephez Bay to Chanak had been fortified. Until late October 1914, the nature of the seaward defences of the Dardanelles was known to the British and French but after hostilities commenced, information on improvements to the Ottoman fortifications became harder to obtain.[1]
Ottoman entry into the war
At the beginning of the 20th century, the
On 2 August, the British requisitioned the modern battleships Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel and Reşadiye which British shipyards had been building for the Ottoman Navy, alienating pro-British elements. The German government offered SMS Goeben and SMS Breslau as replacements. In the Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau, the ships escaped when the Ottoman government opened the Dardanelles to them, despite international law requiring a neutral party to block military shipping.[8] In September, the British naval mission to the Ottomans was recalled and Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon of the Imperial German Navy took command of the Ottoman navy.[9] The German naval presence, and the success of the German armies, gave the pro-German faction in the Ottoman government enough influence to declare war on Russia.[10]
Closure of the Dardanelles
In October 1914, following an incident on 27 September, when the British Dardanelles squadron had seized an Ottoman torpedo boat, the German commander of the Dardanelles fortifications ordered the passage closed, adding to the impression that the Ottomans were pro-German.
A British naval squadron bombarded the Dardanelles outer defensive forts at Kum Kale and Seddulbahir; a shell hit a magazine and the explosion knocked the guns off their mounts and killed 86 soldiers. Britain and France declared war on Turkey on 5 November and the Ottomans declared a jihad (holy war) later that month.
Prelude
Allied strategy
Field Marshal
In November 1914, the French Minister
On 11 January 1915, the commander of the British Mediterranean Squadron,
Dardanelles defences
In August 1914, the Outer Defences were two fortresses at the end of the Gallipoli peninsula and two on the Asiatic shore. The forts had 19 guns, four with a range of 9 mi (14 km) and the remainder with ranges of 3.4–4.5 mi (5.5–7.2 km). Four field howitzers were dug in at Tekke Burnu (Cape Tekke) on the European side, then for the next 10 mi (16 km), there was a gap until the Intermediate Defences at Kephez Point, with four defensive works on the south shore and one on the north shore. The fortresses had been built to cover a minefield, which in August 1914 was a line of mines across the strait from Kephez Point to the European shore. Fort Dardanos was the main work which had two new 6-inch naval guns and the rest contained ten small quick-firing guns with shields. At the Narrows, the Inner Defences had the heaviest guns and some mobile light howitzers and field guns. Five forts had been built on the European side and six on the Asian side with 72 heavy and medium guns. Most of the artillery was obsolescent but there were five long-range 14 in (360 mm) guns with a range of 9.7 mi (15.6 km) and three 9.4 in (240 mm) guns with a 8.5 mi (13.7 km) range. The remainder of the guns in the Inner Defences were mostly obsolete and unable to shoot beyond 5.7 mi (9.2 km).[27]
Of the 100 guns in the pre-war defences, only 14 were modern long-range pieces, the rest being old-fashioned breech loaders on fixed carriages. The gunners were poorly trained, there was little ammunition and scant prospect of replacement. Night illumination consisted of a searchlight at entrance to the Straits and one at the Narrows. The forts were easily visible, there were few gun shields and other protective features for the gun-crews and range-finding, artillery observation and fire-control depended on an telephones linked by wire on telephone poles, vulnerable to artillery-fire.[28] The Ottoman official historian wrote,
On mobilisation, the fortification and armament of the Dardanelles was very inadequate. Not only were the majority of the guns of old pattern, with a slow rate of fire and short range, but their ammunition supply was also limited.
— Ottoman Official History[28]
Ottoman strategy
The Germans secured the appointment of Lieutenant-General Erich Weber as an advisor to the Ottoman GHQ and at the end of August 1914, Vice-Admiral Guido von Usedom, several specialists and 500 men were sent to reinforce the forts on the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. In September, Usedom was made Inspector-General of Coast Defences and Mines and Vice-Admiral Johannes Merten relieved Weber at Chanak with a marine detachment to operate the modern guns. By mid-September, the German advisers reported that the guns in the Narrows had been refurbished and were serviceable. By October, most of the guns in the main batteries had German crews, operating as training units but able to man the guns in an emergency. Plans were made to build more defensive works in the Intermediate Zone and to bring in mobile howitzers and quick-firers dismounted from older Ottoman ships. Several heavy howitzers arrived in October but the poor standard of training of the Ottoman gunners, obsolete armaments and the chronic ammunition shortage, which Usedom reported was sufficient only to defend against one serious attack, led him to base the defence of the straits on minefields.[29]
Three more lines of mines had been laid before Usedom arrived and another 145 mines were searched out, serviced and laid in early November. Cover of the minefields was increased with small quick-firers and four more searchlights. By March 1915, there were ten lines of mines and 12 searchlights. When the Ottoman Empire went to war on 29 October 1914, the defences of the Straits had been much improved but the Intermediate Defences were still inadequately organised and lacking in guns, searchlights and mines. On 3 November, the outer forts were bombarded by Allied ships, which galvanised the Ottoman defenders into reducing their obstructionism against the German advisers. The fortress commander, Jevad Pasha, wrote later that he had to improve the defences at all costs. The short bombardment had been extraordinarily successful, destroying the forts at Sedd el Bahr with two shots, that exploded the magazine and dismounted the guns. The Ottoman and German defenders concluded that the Outer Defences could be demolished by ships firing from beyond the range of the Ottoman reply. The forts were repaired but not reinforced and the main effort was directed to protecting the minefield and Inner Defences.[30]
Forcing the straits
On 3 November 1914, Churchill ordered an attack on the Dardanelles following the opening of hostilities between Ottoman and Russian empires. The battlecruisers of the Mediterranean Squadron, HMS Indomitable and Indefatigable and the obsolete French battleships Suffren and Vérité, attacked before a formal declaration of war had been made by Britain against the Ottoman Empire. The attack was to test the Ottoman defences and in a twenty-minute bombardment, a shell struck the magazine of the fort at Sedd el Bahr, dismounting ten guns and killing 86 Ottoman soldiers. Total casualties during the attack were 150, of which forty were German. The effect of the bombardment alerted the Ottomans to the importance of strengthening their defences and they began laying more mines.[31]
The outer defences lay at the entrance to the straits, vulnerable to bombardment and raiding but the inner defences covered the Narrows near Çanakkale. Beyond the inner defences, the straits were virtually undefended but the defence of the straits depended on ten minefields, with 370 mines laid near the Narrows. On 19 February 1915, two destroyers were sent in to probe the straits and the first shot was fired from Kumkale by the 240 mm (9.4 in) Krupp guns of the Orhaniye Tepe battery at 07:58. The battleships HMS Cornwallis and Vengeance moved in to engage the forts and Cornwallis opened fire at 09:51.[32] The effect of the long-range bombardment was considered disappointing and that it would take direct hits on guns to knock them out. With limited ammunition, indirect fire was insufficient and direct fire would need the ships to be anchored to make stable gun platforms. Ottoman casualties were reported as several men killed on the European shore and three men at Orkanie.[33][34]
On 25 February the Allies attacked again, the Ottomans evacuated the outer defences and the fleet entered the straits to engage the intermediate defences. Demolition parties of Royal Marines raided the Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale forts, meeting little opposition. On 1 March, four battleships bombarded the intermediate defences but little progress was made clearing the minefields. The minesweepers, commanded by the
Queen Elizabeth was called on to engage the inner defences, at first from the
Battle of 18 March
The event that decided the battle took place on the night of 18 March when the Ottoman
Line A | HMS Queen Elizabeth | Agamemnon | Lord Nelson | Inflexible |
---|---|---|---|---|
French Line B | Gaulois | Charlemagne | Bouvet | Suffren |
British Line B | HMS Vengeance | Irresistible | Albion | Ocean |
Supporting ships | HMS Majestic | Prince George | Swiftsure | Triumph |
Reserve | HMS Canopus | Cornwallis |
The first British line opened fire from Eren Köy Bay around 11:00. Shortly after noon, de Robeck ordered the French line to pass through and close on the Narrows forts. The Ottoman fire began to take its toll with Gaulois, Suffren, Agamemnon and Inflexible suffering hits. While the naval fire had not destroyed the Ottoman batteries, it had succeeded in temporarily reducing their fire. By 13:25, the Ottoman defences were mostly silent so de Robeck decided to withdraw the French line and bring forward the second British line as well as Swiftsure and Majestic.[42]
The Allied forces had failed to properly sweep the entire area for mines. Aerial reconnaissance by aircraft from the
The British pressed on with the attack. Around 16:00, Inflexible began to withdraw and struck a mine near where Bouvet had sunk, thirty crew being killed and the ship taking on with 1,600 long tons (1,600 t) of water.
In 1934, Keyes wrote that
The fear of their fire was actually the deciding factor of the fortunes of the day. For five hours the [destroyer] Wear and picket boats had experienced, quite unperturbed and without any loss, a far more intense fire from them than the sweepers encountered... the latter could not be induced to face it, and sweep ahead of the ships in 'B' line.... I had the almost indelible impression that we were in the presence of a beaten foe. I thought he was beaten at 2 pm. I knew he was beaten at 4 pm – and at midnight I knew with still greater clarity that he was absolutely beaten; and it only remained for us to organise a proper sweeping force and devise some means of dealing with drifting mines to reap the fruits of our efforts.
— Keyes[50]
For 118 casualties, the Ottomans sank three battleships, severely damaged three others and inflicted seven hundred casualties on the British-French fleet. There were calls amongst the British, particularly from Churchill, to press on with the naval attack and De Robeck advised on 20 March that he was reorganising his minesweepers. Churchill responded that he was sending four replacement ships; with the exception of Inflexible, the ships were expendable. It is not correct that the ammunition of the guns was low: they could have repulsed two more attacks.
The main minefields at the narrows, over ten layers deep, were still intact and protected by the smaller shore guns that had not seen any action on 18 March. These and other defences further in the strait had not exhausted their ammunition and resources yet. It was not a given that one more push by the fleet would have resulted in passage to
De Robeck wrote on 18 March,
After losing so many ships I shall obviously find myself superseded tomorrow morning.[53]
The fleet lost more ships than the Royal Navy had suffered since the Battle of Trafalgar; on 23 March, de Robeck telegraphed to the Admiralty that land forces were needed. He later told the Dardanelles Commission investigating the campaign, that his main reason for changing his mind, was concern for what might happen in the event of success, that the fleet might find itself at Constantinople or on the Marmara sea fighting an enemy which did not simply surrender as the plan assumed, without any troops to secure captured territory.[58] With the failure of the naval assault, the idea that land forces could advance around the backs of the Dardanelles forts and capture Constantinople gained support as an alternative and on 25 April, the Gallipoli campaign commenced.[59]
Following the failure of the land campaign up to May, De Robeck suggested that it might be desirable to again attempt a naval attack. Churchill supported this idea, at least as far as restarting attempts to clear mines but this was opposed by Fisher and other members of the Admiralty Board. Aside from difficulties in the Dardanelles, they were concerned at the prospect that more ships might have to be diverted away from the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. This disagreement contributed to the final resignation of Fisher, followed by the need for Asquith to seek coalition partners to shore up his government and the consequential dismissal of Churchill also. Further naval attacks were shelved.[60]
Keyes remained a firm supporter of naval action and on 23 September submitted a further proposal to pass through the Dardanelles to de Robeck. De Robeck disliked the plan but passed it to the Admiralty. Risk to ships had increased since March, due to the presence of German submarines in the Mediterranean and the Sea of Marmara, where the British ships would be inviting targets if the plan succeeded. The Allied minesweeping force was better equipped and some of the ships had nets or mine bumpers, which it was hoped would improve their chances against mines. The Ottoman Empire had regained land communications with Germany since the fall of Serbia and demands on the Anglo-French navies for more ships to support the attempt had to be added to the commitment of ships for the land campaign and operations at Salonica attempting to support Serbia. Kitchener made a proposal to take the
The British cabinet as a whole was less keen to abandon the campaign, because of political repercussions of a failure and damaging consequences for Russia. De Robeck had been temporarily replaced by Admiral
Submarine operations
British submarine attacks had commenced in 1914, before the campaign proper had started. On 13 December, the submarine
The first French submarine operation also preceded the start of the campaign; on 15 January 1915, the French submarine
The first submarine to pass the straits was the Australian HMAS AE2 (Lieutenant-Commander Henry Stoker) which got through on the night of 24/25 April. The army landings at Cape Helles and Anzac Cove began at dawn on 25 April. Although AE2 sank one Ottoman destroyer, thought to be a cruiser, the submarine was thwarted by defective torpedoes in several other attacks. On 29 April, in Artaki Bay near Panderma, AE2 was sighted and hit by the Ottoman torpedo boat Sultanhisar. Abandoning ship, the crew was taken prisoner.[66][b]
The second submarine through the straits had more luck than AE2. On 27 April,
A number of demolition missions were performed by men or parties landed from submarines. On 8 September,
French attempts to enter the Sea of Marmara continued. Following the success of AE2 and E14, the French submarine Joule attempted the passage on 1 May but she struck a mine and was lost with all hands.[72] The next attempt was made by Mariotte on 27 July. Mariotte was caught in the anti-submarine net that E14 had eluded and was forced to the surface. After being shelled from the shore batteries, Mariotte was scuttled.[73] On 4 September, the same net caught E7 as it began another tour.[74]
The first French submarine to enter the Sea of Marmara was Turquoise but it was forced to turn back and on 30 October, when returning through the straits, ran aground beneath a fort and was captured intact. The crew of twenty-five were taken prisoner and documents detailing Allied operations were discovered, which included a rendezvous with HMS E20 scheduled for 6 November. The rendezvous was kept by the German U-boat UB-14 which torpedoed and sank E20 killing all but nine of the crew. Turquoise was salvaged and incorporated (but not commissioned) into the Ottoman Navy as the Onbasi Müstecip, named after the gunner who had forced the French commander to surrender.[75]
The Allied submarine campaign in the Sea of Marmara was the one significant success of the Gallipoli campaign, forcing the Ottomans to abandon it as a transport route. Between April and December 1915, nine British and four French submarines sank one battleship, one destroyer, five gunboats, eleven troop transports, forty-four supply ships and 148 sailing vessels at a cost of eight Allied submarines sunk in the strait or in the Sea of Marmara.[76][c]
Military operations
Gallipoli landings
The
The
The navy was to support the landing, using naval guns as substitutes for field artillery, of which there was a severe shortage. With a few spectacular exceptions, the performance of naval guns on land targets was inadequate, particularly against entrenched positions. The guns lacked elevation and so fired on a flat trajectory which, coupled with the inherently unstable gun platform, resulted in reduced accuracy. The battleships' guns did prove effective against exposed lines of troops. On 27 April, during the first Ottoman counter-attack at Anzac, the Ottoman 57th Infantry Regiment attacked down the seaward slope of Battleship Hill within view of Queen Elizabeth which fired a salvo of six fifteen in (380 mm) shells, halting the attack.[81] On 28 April, near the old Y Beach landing, Queen Elizabeth sighted a party of about one hundred Turks. One 15-inch shrapnel shell containing 13,000 shrapnel bullets was fired at short range and killed the entire party.[82]
On 27 April, an observer on a kite-balloon ship had spotted an Ottoman transport ship moving near the Narrows. Queen Elizabeth, stationed off Gaba Tepe, had fired across the peninsula at a range of over ten mi (8.7 nmi; 16 km), and sank the transport with the third shot.[83] For much of the campaign, the Ottomans transported troops via rail, though other supplies continued to be moved by ship on the Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles. At Helles, which was initially the main battlefield, a series of costly battles only managed to edge the front line closer to Krithia. The navy continued to provide support via bombardments but in May, the battleship Goliath was sunk by the Ottoman torpedo boat Muâvenet-i Millîye in Morto Bay on 12 May and U-21 torpedoed and sank Triumph off Anzac on 25 May and Majestic off W Beach on 27 May.[84][85]
Permanent battleship support was withdrawn with the valuable Queen Elizabeth recalled by the
Troop transports
Another important aspect of the allied naval operations was transporting thousands of soldiers to and from the Dardanelles over the Mediterranean Sea. The major threats were attacks by German and Austrian-Hungarian submarines and mines. The worst loss during the Dardanelles Campaign was the sinking of HMT Royal Edward on 13 August 1915. The ship sailed from Alexandria, Egypt to Gallipoli with 1,367 officers and men on board and was torpedoed by SM UB-14 near the Dodecanese, with 935 lives lost.[88]
See also
- Pursuit of Goeben and Breslau
- List of Allied warships that served at Gallipoli
- All the King's Men (1999 film)
- Coastal artillery of the Dardanelles Strait
Notes
- ^ Hamilton's left hand, partially disabled by a wound in the First Boer War, is clearly visible.
- ^ The wreck was found in 1997 and the Turkish and Australian governments later agreed to leave the wreck alone.[67]
- ^ In 1993, a coal mining operation revealed the wreck of the German submarine UB-46 near the Kemerburgaz coast. After carrying out missions in Black Sea, UB-46 hit a mine near Karaburun and sank with all hands. It is now on display at Besiktas Naval Museum in Istanbul.[77]
References
- ^ Aspinall-Oglander 1929, pp. 31–32.
- ^ Fewster, Basarin & Basarin 2003, p. 36.
- ^ Fewster, Basarin & Basarin 2003, pp. 37–41.
- ^ a b c Haythornthwaite 2004, p. 6.
- ^ Aspinall-Oglander 1929, pp. 6–7.
- ^ Fewster, Basarin & Basarin 2003, p. 41.
- ^ Broadbent 2005, pp. 17–18.
- ^ Broadbent 2005, p. 18.
- ^ Broadbent 2005, pp. 9, 18.
- ^ Howard 2002, p. 53.
- ^ Haythornthwaite 2004, p. 7.
- ^ Carlyon 2001, p. 45.
- ^ a b Carlyon 2001, p. 48.
- ^ Broadbent 2005, p. 19.
- ^ Fewster, Basarin & Basarin 2003, p. 44.
- ^ Carlyon 2001, pp. 47–48.
- ^ Holmes 2001, p. 577.
- ^ Keegan 1998, p. 238.
- ^ Erickson 2013, p. 159.
- ^ Tauber 1993, pp. 22–25.
- ^ Corbett 2009, pp. 158, 166.
- ^ Carlyon 2001, p. 34.
- ^ Strachan 2003, p. 115.
- ^ Travers 2001, p. 20.
- ^ Jenkins 2001, pp. 254–255.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 140–157.
- ^ Aspinall-Oglander 1929, pp. 32–33.
- ^ a b Aspinall-Oglander 1929, p. 33.
- ^ Aspinall-Oglander 1929, pp. 33–34.
- ^ Aspinall-Oglander 1929, pp. 34–35.
- ^ Carlyon 2001, p. 47.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 144–146.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 149–150.
- ^ Marder 1965, pp. 233–234.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 157–183.
- ^ Carlyon 2001, pp. 61–62.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 206–210.
- ^ Aspinall-Oglander 1929, pp. 96–97.
- ^ Carlyon 2001, p. 66.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 290–316.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 213–224.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 216–217, 223, 225.
- ^ Layman 1987, p. 151.
- ^ IWM p. 12.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 218–219.
- ^ Aspinall-Oglander 1929, pp. 97–98.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 219–220.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 221–223.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 220–221.
- ^ Keyes 1934, pp. 237–238, 245.
- ^ Ōzakman 2008, p. 686.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 208–209.
- ^ a b Carlyon 2001, p. 72.
- ^ Morgenthau 1918, xviii.
- ^ Carlyon 2001, p. 320.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 223–22.
- ^ Jenkins 2001, p. 260.
- ^ Marder 1965, p. 252.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 225–230, 316–349.
- ^ Marder 1965, p. 275.
- ^ Marder 1965, pp. 314–320.
- ^ Jenkins 2001, p. 265.
- ^ Marder 1965, pp. 320–324.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 71–73.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, p. 140.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 310, 347, 357, 374–375.
- ^ HCNSW 2017.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 374–375.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, p. 119.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, pp. 115–117.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, pp. 76–77.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, p. 374.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, p. 78.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, pp. 118–119.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, pp. 177, 179, 205–206.
- ^ O'Connell 2010, pp. 76–78.
- ^ "Sergi Alanları". 19 September 2008. Archived from the original on 19 September 2008.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 208–211.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 229–230.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 313–314.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, p. 355.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, p. 362.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, p. 359.
- ^ Corbett 2009a, pp. 407–408.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, pp. 29–32.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, pp. 24, 37, 43.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, p. 212.
- ^ Corbett 2009b, pp. 112–113.
Bibliography
Books
- Aspinall-Oglander, Cecil Faber (1929). Military Operations Gallipoli: Inception of the Campaign to May 1915. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. I. London: Heinemann. OCLC 464479053.
- Broadbent, Harvey (2005). Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore. Camberwell, VIC: Viking/Penguin. ISBN 978-0-670-04085-8.
- ISBN 978-0-7329-1089-1.
- ISBN 978-1-84342-489-5. Retrieved 28 January 2017.
- Corbett, J. S. (2009a) [1929]. Naval Operations. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. II (2nd, Imperial War Museum and Naval & military Press repr. ed.). London: Longmans, Green & Co. ISBN 978-1-84342-490-1. Retrieved 28 January 2017.
- Corbett, J. S. (2009b) [1923]. Naval Operations. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. III (Imperial War Museum and Naval & Military Press ed.). London: Longmans. ISBN 978-1-84342-491-8. Retrieved 28 January 2017.
- Erickson, Edward J. (2013). Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-36220-9.
- Fewster, Kevin; Basarin, Vecihi; Basarin, Hatice Hurmuz (2003) [1985]. Gallipoli: The Turkish Story. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 978-1-74114-045-3.
- ISBN 978-0-275-98288-1.
- ISBN 978-0-19-866209-9.
- Howard, Michael (2002). The First World War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-285362-2.
- ISBN 978-0-333-78290-3.
- Keegan, John (1998). The First World War. London: Pimlico. ISBN 978-0-7126-6645-9.
- OCLC 2366061. Retrieved 29 January 2017.
- OCLC 865180297.
- Morgenthau, Henry (1918). "XVIII: The Allied Armada Sails Away, Though on the Brink of Victory". Ambassador Morgenthau's Story. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page. OCLC 1173400. Retrieved 25 February 2009.
- O'Connell, John (2010). Submarine Operational Effectiveness in the 20th Century (1900–1939). Part One. New York: Universe. ISBN 978-1-4502-3689-8.
- Ōzakman, Turgut (2008). Diriliş, Çanakkale 1915 [Resurrection, Canakkale 1915]. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi. ISBN 978-975-22-0247-4.
- Strachan, Hew (2003) [2001]. The First World War: To Arms. Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-926191-8.
- Tauber, Eliezer (1993). The Arab Movements in World War I. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-4083-9.
- Travers, Tim (2001). Gallipoli 1915. Stroud: Tempus. ISBN 978-0-7524-2551-1.
Journals
- Layman, Richard D. (1987). "HMS Ark Royal 1914–1922". ISSN 1360-9009.
- Nykiel, Piotr (March 2004). "Minesweeping Operations in the Dardanelles Feb 25 – March 17, 1915". The Turkish Yearbook of Gallipoli Studies (2). Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Atatürk ve Çanakkale Savaslari Arastirma Merkezi/Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University and Çanakkale Wars Research Center: 81–115. OCLC 52910177. Archived from the originalon 6 January 2009. Retrieved 28 January 2017.
Reports
- Nykiel, Piotr (2001). Was it possible to renew the naval attack on the Dardanelles successfully the day after the 18th March? (Report). Çanakkale: The Gallipoli Campaign International Perspectives 85 Years On Conference Papers (24–25 April 2000).
Websites
- "Australia's Naval Gallipoli Hero (no date)" (PDF). Heritage Council of NSW. Retrieved 29 January 2017.
Further reading
- Jose, Arthur (1941) [1928]. "Chapter 9, Service Overseas, East Africa, Dardanelles, North Atlantic" (PDF). The Royal Australian Navy, 1914–1918. Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918. Vol. IX (9th ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 271462423. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
- ISBN 978-1-84413-411-3.
- Muhterem, Saral; Orhon, Alpaslan (1993). Çanakkale Cephesi Harekâte, 1 Nci Kitap, Haziran 1914 – 25 Nisan 1915 [Operations on the Dardanelles/Gallipoli Front, June 1914 – 25 April 1915]. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi/Turkish Battles in the First World War. Vol. V. Book 1. Ankara: TC Genelkurmay Başkanliği/General Staff Printing House. OCLC 863356254.
External links
- Bibliography: Turkey in the First World War
- War in the Dardanelles: 1915
- Ottoman Naval Official History
- Account of the battle Archived 21 June 2007 at the Wayback Machine from the Imperial War Museum website (accessed Nov 2006)
- Winston Churchill & Gallipoli – UK Parliament Living Heritage