Northern front, East Africa, 1940
Northern front, East Africa, 1940 | |||||||
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Part of East African Campaign (World War II) | |||||||
Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale Italiana) 1940 | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
William Platt | Luigi Frusci | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Sudan Defence Force Northern Rhodesia Regiment | Comando Forze Armate dell'Africa Orientale Italiana |
Operations on the Northern front, East Africa, 1940 in the
Hostilities began soon after the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940. On the
The British blockade of the AOI made Aosta reluctant to deplete stocks of fuel, ammunition and spare parts after the invasion of British Somaliland was complete. With expectations that the Germans would defeat Britain before the end of 1940 and with the need to wait for the Italian invasion of Egypt (9–16 September 1940) to succeed before invading Sudan, the Italians in the AOI waited on events. British policy was to ensure the safety of shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and operations in East Africa were given second priority after Egypt. With reinforcements arriving from India and troops from Egypt due after Operation Compass, the British planned to invade Eritrea from Sudan on 9 February 1941. The British were forestalled by a sudden Italian retreat from Kassala on 18 January and Platt was ordered to mount a vigorous pursuit. The British invaded Eritrea and defeated the Italians at the Battle of Agordat (26–31 January 1941) which began the conquest of Eritrea; Selassie returned to Ethiopia on 20 January.
Background
Africa Orientale Italiana
On 9 May 1936, the Italian dictator,
On 31 March 1940, Mussolini had laid down a defensive strategy against
Mediterranean and Middle East
In mid-1939, General
Ultra
The Italians in the AOI had replaced their ciphers by November 1940 but by the end of the month, the
...he could not believe that any army commander in the field had [ever] been better served by his intelligence....
— DDMI (ME)[9]
Prelude
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
In 1940, the British had three infantry battalions in Sudan and the SDF, which had 4,500 men in 21 companies, the best-equipped being Motor Machine-Gun companies, with light machine-guns mounted in vans, lorries and a few locally made armoured cars; the Sudan Horse was converting to a 3.7-inch mountain howitzer battery.[10][b] Platt held Khartoum with 2nd Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment, the 1st Battalion, Essex Regiment at Atbara and the 1st Battalion, Worcestershire Regiment at Gebeit and Port Sudan. The SDF garrisoned the frontier with the provincial police and a motley group of irregular scouts, to watch, harass and delay the Italians.[11]
Should the Italians invade, the units would converge against the attackers, exploit distance, the inadequate roads, and supply difficulties, to impede their advance. The Royal Air Force (RAF) had three bomber squadrons, K Flight, 112 Squadron, with six Gladiator fighters at Port Sudan and 430 Flight, 47 Squadron for army co-operation. The aircraft were convenient for Port Sudan and the Red Sea but far from Kassala and Gedaref. In August, 203 Group RAF was formed at Khartoum, to guard the eastern end of the Takoradi air route from the Gold Coast (Ghana), with 1 (Fighter) Squadron, South African Air Force (SAAF), equipped with Gladiators.[11]
Kassala
In 1940, Kassala was a provincial town of around 25,000 inhabitants, about 20 mi (32 km) from the frontier on the
At Kassala, the British had No. 5 Motor Machine-Gun Company, No. 6 Mounted Infantry Company of the Eastern Arab Corps, a mounted infantry company of the Western Arab Corps from Darfur 1,000 mi (1,600 km) away and the local police.[12] (No. 3 Motor Machine-Gun Company from Butana arrived at noon on 4 July.) After hostilities began on 10 June, the Regia Aeronautica flew reconnaissance sorties over Sudan and bombed Kassala, Port Sudan, Atbara, Kurmuk and Gedaref. Small arms were the only defence against air attack and civilian morale suffered but the bombing caused no military damage. The SDF patrolled frequently and raided across the Sudan–Ethiopia border around Kassala and Gallabat, causing some casualties and taking several prisoners. The Italian forces in the AOI remained passive in June but during July prepared to attack Karora, Kassala, Gallabat and Kurmuk.[11]
Italian preparations
Before the Italian declaration of war, Mussolini intended a defensive strategy in the AOI, with tactical offensives to protect Eritrea by attacking French Somaliland (Djibouti) and conducting limited attacks on Sudan.[2] The Italian army in the AOI had one metropolitan division, the equivalent of two more European divisions, all short of heavy weapons and transport and seven understrength colonial divisions.[13]
The army was organised in four commands, the Northern Sector in the vicinity of Asmara, Eritrea (Lieutenant-General Luigi Frusci, Comando Truppe dell'Eritrea of the Regio corpo truppe coloniali d'Eritrea, Governor of the Eritrea Governorate and Amhara Governorate), the Southern Sector in the Galla-Sidamo Governorate (General Pietro Gazzera), the Eastern Sector on the border with French Somaliland and British Somaliland (General Guglielmo Nasi) and the Giuba Sector (Lieutenant-General Carlo De Simone) covering southern Somalia near Kismayo, Italian Somaliland.[14]
The Regia Aeronautica had 325 aircraft in the AOI, 142 of which were in reserve (not all operational) with little prospect of more supplies of fuel, ammunition and spare parts.[2] A force was concentrated near the Sudan border for an attack on Kassala, comprising two colonial brigades, four squadrons of cavalry, approximately 24 light tanks, medium tanks and armoured cars and ten batteries of artillery.[15]
Operations
Capture of Kassala
The attack on Kassala was led by Frusci and Major-General Vincenzo Tessitori with Italian and colonial forces comprising about 6,500 men in three columns, Gulsa east, Gulsa west, equipped with trucks and Central, with support from the Regia Aeronautica and some cavalry squadrons acting as vanguards.[16] At 3:00 a.m. on 4 July 1940, the three columns, about 19–22 mi (31–36 km) apart, started their attack on Kassala. The cavalry, led by Lieutenant Francesco Santasilia, bypassed Mount Kasala and Mount Mocram and launched the first attack.[17]
Kassala was held by less than 500 men of the SDF and local police, who remained under cover during a twelve-hour bombardment by the Regia Aeronautica and then emerged. The defenders knocked out six Italian tanks and inflicted considerable casualties on the attackers. At 1:00 p.m., Italian cavalry entered Kassala and the defenders withdrew to Butana Bridge, having lost one man killed, three wounded and 26 missing, some of whom rejoined their units.[18] Italian casualties were 43 dead and 114 men wounded.[16] Gazzera occupied the fort of Gallabat the same day and Kurmuk in Sudan. Gallabat was placed under the command of Colonel Castagnola and fortified.[19]
At Kassala, the 12th Colonial Brigade built anti-tank defences, machine-gun posts and strongpoints. The Italians were disappointed to find no strong anti-British sentiment among the Sudanese population. During the Italian attack at Kassala a battalion of Italian colonial troops and a banda (pl. irregulars) attacked Gallabat and forced No. 3 Company, Eastern Arab Corps to retire. Karora was occupied unopposed when the Sudanese police were ordered to withdraw and at Kurmuk on 7 July, another colonial battalion and a band supported by artillery and aircraft, overcame a force of 60 Sudanese police after a short engagement.[20]
The Italian attacks had gained a valuable entry point to Sudan at Kassala, made it more difficult for the British to support the indigenous resistance in Gojjam by capturing Gallabat and the loss of Kurmuk prompted some of the locals to resort to banditry. Local Sudanese opinion was impressed by the Italian successes but the population of Kassala continued to support the British and supplied valuable information during the occupation. The SDF continued to operate close to Kassala and on 5 July, a company of the 2nd Warwick arrived at Gedaref to act as a reserve for the SDF. The British discovered that rumours of the arrival of the Warwick had reached the Italians in greatly magnified form and Platt decided to bluff the Italians into believing that there were far greater forces on the Sudan border. An Italian map captured on 25 July showed around 20,000 British and Sudanese troops in Kassala province. The 5th Indian Infantry Division was ordered to Port Sudan on 2 August.[20]
Gazelle Force
In September 1940, the 5th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Lewis Heath) began to arrive in Sudan; Platt held back the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier John Marriott) around Port Sudan and the rest, with attachments from the SDF, was ordered to prevent an Italian advance on Khartoum, from Goz Regeb on the Atbara River to Gallabat, a front of about 200 mi (320 km). Gazelle Force (Colonel Frank Messervy), based on Skinner's Horse, No. 1 Motor Machine-Gun Group of the SDF and a varying amount of field and horse artillery, was assembled near Kassala to probe forwards, to harass the Italians and keep them off-balance to make an impression of a much larger force and encourage a defensive mentality. By using the term Five instead of 5th in all communications, the British managed to persuade Italian military intelligence that five Indian divisions occupied the 5th Indian Division area. In November, after the failed British attack at Gallabat, Gazelle Force operated from the Gash river delta against Italian advanced posts around Kassala on the Ethiopian plateau, to the extent that Aosta ordered Frusci, the commander of the Northern Sector to challenge the British raiders. Two Italian battalions conducted desultory operations against Gazelle Force 30 mi (48 km) north of Kassala for about two weeks, then withdrew.[21]
In Rome, General Ugo Cavallero, the new Chief of the Defence Staff (Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale, had urged the abandonment of plans to invade Sudan and to concentrate on the defence of the AOI.[22] From early January, signs appeared that the Italians were reducing the number of troops on the Sudan frontier and a withdrawal from Kassala seemed possible.[23] News of the Italian disaster in Operation Compass in Egypt, hit-and-run attacks by Gazelle Force and the activities of Mission 101 in Ethiopia, led Frusci to become apprehensive about the northern route to Kassala. On 31 December, the troops on the northern flank withdrew behind Sabdaret, with patrols forward at Serobatib and Adardet and a mobile column in Sabdaret for contingencies. Frusci was ordered to retire from Kassala and Metemma to the passes from Agordat to Gondar but objected on grounds of prestige and proclaimed that the imminent British attack would be scattered. On 17 January, the 12th Colonial Brigade withdrew from Kassala and Tessenei to the triangle formed by the northern and southern roads from Kassala at Keru, Giamal Biscia and Aicota.[24]
British Somaliland, 1940
In 1940, British Somaliland was garrisoned by 631 members of the
The SCC skirmished with the advancing Italians as the main British force slowly retired. On 11 August, Major-General
Capture of Gallabat
Gallabat fort lay in Sudan about 200 mi (320 km) south of Kassala opposite Metemma over the Ethiopian border beyond the Boundary Khor, a dry riverbed with steep banks covered by long grass. British orders forbade firing across the frontier if war was declared but the platoon in Gallabat heard over the wireless that it had begun and fired 13,000 rounds from a ridge overlooking Metemma.
An RAF contingent of six
At 8:00 a.m. the 25th and 77th Colonial battalions counter-attacked and were repulsed but three British tanks were knocked out by mines and six by mechanical failures caused by the rocky ground.
Part of the 1st Battalion, Essex Regiment at the fort broke and ran, carrying some of the Gahrwalis with them. Many of the British fugitives mounted their transport and drove off, spreading the panic and some of the runaways reached Doka before being stopped.[34] (The battalion was eventually replaced by the 2nd Highland Light Infantry and fought in Syria and Iraq.)[34] The Italian bombers returned next morning and that evening, Slim ordered a withdrawal from Gallabat Ridge 3 mi (4.8 km) westwards to less exposed ground. Sappers from the 21st Field Company remained behind to demolish the remaining buildings and stores in the fort. The artillery bombarded Gallabat and Metemma and set off Italian ammunition dumps. British casualties since 6 November were 42 men killed and 125 wounded.[36] The Italian 27th Colonial Battalion was thought to have been destroyed with 600 killed or wounded.[37]
The brigade patrolled to deny the fort to the Italians and on 9 November, two
Aftermath
Analysis
July was the height of the rainy season but they were unusually light and disrupted road travel far less than usual. The Italians made no attempt to exploit the victory at Kassala, apart from a short advance to Adardeb near the railway; Kurmuk was abandoned at the same time. The Italians might have believed that an advance would be too difficult or overestimated the size of the forces opposite them. The British to the north and west had time to plan their delaying campaign against an advance on Khartoum, Atbara or Port Sudan. When no attack came, parties from the Worcester and Essex reinforced the force outside Kassala which induced the Italians to retreat into the town and wait. The British issued an intelligence summary on 18 July, which described the huge advantage in numbers enjoyed by the Italians and the apparent absence of any intention decisively to use it. The attack on Kassala was called a raid and the other attacks a nuisance.[41]
The report concluded that the Italians were waiting on the conclusion of armistice talks with the Vichy regime in France before deciding on strategy. The British concluded that the small British and colonial contingents in East Africa had succeeded in defending the frontiers of the east African colonies, according to the strategy laid down by Wavell.[41] The British evacuation of Somaliland was announced on 20 August and Home Intelligence Reports showed that after a period of public apathy there was increasing criticism and doubts about the official excuses being made and scepticism that the reverse did not matter. After the occupation of the Channel Islands and apprehension over the course of the Battle of Britain the news added to public disquiet. While British press reports that the Italian forces in the AOI were a "...beleaguered army which must live on its reserves...." were the same as the Italian appreciation of the situation, this was not publicly known. A member of the public remarked that
We should have recognised the danger signals, first silence, then inadequate news, then hints that the place wasn't worth defending, then the successful strategic withdrawal.
— Anon, 20 August 1940[42]
Some senior British officials thought that defeat was inevitable and that it was a Pyrrhic victory for the Italians, who had used irreplaceable resources, increased the dispersion of the military forces in the AOI and lost the means to follow alternatives, which might have brought more success.[43]
The British had established the Italian order of battle and aspects of Italian strategic thinking but the Italians managed to keep their tactical moves secret. The Italian army changed its cyphers on the outbreak of war and the British took until November to break into the new cypher; a new Regia Aeronautica cypher was introduced in November but this was quickly broken. During the signals intelligence blackout, the British lacked knowledge of the Italian order of battle, equipment and readiness; fears grew that the Italians were preparing to invade Sudan and Kenya. When the British counter-offensives began in January 1941, documents captured by the British and the isolation of the Italians in East Africa made it impossible for them to change their cyphers for transmissions to Italy, created perfect conditions for "the cryptographers' war". Despite a lack of aircraft for reconnaissance and no network of spies in the AOI, the British in 1941 had a comprehensive view of the Italian supply situation and every Italian decision. Knowledge that the Italians were going to retire from Kassala, prompted the British to begin their invasion of the AOI on 19 January instead of 8 February, eavesdropping on Italian plans and assessments of the situation, often before the recipients had decoded the signals.[44]
While in London for discussions with Churchill, Wavell signalled to Cairo that the evacuation of British Somaliland had not been the cause of recriminations but after more details of the Battle of Tug Argan arrived in London, Churchill questioned why the British had retreated and if the Italian superiority was really overwhelming, why they had not exploited their advantage. Churchill complained that the defence of the Tug Argan Gap had been "precipitately discontinued" and that Godwin-Austen had exaggerated the number of British casualties. Churchill blamed the local commanders for failing adequately to conduct a fighting retreat. Wavell replied that high casualties were not a sign of good leadership; Churchill never forgave the slight and began to plan his dismissal. Aosta later wrote that the invasion plan depended on speed but supply difficulties, unexpectedly poor weather and rains blocked some roads, slowing the advance. During the delay caused by the British defence of Tug Argan, Aosta tried to send a force of 300 volunteers by aircraft to capture Berbera by coup de main but the scheme was cancelled, because the British remained in occupation of the only landing ground. The Italians had failed to exploit the opportunity and given the haphazard nature of the British evacuation and the lack of defences, the withdrawal might have prevented.[45]
Aosta drew up plans to exploit the victory in Somaliland, including a scheme to invade Kenya with two columns, to rendezvous at Fort hall north of Nairobi, ready to capture the capital. Under the text Aosta wrote, "Extreme caution must be observed". In Eritrea, Tessitore had proposed to invade Sudan soon after the declaration of war and capture Khartoum and Atbara. On orders from Rome, Aosta based his strategy on events further north in Libya and Egypt. After the Italian invasion of Egypt, Aosta considered that an offensive move was dependent on being able to link with the forces of Italian Libya, which became impossible after the British expelled the Italians from Egypt in Operation Compass (9 December 1940 – 9 February 1941). Aosta liaised with Marshal Rodolfo Graziani in Libya but as Italian supplies of fuel in the AOI diminished, passive defence became the only realistic choice. In late 1940, Aosta was advised that the war in Europe would probably end in October and decided to wait on events.[46]
Casualties
At Kassala, the British lost one man killed, three wounded and 26 missing, some of whom rejoined their units.[18] the Italians suffered casualties of 43 dead and 114 men wounded.[16] During the invasion of British Somaliland, the British suffered casualties of 38 killed and 222 wounded, mostly troops of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and the Camel Corps machine-gunners, along with some equipment that could not be embarked during the evacuation. The Italians suffered 2,052 casualties and expended irreplaceable fuel and ammunition. In the fighting at Gallabat from 6 November, the British suffered casualties of 42 men killed and 125 wounded. Italian losses were thought to be around 600 men.[47]
Subsequent operations
After the British reverse at Gallabat in November, Wavell held a review of the situation in Cairo from 1 to 2 December. With Operation Compass imminent in Egypt, the British forces in east Africa were to provide help to the Patriots in Ethiopia and continue to pressure the Italians at Gallabat. Kassala was to be recaptured early in January 1941, to prevent an Italian invasion and the 4th Indian Division was to be transferred from Egypt to Sudan from the end of December. With the success of Compass, east Africa was made second priority after Egypt and it was intended to have defeated the Italian forces in Ethiopia by April. The Italian retirement from Kassala on 18 January 1941, suggested that the British victory in Egypt was affecting the situation in East Africa and that a bolder British strategy was justified. The British offensive from Sudan due on 9 February was brought forward to 19 January.[48]
Platt was ordered to mount a vigorous pursuit and fought the Battle of Agordat from 26 to 31 January 1941, leading to the capture of Agordat on 1 February and Barentu the next day. Haile Selassie, the deposed Emperor of Ethiopia, crossed into Ethiopia on 20 January and in February, the Frontier Battalion SDF, the 2nd Ethiopian Battalion and Nos 1 and 2 Operational Centres, were renamed Gideon Force. Lieutenant-Colonel Orde Wingate was ordered to capture Dangila and Bure, which had garrisons of a colonial brigade each and gain control of the road between Bure and Bahrdar Giorgis, to provide a base for Selassie. The Arbegnoch were to attack the main roads from Gondar and Addis Ababa and keep as many Italian troops back defending Addis Ababa as possible.[49]
See also
Notes
- Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 allowed the British to occupy Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.[3]
- ^ The SDF comprised the Camel Corps, Eastern Arab Corps, Western Arab Corps and the Equatorial Corps.[10]
- ^ The party had conducted the first hostile act of the East African Campaign and after informing them that the act was against orders, the officer commanding had the event written off as training.[32]
Footnotes
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 2, 93.
- ^ a b c Butler 1971, p. 298.
- ^ a b Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 6–7, 69.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 19, 93.
- ^ Dear 2005, p. 245.
- ^ Raugh 1993, p. 64.
- ^ a b Playfair et al. 1957, p. 168.
- ^ Hinsley 1979, p. 202.
- ^ a b Hinsley 1994, pp. 64–65.
- ^ a b Playfair et al. 1957, p. 169.
- ^ a b c Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 169–170.
- ^ a b Stewart 2016, pp. 59–60.
- ^ Butler 1971, p. 297.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 38–40.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, p. 170.
- ^ a b c Raugh 1993, p. 72.
- ^ Del Boca 1986, p. 356.
- ^ a b Maioli & Baudin 1974, p. 134; Stewart 2016, p. 60.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 170–171; Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel 1995, p. 295.
- ^ a b Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 170–171.
- ^ Raugh 1993, pp. 172–174.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, p. 42.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 397, 399.
- ^ Raugh 1993, pp. 172–174, 175; Mackenzie 1951, pp. 42–44.
- ^ Stewart 2016, p. 67.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, p. 23; Playfair et al. 1957, p. 170.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 174–175.
- ^ Stewart 2016, p. 72.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 172–177.
- ^ Raugh 1993, p. 82.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, p. 178.
- ^ a b Stewart 2016, p. 58.
- ^ a b Playfair et al. 1957, p. 398.
- ^ a b c d Mackenzie 1951, p. 33.
- ^ a b Brett-James 1951, ch 2.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, p. 399.
- ^ Stewart 2016, p. 115.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, pp. 33–34.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, p. 34.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, p. 43.
- ^ a b Stewart 2016, pp. 60–61.
- ^ Stewart 2016, p. 90.
- ^ Stewart 2016, p. 91.
- ^ Hinsley 1979, pp. 380–381.
- ^ Stewart 2016, pp. 93–94.
- ^ Stewart 2016, pp. 99–100.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 178, 399; Raugh 1993, p. 82; Stewart 2016, p. 115.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 400.
- ^ Playfair et al. 1957, pp. 405–406; Raugh 1993, pp. 175, 177.
References
- Brett-James, Antony (1951). Ball of Fire – The Fifth Indian Division in the Second World War. Aldershot: OCLC 4275700.
- Butler, J. R. M. (1971) [1957]. Grand Strategy: September 1939 – June 1941. ISBN 0-11630-095-7.
- Dear, I. C. B. (2005) [1995]. Foot, M. R. D. (ed.). Oxford Companion to World War II. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-280670-3.
- Del Boca, Angelo (1986). Italiani in Africa Orientale: La caduta dell'Impero [Italians in East Africa: The Fall of the Empire] (in Italian). Vol. III. Roma-Bari: Laterza. ISBN 978-88-420-2810-9.
- Hinsley, F. H.; et al. (1979). British Intelligence in the Second World War. Its influence on Strategy and Operations. History of the Second World War. Vol. I. London: ISBN 978-0-11-630933-4.
- Hinsley, F. H. (1994) [1993]. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (abridged edition). History of the Second World War (2nd rev. ed.). London: ISBN 978-0-11-630961-7.
- OCLC 59637091.
- Maioli, G.; Baudin, J. (1974). Vita e morte del soldato italiano nella guerra senza fortuna: La strana guerra dei quindici giorni [Life and Death of Italian Soldiers in the War with no Luck: The Strange War of Fifteen Days]. Amici della storia. Vol. I. 18 volumes, 1973–1974. Ginevra: Ed. Ferni. OCLC 716194871.
- OCLC 494123451. Retrieved 7 September 2017.
- Raugh, H. E. (1993). Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship (1st ed.). London: Brassey's UK. ISBN 978-0-08-040983-2.
- Schreiber, G.; Stegemann, B.; Vogel, D. (1995). Falla, P. S. (ed.). The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and North Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy's Declaration of non-Belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War. ISBN 978-0-19-822884-4.
- Stewart, A. (2016). The First Victory: The Second World War and the East Africa Campaign (1st ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-20855-9.
Further reading
- Mockler, A. (1987) [1984]. Haile Selassie's War (2nd. pbk. Grafton Books [Collins], London ed.). London: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-586-07204-7.
- Petacco, Arrigo (2003). Faccetta nera: storia della conquista dell'impero [Black Face: History of the Conquest of the Empire]. Le scie. Milano: Edizioni Mondadori. ISBN 978-8-80451-803-7.