Battle of Arnhem

Lieutenant Colonel John Frost, commander of the 2nd Parachute Battalion of the 1st Parachute Brigade, had led a mixed group of about 750–800 lightly armed men who had landed near Oosterbeek and marched into Arnhem along the Rhine River route.^[55][56] While encountering few Germans and little opposition, the 2nd Battalion had been unable to secure its objectives along the way. The railway bridge at Oosterbeek was blown up by the Germans when the first British paratroops tried to rush across and seize it. The Germans had moved the Old Ship bridge to the south bank. The battalion reached the main road bridge in Arnhem, capturing the northern end but was unable to secure the southern end from the German defenders. The 2nd Parachute Battalion were able to consolidate their position and quickly repulsed the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion and other German units when they arrived to secure the bridge.^[57]

The Allied advance was severely hampered by poor communications.

The 9th SS Panzer Division continued to reinforce the German blocking line. Krafft's unit withdrew overnight and joined Spindler's line, coming under his command.^[64] Spindler's force was now becoming so large as more men and units arrived at the new front, that he was forced to split it into battle groups Kampfgruppen Allworden and Harder. The defensive line now blocked the western side of Arnhem and had just closed the gap exploited by Frost along the river the previous evening.^[65] Overnight, the 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions had skirted as far south as 2nd Parachute Battalion's original Lion route, hoping to follow them into Arnhem centre.^[66] They approached the German line on the outskirts of the town before light and for several hours attempted to fight through the German positions. Spindler's force – being continually reinforced – was too strong to penetrate and by 10:00 the British advance was stopped.^[25] A more coordinated attack followed in the afternoon but it too was repulsed.^[67] Urquhart attempted to return to his divisional headquarters at Oosterbeek but became cut off and was forced to take shelter in a Dutch family's loft with two other officers.^[68] Lathbury was injured and also forced into hiding.^[69]

At the road bridge, German forces of the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion had quickly surrounded the 2nd Battalion, cutting them off from the rest of the division.

At the landing zones, Urquhart's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mackenzie, told Hicks that, in Urquhart's and Lathbury's absence, he was acting divisional commander. Mackenzie also advised him to send one of his units – the South Staffords (which was not complete and was awaiting its full complement of men in the second lift) – to Arnhem to help with the advance to the bridge.^[73] The South Staffords departed in the morning and joined the 1st Parachute Battalion in the late afternoon.^[74]

German forces began to probe the 1st Airlanding Brigade defences in the morning. Units of Kampfgruppe von Tettau attacked the Border's positions; men of the SS NCO school overran Renkum and Kriegsmarine troops engaged the British all day as they withdrew. Minor fighting broke out around LZ 'X' but not enough to seriously hamper the glider landing there.

With the South Staffords and 11th Parachute Battalion arriving at the positions of the 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions on the western outskirts of Arnhem, the British hoped to have sufficient troops to break through to Frost's position at the bridge.[85] Lieutenant Colonel Dobie, the commander of the 1st Parachute Battalion, planned to attack before first light, but an erroneous report suggesting that the bridge had fallen led to the attack being cancelled.^[86] By the time the report was corrected, first light was due but with reinforcement at the bridge the priority, the attack had to proceed. The advance began on a narrow front between the railway line to the north and the river to the south. The 1st Parachute Battalion led, supported by remnants of the 3rd Parachute Battalion, with the 2nd South Staffordshires on the left flank and the 11th Parachute Battalion following behind.^[87] As soon as it became light, the 1st Parachute Battalion was spotted and halted by fire from the main German defensive line. Trapped in open ground and under heavy fire from three sides, the 1st Parachute Battalion disintegrated and what remained of the 3rd Parachute Battalion fell back.^[88]

The 2nd South Staffordshires were similarly cut off and save for about 150 men, overcome by midday.

By now, the 1st Airborne Division was too weak to attempt to reach Frost at the bridge. Eight of the nine infantry battalions were badly mauled or scattered and only the 1st Battalion, The Border Regiment existed as a unit.

The eastern side of this new perimeter was fairly stable after the previous day's retreat from Arnhem, with numerous ad hoc units under company commanders defending the approaches to Oosterbeek. Major Richard Lonsdale had taken command of the outlying units and their positions weathered severe German attacks, before falling back to the main divisional perimeter.^[107] This sector was later named Lonsdale Force and would remain the main line of defence on the south-eastern perimeter.^[108] The Border Regiment held most of the western edge of the town, with scattered units filling the gaps to the north. As more units fell back to the new defensive area, they were re-organised to establish a thumb-shaped perimeter using the Nederrijn as its southern base.^[109] The mixed units at Wolfheze began to fall back in the morning, but several were surrounded and captured, including one party of 130 men.^[110] One hundred and fifty men of 156th Parachute Battalion, led by Hackett, became pinned down and took cover in a hollow some 1,300 ft (400 m) west of the Oosterbeek perimeter.^[111] The men broke out of the hollow in the late afternoon and approximately 90 of them made it to the Border Regiment's positions.^[112]

The afternoon's supply drop went little better than the previous day's. Although a message had reached Britain to arrange a new dropping zone near the Hotel Hartenstein, some aircraft flew to LZ 'Z' where their supplies fell into German hands. At Oosterbeek, the Germans had used British marker panels and flares to attract the aircraft to their positions and the aircraft were unable to distinguish the exact dropping zones. Ten of the 164 aircraft involved were shot down around Arnhem and only 13 per cent of the supplies reached British hands.^[113][114]

At the bridge, Frost was finally able to make radio contact with Urquhart and was given the difficult news that reinforcement was doubtful.^[115] Shortly afterwards, at about 13:30, Frost was injured in the legs by a mortar bomb, and command passed to Major Gough.^[115][116] Despite their stubborn defence of the few buildings they still held, by late afternoon the British position was becoming untenable.^[117] When fire took hold of many of the buildings in which the wounded were being treated, a two-hour truce was organised in the late afternoon and the wounded (including Frost) were taken into captivity.^[118] Overnight, a few units managed to hold out for a little longer and several groups tried to break out toward the Oosterbeek perimeter, although almost all of them, including Major Hibbert, were captured.^{[62][119][120]} By 05:00 on Thursday morning, all resistance at the bridge had ceased.^[121] In later years, Walter Harzer claimed that, during the final hours of fighting, his men intercepted a radio message sent from the bridge that ended with the sentences: "Out of ammunition. God Save the King".^[122]

Throughout the morning, the Germans mopped up British survivors and stragglers in hiding around Arnhem bridge. It took several hours to clear the bridge of debris to allow German armour to cross and reinforce Nijmegen. Crucially, the British had held the bridge for long enough for the 82nd Airborne Division and the Guards Armoured Division to capture the Nijmegen bridge.^[123] With the resistance at the bridge crushed, the Germans had more troops available for the Oosterbeek engagement, although this changed suddenly in the afternoon.

Delayed by weather, the parachute infantry battalions of Stanisław Sosabowski's 1st (Polish) Parachute Brigade were finally able to take off; 114 C-47s took off but 41 aircraft turned back after Troop Carrier Command decided it would be too dangerous to land if the aircraft were up too long. The remainder pressed on; they did not have the correct transmission codes and did not understand the messages.^[124] One of the few messages to get out of Arnhem warned the Poles that DZ 'K' was not secure and to land instead on the polder east of Driel, where they should secure the Heveadorp ferry on the south bank of the Rhine.^[125] The Poles dropped under fire at 17:00 and suffered casualties, but assembled in good order. Advancing to the river bank, they discovered that the ferry was gone; the ferryman had sunk it to deny its use to the Germans.^[126] The arrival of the Poles relieved the pressure on the British, as the Germans were forced to send more forces south of the Rhine.^[127] Fearing an attack on the southern end of the road bridge or the Nijmegen road, a battalion of the 34th SS Volunteer Grenadier Division Landstorm Nederland, Machine Gun Battalion 47 and other Kampfgruppen headed across the river overnight.^[128]

At Oosterbeek, the defensive positions were consolidated and organised into two zones. Hicks commanded the western and northern sides of the perimeter and Hackett, after some rest, the east side.^[129] The perimeter was not a defensive line but a collection of defensive pockets in houses and foxholes around the centre of Oosterbeek, with the divisional headquarters at the Hotel Hartenstein at its centre. The perimeter was roughly 3 miles (4.8 km) round and was defended by about 3,600 men.^[109][130] The Hermann Göring NCO School attacked the Border positions on the west side near the Rhine, forcing them to abandon tactically important high ground overlooking Oosterbeek.^[131] The biggest boost to the besieged British was being able to make contact with the 64th Medium Regiment, RA of XXX Corps, which bombarded the German positions around the perimeter.^[37] The radio link to the battery headquarters was also used as the main line of communication to XXX Corps.^[132] So important was the 64 Medium Regiment that afterwards Urquhart lobbied (unsuccessfully) for the regiment to be able to wear the airborne Pegasus badge on their uniforms.^[132]

The British had seen the Polish drop, but were unable to make contact by radio; Private Ernest Henry Archer swam the Rhine with a message. The British planned to supply rafts for a river crossing that night, as the Poles were desperately needed on the northern bank.^[133] The Poles waited on the southern bank, but by 03:00 no rafts were evident and they withdrew to Driel to take up defensive positions.^[133]

Overnight, the Germans south of the river formed a blocking line along the railway, linking up with 10th SS to the south and screening the road bridge from the Poles.

In Oosterbeek, heavy fighting continued around the perimeter. Intense shelling and snipers increased the number of casualties at the aid posts in the hotels and houses of the town.[127] Bittrich ordered that the attacks be stepped up and the British bridgehead north of the Rhine destroyed, and at 09:00 the major attacks began with the various Kampfgruppen of 9th SS attacking from the east and Kampfgruppe von Tettau's units from the west.^[135] They made only small gains, but these attacks were followed by simultaneous attacks in the afternoon when the Germans made determined moves on the northern and eastern ends.^[136] To the north, they succeeded in briefly forcing back the King's Own Scottish Borderers, before the latter counterattacked and retook their positions.^[137] Urquhart realised the futility of holding the tactically unimportant tip however and ordered the units in the north to fall back and defend a shorter line.^[138] To the east, the remains of 10th Parachute Battalion were nearly annihilated in their small position on the main Arnhem road, but the Germans failed to gain any significant ground.^[139]

Two of Urquhart's staff officers swam the Rhine during the day and made contact with Sosabowski's HQ. It was arranged that six rubber boats should be supplied on the northern bank to enable the Poles to cross the river and come into the Oosterbeek perimeter.^[140] That night, the plan was put into operation, but the cable designed to run the boats across broke and the small oars were not enough to paddle across the fast-flowing river.^[141] Only 55 Poles made it across before light and only 35 of these made it into the perimeter.^[140]

Spindler was ordered to switch his attacks further south to try to force the British away from the river, isolating the British from any hope of reinforcement and allowing them to be destroyed.^[135] Despite their best efforts, however, they were unsuccessful, although the constant artillery and assaults continued to wear the British defences down further.^[142]

A break in the weather allowed the RAF to finally fly combat missions against the German forces surrounding Urquhart's men.^[143] Hawker Typhoons and Republic P-47 Thunderbolts strafed German positions throughout the day and occasionally duelled with the Luftwaffe over the battlefield.^[143] The RAF attempted their final resupply flight from Britain on the Saturday afternoon, but lost eight planes for little gain to the airborne troops.^[142] Some small resupply efforts would be made from Allied airfields in Europe over the next two days but to little effect.^[144]

South of the river, the Poles prepared for another crossing. That night, they awaited the arrival of assault boats from XXX Corps, but these did not arrive until after midnight, and many were without oars. The crossings started at 03:00, with fire support from the 43rd Wessex Division.^[145] Through the remaining hours of darkness, only 153 men were able to cross – less than ¼ of the hoped for reinforcement.^[146]

In the morning, Horrocks visited the Polish positions at Driel to see the front for himself.^[145] Later, he held a conference attended by Browning, Major-General Ivor Thomas of the 43rd (Wessex) Division and Sosabowski at Valburg.^[145] In a controversial meeting in which Sosabowski was politically outmanoeuvred, it was decided that another crossing would be attempted that night.^[145][147] When the Germans cut the narrow supply road near Nijmegen later that day, it seems that Horrocks realised the futility of the situation and plans were drawn up to withdraw the 1st Airborne Division.^[148]

In Oosterbeek, the situation was desperate; Hackett was wounded in the morning and had to give up the eastern command.^[149] The RAF attempted some close support around the perimeter which just held but shelling and sniping increased casualties by the hour.^[142] The aid stations were occupied by 2,000 men, British, German and Dutch civilian casualties.^[150][151] Because many aid posts were in the front line, in homes taken over earlier in the battle, the odd situation was created where casualties were evacuated forward rather than rearwards.^[152] Without evacuation, the wounded were often injured again and some posts changed hands between the British and Germans several times as the perimeter was fought over.^[150]

During the fighting around Oosterbeek, there had been short, local

That night, the Allies on the south side of the river attempted another crossing. The plan called for 4th Battalion, the Dorset Regiment and the 1st Polish Parachute Battalion to cross at 22:00 using boats and DUKWs.^[153] Sosabowski was furious at having to give up control of one of his battalions and thought the plan dangerous but was overruled.^[142] The boats took until 1:00 a.m. to arrive, several having been destroyed or lost en route; in a last-minute change of plan, only the Dorsets would cross.^[154] The small boats, without skilled crews, the strong current and poor choice of landing site on the north bank meant that of the 315 men who embarked, only a handful reached the British lines on the other side. The DUKWs and most boats landed too far downstream and at least 200 men were captured.^[155]

During the night, a copy of the withdrawal plan was sent across the river to Urquhart.^[156] Despite the obviously frustrating content, Urquhart knew there was little other choice. He radioed Thomas at 08:00 and agreed to the plan, provided it went ahead that night.^[157] The Airborne forces would need to endure another day in their perimeter. More men were evacuated from the aid posts throughout the day, but there was no official truce and this was sometimes done under fire.^[158] At 10:00, the Germans began their most successful assault on the perimeter, attacking the south-eastern end with infantry supported by newly arrived Tiger tanks.^[159] This assault pushed through the defenders' outer lines and threatened to isolate the bulk of the division from the river. Strong counter-attacks from the defenders and concentrated shellfire from south of the river eventually repulsed the Germans.^[160]

Urquhart made his withdrawal plan on the model used in the evacuation of

By 21:00, heavy rain had begun to fall, which helped disguise the withdrawal. The bombardment commenced and the units began to fall back to the river. Half of the engineers' boats were too far west to be used (the 43rd (Wessex) Division mistakenly believing the crossing points used by the Dorsets the previous night were in British hands), slowing the evacuation. The Germans shelled the withdrawal, believing it to be a supply attempt.[167] At 05:00, the operation was ended lest the coming light enable the Germans to fire onto the boats more accurately.^[168] A total of 2,163 Airborne men, 160 Poles, 75 Dorsets and several dozen other men were evacuated, but about 300 men were left behind on the northern bank when the operation was stopped, and 95 men were killed overnight during the evacuation.^[169][170]

During the morning of 26 September, the Germans pressed home their attacks and cut off the bridgehead from the river.^[171] It was not until about noon that they realised the British had gone.^[171] Later in the day, they rounded up about 600 men, mostly wounded in aid stations and those left behind on the north bank, as well as some pockets of resistance that had been out of radio contact with division headquarters and did not know about the withdrawal.^[172] Some of the British and Polish paratroopers managed to avoid capture by the Germans and were sheltered by the Dutch underground. They would be hidden in various houses in the towns and villages, or in huts or makeshift dens in the woods, for around a month until they could be rescued in Operation Pegasus on 22 October 1944.^[173]

The Allies withdrew from the southern bank of the Rhine and the front remained on "the island" between the Rhine and Waal rivers. The Germans counter-attacked in October at the Battle of the Nijmegen salient and were repulsed; the front line in the area remained stable until after the winter.^[174][175] The bridgeheads across the Maas and Waal served as an important base for operations against the Germans on the Rhine and Operation Veritable into Germany.^[176][175]

The Polish Brigade was moved to Nijmegen to defend the withdrawal of British troops in Operation Berlin, before returning to England in early October.^[177] Shortly afterwards, the British scapegoated Sosabowski and the Polish Brigade for the failure at Arnhem, perhaps to cover their own failings.^[178][179] On 17 October, Montgomery informed Alan Brooke – Chief of the Imperial General Staff – that he felt the Polish forces had "fought very badly" at Arnhem and that he did not want them under his command.^[180][181] David Bennett wrote that Montgomery had almost certainly been fed gross misinformation that supported his prejudices.^[181]

A month later, Browning wrote a long letter, highly critical of Sosabowski, to Brooke's deputy.^[180][182] In it, he accused Sosabowski of being difficult, unadaptable, argumentative and "loth to play his full part in the operation unless everything was done for him and his brigade".^[178][182] It is possible that Browning wanted unfairly to blame Sosabowski, although it may equally have been the work of officers of the 43rd Division.^[183] Browning recommended that Sosabowski be replaced – suggesting Lieutenant Colonel Jachnik or Major Tonn – and in December the Polish government in exile duly dismissed him, in a move almost certainly made under British pressure.^[179][184]

Carlo D'Este wrote "Sosabowski, an experienced and highly competent officer, was removed because he had become an embarrassment to Browning's own ineptitude. Had Sosabowski's counsel been heeded the battle might have been won, even at the eleventh hour."^[185] Although it may be fair to say that Sosabowski was difficult to work with, his scapegoating is judged a disgrace in the accounts of many historians.^{[179][186][178][184][187]} Brian Urquhart—who had done so much to warn his superiors about the dangers of Arnhem—described the criticism of Sosabowski and the brigade as "grotesque" and his dismissal as a "shameful act".^[188]

Arnhem was a victory for the Germans (albeit tempered by their losses further south) and a defeat for the Second Army.^{[171][189][190]} Many military commentators and historians believe that the failure to secure Arnhem was not the fault of the airborne forces (who had held out for far longer than planned) but of the operation.^[191] John Frost noted that "by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge" and was unable to understand why Browning had ordered Brigadier General James M. Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, to secure the Groesbeek Heights before Nijmegen Bridge.^[192][193] In his analysis of the battle, Martin Middlebrook believed the "failure of Browning to give the 82nd US Airborne Division a greater priority in capturing the bridge at Nijmegen" was only just behind the weakness of the air plan in importance.^[194]

In his assessment of the German perspective at Arnhem, Robert Kershaw concluded that "the battle on the Waal at Nijmegen proved to be the decisive event" and that Arnhem became a simple matter of containment after the British had retreated into the Oosterbeek perimeter.^[195] After that, it was merely "a side-show to the crisis being enacted on the Waal".^[195] Heinz Harmel asserted that "The Allies were stopped in the south just north of Nijmegen – that is why Arnhem turned out as it did".^[195] Gavin commented that "there was no failure at Arnhem. If, historically, there remains an implication of failure it was the failure of the ground forces to arrive in time to exploit the initial gains of the [1st] Airborne Division".^[196]

The air plan was a grave weakness in the events at Arnhem. Middlebrook believes that the refusal to consider night drops, two lifts on day 1 or a coup-de-main assault on Arnhem bridge were "cardinal fundamental errors" and that the failure to land nearer the bridge threw away the airborne force's most valuable asset – that of surprise.^[197] Frost believed that the distance from the drop zones to the bridge and the long approach on foot was a "glaring snag" and was highly critical of the "unwillingness of the air forces to fly more than one sortie in the day [which] was one of the chief factors that mitigated against success".^[2][198]

The Allies' failure to secure a bridge over the Lower Rhine spelled the end of Market Garden. While all other objectives had been achieved, the failure to secure the Arnhem road bridge over the Rhine meant that the operation failed in its ultimate objective.^[175] Montgomery claimed that the operation was 90 per cent successful and the Allies had driven a deep salient into German-occupied territory that was quickly reinforced.^[199][175] Milton Shulman observed that the operation had driven a wedge into the German positions, isolating the 15th Army north of Antwerp from the First Parachute Army on the eastern side of the bulge. This complicated the supply problem of the 15th Army and removed the chance of the Germans being able to assemble enough troops for a serious counter-attack to retake Antwerp.^[176] Chester Wilmot agreed with this, claiming that the salient was of immense tactical value for the purpose of driving the Germans from the area south of the Maas and removing the threat of an immediate counterattack against Antwerp.^[200] Kershaw wrote that the north flank of the west wall was not turned and the 15th Army was able to escape. John Warren wrote that the Allies controlled a salient leading nowhere.^[201] John Waddy wrote that the strategic and tactical debate of Market Garden will never be resolved.^[202]

Arnhem was described as "a tactical change of plan, designed to meet a favourable local situation within the main plan of campaign," but the result "dispelled the hope that the enemy would be beaten before the winter.

The battle was a costly defeat and the 1st Airborne Division never recovered. Three-quarters of the division were missing when it returned to England, including two of the three brigade commanders, eight of the nine battalion commanders and 26 of the 30 infantry company commanders.[204] About 500 men were in hiding north of the Rhine and many of these were able to escape during the winter, initially in Operation Pegasus.^[170] New recruits, escapees and repatriated POWs joined the division over the coming months but the division was still so understrength that the 4th Parachute Brigade had to merge with the 1st Parachute Brigade; the division could barely produce two brigades of infantry.^[204] Between May and August 1945, many of the men were sent to Denmark and Norway to oversee Operation Doomsday, the German surrenders; on their return the division was disbanded.^[205][180] The Glider Pilot Regiment suffered the highest proportion of fatalities during the battle (17.3 per cent) and was so depleted that in Operation Varsity, RAF pilots flew many of the gliders.^[206][207] As glider operations were abolished after the war, the regiment shrank and was eventually disbanded in 1957.^[180]

German casualty figures are less complete than those of the Allies and official figures have never been released.^[209] A signal, possibly sent by II SS Panzer Corps on 27 September, listed 3,300 casualties (1,300 killed and 2,000 injured) around Arnhem and Oosterbeek.^[210][211] Robert Kershaw's assessment of the incomplete records identified at least 2,500 casualties.^[212] In the Roll of Honour: Battle of Arnhem 17–26 September 1944, J.A. Hey of the Society of Friends of the Airborne Museum, Oosterbeek identified 1,725 German dead from the Arnhem area.^[213] All of these figures are significantly higher than Model's conservative estimate of 3,300 casualties for the entire Market Garden area of battle (which included Eindhoven and Nijmegen).^[212]

Dutch records suggest that at least 453 civilians died during the battle, either as a result of Allied bombing on the first day or during the subsequent fighting.

Although the battle was a disaster for the British 1st Airborne Division, their fight north of the Rhine is considered an example of courage and endurance and one of the greatest feats of arms in the Second World War.^{[216][217][190]} Despite being the last great failure of the British Army,^[189] Arnhem has become a byword for the fighting spirit of the British people and has set a standard for the Parachute Regiment.^[217] Montgomery claimed that "in years to come it will be a great thing for a man to be able to say: 'I fought at Arnhem'", a prediction seemingly borne out by the pride of soldiers who took part, and the occasional desire of those who did not to claim that they were there.^[218][219]

Within days of Operation Berlin, the British returned to a heroes' welcome in England.

• John Baskeyfield, 2nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment
• Major Robert Cain, 2nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment
• Flight Lieutenant David Lord 271 Squadron, Royal Air Force
• 10th Battalion, Parachute Regiment
• John Grayburn, 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment

In Germany, the battle was treated as a great victory and eight men were awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.^[224][225] The German dead were gathered and buried in the SS Heroes Cemetery near Arnhem, but after the war they were reburied in Ysselsteyn.^[226]

The shattered Arnhem road bridge was briefly replaced by a succession of

Eusebius Church, which was largely destroyed, also lost its 32-bell carillon dating back to 1652. Petit & Fritsen constructed a new, 49-bell carillon for the reconstructed church between 1958 and 1964. Since then, the carillon became associated with the yearly war memorial services held each May. In 1994, fifty years after the Battle of Arnhem, four bass bells were added to the instrument, with the largest funded by several English organisations. One of the 1994 bells features a quote from the book A Bridge Too Far and the film adaptation.^[230]

The Hotel Hartenstein, used by Urquhart as his headquarters, is now the home of the

To the People of Gelderland; 50 years ago British and Polish Airborne soldiers fought here against overwhelming odds to open the way into Germany and bring the war to an early end. Instead we brought death and destruction for which you have never blamed us. This stone marks our admiration for your great courage remembering especially the women who tended our wounded. In the long winter that followed your families risked death by hiding Allied soldiers and Airmen while members of the resistance led many to safety.[231]

The progress of the battle was widely reported in the British press,^[232] thanks largely to the efforts of two BBC reporters (Stanley Maxted and Guy Byam) and three journalists (newspaper reporters Alan Wood of the Daily Express and Jack Smyth of Reuters) who accompanied the British forces.^[8] The journalists had their reports sent back almost daily – ironically making communication with London at a time when Divisional Signals had not.^[233] The division was also accompanied by a three-man team from the Army Film and Photographic Unit who recorded much of the battle^[8] – including many of the images on this page.

In 1945, Louis Hagen, a Jewish refugee from Germany and a British army glider pilot present at the battle, wrote Arnhem Lift, believed to be the first book published about the events at Arnhem.