Battle of Yongdong
Battle of Yongdong | |
---|---|
Part of South Korea | |
Result | North Korean victory |
The Battle of Yongdong was an engagement between United States and
Though the Americans lost the town, their artillery inflicted substantial casualties on the North Koreans and delayed them for several crucial days, allowing the
Background
Outbreak of war
Following the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, the
The 24th Infantry Division was the first US unit sent into Korea with the mission to take the initial "shock" of North Korean advances, delaying much larger KPA units to buy time to allow follow-on forces to arrive.[2] The division's delaying actions allowed the 7th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division,[n 1] and other Eighth Army supporting units to move into position. Republic of Korea Army (ROK) forces in the meantime were systematically defeated and forced south along Korea's east coast, with entire divisions being overrun by the KPA's superior firepower and equipment.[2] Advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division were badly defeated in the Battle of Osan on July 5, during the first battle between American and KPA forces.[3] For the first month after the defeat at Osan, 24th Infantry Division soldiers were repeatedly defeated and forced south by the KPA's superior numbers and equipment.[4][5] The division's regiments were systematically pushed south in battles around Chochiwon, Chonan, and Pyongtaek.[4] The division made a final stand in the Battle of Taejon and was almost completely destroyed, but delayed KPA forces from advancing until July 20.[6] By that time, the Eighth Army's combat troops were roughly equal to KPA forces attacking the region at around 70,000 for each side, with new UN units arriving every day.[7]
US 1st Cavalry Division arrival
On July 6,
The transfer of 750
On July 19, the 5th Cavalry Regiment started toward Taejon.
Protect Yongdong. Remember there are no friendly troops behind you. You must keep your own back door open. You can live without food but you cannot last long without ammunition, and unless the Yongdong–Taegu road is kept open you will soon be without ammunition.
-Lieutenant General Walton Walker's orders to Gay[13]
Once it was fully assembled in the city, the 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to move north of Yongdong and set up defensive positions.
Battle
Opening moves
The KPA quickly advanced after the Battle of Taejon, with four of their divisions attacking south from the city along four different roads.[7][19] The KPA 3rd Division departed the city on July 22, advancing down the main highway toward Taegu and Yongdong, to where the 1st Cavalry Division was emplaced.[16][20] The next morning, July 23, the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, in front of Yongdong, reported it had destroyed three KPA T-34 tanks with 3.5-inch rocket launchers in its first use of that weapon.[19][21]
On July 23 the 7th and 9th Regiments of the KPA 3rd Division began their attack on the Yongdong defensive positions held by the 1st Cavalry Division.[19] They made their first penetration southwest of Yongdong, establishing a roadblock behind the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and at the same time other KPA units heavily engaged the 1st Battalion northwest of Yongdong in frontal attack.[21]
The next day, American M24 tanks attacked the roadblock behind the 2nd Battalion four times in an attempt to break it, but all were unsuccessful, and
Fighting on the roads
On the other main approach to Yongdong, a road northwest of the city, heavy machine gun fire and 37-mm fire from A Battery of the 92nd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, and artillery fire from the
By the morning of July 25 KPA forces had infiltrated the positions of the 1st Cavalry Division so thoroughly that they were disrupting its lines of supply, and Gay ordered the division to withdrawal and re-form its lines further south.[19] Northwest of Yongdong, 1st Battalion executed an orderly withdrawal, covered by the fire of the Heavy Mortar Company and the two batteries of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion. The mortar operators fought as infantry in the withdrawal.[22] During these retreats KPA troops disguised themselves as refugees and would form roadblocks in the UN troops' rear areas, or used hidden communications equipment to inform higher commands of UN concentrations so those concentrations could be attacked when they were most vulnerable.[26]
Meanwhile, the KPA intensified their attack on the 2nd Battalion on the road southwest of Yongdong. Concentrated artillery support, with the shells falling so close to the 2nd Battalion positions that they
On this same road, closer to Yongdong, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, which was trying to help the cutoff units of the 8th Cavalry, was itself attacked by strong KPA units. Through some error, the US battalion's F Company advanced to the wrong hill and stumbled into a concentration of KPA soldiers. Only 26 men from F Company returned, the rest were killed or captured in the subsequent ambush. Altogether, the 5th Cavalry Regiment suffered 275 casualties on July 25.[22]
American withdrawal
The KPA 3rd Division used essentially the same tactics it employed against the 24th Infantry Division at Taejon against the 1st Cavalry Division at Yongdong. In both fights, the KPA opened with a direct
Aftermath
North Korean
References
Notes
Citations
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 3
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 52
- ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 15
- ^ a b Varhola 2000, p. 4
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 90
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 105
- ^ a b c d Fehrenbach 2001, p. 103
- ^ a b c d e Appleman 1998, p. 196
- ^ a b Millett 2000, p. 369
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 364
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 363
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 367
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 197
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 350
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 351
- ^ a b Millett 2000, p. 368
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 101
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 117
- ^ a b c d e f Millett 2000, p. 370
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 366
- ^ a b c Appleman 1998, p. 198
- ^ a b c d e f g Appleman 1998, p. 199
- ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7.
The earliest such communication was recorded in the Eighth Cavalry journal, a running log of each day's messages, as that regiment sought to hold Yongdong on 24 July. 'No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children,' read the message from the regiment's liaison officer with the First Cavalry Division operations staff.
- ^ Lee, B-C (2012-10-15). "노근리재단, 과거사 특별법 제정 세미나 개최" [No Gun Ri Foundation held special law seminar]. Newsis (online news agency) (in Korean). Seoul. Retrieved 2015-06-02.
- ^ Hanley, Charles J. (2015-03-09). "In the Face of American Amnesia, The Grim Truths of No Gun Ri Find a Home". The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus. 13 (10). Retrieved 2020-06-06.
- ^ a b Millett 2000, p. 371
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 118
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 372
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 373
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 90
Sources
- ISBN 978-0-7818-1019-7
- Appleman, Roy E. (1998), South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: United States Army in the Korean War, ISBN 978-0-16-001918-0, archived from the originalon 2014-02-07, retrieved 2010-11-16
- Catchpole, Brian (2001), The Korean War, ISBN 978-1-84119-413-4
- ISBN 978-1-57488-334-3
- Millett, Allan R. (2000), The Korean War, Volume 1, ISBN 978-0-8032-7794-6
- ISBN 978-1-882810-44-4