Air Battle of South Korea
Air Battle of South Korea | |
---|---|
Part of South Korea and Pyongyang, North Korea | |
Result | United Nations victory |
South Korea
United Kingdom
Australia
Republic of Korea Air Force
No. 77 Squadron RAAF
800 Naval Air Squadron
802 Naval Air Squadron
The Air Battle of South Korea was an air campaign early in the
Background
Invasion
On the morning of 25 June 1950, ten divisions of the North
To prevent South Korea's collapse, the United Nations Security Council voted to send military forces. The United States Seventh Fleet dispatched Task Force 77, led by the fleet carrier USS Valley Forge; the British Far East Fleet dispatched several ships, including HMS Triumph, to provide air and naval support.[3] By 27 June the naval and air forces moving to Korea had authorization to attack North Korean targets with the goal of helping repel the North Korean invasion of the country.[4] With the US forces seeing the North Korean attack as an act of war, it became imperative to evacuate civilians and American diplomats from Korea, as the forces of the North and South were battling across the peninsula. On 27 June the South Koreans were losing the First Battle of Seoul.[5] Most of South Korea's forces retreated in the face of the invasion. The North Koreans captured the city on 28 June, forcing the South Korean government and its shattered army to retreat further south.[6]
In the meantime, US naval and air forces were evacuating US diplomats, military dependents, and civilians by ship and air transport, hoping to get American civilians out of the country "by any means." Civilians were being gathered at Suwon Airfield and Kimpo Airfield near Seoul, before moving to Incheon and out of the country. These airlifts and convoys were being escorted by aircraft from the Far East Air Force, which was operating its aircraft from bases in Japan.[5]
Air forces involved
The United States Air Force had 1,172 aircraft in the Pacific region at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War, including hundreds of F-80 Shooting Stars as well as numerous F-82 Twin Mustangs, B-26 Invaders, B-29 Superfortresses, among others. Hundreds of aircraft were available to be immediately mustered against the North Korean invasion, many of them the newest jet engine-powered fighter aircraft.[7] The aircraft could fulfill a variety of missions and were well equipped, well armed and out of reach of North Korean attack, with many bases safely in Japan.[8] Additionally, the Fleet Air Arm of the United Kingdom, and the Royal Australian Air Force of Australia provided assistance as 800 Naval Air Squadron, 802 Naval Air Squadron, and No. 77 Squadron RAAF were dispatched to provide additional support for ground operations.[9][10] The combined airpower had about 33,975 personnel.[11] The Republic of Korea Air Force had 1,800 personnel but only 22 planes: 12 liaison aircraft and 10 T-6 Texan trainer aircraft purchased from Canada.
The
Battle
At the 25 June outbreak of the war, the US aircraft in Japan immediately began moving to the closest bases to the Korean Peninsula,
Attack at Suwon
North Korean aircraft first met US aircraft in combat during the Battle of Suwon Airfield, in which 7 of the 13 North Korean aircraft were destroyed. The Lavochkin La-7 and Ilyushin Il-10 were easily outmatched by the superior F-82s and F-80Cs, which also had better-trained pilots. The 8th Fighter Wing, which was attempting to defend Suwon to allow evacuation of US civilians, encountered repeated harassing attacks from the North Koreans operating out of Heijo Airfield in Pyongyang. Heijo was the KPAF's main base, but in the first few days in the war the US pilots only had authorization to defend themselves if attacked; they could not conduct offensive operations into North Korea.[11][14]
Raid of Heijo Airfield
On 29 June the KPAF returned to attack Suwon, and six sorties
The
Subsequent strikes
With the successful strike on Heijo Airfield, the UN attempted more attacks against North Korean airfields. The 19th Bombardment Group launched a 2 July strike at
When they returned to the fight a week later, the North Koreans employed
In counterattacks against the KPAF, the UN responded on 15 July with an attack on Kimpo, destroying two or three of the seven Yak-9s there and damaging the runway at the airfield. On 18 July Task Force 77 attacked Pyongyang and
North Korean airpower ceased to resist UN forces after 20 July, except for isolated engagements. On 5-6 August the final airstrikes on Pyongyang airfields destroyed another 18 combat aircraft, and 7 more were damaged. By this point the North Korean Air Force was considered to have been destroyed, losing 110 aircraft and only possessing 35, with only 18 operable. Through August and September, the North Koreans could only muster at most 16 sorties per day, most by isolated, single aircraft.[22]
Air-to-ground operations
By 30 June, air assets were being rallied against ground targets as well as aircraft. That day the
Beginning with the 5 July
The North Korean ground troops, unprepared for the aggressive use of US air power and untrained in countering it, continued to operate tightly packed convoys on open roads, allowing the US air forces to attack and ravage them repeatedly. From 7 to 9 July an estimated 197 trucks and 44
Aftermath
In spite of the unsuccessful UN ground action from 25 June to 4 August, the air battle for South Korea was considered a crucial success for the UN forces. Able to attain air superiority over its outmatched enemy, the UN air forces were able to concentrate its efforts on attacking the North Koreans on the ground, and in the process inflicted significant casualties. This, in conjunction with bombing missions against North Korean armor, supplies and ports, greatly hampered North Korean efforts against the Pusan Perimeter, contributing to the eventual UN victory on the ground.[31]
Stratemeyer later said the victory was "short and sweet" but attributed the victory more to the North Koreans' lack of a modern air force than to skill; he felt his pilots were just as inexperienced as the UN ground troops and could have faced similar defeats had they not outnumbered the North Koreans. The victory in the air battles also meant a large number of other advantages for the war during August and September: UN troops were able to move by day without fear of air attack, and UN naval ships could operate close to shore. North Korean troops were confined to night attacks to avoid UN aircraft, and much of its limited navy was also destroyed.
References
Citations
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 1
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 2
- ^ Malkasian 2001, p. 23
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 38
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 39
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 2
- ^ a b Futrell 1997, p. 58
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 59
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 90
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 49
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 44
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 19
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 51
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 13
- ^ a b c Futrell 1997, p. 31
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 45
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 46
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 32
- ^ a b Futrell 1997, p. 99
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 151
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 101
- ^ a b Futrell 1997, p. 102
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 33
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 37
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 48
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 95
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 86
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 95
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 97
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 127
- ^ Futrell 1997, p. 98
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 126
Sources
- ISBN 978-0-7818-1019-7
- Appleman, Roy E. (1998), South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: United States Army in the Korean War, ISBN 978-0-16-001918-0, archived from the originalon 2014-02-07, retrieved 2011-08-24
- Futrell, Robert F. (1997), The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953, ISBN 978-0-16-048879-5
- Malkasian, Carter (2001), The Korean War, ISBN 978-1-84176-282-1
- ISBN 978-1-882810-44-4