Battle of Sangju (1950)
36°26′23″N 128°10′11″E / 36.43972°N 128.16972°E
Battle of Sangju | |||||||
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Part of US 24th Infantry fire from Yongdok, July 22. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
North Korea | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Paik Sun Yup | Pak Song-chol | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
25th Infantry Division 1st Infantry Division | 15th Infantry Division | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
US: 13,059 South Korea: 5,727[1] | 7,500[2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
27 killed, 293 wounded, 3 missing ~2,500 killed, wounded and missing |
~2,500 casualties 17 T-34 tanks |
The Battle of Sangju (Korean: 상주 전투) was an engagement between the United Nations and North Korean forces, occurring on July 20–31, 1950, in the village of Sangju in southern South Korea, early in the Korean War. It ended in a victory for the North Korean forces after they were able to push troops of the United States and South Korea out of the area.
The
Background
Outbreak of war
Following the invasion of the South Korea by North Korea, the
The 24th Infantry Division was the first US unit sent into Korea with the mission to take the initial "shock" of North Korean advances, fighting alone and outnumbered for several weeks [4] They delayed much larger KPA units while additional UN forces arrived and moved into position: the 7th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division and other Eighth Army supporting units. ROK forces in the meantime were systematically defeated and forced south along Korea's east coast, with entire divisions being overrun by the KPA's superior firepower and equipment.[4] Advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division were badly defeated in the Battle of Osan on July 5, during the first battle between American and North Korean forces.[5] For the first month after the defeat at Osan, 24th Infantry Division soldiers were repeatedly defeated and forced south by the KPA's superior numbers and equipment.[6][7] The regiments of the 24th Infantry Division were systematically pushed south in battles around Chochiwon, Chonan, and Pyongtaek.[6] The 24th Infantry Division made a final stand in the Battle of Taejon, being almost completely destroyed but delaying KPA forces from advancing until July 20.[8] By that time, the Eighth Army's force of combat troops were roughly equal to North Korean forces attacking the region at around 70,000 for each side, with new UN units arriving every day.[9]
US 25th Infantry Division arrives
At the same time, on the east coast, the KPA
Battle
Capture of Yechon
The first action between elements of the 25th Division and the KPA took place at Yechon on July 20.
Meeting at the battalion command post, the commanders of the US units planned a renewed assault for 05:00 the next morning.
Drawing battle lines
Major General Kean and his 25th Division had to guard two main approaches to Sangju to keep the town from falling to the North Koreans.[21] The main road crossed the Mun'gyong plateau and passed through Hamch'ang at the base of the plateau about 15 miles (24 km) north of Sangju.[26] Next, there was a secondary mountain road that crossed the plateau farther west and, once through the mountains, turned east toward Sangju.[21][27]
On the main road, the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, held a blocking position northwest of Hamch'ang, supported by a
The 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry took up a hill position northwest of Hamch'ang and south of Mun'gyong on the south side of a stream that flowed past Sangju to the Naktong. On the north side of the stream an ROK battalion held the front line.
North Korean attack on Sangju
On July 22 the North Koreans attacked. The ROK troops resisted briefly, but withdrew from their positions on either side of F Company without communicating their intentions.
The next morning five North Korean T-34 tanks crossed the river and moved toward Hamch'ang. Artillery fire from A Battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion knocked out four of the tanks immediately. The fifth moved back across the river, where an air strike later destroyed it.[28]
UN consolidates around Sangju
The 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, was still in its position when it received orders to withdraw to a point 5 miles (8.0 km) north of Sangju on July 23. On July 28 the battalion fell back 2 miles (3.2 km) further, and the next day it moved to a position south of Sangju. On the last day of July, the 35th Infantry was ordered to a blocking position on a line of hills 8 miles (13 km) south of Sangju on the
The ROK
By July 27 all the Mun'gyong divide was in North Korean possession and their units were moving into the valley of the upper Naktong in the vicinity of Hamch'ang. Prisoners taken at the time and others captured later said that the KPA 1st Division suffered 5,000 casualties in the struggle for control of the divide, including the division commander who was wounded and replaced. The KPA 13th Division, following the 1st, suffered about 500 casualties below Mun'gyong, but otherwise it was not engaged during this period.[31] The KPA 15th Division, one of North Korea's weaker divisions which consisted mostly of inexperienced youth, moved on Sangju.[32][33] It was part of a concentrated attack by the KPA aiming to push the UN forces south before they had time to organize an effective defensive line.[34]
Simultaneously with their appearance on the Hamch'ang road at the southern base of the Mun'gyong plateau north of Sangju, the North Koreans approached on the secondary mountain road to the west.[31] On July 22, F Company of the 35th Infantry was also attacked north of Hamch'ang,[35] when it was confronted with a North Korean battalion three times its size. The company fought effectively and inflicted heavy casualties, though the next day rains caused flooding of a river to the unit's rear and cut off its route of supply. Assisted by artillery, it was able to disengage.[36]
The 24th Infantry falters
Elements of the US 24th Infantry Regiment had a similar experience west of Sangju. On that day, the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, and elements of the ROK 17th Regiment were advancing into the mountains 20 miles (32 km) northwest of the town.[37] There, they came into contact with the KPA 48th Regiment, 15th Division, the leading element of the North Korean troops.[38][39] With E Company leading, 2nd Battalion moved along the dirt road into a gorge with precipitous mountain walls. Suddenly, a North Korean light mortar and one or two automatic weapons fired on E Company. It stopped and the men dispersed along the sides of the road.[31][40]
Soon North Korean rifle fire came in on the dispersed men and E and F Companies immediately began withdrawing in a disorderly manner.[41] Troops began shying from the front and retreating without orders, ignoring officers' commands to stay in position.[42] Colonel Horton V. White, the regimental commander, heard of the difficulty and drove hurriedly to the scene. He found the battalion coming back down the road in disorder and most of the men in a state of panic.[41] Historians blame the retreat as much on officers' ineptitude as individual soldiers panicking.[43] He mustered the men and ordered a retreat but by then many soldiers were withdrawing on their own.[42] The next day the ROK 17th Regiment enveloped the North Korean position that had launched the attack and captured two light machine guns, one mortar, and about 30 North Koreans who appeared to be guerrillas. The ROK 17th Regiment fought in the hills for the next two days, making some limited gains, and then it moved back to Sangju to join other units as part of the ROK reorganization in progress around Pusan. This left only the US 24th Infantry Regiment guarding the west approach to Sangju from the Mun'gyong plateau.[41]
The tendency to panic continued in nearly all the 24th Infantry operations west of Sangju.[11][16] Men left their positions and straggled to the rear. They abandoned weapons on positions. On many occasions units lost most of their equipment while on the move, even when not under fire, causing logistical shortages.[44] In other cases the majority of a unit would desert its position at the first sign of North Korean fire.[41]
By July 26 all three battalions of the 24th Infantry were concentrated in remote battle positions that were difficult to resupply, astride the road 10 miles (16 km) west of Sangju.[45] The shortage of UN troops forced the regiment to devote most of its troops to the front, leaving very few reserves to respond to attacks.[46] Elements of the KPA 15th Division advancing on this road had cleared the mountain passes and were closing with the regiment. From July 26 to the end of the month the North Koreans had almost constant contact with the 24th Infantry, which was supported by the 159th and 64th Field Artillery Battalions and one battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion.[41] The North Koreans relied heavily on massed charges to close rapidly on the US lines.[47] This caused heavy casualties for the North Koreans, but their mortars and artillery inflicted significant casualties on the American lines in turn.[48]
During the last days of July, the 24th Infantry generally tried to hold positions during the day, and then withdrew at night.[49] Their performance was mixed; during the first few North Korean attacks, most units held positions until they ran out of ammunition. Higher officers attempted to move the units back in position but were unsuccessful in the face of mounting North Korean resistance.[50] Notably, L Company fought until surrounded by North Korean attackers; the rest of the regiment was able to drive them off.[51]
On July 29 the 1st Battalion suffered about 60 casualties from North Korean mortar fire. As the men were preparing their perimeter defense for the night, a general panic arose, for reasons that are still unclear. Most of them deserted their positions in a state of alarm.[11] Colonel White found himself, the 77th Combat Engineer Company and a battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion all that was left in the front line.[49] He had to personally reorganize the battalion as many of his officers were unable to get the men to listen to them.[52] As White tried to rally his men, the field artillery maintained a sustained barrage of fire to slow the North Koreans advance. That night alone the artillery fired 3,000 rounds in holding back the North Koreans.[49]
US withdrawal
In the final days of the fight, to the west of Sangju, Major John R. Woolridge, one of the regiment's senior officers, set up a check point west of the town and stopped every vehicle coming from the west, taking off stragglers attempting to retreat. Many jeeps were filled with six or seven men claiming they were retreating after their position was overrun.[11][30] He averaged about 75 stragglers a day, and 150 on the last day of the battle.[49] A contingent of military police were dispatched specifically to collect men abandoning their positions and to return them to the front.[53]
By July 30, the 24th Infantry had withdrawn to the last defensible high ground west of Sangju, 3 miles (4.8 km) from the town.
Finally, during the night of July 31 the 24th Infantry Regiment withdrew through Sangju. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, covered the withdrawal.[49][56] The KPA 15th Division set up a new defensive line at Sangju the next day as the 25th Infantry Division was moved to deal with a growing attack on Masan to the south.[55]
Aftermath
In 11 days of action in the Sangju area the 24th Regiment had suffered 323 battle casualties, 27 killed, 293 wounded, and 3 missing.[49] The light casualty count was partially credited to effective use of fortifications and North Korean caution in advancing during the fight, but the fact that 24th Infantry troops were quick to withdraw was also blamed.[57] The regiment, a mostly black unit left over from the US military's recently abolished segregated system, was blasted for its poor performance during the fight.[11] Walker, seeing the 24th Infantry as an ineffective unit, resolved to use it only as a "trip wire force" on the front lines, requiring it to be reinforced by another regiment in reserve to conduct serious resistance when the 24th broke. Other leaders saw the poor performance as a reason to demand further integration of the armed forces, which had not been easy to do before the war.[47] The 24th Infantry was fully desegregated on October 1, 1951.[16]
In reaching the upper Naktong valley at the end of July, the North Korean divisions engaged in this part of the drive southward had suffered heavy casualties. The KPA 1st Division in battling across the Mun'gyong plateau against the ROK 6th Division not only suffered great losses in the ground battle but also took serious losses from UN aerial attack. Prisoners reported that by the time it reached Hamch'ang at the end of July it was down to 3,000 men from the 5,500 it had before the push. The KPA 15th Division, according to prisoners, also lost heavily to artillery and mortar fire in its drive on Sangju against ROK troops and the US 24th Infantry Regiment, and was down to about 5,000 men at the end of July, from 7,500 before the fight. In contrast, the KPA 13th Division had bypassed Hamch'ang on the west and, save for minor skirmishes with ROK troops and the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, it had not been engaged and consequently had suffered relatively few casualties.[49]
In the years since the war, the battle has been investigated as an example of the prevalence of racism in the US Army during the Korean War. The 24th Infantry, though officially desegregated, was still made up overwhelmingly of African-American soldiers. Historians contend its accomplishments, particularly at Yechon, were ignored while shortcomings were seized upon to depict the 24th as a sub-par unit and African-Americans as inferior soldiers to whites.
See also
References
Citations
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 351.
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 435.
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 3.
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 52.
- ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 15.
- ^ a b Varhola 2000, p. 4.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 90.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 105.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 103.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 82.
- ^ a b c d e f Hastings 1988, p. 80.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 350.
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 190.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 88.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 197.
- ^ a b c Alexander 2003, p. 117.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 85.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 355.
- ^ a b Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 89.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 90.
- ^ a b c d Appleman 1998, p. 191.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 91.
- ^ a b Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 92.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 93.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 352.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 87.
- ^ a b c d Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 96.
- ^ a b c d e f Appleman 1998, p. 192.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 378.
- ^ a b Millett 2010, p. 379.
- ^ a b c d e f g Appleman 1998, p. 193.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 97.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 370.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 376.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 99.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 104.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 98.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 100.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 377.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 101.
- ^ a b c d e Appleman 1998, p. 194.
- ^ a b Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 102.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 103.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 105.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 106.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 108.
- ^ a b c Hastings 1988, p. 81.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 109.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Appleman 1998, p. 195.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 110.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 111.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 114.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 115.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 119.
- ^ a b Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 121.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 380.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 113.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 94.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 120.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 122.
- ^ Millett 2007, p. 158.
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 141.
Sources
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