Fédon's rebellion
Fédon's rebellion | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Grenadan revolutionaries Supported by: French Republic | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Ralph Abercromby |
Julien Fédon (MIA) Stanislaus Besson Joachim Philip | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
7,000+ killed |
Fédon's rebellion (also known as the Brigands' War,[1][note 1] or Fédon's Revolution,[3] 2 March 1795 – 19 June 1796) was an uprising against British rule in Grenada. Although a significant number of slaves were involved, they fought on both sides (the majority being on the side of Fédon and his forces). Predominantly led by free mixed-race French-speakers, the stated purpose was to create a black republic as had already occurred in neighbouring Haiti rather than to free slaves, so it is not properly called a slave rebellion, although freedom of the slaves would have been a consequence of its success. Under the leadership of Julien Fédon,[note 2] owner of a plantation in the mountainous interior of the island, and encouraged by French Revolutionary leaders on Guadeloupe, the rebels seized control of most of the island (St. George's, the capital, was never taken), but were eventually defeated by a military expedition led by General Ralph Abercromby.
Planning for the rebellion began in March 1793, when Fédon started converting his Belvidere coffee and cocoa
Although there was a dearth in scholarship regarding the rebellion until the 1960s—particularly in comparison to that of Haiti, for example, since then it has been the focus of increased study, particularly regarding the extent to which it was either a slave rebellion or part of the broader
Background
Late 18th-century Grenada was a 120 square miles (310 km2) island in the South-Eastern Caribbean,
News of the French revolution was, says the historian Kit Candlin, "particularly prescient" in Grenada, especially as two-thirds of the 5,000 free population were French,[18] or gens de couleur.[19] In the early days of the revolution, French planters appear to have remained resistant to the revolution's call to violence. In August 1790 for example, Fédon himself signed a petition against growing radicalism on the island, which claimed that both French and British planters were at risk,[20] although this may also have been a deliberate strategy to defer suspicion.[21] The political upheavals in nearby Haiti provided the motivation for a similar rebellion in Grenada, and also provided a sufficient diversion to allow it to happen.[22] It was not, however, strictly a slave rebellion. In the aftermath, it was noted that perhaps only half the island's slave population had joined the rebels, the other half, comments Candlin, were "found cowering in their plantations or discovered aimlessly wandering the island's roads, unsure of what to do".[23]
At the time of the rebellion, Grenada had a population of approximately 1,125 free coloured residents—including 940 French free coloureds—and 185 British citizens.[24] The situation was worse for the black French, argues Martin, as—even though they were free—they were generally treated as third-class citizens by both the white French and the British.[22] The Governor, Ninian Home, had restricted entry to the island to all but a few French whom he deemed to have "sufferings are great and...principles good"; no slaves or free-coloureds were permitted, whom he believed to be exponents of radical egalitarian doctrines to a man.[25][note 3]
Causes of the revolution
Internal grievances, rather than external influence, were the fundamental cause of Fédon's rebellion, argues the scholar John Angus Martin, being an "anti-discriminatory rebellion for social, political and religious rights by the French who orchestrated and led the rebellion against the British colonial government".
British (
It appears that the native slave and free coloured population did not unduly worry the administration, who saw them as being unlikely to rebel of their own accord. The influx of a large number of French from surrounding islands, however, was a cause for concern.[25] They worried the British, who, says Candlin "regarded them first with deep suspicion then actively tried to oppress them through legislation, each law underscoring further the inherent difficulty members of the white community had at distinguishing friend from foe".[24][note 6] On one occasion, Fédon's wife had been arrested for breaching a restriction and had been imprisoned for some weeks before he could secure her release.[24] Marie Rose Fédon had been unable to prove she was a free woman under a ruling enacted the previous year. Those unable to do so within six weeks were to be sold into slavery.[36][note 7]
The scholar of Caribbean history Laurent Dubois suggests that "chafing under [British] regulations, the free coloureds of Grenada watched intently as the nearby French colonies instituted policies of racial equality".[37] For their part, the British—who knew what had happened in other islands—expected "anarchy, confusion and killings...Increasingly the Governor's correspondence was filled with worries for security and his fear of the island's French inhabitants, especially the free coloureds".[38] There were rumours of a rising some months before it took place, and slaves were offered incentives to report to their owners anything they learned.[39][note 8] Lieutenant Governor Home[40] appears to have been expecting an invasion from the French in Guadeloupe rather than an initial uprising, as he devoted most of the militia to manning coastal lookouts.[41][note 9]
Planning
Planning of the rebellion seems to have begun around March 1793. Dr Hay later reported that a
Supplies were initially received
Participants
The first slaves to join Fédon and his comrades were their own, whom they had freed as one of their first acts.[51] Candlin has estimated that around 12,500 slaves took an active role in the rebellion, or half the island's slave population.[23][note 12] Praedial slaves appear to have been more militant, generally, than house slaves, and a contemporary complained that it was "the most trusted, and best treated, both men and women, [who] were the first to join, and the most active in the insurrection".[52] Although the slaves who revolted were doing so for with the aim of their own emancipation as their primary goal, they appear to have had a longer-term intention of abolishing the system itself.[16] The French white and freedmen probably only amounted to around 150 individuals, however,[20] while the leadership cadre possessed a "stark diversity of ideas and personalities" among them.[47] Many had been business associates of Fédon and his brothers-in-law, or legal witnesses to deeds and charters;[38] Murphy suggests that "personal ties, as well as the belief that political rights should be extended to men regardless of race, may have motivated at least some of the white participants".[53] Of the rebel army in the field on the rebellion's outbreak, Craton has estimated its size at around 350 who possessed firearms, 250 with pikes or swords, and the remainder awaiting weapons.[54] Fédon's rebels were assisted by the island's Catholic priesthood, who were later accused of fermenting dissent, as well as mulattos who had originally propagated the ideals of the French revolution in 1789–1790 but had been then driven underground by the British.[55] Cox argues that the initial success of the rebellion is a direct result of the fact that it "seemed to promise something to all its participants".[12]
Of Fedon himself, or his family, notes Curtis Jacob, little is known. John Garraway, whose father lived through the rebellion, reported that Fédon was of no great ability, "nor was he possessed of any extraordinary courage, but in his detestation of the whites, and his readiness to assent to any species of cruelty and atrocity, his companions saw sufficient qualifications to entitle him to command".
Leadership
Julien Fédon, the leader, was the son of a slave woman and a French planter, from whom he inherited Belvidere. Ideologically, Fédon had undergone a "remarkable" change since 1790, when he had written in support of the administration.
Much of Fédon's immediate support came from his relatives, either by blood or by marriage.[59] Prominent amongst them was his wife, Marie Rose, whom eyewitnesses later testified to being an "active and engaging presence" alongside Fédon.[66] Another leading figure, Joachim Philip, was, according to Candlin, a "most interesting man".[67] From a large and extremely prosperous family of Grenadian planters, with much standing in the community,[59] he felt that he had been repeatedly ignored for office or patronage by the British administration.[67][note 15] The rebellion's leadership, suggests Candlin, was composed of "tightly knit series of free coloured families who all intermarried". Fédon's deputy in the rebellion, Stanislaus Besson—also appointed by Hugues[64]—was a local silversmith; Philip was a carpenter. Fédon was heavily mortgaged.[38]
Belvidere Estate: Camp Liberté
The conspirators' headquarters was Fédon's remote plantation in Belvidere Estate.[1] This covered 360 square kilometres (140 sq mi) and held 965 African slaves.[68] Capable of producing 6,600 pounds (3.0 t) of coffee and 20,250 pounds (9.19 t) of cocoa,[40] its plantation was situated up the side of a steep mountain.[69][note 16] Belvidere then was not only large[64] but largely inaccessible[51] and its isolation gave it commanding views of the surrounding countryside. Further, not only had Fédon arranged a food supply, but it was backed by springs and streams providing a water supply.[43]
Outbreak and the first week of operations
The political historian Timothy Ashby has argued that Home had a chance to assert Britain against the conspirators in 1794 when he was urged to collect arms off all the French and free coloureds. Home, though, a local planter later reported, was "fearful that such a measure would betray their own weakness and apprehensions", and did not do so.[45] By 1 March 1795, Home, Candlin argues, was "increasingly desperate and aware that something might be afoot". The militia was raised, but—in a continuance of the heavy-handed treatment of the island's coloured population—the coloured members of the militia were excluded from the general call to arms,[71] in whom Home "should think it the last imprudence to trust the fortifications and military stores".[46] This created further ill-feeling, and may, suggest Candlin, encouraged those members to join, rather than resist, the rebels. Home's actions may have forced Fédon's hand in the timing of the rebellion: "On an island where distrust and disloyalty were salient features, keeping covert plans secret was impossible".[71]
In February, Fédon despatched Nogues and Valette to Guadeloupe, seeking the assistance of the new French republican government under Victor Huges. Only absent a few days, when they returned it was bearing the rank of captain in the French revolutionary army and a large supply of arms, tricolour cockades and liberty caps.[71] Having received ideological instruction and arms training,[45] they returned with a commissions of rank in the French revolutionary army.[72] Fedon was appointed Commandant-General, Stanislau Besson his deputy, and Nogue and Lavalette both captains.[41] Nogues was Hugues' personal representative on Grenada.[73] Their instructions were simple: To promulgate the revolution through Grenada and then to the rest of the archipelago,[74] in return for which they would receive prompt and fulsome support.[75] Fédon—now holding the rank of General—directed the opening assaults on the night of 2–3 March 1795,[76] simultaneously attacking the towns of Gouyave and Grenville,[note 17] in the parishes of St John and St Andrew respectively.[1]
Massacre at Grenville and Marquis
In the east, at the small village of Grenville, a group of around 100
Assault on Gouyave
Gouyave—where Fédon owned a large property
Intelligence
It is possible, suggests Jacobs, that Hay's own servant was a member of Fédon's intelligence network. Hay later reported how, on the forced march to Belvidere, Hay observed his "principal servant John Charles, with a national cockade in his hat; he addressed himself to me, and said he had been pressed into the service as a drummer, which I doubted".[82] Hay believed Fedon's intelligence to be extensive. Not only was it suggested by the fact that—despite it being common supposition that the militia's supplies of guns and ammunition were held in St George's—the raiders on Hay's house knew he kept a large quantity of gunpowder in his cellar and muskets in an outhouse. Hay believed that, prior to the outbreak of rebellion, "not a single transaction of moment took place in town which was not known in six hours afterwards at their post of Belvidere", and that thefts of guns and munitions were being stolen by sympathisers in the capital and despatched to Belvidere on a daily basis.[83] Not all Fedon's agents were slaves; at least one, Pierre Llavat, was white, and he was a constable of St George's parish, having been "strongly recommended" for the post by the magistrates, says Hay. Labat was one of the group who arrested Hay, and Jacobs argues this indicates that agents had infiltrated the colonial police, and, therefore, "at least part of Grenada's internal security had been compromised".[84]
Governor Home was not in St George's when the rebellion was launched, but was on his estate in Paraclete in the northeast of the island. He heard exaggerated rumours that the rebels were already in control of the island, so, believing the roads to be unsafe, he took a sloop to Gouyave.[54][note 20] Soon after the attackers left Gouyave, Home—not realising that the town had been raided—landed at Gouyave with four others. Fédon's brother, Jean-Pierre had been left in command;[44] Home's longboat was captured before it had even landed, and he and his men were also taken back to Belvidere.[54] Fédon's simultaneous assault on two targets equidistant from his central base has been seen as an example of his grasp of military tactics,[81] as well as indicating the extent of his intelligence network.[86] Conversely, Home's inability to act decisively has supported arguments as to his weakness of character in a crisis. Critical to Home's capture, so Grenadian oral history tells it, were the actions of a slave named Oroonko. Oroonko, it was said, wanted revenge on Home, who had split Oroonko and his wife up; recognising Home's isolation on the estate, Oroonko made his way to Fédon and passed on the information.[87] Oronookoo, argues Jacobs, although a slave, was "obviously gathering intelligence at the highest echelons of Grenada's British community".[86][note 21] Home, writing to the council in St George's on 3 March, telling them[88]
No French had landed at La Baye, but the Free people have risen against the Whites. Captain Blair and several are killed. I think the Coloured people ought not to have their arms or at least none except Captain La Grenade's company. I shall be in town as soon as possible.[89]
But, notes Brizan, "Governor Home was never to see St George's again".[89]
Marching on St George's
Without entering into any detail of our rights, we summon you, and all the inhabitants, of every denomination in this colony, to surrender, within the space of two hours, to the republican forces under our command...And we give you notice, that in case of your not submitting, as you are enjoined, you shall be liable to all the scourges of a disastrous war ... Done at our camp, the fourth of March in the third year of the French Republic, one and indivisible. Julien Fédon, Officer of the Republic, appointed at Guadeloupe.[90]
Proclamation of Julien Fédon, 4 March 1796
The morning after the attacks on Gouyave and Grenville, a
Time and the defeat of the English forces at Guadeloupe had weakened the remembrance of the heinous crimes by which the vile satellites of GEORGE had sullied the Windward Islands...that from and after the date of this our official declaration, the assassination of each and every individual republican (of whatever colour he is; and in whatever island it may happen) shall be expiated by the death of two English officers, our prisoners.[90]
Proclamation of Victor Huges to the British council in St George's, 4 March 1796
Fédon's message finished by telling the British that Grenada was French by birth and by right; "you", said Fédon, "are only intruders; you came from England, that is your country, where you ought to have remained".[96] Nogues and Philip were fed and watered by the British—which "they calmly enjoyed"—while the latter went into consultation.[90] Outside, meanwhile, the rest of the gang that had accompanied them was becoming increasingly fractious and was being continually augmented by supporters in St George's. The British procrastinated, suggests Candlin, probably because the deputy Governor McKenzie was unused to taking command.[67]
French republican propaganda was important to the rebels in recruiting.
By the end of the week, the rebel ranks had swollen to over 7,000 people, comprising coloured and black freemen, whites and self-emancipated.
British response
The British, besieged in the south in the capital, St George's, were taken by surprise, and this frustrated their efforts at a concerted response.[56] The British garrison comprised 190 troops and officers of the 9th and 58th Regiments of Foot, and a small section of Royal Artillery. About half of the garrison was unfit for duty due to illness.[81] Although in disarray, when the rebels called upon the administration to dissolve itself, the British refused.[56] Although Nogues' and Philip's negotiations with McKenzie lasted three hours, they left with nothing tangible to show for it, and it is likely that the deputy Governor expected reinforcements shortly. This belief enabled McKenzie to dismiss the rebels' demands, saying, "with some stoicism...that any British Governor, indeed any British subject, imprisoned or otherwise would rather die with honour than face the ignominy of surrendering an island to slaves.[99] This was in spite of Home having written, under supervision, to the council urging them to give "serious consideration" to the rebel's proposals and urging to do what they could to save the hostages' lives,[102] because, Home wrote, Fédon had made a "positive declaration" to kill hostages at some point.[103] McKenzie offered a reward of 20 johannes to anyone who captured a rebel.[94][note 23]
Cox suggests that had the British launched a lightning raid on the rebels camp, they might have caught them sufficiently dispersed and disarrayed to grant the attackers a swift victory. McKenzie wrote to London demanding reinforcements, emphasising the precarious nature of British rule following the rebellion:
Every moment of inactivity must increase the evil within, as the Negroes are daily joining the Insurgents and desolating the Estates; all of which have been plundered, and a number in the neighbourhood of St George's...have been burnt".[107]
Brigadier-General Sir Colin Lyndsay was despatched to Grenada with 150 regular soldiers from Martinique,[108] as was a force comprising reinforcements from Barbados and the sailors and marines from a passing British frigate. Also present were a number of Spanish soldiers sent by José María Chacón, Governor of Trinidad[99] in what Candlin describes as a "rare show of foreign support".[109][note 25]. McKenzie had written to him at the same time as he had requested his domestic reinforcements, reminding Chácon it was "a moment pregnant with so much danger, as well to the Spanish, as the British colonies."[92][note 26]
Course of the rebellion
A few days into the rebellion, Fédon told his hostages that they need not expect swift rescue, as the rebels "were perfectly acquainted with the mode of making war in the woods".
The rebellion, says Martin, "raged for 15 months, and saw extreme brutality and destruction" take place.[56] Many of the white French rebels surrendered to the British as the rebellion increased in ferocity; they may have felt more endangered from the rebels than from the British.[47] Most British planters deserted their estates for the towns, leaving both them and any faithful slaves at the mercy of the rebels.[108] The British Army sustained continual losses, and the Chief Surgeon, called McGrigor, recorded "frightful" losses.[113]
In the early days of the rebellion, comments Candlin, and in spite of the widespread destruction, "Fédon seemed to have kept a semblance of order or, at least, focus".
Sickness, mostly from
Little activity from either side is known of between the initial rebel attacks and May 1795; the rebels may have spent their time consolidating the defences at Belvidere; Philip's brother was a trained
Attacks on Belvidere
The British launched a number of assaults on the Belvidere Estate. The first was the day after Nogues' and Philip's visit to St George's, and the plan was to disperse Fedon's army before it could gather more adherents and become further entrenched. To this end, the militias of St Patrick's and St Andrew's parishes were raised with the aim of approaching Fédon from the east, north and west of the island. Demonstrating the seriousness of the situation argues Ashby, is the fact that the militia commanders were instructed, at their discretion, "to arm a number of able trusty negroes" at a time when the administration was in constant fear of those members of the population turning the aforesaid guns against their masters.[118]
A force led by Captain Gurdon of the 58th landed at Gouyave, intending to march east to Belvidere. However—in what Ashby has termed a "tactical error"—instead of doing so immediately, he camped his force in town overnight. His men, in turn, proceeded to get plastered on "rum, wine and porter"; as a result, Ashby's role in the operation was called off. However, they were still called upon to fight. Somehow, the rebels had learned of Gurdon's presence in Gouyave and attacked the town with around 400 men. This attack, suggests Ashby, was probably designed to test the British strength and the defences for weak spots. Twelve rebels died to four defenders: Comments Ashby, "Apparently, the St. George's Militia distinguished themselves during the action, which sorely embarrassed the British officers because of their own men's drunkenness".[119]
Strong drink
On the east of the island, the militia refused to make its way to Gurdon because of, as they saw it, "the hostile disposition of almost all the gangs of negroes, not to say the same of many whites in this quarter". By the time McKenzie had managed to persuade them to march out and meet Gurdon, over a day had been lost. And although Gurdon's force had been reinforced with sailors from HMS Quebec, both his men and the newly-arrived sailors had got drunk again and were in no position to campaign. In response, Gurdon marched them closer to Fédon's camp, where they would be denied access to further libations. His plan failed, however, when he discovered that, as he later noted in his official report, "contrary to my expectations, I found that the negroes brought rum to the men from every house or hut". Ashby suggests that, of the 50 Royal Marines from the Quebec, on 28 were capable of marching any distance.[120] Eventually, the attempt on the Belvidere encampment was arranged for Sunday, 8 March. In the event, Gurdon considered it too well defended to be successfully stormed with the force at his disposal and the British returned to Gouyave. By this point, the militia was on the verge of revolt, so Gurdon deemed it tactical to withdraw to St George's.[120] Gurdon's army was beset with discontent, with many considering their position outnumbered and helpless. Fights broke out in the ranks, and on one occasion, a private attempted to bayonet his captain. Another captain was urging the men to desert and the militia's doctor had already abandoned his post.[121]
On 12 March, Colin Lindsay arrived in Grenada; he was followed by Schaw two days later. With them came men from the
Attack of 20 March
Sir, Upwards of one half of the militia having left me, contrary to the most positive orders, I have been prevented from carrying my plans into execution; and as I shall not be able to act offensively until I have at least a number equal to those with which I set out, I thought it advisable to give the part of the militia that remained behind and who bore cheerfully much hardship from the extreme badness of the weather, leave to return to St. George's to refresh themselves, under the positive promise of them returning in two days; in which time it is to be hoped that the weather may prove more favourable for active operations...I must request a supply of blankets and shirts for my troops, as when they laid down their haversacks to engage the enemy, the negroes stole them.[124]
General Lindsay complains to McKenzie, 21 March 1795
At dawn on the 15th, Lindsay led 400 men and militia northwards out of St George's toward Gouyave—the rebels having evacuated on his approach—he awaited Royal Marines to be landed again. Although it is unknown for what reason, Lindsay kept his troops at Gouyave for another two days before marching westwards. About a mile from Fédon's camp, Lindsay rested the troop for two hours. This argues Ashby, was a mistake, as it wasted the final precious hours of daylight. Belvidere was once again not taken, and although a rebel outpost was captured, two men were lost in a bloody set-to doing so. Further operations were hampered by continuing rain, and Lindsay wrote to McKenzie on 21 March.[124] While promising to be in the enemy camp "tomorrow",[122] he also had a litany of complaint ranging from the (poor) quality of his forces to the weather, to thieving locals and the continued inebriation of much of his army. Two days later—"in a fit of temporary insanity",[124] possibly brought on by fever[122]—he blew his brains out.[124]
British offensives
At this point Vaughan—then in Martinique—called off all British offensive operations until reinforcements could be despatched to Grenada.[125] The outpost captured by Lindsay was to be maintained as an observation post by Schaw, and he was also to reinforce Gouyave. However, McKenzie believed that inactivity would be bad for the army and countermanded Vaughn's orders, despatching a force by sea under Schaw to reinforce Grenville. On their arrival, they came under artillery fire from Pilot Hill, killing one. Ashby estimates Fédon to have placed 200 men on Pilot Hill to accompany two pieces of cannon; this was too strong a defensive position to be taken by Schaw's smaller force. Schaw wrote to McKenzie, complaining that he and his men were "here without any provisions or bread, and there are scarce any plantains to be found".[126] He also highlighted how sickness was ravaging his troops, "a considerable number [of whom] with sore legs".[127][note 31]
An escapee from Fédon's camp informed the administration that, with around 7,000 people a day to feed—which itself took between eight and ten cattle to achieve daily—Fedon's army was starting to run out of supplies as well as meteriél.[123] At the same time, Abercromby, in Barbados defeated Goyrand in St Lucia. Bringing that island under control was a tactical necessity, as there was little point in attempting an invasion of Grenada until it was cut off from its supply lines.[128] A number of French ships were captured attempting to import arms. Those on board were taken prisoner except in one case when a deserter from the militia was discovered; he was hanged in St George's market place.[123] A number of small rebel positions were attacked and overran, including Paradise Negro-House, Pilot House and Telescope Hill, but Gurdon's position on the latter gave him a view from which he established that an assault on Belvidere could lose him up to two-thirds of his men. Furthermore, although now in possession of Pilot Hill, he doubted he could hold it for any period of time, so he withdrew that night.[125]
Murder of the hostages
Despite having sworn to kill the hostages if Belvidere was attacked, it had now been assaulted twice without their having been harmed, indicating their value to Fédon.[129] Eventually, though, he lost patience.[130] In retaliation for the attack on Belvidere—and perhaps indicating how close it had come to victory[131]—Fédon had the 44 of his 47 hostages killed: "one by one", comments Candlin, "the prisoners were dragged from the coffee store into the estate courtyard and shot, their blood mingling with the muddy, rain-soaked ground and running in great streams off the hillside".[132][note 32] This number included the island's Governor, Ninian Home, upon whose killing Marie Rose Fédon observed with a "cold indifference", as Dr Hay later wrote,[66] or a "protean detachment" according to Brizan.[134] The Fédons' daughter, also Marie Rose,[135] may also have been an onlooker.[note 33] Another victim was one James Campbell, who had originally sold Fédon the Belvidere estate in 1791 and was also close to Ninian Home.[44] The dead were buried in a mass grave, but this was dug into by rooting pigs.[137] The survivors were sent to Guadeloupe and into Hugues' custody.[138]
Among those whom Frédon allowed living was the "much-loved" Parson McMahon—who may have been personally known to Fédon—a Dr Hay, and a fellow named Kerr. Dr Hay was spared because, as a medical doctor, his skills would come in handy to the rebels;[99] it is also probable, suggest Candlin and Pybus, that this was a quid pro quo for his generous treatment of Marie Rose following her arrest.[139] Little is known of Kerr, although he may have been married to the daughter of a local French chevalier.[137] It is also unknown why he was spared, is unknown, but in his memoirs, Dr Hay asserted that Kerr was probably a rebel spy among the hostages.[99]
May 1795
In May 1795, the British launched a surprise night-attack on Fédon's Belvidere base. Due to Lindsay's suicide, the command had fallen to his inexperienced subordinate, Colonel Schaw. The British troops, in particular, were weakened by sickness, and this lost them the element of surprise they had relied on for victory.[99]
As the Belvidere Estate was situated on elevated ground, the British were at a severe tactical disadvantage.
In torrential rain,[108] the British attacked from several directions simultaneously, supported by both cannon and cavalry.[69] After intense hand-to-hand combat, the British army got to the gates of Morte redoubt.[131] Dr Hay was responsible for the rebels' medical station in Liberté.[140] Fédon's brother, Jean-Pierre, was killed in the intense fighting.[69] and Fédon later suggested that no quarter was given the rebels. The attack, however, had dissipated by morning. The failure was the result, says Candlin, of "poor coordination, coupled with bad weather and mere bad luck";[99] Jacobs describes the operation as "bungled".[31] The British lost 27 men dead and 57 wounded.[131]
Hiatus
The assault on Belvidere and the killings of the hostages was followed, comments Candlin, by a "bizarre year-long standoff"
Their attachment and fidelity to the cause is great; they go to death with indifference. One man the other day denied, and persevered in doing so, that he had ever been with them or knew anything of them. The instant before he was shot he called out "vive le république".[98]
During this period, argues Cox, the helplessness of the British position was exposed to all;[103] they were awaiting men and supplies that were gradually reached them by sea.[34] During these months, says Dubois, with the British confined to St George's, Fédon's followers "pillaged and destroyed the abandoned plantations on the rest of the island".[142] This enabled Fédon to feed the increasing number of people who now dwelt at Camp Liberté.[143] McKenzie continued to fortify St George's until it was almost as formidable a port as English Harbour in Antigua.[131] He decided to conserve his forces and retreat to urban areas and forts,[131] but by doing so, suggests Walvin, he allowed Fédon effectively to create a "state within a state".[144] McKenzie recognised, however, that he was no soldier and could not expect troops to obey him as if he was their general.[note 35] He wrote to Vaughn on 9 April that, regretfully[134]
The plans I have formed for the restoration of tranquillity were the best which I could devise but they have been uniformly defeated by some sinister accident. My profession is not arms and of course, it cannot be expected that the army will act under me with that vigour and confidence which they would feel when commanded by an experienced general.[134]
MacKenzie was also forced to rely on credit to bring in supplies from other islands.
The failure of the attack on St George's meant that the British remained in control of the most important strategic site on the island, and to where they could be regularly revictualled. Fédon, meanwhile, remained in command of most of the island. His army needed feeding, but he had no effective strategy for this and mainly relied on hand-to-mouth pillaging of by now-deserted estates. Although originally a rich vein of succour, these estates—by now producing nothing due to the war—were gradually becoming less and less profitable for the rebels. This was reflected generally: says Candlin, "the island's produce was destroyed, there were no crops and the economy completely collapsed".[34]
Following the suicide of Lindsay, he was replaced by Brigadier-General Oliver Nicolls who brought 1,000 men and over-ran Pilot Hill in early May;[note 36] Gurdon was killed in one of the skirmishes.[146] At the same time, HMS Mermaid captured two French ships and the 250 marines on board.[131] However, Yellow Fever continued to ravage the British Army, which by summer 1795 had lost two-thirds of its regulars to the disease; further, large numbers of the white militia also deserted. By the start of 1796 Craton has estimated that the militia stood at 281 active men (when it had been 535 the same time the previous year). There was some good news for McKenzie; the creation of a Loyal Black Ranger Corp had proved popular as an auxiliary force and now comprised 5 companies of 60 men and 25 officers.[131][note 37] However, despite the sea embargo, the rebels were able to land two ships from St Lucia which provided 200 French troops.[146]
Support
External
The rebels maintained a world view of events, and a comment from one of Fedon's deputies acknowledges this: "Liberty can never be confined solely to the dominions of France, but must gradually extend to every corner of the globe, when it will the interest of mankind to unite and totally terminate that perfidious race".
In Guadeloupe, Hugues, says Dubois, "issued a declaration of all-out war against the British", declaring that they were trying to crush the rights of man and the "brave and loyal Republicans" upholding them.
Internal dissention
From almost the point the rebellion had been declared, rifts appeared in the ranks. In the first week, a mutinous rebel shot Lavalette, and was then himself ordered executed by Fédon. Martin suggests that internal relations went downhill rapidly on account of the rebels' failure to swiftly overcome the British forces.[47] Nogues, too, seems to have fallen out with the leadership relatively quickly; although an original member of the Commission of 24, he left it soon after the rebellion broke out.[151] Martin notes that the causes of Nogues' falling out with Fédon is now unknown, but in a letter to Fédon, Goyrand urged him to strive for unity:[151]
We are pained to see how divided you are; the enemy will hear of it, and will take advantage of it to fall upon you and defeat you. Let ambition give way to love of the Republic. It is impossible for you all to be in charge; obey those who command you and do not force us to use harsh measures against you. Listen to our appeals, they are for your own good.[151]
Gaspar Goyrand, in St Lucia, wrote that he had heard that "several individuals have desired to act a part in this revolution, who, from a spirit of jealousy, of ambition, or the insanity of pride, have endeavoured to revive prejudices condemned to profound oblivion".[155] He reminded Fédon that, for as long as his "ambition [is] to wear epaulettes" rather than unite his army, he was hurting the rebellion's chances.[151] For his part, Hugues seems to have disapproved of Fédon's treatment of the hostages: in April 1795 he sent a ship to bring them from Grenada to Guadeloupe, but by then—with the exception of Hay, McMahon and Kerr—they had all been killed.[134] As a result of the disagreements between Fédon and Hugues, the rebellion effectively split into two parties,[31] physically and ideologically.[156] The French Republicans were based at Belvidere, while the Grenadians operated out of Gouyave.[31] Resources were also a source of contention within the rebel leadership. At one point, possibly around the time Gurdon missed the opportunity to take Pilot Hill, Nogues wrote to Fédon complaining that Nogues' repeated requests for ammunition had gone unfulfilled:[114]
Citizen—To the several demands which I have made for ammunition, you have given me for an answer that you could not send any. Recollect that the powder belongs to the Republic, as well as ourselves. I must tell you, that ammunition ought not to be refused to a chief whom the Republic has invested with its powers.[114]
Divisions within the leadership may have been exacerbated, suggests Candlin, as much by the independence of the slaves and the position they forced the rebels into as much as anything the British administration could do.[157]
Summoned by Goyrand
The two rebel groups, while fighting a common enemy, had increasingly distinct commands.[156] This came to a head in October 1795, when Goyrand finally took action against Fédon. Goyrand ordered the dissolution of the Commission of 24 and summoned Fédon to Guadeloupe. Nogues had brought charges against Fédon, and Goyrand was investigating, but Fédon failed to appear. As a result, he was stripped of his command of the French revolutionary troops in Grenada he had been sent, although he maintained his control of the freedmen and slaves.[151]
Rebel government
Idleness being a Vice contrary to the Spirit Of the Government, the Energy of the Government, being to watch over the happiness Of the Social Contract, It is therefore the Duty Of the Government to work at extirpating this odious Vice of Idleness. The Eye of the Chief has penetrated into the forests, and instead of wild beasts, has seen there Citizens living separate from the Society of men. The Law does not know man, whom Society does not know. All those who live at a distance from others, are suspicious in her (sic) Eyes, She cannot look upon them as her legitimate Children. A Vagabond is a dangerous Monster, every man useless to the Republic ought to be treated as such, the Action of the honest man are public Acts, usefull (sic) to the Republic, as well as himself. Now, he who lives retired and concealed does no public Actions, whose Actions are not useful to the public Cause, and from that time he must be considered as a suspicious and dangerous man, this is a man whom Government must prosecute with all the Rigour of the laws in order to make him useful to the common happiness[...][156]
Ordinance of the Police, signed by Fédon on 12 Brumaire, Year IV (2 November 1795)
During their occupation of Gouyave by the rebels—who made it their capital—the town was renamed
Renewal of hostilities
In August 1795, the administration had requested and received, a 10,991,459[clarification needed] loan with which to fund the revolt's suppression. Similar requests followed, with increased frequency.[160] Late December 1795 saw a renewed British offensive. On 17 December In January 1786, the Grenville garrison was attacked by a larger rebel force, killing two British officers. The town was besieged for a week before the rebels withdrew to Marquis. Nicolls reported to Dundas that the rebels had not been particularly effective:[161]
They got a Gun to bear on the blockhouse, which was soon silenced; they made some attempts to cut off communication between Pilot Hill and the town of [Grenville] which have been equally frustrated, and their guns taken and destroyed and thrown over the cliff into the sea by Sallies from the Garrison.[161]
However, the rebels were able to bring two large schooners' worth of men and guns into Marquis Bay. This prompted Nicolls to write again requesting reinforcements from home and emphasising the strategic importance of Pilot Hill. By early January, these forces were ready to sail to Grenada. The
By the first week in April a division of not less than 4,000 British infantry will be ready to sail from England, Ireland and Gibraltar, which I trust will be found sufficient to replace all the losses which the army may experience during the Campaign.[162]
On 17 February, rebel schooners captured a
By now low on water and supplies, the decision was taken to evacuate Pilot Hill. Major Wright, 42 British and 264 black soldiers made their way through a besieging force of around 1,500 rebels. Two men two wounded to carry had to be left behind, along with a large quantity of cannon and other weaponry. Ashby describes their escape—without loss—as "miraculous".[164] By March 1796, the government had abandoned a number of posts and the rebels had captured several others; Brizan suggests that "there was no doubt that at this time five parishes were firmly under Fédon's control. St George's alone eluded his grasp."[111] However, by early 1796, Fédon's army, says Cox, faced the consequences of their policy from the previous year of burning and pillaging the island's estates. This had, in the short term, fed the army and its supporters, but no further cultivation had taken place and a food shortage began. Furthermore, he had, by occupying so many outposts, overextended his supply lines, and the British were aware of this.[143][note 42]
Arrival of British reinforcements
Grenada now became the focus of British military and strategic operation in the West Indies; Jacobs writes how Haiti, "the colony in which the British had sacrificed thousands of soldiers in order to wrest it France, was consigned to the background".[128] In March 1796 Nicolls launched an assault on the Grenville-Marquis area. The rebels were forced to fight and were eventually expelled from the area having lost around 300 men. Fédon was himself wounded and his force retired to the mountains surrounding Grand Etang and Belvidere.[165]
In the meantime, Britain had been organising an expeditionary force under Sir Ralph Abercromby to take back the island. It was by now long overdue; although Abercromby had been appointed in June 1795,[166] a series of mishaps[note 43] had prevented a number of departures from the south of England.[128] The expeditionary force arrived in Barbados—the designated mustering point from where to invade Grenada in June 1796.[34][128] Abercromby was a highly capable officer[note 44] and now outnumbered the rebels by about 10 to 1.[165]
Reinforcements of around 500 men from the
Collapse of the rebellion
The arrival of reinforcements led to a number of British attacks on rebel positions, which were gradually overtaken piecemeal.[171] On at least one occasion, said Dyott, as the rebels fled, British cavalry "made dreadful slaughter with their swords on the enemy that were endeavouring to make their escape", although he also says that "it was some time dubious how the affair would end".[172] In early May, an attack on Post Royal saw around 300 rebels killed and 500 escaping, including Fédon; British losses were six officers and 40 men.[173] A temporary stalemate existed while the British awaited further reinforcements, as sickness was as much an enemy as the rebels. The army also experienced a small number of desertions. Dyott reports how "three villains (Dutchmen) deserted from the 25th regiment to the enemy. One of them was afterwards taken at Gouyave, and we had him hung up on the highest tree we could find without ceremony."[174]
On 28 May Sir John Hope arrived in St George's; he also reported the recent British capture of St Lucia. This was welcome news to the British administration of Grenada, as it meant that troops could now be diverted from St Lucia to assist against the rebellion.[174] Dyott describes the difficulties of the final 21-hour march on Fédon's headquarters:
Our march for the last three miles was literally up and down precipices, half-way up the leg in clay, and through a wood where I believe no human foot had ever before stepped. A party from the enemy had attacked our advanced guard, and disputed the ground we halted upon, but they made no stand; however, they annoyed us all evening with their bush fighting from the woods with which we were surrounded, and killed and wounded several men."[175]
Around this time Abercromby wrote to London that when he found Fédon, "his Force is supposed not to exceed 300 Men, without any regular Supply of Provisions, but in a Situation very difficult of Access".[176] Candlin estimates that it took only a fortnight to rout Fédon's rebel army and regain the island.[34] After a short exchange in which there were no British casualties, the 200-strong[175] French republican force in Gouyave under Captain Jossey de Tournecy[165] surrendered to Nicolls on 10 June.[31] There were six articles of surrender, and included the return of the non-free to slavery. Fédon's army, still in the field and composed almost exclusively of this demographic was otherwise not mentioned in the surrender of Jossey's men.[note 46] Jossey's surrender marked the end of both revolutionary France's engagement in Grenada and its support of Fédon's rebellion.[note 47] It is unknown, notes Jacobs, whether Fédon was aware of his ally's intention of surrendering before Jossey did so, although much of the revolutionary army seems to have melted away under cover of darkness and joined Fédon's forces in the interior.[177]
Attack on Camp Liberté
By this time, however, Fédon seems to have been running low on supplies in Belvidere; a contemporary reported that the ensconced rebels had "a number of Cattle, but plantains...fall short, and they have not Salt".
During the night of 18 June, the attackers—deliberately leaving their campfires burning below
Fédon's fate
Jacobs notes that "many revolutönaries preferred death to slavery and leapt off the mountain stronghold to their deaths".[177] Fédon was officially last seen on 27 June 1796, and may have been among those who did so; although whether he actually died is unknown.[177] Craton suggests that it was from this point that he and those with him were transformed from "revolutionary soldiers into legendary outlaws",[184] and this was due at least in part to the fact that he had avoided an ignominious death at the hands of the government.[44][note 51] Nine days later the Grenadians in Belvidere surrendered.[31] By the end of the rebellion, the British presence in Grenada has been estimated at 5,000 men,[144] and, comments Candlin, "clearly by the end of the conflict Fedon's dreams of becoming a republican general and governor of the island were in tatters".[6]
Fédon's fate is unknown, comments Candlin, "only a compass in an upturned rowboat tantalizing" scholars as to his end. The fact that the boat was pointing towards Trinidad when it was found suggested to contemporaries that he had drowned attempting to join his sister there.[133] Brizan supports the argument that Fédon died en route to Trinidad, in a boat unfit for the journey.[185] The Spanish administration of Trinidad was so disorganised, say Candlin and Pybus, that this would not have been as difficult as it may seem.[182] Dubois also believes Fédon to have escaped the island.[186] A report as late as 1815, from Sir Ralph Woodford, Governor of Trinidad, that Fédon had been recently sighted in Cuba. However, the Spanish government disallowed an investigation.[133] Candlin inclines to the theory that—"Given the interconnectedness of relatives in Trinidad and Grenada"—it is most likely that he survived and went into hiding in the former,[133] while Jacobs suggests that he escaped to Cuba.[31] Wherever he was, suggests Craton, he was presumably "living incognito and waiting for his chance to return and lead the ultimate rebellion".[187] The failure to capture Fédon both enhanced his mythical status among the freed coloureds and slaves and created a long-term sense of insecurity for the white population, who lived in a semi-constant state of fear of his return.[188] The £500 reward for his capture was never claimed.[177]
The British had regained control of most of the island, and now, comments Martin, "the might of the British Empire descended".[56] The effectiveness of the British assault led to large losses among the slaves,[56] and by this point, Fédon and his colleagues would have been focussing their energies in escaping Grenada, suggest Candlin.[133] He had a number of near misses from being captured. A British official later recorded that, on the last such occasion, Fédon launched himself "down a place where [no man] dare venture after him. His object and that of the few remaining in the woods was to get off in a canoe. We have...destroyed several that were preparing for that purpose".[133] Even so, notes Walvin, it took the British another 18 months to restore order[144] and seek out remaining rebels.[50]
Consequences
Following the collapse of the rebellion, a
Oh shame to tell never did anything equal the neglect of this army in the article of provisions. After two days' severe, harassing marches, at the end of each a sharp action...there was not a drop of rum to give the men as a reward of their exertions...There was not a morsel of provisions of any kind for either officer or private man. Neglect and infamous misconduct have prevailed in this particular during the whole campaign. Blame is due somewhere, and exemplary punishment ought to attach to the person in fault."[73][note 54]
Although Fedon's fate is unknown, that of his deputy, Philip, is well-attested to. He stayed in Grenada for much of the time, successfully hiding from the authorities for eight years—possibly as a "maroon" in the forest, suggested an official report—when he was discovered on Petite Martinique in March 1803 and hanged St George's market place a few days later.[196][93] A similar case was that of Captain Jacques Chadeau, who evaded capture until 1808, when he was captured, hanged and gibbeted at St Eloi.[185][note 55] Candlin notes that, while those directly involved could not expect to receive mercy—and did not—those who managed to "managed to keep a low profile away from the violence and at relative peace with their neighbours fared better".[196]
The rebellion was defined as
There are I understand still a few of the coloured and black Insurgents skulking in the more inaccessible parts of the Island, but of late they have done no Mischief; being afraid to shew themselves in the inhabited Quarters, and it is to be presumed cannot long exist in their present forlorn situation.[198]
Green also refused the return to Grenada of some of the dead rebels' female relatives in 1797, on the basis that it was too dangerous to allow them back.
"Such are the dreadful effects which have resulted from the persecution of the adopted subjects in Grenada, from the weak government of Mr Home, from the withdrawing of our usual garrison for the capture of the French islands in 1794, and the defence of them afterwards; and above all from the weak and pusillanimous conduct of the Colonial Government, from the time the President assumed the command, until the arrival of General Nicholls.[195]
Aftermath
Due to the ultimate failure of the rebellion, it impossible for scholars to know what would have happened consequently. Martin suggests that the most likely immediate result would have been—mirroring Haiti—the abolishing of slavery.[16] However, argues Craton, while many big houses and their estates had been destroyed, Fédon and the other planter leaders of the rebellion managed to keep their own lands safe and appear to have intended a return to the plantation economy once the British had been finally evicted.[158] Jacobs highlights that there is no documentary evidence extant that Fédon or his colleagues ever declared emancipation for the slaves of Grenada in March 1795, although notes that Dr Hay recalled Fédon offering slaves freedom if they would join the rebel army.[204]
Goyrand, in St Lucia, put the failing of the rebellion down to the rebels' lack of unity. In a later letter to Fédon, Goyrand told him that[151]
We had predicted, citizen, you are divided, you were overcome, thus re-join that love of the Republic to replace your ambitious desires. We want to send you forces to repair the loss that disunion has just made you.[16]
As a result of his falling out with Fédon, Nogues left Grenada and joined Goyrand's staff in St Lucia.[151] Martin argues that the ideological and strategic divisions within the rebel leadership fundamentally weakened it, and made it incapable of meeting the increasingly effective sorties of the British.[56]
The white population of Grenada was radically reduced as a result of the rebellion. Candlin estimates 1,000 whites and free coloureds to have died as a result,
The Royal Navy now patrolled the coastline in force. There was now no argument or protest from the French community, no truculent local councilmen or companies badgering to turn a profit, just grateful British planters and merchants at least thankful that order had been restored. The conflict had cleared the way for a widespread Anglicanization of the island and a dramatic increase in colonial power.[211]
The rebellion was one of what Candlin and Pybus call "several interconnected struggles that tore through the Caribbean" in the Age of Revolution.[212] It directly influenced the revolt in St Vincent in 1796, in which rebels held the country for six months before being crushed by Abercromby.[207][213][note 59] Although by 1797, suggests Craton "Grenada was superficially peaceful, but the effects of Fédon's rebellion were never fully mended",[198] while Jacobs notes that the island "remained an armed camp for more than a decade afterwards".[214]
There was as much personal as political motivations for the rebellion; the Fédons, for example, "used the conflict to try and gain more power for themselves as white rule fractured around them", [212] and may have seen in the latest war between France and Britain a chance to secure economic and political independence for their island.[215] while his Lieutenant, Philip, was in debt by £2,260 and had had to sell off much of his property in the years prior to the rebellion.[93] As did much of the slave community, which often took freedom for itself without actively joining the revolt.[212] Although the slaves who joined Fédon's army enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than they had, the vast majority of the island's slaves watched from the sidelines. Martin suggests that choosing the wrong side would mean harsh retaliation, and they chose to avoid this.[56]
The rebellion had lasted over a year, consumed the resources of 16 British regiments,[77]—about 10,000 men, including slaves and skilled mercenaries[44]—and cost over £2,500,000 in sterling, argues the historian Tessa Murphy, and "paralysed one of Great Britain's most promising plantation colonies".[77] The historian Robin Blackburn argues that Fedon's rebellion, and others in the Eastern Caribbean, "tied up more British troops and warships than the campaign in San Domingo".[216] Both the war, and the diminishing profits that it had caused, required a large injection of cash to stimulate the Grenadian economy.[217] Grenada may have been re-taken, argues the scholar Jessica Harland-Jacobs, but "it was clear that Britain's policies with regard to the governance of Grenada had utterly failed".[218]
Historiography
It has been suggested that this article should be split into a new article titled Historiography of Fédon's rebellion. (discuss) (June 2021) |
Sourcing
The main sources for scholars of Fédon's Rebellion are original documents, mostly held in the Registry of the Supreme Court in St George's, which contain records relating to not just Fedon but his family and antecedents.
The majority of contemporary sources view it solely as the work of "French revolutionary agents, traitorous francophone residents, or free persons of African descent whose liberty threatened the colonial order", argues the scholar Caitlin Anderson. This—and the fact that they are "marked by profound silences"—makes the sources inadequate to know the fundamentals a historian wants to know: who planned it, why and what they wished to replace it with.[221] Anderson also notes that this is at least in part due to the nature of the subsequent trials and investigations. Because courts of oyer and terminer required neither witnesses nor defence, there is nothing in writing confirming or denying either the accusations nor the responses, only lists of names, convictions and sentence.[197] No testimonies were taken,[154] nor, notes Jacobs, does anything remain to "shed light on the precise thoughts and feelings of the Africans, who were forcibly returned to a life of slavery after nearly two years of self-emancipated freedom".[214] However a contemporary British slave owner touched on this question in a letter before Abercromby's final assault on Belvidere, opining that:[214]
We are now waiting the arrival of Gen'l Abercrombie, but we are yet to know far the force of arms will succeed in laying this spirit of Insurrection. Those negroes who have tasted the charms of a life if Indolence free from controul (sic) will return with bitter reluctance to their former subjection.[214]
The secondary scholarship, comments Candlin, has also tended towards the cursory, particularly "in comparison to the voluminous research on the closely related 1791–1804 revolution in Saint Domingue...it is often mentioned in passing but rarely discussed in detail".[30]
Analysis
Martin argues that, while "almost all analyses of [the rebellion] define it as a slave revolt or a revolt against the slave system", the number of white French involved necessitates a far more nuanced view.[16] The participants probably viewed the rebellion differently from the beginning, the French and free coloureds seeing themselves as anti-colonialists, while the slaves seeing as a traditional slave rebellion.[222] Brizan, similarly, has argued that it was along the lines of a joint operation, with the French and free coloureds fighting for the ideals of the revolution while native slaves fought for their liberation.[185] Candlin has argued that, not only was the rebellion "the deadliest slave revolt in the history of the British Caribbean",[205] but in unleashing the power of the slaves, including their own, they [the rebel leaders] had betrayed everyone who remained loyal to the old system".[67] The slaves were not just armed by the rebels: "all sides, royalist and republican, French and British, armed slaves in droves".[223] Contemporaries saw the French revolutionary revolt under Fédon as preceding, but automatically leading to, a broader slave rebellion, saying, for example, how "the general insurrection of the slaves which soon followed was undoubtedly the work of the same insidious instruments employed in spreading the flame of rebellion, disseminating discord, confusion and anarchy in the minds of all who were susceptible.[89]
The French
Murphy's argument is at odds with traditional analyses that emphasised the role and influence of the French revolution and emphasise the imported nature of much of the cause of conflict. For example, the Grenadian politician and author, George Brizan, has written that the numerous slave and black uprisings around the Caribbean on the period were "inextricably bound to events and developments within the French Revolution of 1789-96. They were by no means isolated movements but were considerably influenced by the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity as propounded by the French Revolution."[51] Fédon's rebellion, argues Jacobs, "defies categorization",[31] while the historian James Walvin has highlighted the particular problems that hybrid revolts such as Fédon's caused the government, arguing that "what puzzled the worried planters, however, was that the slave leaders were local-born. As long as the rebels were Africans, slave-owners had no trouble explaining revolt in terms of African barbarism. But who could explain the rebellious instinct in local-born slaves?"[144]
Another problem the aftermath of the rebellion raised for the administration, argues Anderson, was the treatment of the slaves. While there was no compunction in meting the highest penalties of treason to them, there was an awareness that this, therefore, implied them to be British subjects—"with all the rights and privileges of that status".[228] As such, there appears to have been an unspoken agreement not to summon any slaves before the oyer and terminer courts nor to convict them, as doing so would confer rights upon them that were incommensurate with their slave status.[229][note 61] Writing in The Encyclopedia of Africa and the Americas, C. M. Jacobs has described the revolt as "one of the most spectacular, sustained, bloody but ultimately unsuccessful antislavery, anticolonial, proto-nationalist struggles of the Age of Revolution",[29] although the extent of the bloodshed has been contested. Craton suggests that, in fact, off the battlefield, Fédon's regime "appears (the details are sketchy) to have been far from the destructive and bloody anarchy pictured by the beleaguered whites".[158]
Influence on later rebellions
Fédon's rebellion changed British policy towards its colonial possessions in the West Indies, which became conciliatory towards the inhabitants rather than attempting to proselytise them for the King.
Jookootoo I who walked through Belvidere wid Fedon
Was me who tell him to bun de dam place down
Grenada 1795 was naked blood and sand
and every bitch and dey brudder wid a hatchet in dey hand
Was death and terror for de Englishman
Believe yuh me dey run like hell[237]
Martin has compared Fédon's Rebellion with that of 1979 in being equally "defining moments" in the history of the country, both "for what they set out to achieve and the impact they have had on Grenadian society ever since",
Reasons for failure
Brizan argues that Fedon's failure can be placed squarely on the shoulders of his inability—or unwillingness—to make a full-frontal, decisive attack on St George's: "instead of intensifying government pressure, Fédon continued demanding that the government abdicate". This allowed the British to reinforce their positions while remaining safe from attack, and eventually, isolating Fédon at Camp Liberté.[185] Candlin emphasises that too little planning was to blame for the eventual failure of the rebellion, particularly regarding supplies and materiel. Fédon had not planned for an eventuality in which he began running out of either, and was, therefore, surprised when this occurred. Further, too much of the island's productive machinery had been destroyed in the early weeks of the uprising without a long-term plan or ability to replace it. Fédon relied on reinforcements that never materialised.[67] As a result, notes the scholar Claudia Wright, he was unable to turn his rebellion into a revolution, "despite the duration and intensity" of it, remaining too "limited in scope" to do so.[241] Cox, meanwhile, has argued that Fedon's inability to bring the struggle to a close ultimately worked against him, arguing that, while the original prolongation of the war had favoured him, it eventually enabled the British to re-arm and utilise external support while denying him his own.[242] Likewise, the longer the war took, the higher the rate of attrition on Fédon's own army through injury and death.[191]
Memorials and cultural impact
It has been suggested that this article should be split into a new article titled Fédon's rebellion in culture. (discuss) (June 2021) |
The 19th-century Trinidadian novelist
I wished to make the negro respected despite his inky skin, to induce the mulatto to consider himself a man, although his brown complexion told him he was the son of the tyrannical white man. This archipelago once possessed a numerous and happy progeny; the white man came, and the red children of the Antilles were exterminated. Millions after millions of the dark tribes of Guinea have been brought hither by white men: where are they? They have perished, except a miserable few, who live to give birth to offspring whose inheritance is bondage, whose complexion is reproach.[246]
Jacobs has described Fédon as "a legend and inspiration to Grenada's artists, nationalists, and revolutionaries".
The University of the West Indies runs the annual Julien Fédon Memorial Prize for historical research presented by the student body; the reference to Fedon, the University states, is intended "to increase the awareness among Grenadians and people of the region of Fedon's contribution to his homeland and the region". There is an annual Julien Fedon Lecture every year also, at which the Memorial Prize is awarded.[248] Places named after Fédon are rare, only Mount Fédon—the mountain on which his estate was sited—being so.[44][note 63]
Velvet Nelson, analysing the role of the slave trade in the modern Caribbean
Notes
- ^ Predominantly referred to as such by the British at the time.[1] Candlin has recently posited, however, that linking it by name to Fédon distracts historians from those who made up the bulk of the rebellion in both army and spirit, the slave population.[2]
- ^ Also given without the acute accent, and occasionally spelt Foedon or Feydon.[4]
- ^ This was intended to stem an influx of around 1,200 in the previous six months, which Cox suggests "augured ill for the island's safety, especially because of the doubtful attachment to the English of French-speaking persons of every colour or class".[25]
- ^ Although David Geggus has warned against seeing too much of a direct link between the movements, which he suggests is too easily "imagined rather than demonstrated".[26]
- ^ Britain's harsh treatment of the Grenadans, suggest Candlin, can be compared to that of the Spanish who "showed a particularly lenient attitude to people of mixed race" and encouraged emigration to their Trinidad lands.[34]
- ^ Legislation included restrictions on the holding of unregulated ceremonies, coloureds being forbidden to walk at night without a lantern to light them, a curfew and weapons restrictions.[24]
- ^ Candlin and Pybus describe Marie Rose as
contemptuous of such laws...She understood the law and its implications, but she was proud of her French heritage and the liberties she had previously enjoyed. She saw no reason to travel the fourteen or so miles from [their estate] to the capital to prove who she was to the Anglo interlopers.[36]
- ^ Philip's own family granted one of their slaves her freedom for revealing what she knew; Candlin suggests that due to "the monotony of the regular work of the enslaved", any unusual activity would have stood out.[39]
- ^ In any case, argues Cox, the militia as a stand-alone force was almost useless, being raised as it was at short notice, although it did provide a sense of reassurance to the white population who would otherwise have viewed the absence of the British army with askance.[25]
- self-fertilising and so only had to be planted once. It was useful not only as a food: its foliage provided cover from both surveillance and inclement weather.[43]
- ^ Jacobs notes that this was a year before the arrival of Victor Hugues in Guadeloupe, bringing news of the National Convention's abolishment of slavery in, and extension of citizenship to, French overseas territories.[31][44]
- ^ Many others, he notes, "hedged their bets or took opportunities as they came", for instance, to escape the island.[23]
- ^ Occasionally Lavelette.[57]
- ^ Fédon may have been related through his mother to Henri Christophe, deputy to the Haitian General L'Ouverture.[62]
- ^ His family was also already known to the Governor, Home. In 1793 his father Michael had submitted a request to the administration for small arms to defend Petite Martinique; "unable to countenance such an idea, in the margin of the request Ninian Home scribbled 'not complied with'".[24]
- ^ Its location, suggests Jacobs, harked back to the last revolt in Grenada, when the naive Caribs attempted to expel the British colonialists: their headquarters was the fortified peak of Mount St Catherine—the highest on the island—2,756 feet (840 m) above sea level.[70]
- ^ At this time Grenville was often called by its French name of La Baye.[77]
- ^ Fédon later blamed this massacre on a non-existent French Revolutionary army he claimed had invaded.[1]
- ^ Candlin argues that the relative lack of violence done in Gouyave may have been due to Philip, who, he suggests, had "more to lose" than his comrades.[60]
- ^ A large number of Home's own slaves deserted to Fédon's armies, although several were deemed sufficiently loyal to number among the Loyal Black Regiment.[52] Brizan argues that the Loyal Black Rangers served the British forces twice over, or what he describes as a "clear manifestation of 'divide and conquer', whereby...if the Black Rangers were successful then the British would have achieved their aim; if they were killed, white lives would have been saved".[85]
- ^ In support of this thesis, Jacobs notes that at this point in the rebellion, no-one in Gouyave—including the Governor—even knew Fédon was leading the revolt, let alone that it would be based out of his own estate; Oroonko must have known beforehand.[86]
- ^ Unlike, for example, neighbouring St Kitts, which had the permanent and strongly manned garrison at Brimstone Hill for both internal and external defence.[25] Sir William Young, to the government, asserted that a string fort was essential for the secure governance of each of Britain's West Indian islands. According to Young, "the restlessness among the servile population matched the growing anxiety and insecurity among island whites whenever a British fleet was no longer stationary Or cruising in the Caribbean", and by 1795, Grenada epitomised that situation.[91]
- ^ A johanne was a Portuguese colonial gold coin weighing no less than seven pennyweights.[104]
- ^ Craton argues this was bound to be of little effect, as "the republican offer of freedom was much more attractive to the Grenadian slaves than the mere promise of an amnesty made by the regime".[105] Even more, suggests Cox, it was likely to spur the rebels on to greater, in their view, things.[106]
- ^ Grenada, although held by a foreign power, was important to the Spanish, as cotton produced in Trinidad was transported to Britain via Grenada,[14] and Chacón, says Candlin, was as keen to stop the "contagion" of republicanism spreading as the British.[109]
- ^ Around the same time, the Spanish also helped the British administration in Jamaica suppress the Trelawny Maroons with hunting dogs.[110]
- ^ It is unknown, says Jacobs, precisely how Fédon garnered this knowledge, but it may be connected to a 1767 ordinance which instructed French and free coloureds—such as Fedon—to go into the woods and recapture escaped slaves. If so, argues Jacobs, the British "in trying to put the free coloureds against the [escaped slaves], only succeeded in exposing the free coloureds to the knowledge of 'making war in the woods'".[44]
- ^ Fédon had reportedly offered a reward to slaves who deserted or killed their owners and burned down their properties.[111]
- ^ Although not completely; schooners from Guadeloupe occasionally got through.[114]
- ^ In Colonial times and during the Napoleonic Wars, the West Indies were known as a particularly dangerous posting for soldiers due to yellow fever being endemic in the area. The mortality rate in British garrisons in Jamaica was seven times that of garrisons in Canada, mostly because of yellow fever and other tropical diseases.[115] Between the years 1791 and 1797, across the entire archipelago, the army lost an average of 700 me a month to the fever; this was its worst losses in its history.[113] The army was also ill-attuned to fighting guerilla jungle warfare: Sir John Moore, who both created the British light infantry and fought in St Lucia, said that European soldiers could never fight in a jungle. He put this weakness down to "poor diet, rum, a general lack of discipline and economy among the troops, and a dispirited and incompetent officer corps".[116]
- ^ Axually, comments Ashby, it later became apparent that the rebels only had two companies of men on Pilot Hill, and they were running out of ammunition: Gurdon's retreat had "again proved unfortunate for the British cause".[114]
- coup de grace when necessary.[133]
- ^ In his account, Brizan suggests that two of Fédon's daughters watched the executions and that Jean B. Cotton personally split the skulls of the dead with a cutlass to make sure none survived.[136]
- ^ The defences were good enough that, later on, British officers assumed that they had to have been a long time in the preparation.[69]
- ^ McKenzie was not only a civilian, wrote Campbell later, but his methods were also "too Austrian".[98]
- Edward Matthew[134]
- ^ Recruited in direct response to Fédon's swelling slave army, the Loyal Black Rangers were offered freedom in return for their service.[147] Craton argues that "ironically, without these faithful black auxiliaries, who...already outnumbered the rest of the militia, Grenada would have fallen entirely to Fédon's forces",[131] and Dubois describes them as "crucial" to the British war effort.[142]
- ^ Much of what is known of the growing distance between Fédon and Hugues comes to scholars from the later memoirs of Dr Hay, who was sent to Guadeloupe after the execution of the hostages.[148]
- ships of the line in the area to ensure an effective blockade of Grenada,[34] as the Royal Navy had maintained a presence in the Caribbean since the Seven Years' War.[107]
- ^ An anonymous contemporary opponent of Hugues wrote that he had granted commissions to "trois mulâtres chassés de cette isle pour dettes" and that Hugues then "avait abandonné cette tentative à elle-même pendant l'espace de huit mois sans rien faire pour la soutenir". (Three mullatos driven from the island over debt, and that he abandoned Granada after 8 months, doing nothing further.)[154]
- ^ On one occasion, reports Hay, "eight negroes were guillotined in one day for eating mules".[157]
- ^ Candlin suggests that the rebellion was a victim of its own success, as the fact that food began running out may indicate that Fedon might not have expected it to have been so popular with the slave populace as it turned out to be.[109] That there was a food supply problem may also be indicated by the death penalty that a number of Fédon's army received for eating mules without permission.[157]
- aide de camp to George III.[168]
- ^ Dyott also reports how men from the Loyal Black Rangers kept themselves amused by shooting at, and killing, "some wretched poor devils in the cane fields", whom Ashby supposes to have been innocent slaves rather than rebels.[170]
- prisoners of war rather than rebels.[175]
- ^ Jacobs notes that the Decree of Pluvôise remained on the French statute book—codifying as it did France's relationship with its colonies—until its revocation by Napoleon in 1801.[177]
- ^ Victor Hugues, although undefeated was had been "holed up" in Guadeloupe and effectively neutralised.[177]
- ^ The Jägers were, in Jacobs' words, "a crack mercenary unit comprised of German and Dutch soldiers of fortune".[177] Brizan describes them as "specially trained fighters, skilled in...mountain war".[160]
- Grenadian indigants, and had been known of since the European conquest of Grenada in the 17th century.[183]
- ^ Fédon's hide-out was sparse. Craton describes what the soldiers found when they broke in: "only three pairs of boots, some mountain cabbage, and a few sugar canes. Nearby were a few muskets, carpenters' tools, and the skeleton of a canoe that the rebels had been building."[184]
- ^ The Act was officially titled "'An Act to attaint certain Persons therein Named of High Treason unless they shall render themselves and submit to Justice on or before the first day of September One thousand seven hundred and ninety five".[44]
- ^ Grenada's demographics took only a few years to recalibrate, and by 1829 there were 3,786 free coloureds compared to 801 whites.[194]
- ^ Dyott's regiment, the 25th, had suffered, he thought, more brutally from sickness than even from enemy action: it had lost, over a period of 15 months, 11 officers, 30 sergeants, 15 drummers and over 500 infantry[195]
- ^ Brizan suggests that Chadeau may have been the victim of a love triangle, whereby one of his lovers reported him to the authorities to spike her rival.[185]
- ^ This particular judicial implement was also useful because it did not require witnesses to be called; the only two responses to the charge a defendant was allowed to make was either to plead guilty or to state that they were not the named individual. In Britain, by this period, although still on the statute book, it was "regarded as antiquated and morally dubious".[197]
- ^ In the same letter to London, Houston both claimed that the island was in "perfect tranquillity" and requested to the regiments of soldiers newly sent there were allowed to stay on longer.[198]
- ^ It was not until 1882 that French Catholics in Grenada attained equality with their Protestant neighbours.[210]
- ^ Although Craton argues that the Maroon War, although much smaller than Fédon's rebellion,[198]
Has always been more famous...not just because it occurred in Jamaica, the chief of Britain's sugar colonies, but because it had the lineaments of a classic tale: a desperate cause, a heroic fight against odds, and a tragic outcome deeply discreditable to the winning side.[213]
- ^ The logical result of Murphy's analysis, she notes, is that the spark for revolution is moved back from 1795—when violence broke out—but 1763, when France recognised Britain's suzerainty over Grenada.[153]
- ^ Anderson notes that one slave was caught and condemned for high treason in the first week of the rebellion, but also that he was the only one to be so treated.[229]
- ^ Ironically, notes Jacobs, one of Bishop's ancestors was Louis La Grenade, a political opponent of Fédons who sided with the British during the rebellion,[233][234] having become a Protestant[86] and led the 8 April 1795 attack on Belvidere.[235] Says Jacobs, "the evidence suggests that Bishop never publicly discussed his famous ancestor".[231]
- ^ Jacobs also notes that "the Fédon family name, meanwhile, has completely disappeared from Grenada".[44]
- ^ Similar, says Nelson, to such figures as Ned Kelly, Robin Hood and Jesse James, each of whom polarised their contemporaries in life but were romanticised by them in death.[249]
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- ^ a b c d Candlin 2018, p. 699.
- ^ Montague, Montague & Montague 1984, p. 531.
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- ^ Candlin 2018, p. 691.
- ^ Brizan 1984, p. 44.
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