Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations
The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was an August 23, 1939, agreement between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany colloquially named after Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. The treaty renounced warfare between the two countries. In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol dividing several eastern European countries between the parties.
Before the treaty's signing, the Soviet Union conducted negotiations with the
Background
After World War I
After the
, those countries also became independent. However, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk lasted only eight-and-a-half months, when Germany renounced it and broke off diplomatic relations with Russia.Before World War I, Germany and Russia had long shared a trading relationship.
In 1922, the countries signed the
In the early 1930s, that relationship fell as the more isolationist
Mid-1930s
In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts to re-establish closer contacts with Germany.
Despite the political rhetoric, the Soviets in 1936, attempted to seek closer political ties to Germany along with an additional credit agreement, but Hitler rebuffed the advances and did not want to seek closer political ties
Tensions grew further after Germany and
Late 1930s
The
The Soviets were not invited to the Munich Conference on
After the German need for military supplies after the Munich Agreement and the Soviet demand for military machinery increased, talks between both countries occurred from late 1938 to March 1939.
On 31 March 1939, British Prime Minister
Initial talks
Potential for Soviet-German talk expansion
Germany and the Soviet Union discussed an economic deal throughout early 1939.[32] For months, Germany had secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could offer better terms for a political agreement than could Britain and France.[33][34][35] On March 10, Hitler in his official speech proclaimed that directly.[36][37] That same day, Stalin, in a speech to the Eighteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, characterised the Western nations' actions regarding Hitler as moving away from "collective security" and toward "nonintervention" with the goal being to direct fascist aggression anywhere but against themselves.[38] After the Congress concluded, the Soviet press mounted an attack on both France and Britain.[38] Stalin believed that the British and the French governments were engaging in a conspiracy to direct Germany towards the east and to cause a German-Soviet war.[39] In the aftermath of the Great Terror, the maxim ugadat, ugodit, utselet ("sniff out, suck up, survive") dominated the Soviet regime, and the NKVD tended to provide Stalin with intelligence that fit his preconceptions, which thus reinforced what he already believed.[39]
Rudolf von Scheliha, the First Secretary at the German embassy in Warsaw, had been working as a Soviet spy since 1937 and kept the Kremlin well informed about the state of German-Polish relations, and it was intelligence provided by him that let the Soviets know that Hitler was seriously considering invading Poland from March 1939 onward and agve the orders for an invasion of Poland in May.[40] On 13 March 1939, Scheliha reported to Moscow that he had conversation with one of Ribbentrop's aides, a Peter Kleist, who told him Germany would probably attack Poland sometime that year.[41] In his reports to Moscow, Scheliha made it clear that the Auswärtiges Amt had attempted to reduce Poland to a German satellite state during the winter of 1938-1939, but the Poles had refused to play that role.[42] The chief Soviet spy in Japan, Richard Sorge, had meanwhile reported to Moscow that the German attempt to convert the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance had failed, as Germany wanted the alliance to be directed against Britain, but Japan wanted it to be directed against the Soviet Union.[43] On 5 April 1939, Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, the State Secretary (second man) at the Auswärtiges Amt, ordered Count Hans-Adolf von Moltke, the German ambassador to Poland, not to engage in talks with the Poles under any conditions over resolving the dispute over the Free City of Danzig (now Gdańsk). as the Danzig issue was just a pretext for war, and he was afraid if talks began, the Poles might actually agree to Danzig rejoining Germany, which would deprive the Reich of its pretext for war.[44] Scheliha, in turn, informed Moscow that the Auswärtiges Amt would not engage in talks for a diplomatic solution to the Danzig issue, which indicated that German policy towards Poland was not a policy with a high risk of war, but it was a policy aimed at causing a war.[45]
On April 7, a Soviet diplomat visited the German Foreign Ministry stating that there was no point in continuing the German-Soviet ideological struggle and that the countries could conduct a concerted policy.[46] Ten days later, Soviet Ambassador Alexei Merekalov met Ernst von Weizsäcker, the State Secretary at the Auswärtiges Amt and presented him a note requesting speedy removal of any obstacles for fulfillment of military contracts signed between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union before the former was occupied by Germany.[47] According to German accounts,[48] at the end of the discussion, the ambassador stated, "there exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with us on a normal footing. And from normal the relations might become better and better",[4][49] but other sources admit that it could be an exaggeration or an inaccurate recounting of the ambassador's words.[50]
Immediately, the Soviet ambassador had been withdrawn to Moscow and never returned to Germany.[47] According to Ulam, future conversations on the topic in Berlin were believed to continue with lower-level officials working under the cover of a Soviet trade mission.[51] Starting on 14 April 1939 and continuing right up to August 1939, the German embassy in London received anonymous copies of British diplomatic cables to and from Moscow, which detailed London's attempts to have the Soviets join the anti-German "peace front".[52] The Foreign Office's diplomatic telegrams were selectively edited to make it sound like that Anglo-Soviet relations were far better than they actually were and that the talks were going much better than they really were.[52] The German ambassador to Britain, Herbert von Dirksen, judged the cables credible and passed them along in his reports to Berlin.[52] As the Germans could not break the Foreign Office's codes, and the Abwehr had no agent with access to the Foreign Office's codes, the intercepted cables were not the work of German intelligence.[52] In fact, the cables that sent to the German embassy in London were the work of the NKVD, which had broken the British codes and was seeking to pressure the Reich to come to terms with the Soviet Union .[53]
Tripartite talks begin
In mid-March 1939, the Soviet Union, Britain and France staerted to trade a flurry of suggestions and counterplans regarding a potential political and military agreement.[31] The Soviet Union feared the West and the possibility of a "capitalist encirclements", had little faith either that war could be avoided or in the Polish Army and wanted guaranteed support for a two-pronged attack on Germany.[54][55]
Britain and France believed that war could still be avoided and that the Soviet Union, weakened by Great Purge,[56] could not serve as a main military participant.[54] France, as a continental power, was more anxious for an agreement with the Soviets than was Britain, which was more willing to make concessions and more aware of the dangers of an agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany.[57] On April 17, Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov outlined a French–British–Soviet mutual assistance pact between the three powers for five to ten years, including military support, if any of the powers was the subject of aggression.[31]
May changes
Litvinov dismissal
On May 3, Stalin replaced Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov with Vyacheslav Molotov, which significantly increased Stalin's freedom to manoeuvre in foreign policy.[58] The dismissal of Litvinov, whose Jewish ethnicity was viewed disfavourably by Nazi Germany, removed an obstacle to negotiations with Germany.[51][59][60][61][62][63][64][65]
Stalin immediately directed Molotov to "purge the ministry of Jews".
The dismissal also signaled to France and Britain the existence of a potential negotiation option with Germany.[31][71] One British official wrote that Litvinov's disappearance also meant the loss of an admirable technician or shock-absorber, and Molotov's "modus operandi" was "more truly Bolshevik than diplomatic or cosmopolitan".[72] However, Stalin sent a double message since Molotov appointed Solomon Lozovsky, a Jew, as one of his deputies.[73] Émile Naggiar, the French ambassador in Moscow, reported to Bonnet that Molotov wanted a full military alliance as "the new commissar now intends to obtain more extensive advantages".[74]
May tripartite negotiations
Although informal consultations started in late April, the main negotiations between the Soviet Union, Britain and France began in May.[31] At a meeting in May 1939, the French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet told the Soviet Ambassador to France, Jakob Suritz, that Bonnet was willing to support turning over all of eastern Poland to the Soviet Union, regardless of Polish opposition, if that was the price of an alliance with Moscow.[75]
German supply concerns and potential political discussions
In May, German war planners also became increasingly concerned that without Soviet supplies, Germany would need to find massive substitute quantities of 165,000 tons of manganese and almost 2 million tons of oil per year.
On May 26, German officials feared a potential positive result to come from the Soviets talks regarding proposals by Britain and France.[80] On May 30, fearing potential positive results from a British and French offer to the Soviets,[80] Germany directed its diplomats in Moscow that "we have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union."[51] The ensuing discussions were channelled through the economic negotiation because the economic needs of both sides were substantial and because close military and diplomatic connections had been severed in the mid-1930s, which left those talks as the only means of communication.[80]
Baltic sticking point and German rapprochement
Mixed signals
The Soviets sent mixed signals thereafter.[80] In his first main speech as Soviet Foreign Minister on May 31, Molotov criticized an Anglo-French proposal,[81] stated that the Soviets did not "consider it necessary to renounce business relations with countries like Germany" and proposed to enter a wide-ranging mutual assistance pact against aggression.[82] However, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Trade Anastas Mikoyan argued on June 2 to a German official that Moscow "had lost all interest in these [economic] negotiations' as a result of earlier German procrastination".[80] By June 1939, information sold by Scheliha let the Soviets know that Germany was committed to an invasion of Poland later that year.[83]
Tripartite talks progress and Baltic moves
On June 2, the Soviet Union insisted that any mutual assistance pact should be accompanied by a military agreement describing in detail the military assistance that the Soviets, the French and the British would provide.[84] The same day, the Soviet Union also submitted a modification to a French and British proposalm[84] which specified the states that would be given aid in the event of "direct aggression"; they included Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Finland.[85] Five days later, Estonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts with Germany,[86] which created suspicions that Germany had ambitions in a region through which it could attack the Soviet Union.[87]
British attempt to stop German armament
On June 8, the Soviets had agreed that a high-ranking German official could come to Moscow to continue the economic negotiations, which occurred in Moscow on July 3.[88] Thereafter, official talks were started in Berlin on July 22.[89]
Meanwhile, hoping to stop the German war machine, in July, Sir
Tripartite talks regarding "indirect aggression"
After weeks of political talks that began after the arrival of Central Department Foreign Office head William Strang, on July 8, the British and French submitted a proposed agreement to which Molotov added a supplementary letter.[93] Talks in late July stalled over a provision in Molotov's supplementary letter stating that a political turn to Germany by the Baltic states constituted "indirect aggression",[94] which Britain feared might justify Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic states or push those countries to seek closer relations with Germany, but France was less resistant to the supplement.[84][95] On July 23, France and Britain agreed with the Soviet proposal to draw up a military convention specifying a reaction to a German attack.[84]
Beginning of German-Soviet political negotiations
On July 18, the Soviet trade representative Yevgeniy Barbarin visited Julius Schnurre and said that the Soviets would like to extend and intensify German-Soviet relations.[96] On July 25, the Soviet Union and Germany were very close to finalising the terms of a proposed economic deal.[97] On July 26, over dinner, the Soviets accepted a proposed three-stage agenda, which included first the economic agenda and "a new arrangement which took account of the vital political interests of both parties."[97][98][99] On July 28, Molotov sent a first political instruction to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin that finally opened the door to a political détente with Germany.[100]
Germany had learned about the military convention talks before the July 31 British announcement[84] and was skeptical that the Soviets would reach a deal with Britain and France during those planned talks in August.[101] On August 1, the Soviet ambassador stated that two conditions must be met before political negotiations could begin: a new economic treaty and the cessation of anti-Soviet attacks by German media, and German officials immediately agreed with them.[97] On August 2, Soviet political discussions with France and Britain were suspended when Molotov stated they could not be restarted until progress was made in the scheduled military talks.[102]
Addressing past hostilities
On August 3, German Foreign Minister
Final negotiations
Finalising economic agreement
In August, as Germany scheduled its invasion of Poland on August 25 and prepared for war with France, German war planners estimated that with an expected British naval blockade, if the Soviet Union became hostile, Germany would fall short of its war mobilization requirements of oil, manganese, rubber and foodstuffs by huge margins.[97] Every internal German military and economic study had argued that Germany was doomed to defeat without at least Soviet neutrality.[107] On August 5, Soviet officials stated that the completion of the trading credit agreement was the most important stage that could be taken in the direction of further such talks.[107]
By August 10, the countries worked out the last minor technical details to make their economic arrangement all but final, but the Soviets delayed signing that agreement for almost ten days until they were sure that they had reached a political agreement with Germany.[107] The Soviet ambassador explained to German officials that the Soviets had begun their British negotiations "without much enthusiasm" when they felt Germany would not "come to an understanding", and the parallel talks with the British could not be simply broken off when they had been initiated after "mature consideration".[108] On August 12, Germany received word that Molotov wished to further discuss these issues, including Poland, in Moscow.[109]
Tripartite military talks begin
The Soviets, British and French began military negotiations in August. hey were delayed until August 12 because the British military delegation, which did not include Strang, took six days to make the trip since it travelled in a slow merchant ship, The City of Exeter. That undermined the Soviets' confidence in British resolve.[110] In a show of Allied solidarity, the French military mission led by General Joseph Doumenc, was to travel with the British delegation, and there were a number of protests from French Ambassador Charles Corbin when he learned that the military mission would travel on The City of Exeter, which moved at only 13 knots per hour.[111] Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in London, complained to Admiral Reginald Drax, who was to command the British military mission, about the decision to travel on The City of Exeter instead of taking the first flight to Moscow, but Drax claimed that he and the other members of the mission needed a ship because of all the excess baggage that they were bringing with them.[112]
Lord Halifax vetoed the idea of the mission travelling from London to
Meanwhile, Molotov spoke with Germany's ambassador in Moscow on August 15 about the possibility of "settling by negotiation all outstanding problems of Soviet–German relations".[116] The discussions included the possibility of a Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the fates of the Baltic states and potential improvements in Soviet-Japanese relations.[117] Molotov stated that "should the German foreign minister come here", those issues "must be discussed in concrete terms"é[117] Within hours of receiving word of the meeting, Germany sent a reply stating that it was prepared to conclude a 25-year non-aggression pact, "guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union" and exert influence to improve Soviet-Japanese relations.[117] The Soviets responded positively but stated that a "special protocol" was required, "defining the interests" of the parties.[118] Germany replied that in contrast to the British delegation in Moscow at that time without Strang, Ribbentrop would personally travel to Moscow to conclude a deal.[118]
In the Soviet-British-French talks, the Anglo-Franco military negotiators were sent to discuss "general principles", rather than details.[114] On August 15, the British contingent was instructed to move more quickly to bring the military talks to a conclusion and thus were permitted to give Soviet negotiators confidential British information.[115] The British contingent stated that Britain currently had only six army divisions but in the event of a war they use employ 16 divisions initially, followed by a second contingent of 16 divisions, far less than the 120 Soviet divisions.[114] French negotiators stated that they had 110 divisions available.[119] In discussions on August 18–19, the Poles informed the French ambassador that they would not approve Red Army troops operating in Poland.[120]
Delayed signing of commercial agreement
After Soviet and German officials in Moscow first finalised the terms of a seven-year German-Soviet Commercial Agreement, German officials became nervous that the Soviets were delaying its signing on August 19 for political reasons.
At 2:00 a.m. on August 20,
Soviets adjourn tripartite military talks and strike deal with Germany
After the Poles' resistance to pressure,[33][129] Voroshilov proposed on August 21 the adjournment of the military talks with the British and French by using the excuse that the absence of the senior Soviet personnel at the talks interfered with the autumn manoeuvres of the Soviet forces, but the primary reason was the progress thatwas made in the German-Soviet negotiations.[129]
That same day, August 21, Stalin has received assurance would approve secret protocols to the proposed non-aggression pact that would grant the Soviets land in Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Romania.[130] That night, with Germany nervously awaiting a response to Hitler's August 19 telegram, Stalin replied at 9:35 p.m. that the Soviets were willing to sign the pact and that he would receive Ribbentrop on August 23.[131] The Pact was signed sometime in the night between August 23–24.[132]
Signing of pact
On August 24, a ten-year
Poland was to be partitioned in the event of its "political rearrangement".[133] The Soviets promised the eastern part of Poland that was primarily populated with Ukrainians and Belarusians]], in case of its dissolution, and additionally Latvia, Estonia and Finland.[133] Bessarabia, which was part of Romania, was given a free hand for the Soviets by Germany.[133]
Ribbentrop and Stalin enjoyed warm conversations at the signing, exchanged toasts and further discussed the prior hostilities between the countries in the 1930s.[134] Ribbentrop stated that Britain had always attempted to disrupt Soviet–German relations, was "weak" and "wants to let others fight for her presumptuous claim to world dominion."[134] Stalin concurred by adding, "If England dominated the world, that was due to the stupidity of the other countries that always let themselves be bluffed".[134] Ribbentrop stated that the Anti-Comintern Pact was directed against not the Soviet Union but the Western democracies, "frightened principally the City of London [the British financiers] and the English shopkeepers", and he stated that Berliners had joked that Stalin would yet joint the Anti-Comintern Pact himself.[132] Stalin proposed a toast to Hitler, and Stalin and Molotov repeatedly toasted the German nation, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and Soviet-German relations.[132] Ribbentrop countered with a toast to Stalin and a toast to both countries' relations.[132] As Ribbentrop left, Stalin took him aside and stated that the Soviet government took the new pact very seriously and that he would "guarantee his word of honor that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner."[132]
The news of the pact was met with utter shock and surprise by government leaders and media worldwide, most being aware only of the British–French–Soviet negotiations that had taken place for months.[33]
Events during pact's operation
Immediate dealings with Britain
The day after the Pact was signed, the French and British military negotiation delegation urgently requested a meeting with Voroshilov.[135] On August 25, Voroshilov told them, "In view of the changed political situation, no useful purpose can be served in continuing the conversation".[135] That day, Hitler told the British ambassador to Berlin that the pact with the Soviets prevented Germany from facing a two-front war and changed the strategic situation from that in World War I and that Britain should accept his demands regarding Poland.[136] Surprising Hitler, Britain signed a mutual-assistance treaty with Poland that day, which caused Hitler to delay the planned August 26 invasion of western Poland.[136]
Division of eastern Europe
On September 1, 1939, the
After a Soviet attempt to invade Finland faced stiff resistance, the combatants signed an interim peace granting the Soviets approximately 10% of Finnish territory.[139] The Soviet Union also sent troops into Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.[138][140] Puppet governments in all three Baltic countries requested admission to the Soviet Union, which soon occurred.[141]
Further dealings
Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to an
Discussions in the fall and the winter of 1940 and 1941 ensued regarding the potential entry of the Soviet Union as the fourth member of the Axis powers.[144][145] The countries never came to an agreement on that issue.[146]
Aftermath
Nazi Germany terminated the pact with its invasion of the Soviet Union in
Post-war commentary regarding negotiations
Reasons behind signing pact
There is no consensus among historians regarding the reasons that prompted the Soviet Union to sign the pact with Germany. According to Ericson, the opinions "have ranged from seeing the Soviets as far-sighted anti-Nazis, to seeing them as reluctant appeasers, as cautious expansionists, or as active aggressors and blackmailers".[151] Edward Hallett Carr argued that it was necessary to join a non-aggression pact to buy tim since the Soviet Union was not in a position to fight a war in 1939 and needed at least three years to prepare. He stated: "In return for non-intervention Stalin secured a breathing space of immunity from German attack." According to Carr, the "bastion" created by means of the Pact, "was and could only be, a line of defense against potential German attack".[152][153] An important advantage, projected by Carr, was that "if Soviet Russia had eventually to fight Hitler, the Western Powers would already be involved".[154][155]
However, during the last decades, that view has been disputed. The historian Werner Maser stated that "the claim that the Soviet Union was at the time threatened by Hitler, as Stalin supposed,... is a legend, to whose creators Stalin himself belonged".[156] In Maser's view,[157] "neither Germany nor Japan were in a situation [of] invading the USSR even with the least perspective [sic] of success", which Stalin must have known.
The extent to which the Soviet Union's territorial acquisitions may have contributed to preventing its fall and thus a German victory in the war remains a factor in evaluating the pact. Soviet sources point out that the German advance eventually stopped just a few kilometres away from Moscow and so the role of the extra territory might have been crucial in such a close call. Others postulate that Poland and the Baltic countries played the important role of
Historians
Documentary evidence of early Soviet-German rapprochement
In 1948, the
The last document is the German State Office memorandum on the telephone call made on June 17 by Bulgarian Ambassador Purvan Draganov.[167] In German accounts of Draganov's report, Astakhov explained that a Soviet deal with Germany better suited the Soviets than one with Britain and France, but from the Bulgarian ambassador, it "could not be ascertained whether it had reflected the personal opinions of Herr Astakhov or the opinions of the Soviet Government".[166]
The documentary evidence of an early Nazi-Soviet rapprochement was questioned by Geoffrey Roberts, who analyzed Soviet archival documents[168] that had been declassified and released on the eve of the 1990s.[169] Roberts found no evidence that the alleged statements quoted by the Germans had ever been made, and he came to the conclusion that the German archival documents cannot serve as evidence for the existence of a dual policy during first half of 1939. According to him, no documentary evidence exists that the Soviets responded to or made any overtures to the Germans "until the end of July 1939 at the earliest".[170]
Litvinov's dismissal and Molotov's appointment
Many historians note that the dismissal of Foreign Minister Litvinov, whose Jewish ethnicity was viewed unfavourably by Nazi Germany, removed a major obstacle to negotiations between it and the Soviets.[51][59][60][61][62][63][64][65]
Carr, however, has argued that the Soviet Union's replacement of Litvinov with Molotov on May 3, 1939 indicated not an irrevocable shift towards alignment with Germany but rather Stalin's way of engaging in hard bargaining with the British and the French by appointing a tough negotiator, Molotov, to the Foreign Commissariat.[171] Albert Resis argued that the replacement of Litvinov by Molotov was both a warning to Britain and a signal to Germany.[172]
Derek Watson argued that Molotov could get the best deal with Britain and France because he was not encumbered with the baggage of collective security and could more easily negotiate with Germany.[173] Geoffrey Roberts argued that Litvinov's dismissal helped the Soviets with British-French talks, because Litvinov doubted or maybe even opposed such discussions.[174]
See also
Notes
- ^ George F. Kennan Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941, Kreiger Publishing Company, 1960.
- ^ Text of the 3 March, 1918 Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
- ^ a b c Ericson 1999, pp. 11–12
- ^ a b c d e f g h Ericson 1999, pp. 1–2
- ^ Hehn 2005, p. 15
- ^ a b Ericson 1999, pp. 14–5
- ^ Hehn 2005, p. 212
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 17–18
- ^ a b Ericson 1999, pp. 23–24
- ISBN 0-8304-1567-X, page 177
- ^ ISBN 0-674-02213-0, page 15
- ISBN 0-435-30920-X, page 33
- ISBN 0-8304-1567-X, page 159
- ISBN 1-57181-293-8, page 244
- ISBN 1-4286-0034-5, pages 136-7
- ^ Hehn 2005, p. 37
- ^ Andrew & Gordievsky 1990, pp. 142–144 & 179–180
- ^ a b Andrew & Gordievsky 1990, p. 190
- ^ Andrew & Gordievsky 1990, p. 189
- ISBN 1-84176-899-5, page 5-6
- ^ Gerhard Weinberg: The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, pages 346.
- ^ Robert Melvin Spector. World Without Civilization: Mass Murder and the Holocaust, History, and Analysis, pg. 257
- ISBN 0-375-40881-9
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 27–28
- ^ Text of the Agreement concluded at Munich, September 29, 1938, between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy
- ISBN 0-393-32252-1, page 157-8
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 29–35
- ^ Hehn 2005, pp. 42–3
- ^ a b c Ericson 1999, pp. 3–4
- ISBN 0-7864-2066-9
- ^ a b c d e Watson 2000, p. 698
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 23–35
- ^ a b c d e Roberts 2006, p. 30
- ^ "Tentative Efforts To Improve German–Soviet Relations, April 17 – August 14, 1939". Archived from the original on September 8, 2007. Retrieved February 7, 2009.
- ^ "Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War 1917–1991" by Robert C. Grogin 2001, Lexington Books page 28
- ISBN 978-0-19-518261-3, p. 109
- ^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 107
- ^ a b Karski, J. The Great Powers and Poland, University Press, 1985, p.342
- ^ a b Andrew & Gordievsky 1990, p. 195
- ^ Andrew & Gordievsky 1990, p. 192
- ^ Weinberg 2010, p. 691
- ^ Weinberg 2010, p. 705
- ^ Weinberg 2010, pp. 705–706
- ^ Weinberg 2010, p. 712
- ^ Weinberg 2010, p. 713
- ^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, pp. 108–9
- ^ a b c Roberts (1992; Historical Journal) p. 921-926
- ^ "Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 : Documents from the German Foreign Office".
- ^ a b Ericson 1999, p. 43
- ^ Biskupski & Wandycz 2003, pp. 171–72
- ^ a b c d Ulam 1989, p. 508
- ^ a b c d Andrew & Gordievsky 1990, p. 197
- ^ Andrew & Gordievsky 1990, pp. 197–198
- ^ a b Watson 2000, p. 695
- ^ In Jonathan Haslam's view, it should not be overlooked that Stalin's adherence to the collective security line was purely conditional. [Review of] Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War. by R. Raack; The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933–1941. by G. Roberts. The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), p.787
- ISBN 0-394-57916-X, 9780394579160
- ^ Watson 2000, p. 696
- ^ Resis 2000, p. 47
- ^ ISBN 0-271-02297-3, page 10
- ^ a b Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, pp. 109–110
- ^ a b Shirer 1990, pp. 480–1
- ^ a b c Herf 2006, pp. 97–98
- ^ ISBN 0-313-31368-7, page xix
- ^ ISBN 0-8147-5051-6, page 330. Litvniov "was referred to by the German radio as 'Litvinov-Finkelstein'-- was dropped in favor of Vyascheslav Molotov. 'The emininent Jew', as Churchill put it, 'the target of German antagonism was flung aside… like a broken tool… The Jew Litvinov was gone and Hitler's dominant prejudice placated.'"
- ^ a b In an introduction to a 1992 paper, Geoffrey Roberts wrote, "Perhaps the only thing that can be salvaged from the wreckage of the orthodox interpretation of Litvinov's dismissal is some notion that, by appointing Molotov foreign minister, Stalin was preparing for the contingency of a possible deal with Hitler. In view of Litvinov's Jewish heritage and his militant anti-nazism, that is not an unreasonable supposition. But it is a hypothesis for which there is as yet no evidence. Moreover, we shall see that what evidence there is suggests that Stalin's decision was determined by a quite different set of circumstances and calculations", Geoffrey Roberts. The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 639-657 Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/260946
- ^ Resis 2000, p. 35
- ISBN 1-84331-034-1, page 283
- ISBN 0-7146-4506-0, page 55
- ^ a b Resis 2000, p. 51
- ^ According to Paul Flewers, Stalin's address to the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 10, 1939, discounted any idea of German designs on the Soviet Union. Stalin had intended: "To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them". That was intended to warn the Western powers that they could not necessarily rely upon the support of the Soviet Union. As Flewers put it, "Stalin was publicly making the none-too-subtle implication that some form of deal between the Soviet Union and Germany could not be ruled out". From the Red Flag to the Union Jack: The Rise of Domestic Patriotism in the Communist Party of Great Britain Archived 2006-02-23 at the Wayback Machine 1995
- ^ Resis 2000, pp. 33–56
- ^ Watson 2000, p. 699
- ^ Montefiore 2005, p. 312
- ^ Carley 1999, p. 153.
- ^ Imlay, Talbot, "France and the Phony War, 1939-1940", pages 261-280 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 edited by Robert Boyce, London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 1998 page 264
- ^ Ericson 1999, p. 44
- ^ a b c d Ericson 1999, p. 45
- ^ a b Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 111
- ^ Weinberg 2010, p. 726
- ^ a b c d e Ericson 1999, p. 46
- ^ Biskupski & Wandycz 2003, p. 179
- ^ Watson 2000, p. 703
- ^ Weinberg 2010, p. 746
- ^ a b c d e Shirer 1990, p. 502
- ^ Watson 2000, p. 704
- ^ Roberts 1995, p. 1995
- ISBN 978-0-333-30050-3
- ^ Ericson 1999, p. 47
- ^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 114
- ^ Watt 1989, p. 400.
- ^ Hehn 2005, p. 218
- ^ Weinberg 2010, p. 752
- ^ Biskupski & Wandycz 2003, p. 186
- ^ Watson 2000, p. 708
- ISBN 0-521-53120-9, page 46
- ^ Shirer 1990, p. 447
- ^ a b c d Ericson 1999, pp. 54–55
- ^ Fest 2002, p. 588
- ^ Ulam 1989, pp. 509–10
- ^ Roberts 1992, p. 64
- ^ Shirer 1990, p. 503
- ^ Shirer 1990, p. 504
- ^ a b Fest 2002, pp. 589–90
- ISBN 0-333-80149-0, page 30
- ISBN 90-420-0890-3page 131
- ^ a b c Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 115
- ^ a b c Ericson 1999, p. 56
- ^ Erickson 2001, p. 539-30
- ^ Shirer 1990, p. 513
- ^ Watson 2000, p. 713
- ^ a b Carley 1999, p. 185.
- ^ a b Carley 1999, p. 186.
- ^ Carley 1999, p. 195.
- ^ a b c Shirer 1990, pp. 533–4
- ^ a b Shirer 1990, p. 535
- ^ Taylor and Shaw, Penguin Dictionary of the Third Reich, 1997, p.246.
- ^ a b c Shirer 1990, p. 521
- ^ a b Shirer 1990, pp. 523–4
- ^ Murphy 2006, p. 22
- ^ Shirer 1990, p. 536
- ^ a b Shirer 1990, p. 525
- ^ Shirer 1990, pp. 526–7
- ^ a b Murphy 2006, pp. 24–28
- ^ a b c Ericson 1999, p. 57
- ^ a b c Shirer 1990, p. 668
- ^ a b Wegner 1997, p. 99
- ^ Grenville & Wasserstein 2001, p. 227
- ^ Ericson 1999, p. 61
- ^ a b Watson 2000, p. 715
- ^ Murphy 2006, p. 23
- ^ Shirer 1990, p. 528
- ^ a b c d e Shirer 1990, p. 540
- ^ a b c d Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, executed August 23, 1939
- ^ a b c Shirer 1990, p. 539
- ^ a b Shirer 1990, pp. 541–2
- ^ a b Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 123
- ISBN 978-0-415-33873-8.
- ^ ISBN 0-7425-5542-9, page 20
- ISBN 0-7190-4201-1
- ISBN 978-90-420-2225-6
- ISBN 0-7425-5542-9, page 21
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 150–3
- ISBN 81-7488-491-2pages 134-137
- ^ Roberts 2006, p. 58
- ISBN 0-7146-5050-1, page 341
- ^ Roberts 2006, p. 59
- ^ Roberts 2006, p. 82
- ^ a b Roberts 2006, p. 85
- ^ Roberts 2006, pp. 116–7
- ^ Glantz, David, The Soviet-German War 1941–45: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, October 11, 2001, page 7
- ^ Edward E. Ericson, III. Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1936-1941. German Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 263-283
- ^ Carr, Edward H., German–Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919–1939, Oxford 1952, p. 136.
- ^ E. H. Carr., From Munich to Moscow. I., Soviet Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Jun., 1949), pp. 3–17. Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
- ^ Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, London 1961, p. 262–3
- ^ Max Beloff. Soviet Foreign Policy, 1929-41: Some Notes Soviet Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Oct., 1950), pp. 123-137
- ^ Maser 1994, p. 64.
- ^ Maser 1994, p. 42.
- OCLC 1005849626.
- OCLC 836636715.
- ^ Hillgruber, Andreas (1981). Germany and the two World Wars. p. 86.
- ^ Nazi-Soviet relations 1939-1941. : Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, ed. 1948. Department of State. Publication 3023 [1]
- ^ Geoffrey Roberts.The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1992), pp. 57-78
- ^ Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office - Weizsacker[2]
- ^ E. H. Carr. From Munich to Moscow. II Soviet Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Oct., 1949), pp. 93-105
- ^ Foreign Office Memorandum : May 17, 1939
- ^ a b Memorandum by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) May 20, 1939 [3]
- ^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, pp. 112–3
- ISBN 9785250010924
- ^ Roberts 1992, pp. 57–78
- ^ Geoffrey Roberts. On Soviet-German Relations: The Debate Continues. A Review Article Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 8 (Dec., 1998), pp.1471-1475
- ^ Carr, E.H. German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, Harper & Row: New York, 1951, 1996 pages 129-130
- ^ Albert Resis. The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 33-56 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/153750 "By replacing Litvinov with Molotov, Stalin significantly increased his freedom of maneuver in foreign policy. Litvinov's dismissal served as a warning to London and Paris that Moscow had another option: rapprochement with Germany. After Litvinov's dismissal, the pace of Soviet-German contacts quickened. But that did not mean that Moscow had abandoned the search for collective security, now exemplified by the Soviet draft triple alliance. Meanwhile, Molotov's appointment served as an additional signal to Berlin that Moscow was open to offers. The signal worked, the warning did not."
- ^ Derek Watson. Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Jun., 2000), pp. 695-722. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/153322 "The choice of Molotov reflected not only the appointment of a nationalist and one of Stalin's leading lieutenants, a Russian who was not a Jew and who could negotiate with Nazi Germany, but also someone unencumbered with the baggage of collective security who could obtain the best deal with Britain and France, if they could be forced into an agreement."
- ^ Geoffrey Roberts. The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View. Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 27, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 639-657. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/260946. "the foreign policy factor in Litvinov's downfall was the desire of Stalin and Molotov to take charge of foreign relations in order to pursue their policy of a triple alliance with Britain and France - a policy whose utility Litvinov doubted and may even have opposed or obstructed."
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