Nachtjagdgeschwader 1
Nachtjagdgeschwader 1 | |
---|---|
Air superiority Offensive counter air | |
Size | Wing |
Engagements | World War II |
Commanders | |
Notable commanders | Wolfgang Falck Werner Streib Hans-Joachim Jabs |
Insignia | |
Identification symbol | Geschwaderkennung of G9 |
Aircraft flown | |
Fighter | Messerschmitt Bf 109 Dornier Do 17 Messerschmitt Bf 110 Junkers Ju 88 Heinkel He 219 Dornier Do 217 |
Nachtjagdgeschwader 1 (NJG 1) was a German
NJG 1 operated all of the major twin-engine night fighters produced by German industry during the war. It fought in notable campaigns, such as the Battle of the Ruhr and Battle of Berlin. By the end of the war, lack of fuel, technical setbacks, lack of training and advances by the Allied powers rendered the Luftwaffe night force ineffective from August 1944 until the end of the war in May 1945. NJG 1 was the most successful night fighter wing and had claimed some 2,311 victories by day and night, for some 676 aircrew killed in action.[1]
Background
The
Falck concluded that night fighting could not be organised and operated by one wing and Josef Kammhuber formed the Night Fighter Division. Radar, searchlights and anti-aircraft artillery were coordinated under this organisation from 17 July 1940. On 23 July the headquarters was established at Brussels, in occupied Belgium. On 1 August 1940 a command post was established at Zeist near Utrecht in the occupied Netherlands. The Zerstörer (destroyer, heavy fighter) pilots and units were used for conversion to night fighters. No night fighter training schools existed in 1940, until blind-flying schools were established at Schleißheim from 1941.[6] Kammhuber established the Kammhuber Line, which used radar to guide night fighters to RAF bombers.[7]
Formation
I Gruppe was formed on 22 June 1940 from elements of I. Gruppe of Zerstörergeschwader 1 (ZG 1) and IV. Gruppe of Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26). II. Gruppe was formed from IV.(N) Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 2 on 1 July 1940, although the Gruppe was renamed III./NJG 1. The second formation occurred the same date, 1 July, from renaming Z./Kampfgeschwader 30 (Zerstörer/KG 30). On 7 September 1940 this Gruppe was renamed I./Nachtjagdgeschwader 2 (NJG 2), though it received personnel from I./ZG 26. III. Gruppe was raised on 1 July also, from II./NJG 1. IV./NJG 1 was raised on 1 October 1942 from elements of II./NJG 2.[8] Falck became the first Geschwaderkommodore.[9] Hauptmann Günther Radusch, took command of I./NJG 1, Major Walter Ehle, became the first permanent commander of II./NJG 1, Hauptmann Philipp von Bothmer and Major Helmut Lent took command of III. and IV./NJG 1 respectively.[10]
I./NJG 1 set up base at Venlo Airfield, where it remained from 18 March 1941 to 5 September 1944, 18,000 workers laboured on the site, which measured 1,180 ha (2,900 acres). The two take-off runways were 1,450 m (4,760 ft) long, and a third 1,200 m (3,900 ft) in length. 2,000 lamps were used for lighting and 48 km (30 mi) of roads led to workshops, command posts, and accommodation.[11] The formation of the night fighter wings brought together different kinds of pilots with different preferences. The crews of II./NJG 1, which were formed from Z/KG 30, preferred the Junkers Ju 88, Dornier Do 17 and Dornier Do 217, which were regarded by Bf 110 pilots as "lame ducks" unsuitable for the role. These pilots preferred other qualities not prevalent in Zerstörer aircraft; spacious cockpits, a third man to act as lookout, longer endurance, autopilot and more powerful armament. These pilots, in some cases, were advanced in years for a military aviator, often they were former Luft Hansa pilots. These men did not adapt easily to the concept of controlled night fighting.[12] Werner Baake and Rudolf Schoenert were examples of the ex-Luft Hansa pilots that joined the Luftwaffe in 1941.[13] II./NJG 1 was equipped with the Ju 88 C and Do 17 Z-10 in 1940.[14]
World War II
In the autumn, 1940 the Luftwaffe began long-range intruder operations (Fernnachtjagd) to forestall the increasing number of Bomber Command raids.
In mid-1940, the Stab/NJG 1 was based at Düsseldorf and Deelen under Falck and equipped with three Bf 110Bs. At Bönninghardt, I./NJG 1 mustered 34 Bf 110Cs and Ds with 22 operational. At Düsseldorf, II./NJG 1 could field 11 Ju 88Cs, four operational, and 10 Do 17Zs, nine operational. At Cologne, III/NJG 1 still operated the Messerschmitt Bf 109; 13 Bf 109Cs, four operational, three Bf 109 Ds and one combat ready, 17 Bf 109 Es were present with all but one operational.[21] On the night of 19/20 July, Werner Streib, 2./NJG 1, claimed one of the first aerial victories for NJG 1; an Armstrong Whitworth Whitley shot down at 02:15 near Saerbeck. Streib would become Gruppenkommandeur II./NJG 1 only two months later.[22] Oberfeldwebel Föster of 8./NJG 1 was given the distinction of the first NJG 1 air victory on the night of the 9 July 1940.[14] At this time, NJG 1 was experimenting in night interceptions using their Bf 110s and Do 17s with the support of a single searchlight regiment.[23] Only 42 British bombers were claimed shot down in 1940 by German night fighters.[1] I. and II./NJG 1 experienced difficulties in locating bombers in 1940 and their failures encouraged Kammhuber to introduce tighter control-based tactics for night fighters, searchlight batteries and radar. The night fighters were guided to a light and radio beacon located behind an "illuminated belt" of searchlights. Once a bomber was detected the night fighter flew into the belt, turned behind the bomber and engaged in combat.[24] Würzburg radars were required for the intercept; one to track the fighter, while the other focused on the bomber in order to coordinate the searchlight.[25] The Himmelbett (canopy bed) replaced this system in 1941. The system remained the same, but the accurate, long-range Freya was introduced to maintain overall surveillance and often could bring the radar-less night fighters into visual range of the bomber.[25]
In mid-1941, NJG 1 began experimenting with Lichtenstein radar, which had become operational.[26] Ludwig Becker shot down six RAF bombers while flying a radar-installed Dornier Do 215 B-5 between 10 August and 30 September 1941.[26] The only Lichtenstein radar in service then became unserviceable for the next successes were not recorded until June 1942.[27] Lichtenstein was in short supply until mid-1943, at which time 80 percent of night fighters had it. I./NJG 1 and II./NJG 2 were given priority for it because they shielded the approaches to the Ruhr.[28] The first Ju 88C fighters, equipped with radar were delivered to II./NJG 1 at Leeuwarden in February 1942. Only four sets arrived and it took several weeks for them to become operational. The crews soon came to appreciate the device and were eager to secure it for their aircraft.[27] Other platforms were tested in NJG 1 at this time. In March 1942 the Dornier Do 217 J was also tested by NJG 1; however the lack of performance made the type unpopular with crews.[29]
Becker developed his own tactics for attacking a bomber. He stalked the aircraft from the stern, just below the height shown on the radar. After sighting the bomber, he dived and accelerated to avoid being spotted by the tail gunner. Once underneath the enemy, Becker reduced the throttle and matched the speed of the unsuspecting pilot. Becker then climbed steadily to 50 m (160 ft) from below the target before he pulled up and opened fire. The Do 215 would then lose speed allowing the bomber to fly ahead and expose itself to a stream of shells. With this method, the gun sight was rarely needed. These tactics were adopted by the night fighter force.[27] Streib claimed 22 aerial victories in 1941, making him the most successful night fighter pilot of the year. Paul Gildner claimed 21, and Lent claimed 20, making him the third highest claimant in the Luftwaffe that year.[30] Radusch, who spent several days commanding I./NJG 1 in 1940 during its formation, claimed 13.[31] At the end of 1941 Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer joined the wing and became the most successful night fighter pilot in history, with 121 claims.[32]
In February 1942,
Bomber Command began routine 1,000-bomber raids over Germany from 30 May to 17 August 1942 using the
Battle of the Ruhr, Hamburg and Peenemünde
In February 1943, several of the Experten were killed. Knacke was killed on day three.
On the first night, 5/6 March 1943, NJG 1 claimed 10 bombers destroyed. Among the claimants were fighter pilots
The Nazi Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, wrote in his diary on 14 May 1943 of German defences,
during the night there was another exceptionally heavy raid on Duisburg.... An unspeakable sorrow and great distress has come to the sorely tired city. Our technical development as regards submarine missions and air warfare is far inferior to that of the English and Americans. During the past five months the enemy has had the upper hand, almost everywhere he is defeating us in the air.[57]
By the time the Ruhr campaign ended Bomber Command had suffered heavy losses to German night fighters and anti-aircraft defences. 1,099 were lost to all causes.
Luftwaffe night-fighter pilots experienced the presence of long-range RAF night fighting aircraft for the first time over Germany. Radar-installed
On 24 July 1943, days after the end of the Ruhr campaign, Harris ordered Operation Gomorrah, an attack on Hamburg. The objective was to disrupt or end U-boat production in the port city. The introduction of "Window" blew a hole in German radar coverage and the bomber streams, aided by OBOE and H2S radar were able to penetrate the defences to devastate the centre of the city. The Himmelbett (canopy bed) system of radar-controlled night fighters slipping into the bomber stream and then using its own radar to pick out and engage individual bombers had gone. The effects of the raid, and the realisation German radar was temporarily blinded, led to the widespread use of the Wild Boar tactics over the summer, 1943.[67] 791 bombers hit the city. German air defences accounted for only 1.5 percent of the attacking force. The Nazi leadership was shaken, and Kammhuber, who resisted calls to abandon the advanced Himmelbett system, was compelled to find technical solutions to the jamming of Freya, Liechtenstein and Würzburg radars. Kammhuber regarded the Wild Boar solution as an emergency measure only.[68] NJG 1 claimed only three from a total of 12 claimed by night fighter pilots in defence of the city—Nachtjagdgeschwader 3 claimed the rest. August Geiger claimed two [Geiger became another notable victim of Braham in September 1943].[69]
In August
On 5 October 1943, NJG 1 with NJG 2 formed the
Battle of Berlin, Nuremberg and Normandy
In November 1943 Arthur Harris began the "Battle of Berlin" in the belief the destruction of the German capital would end the war without Operation Overlord, the planned amphibious invasion of France.[79] The battle would end in March 1944, in a defensive victory for the German night fighter force.[80] The introduction of SN-2 radar and the passive Flensburg radar detector helped the Luftwaffe crews. Flensburg had been able to detect the Monica radar emissions which warned RAF crews of an approaching night fighter.[81] Naxos radar detector and the SN-2 radars had proved their worth along with Flensburg.[82] The Monica radar gave only warning of a fighter within 1,000 m (3,300 ft) in a 45 degree cone, while Flensburg could detect the bomber from 100 km (62 mi) away. The capture of Monica and Boozer early warning receivers in March 1943 allowed the Germans to develop Flensburg.[83] The Monica set was captured a week after its introduction in a major blow for Bomber Command.[84] The capture of a Ju 88 night fighter that landed in England in July 1944 exposed these developments to the British who then developed counter-measures; mainly by stripping the tail radars from their bombers or switching them off.[85][86]
By 12 December 1943, the Heinkel He 219 night fighter had been added to NJG 1's order of battle and I. Gruppe were equipped with it. By June 1944, I. Gruppe had 20 He 219s, which proved expensive in time and effort; some 90,000 man-hours per aircraft in comparison to 30,000 on the Ju 88C and G. A handful were delivered to II./NJG 1.[87] At the start of the battle, NJG 1 was mostly still a Bf 110 unit. Streib commanded Stab/NJG 1 and the wing from Deelen. Meurer commanded I./NJG 1 at Venlo which operated the Bf 110 and He 219. II. Gruppe under von Bonnin at Sint Truiden operated the Bf 110 and the Do 217 while Egmont Prinz zur Lippe-Weißenfeld and Hans-Joachim Jabs commanded III. and IV. Gruppe at Twente and Leeuwarden; both operated the Bf 110.[88]
A notable development was the introduction of Schräge Musik, pioneered in NJG 2, was now in use in NJG 1 during 1943 and 1944. Schnaufer, the leading night fighter in history, estimated he claimed 20 to 30 bombers using the upward firing cannon(s).[89] According to Schnaufer, many of the less experienced crew preferred the weapon system to the conventional front-pointing guns.[89] The method of attack was still dangerous, for British bombers carried heavy loads of fuel and explosives. A night fighter pilot could approach the bomber from below and fire into the fuel tanks and engines before making a violent evasive dive away from danger. The approach was possible as British bombers did not carry a ball turret.[90] Schoenert suggested to Kammhuber that a vertical-firing cannon be fitted in a Do 17 in mid-1941 because Becker's tactics were too complicated for the average pilot and attacking from underneath was easier, but his commander rejected the suggestion after reports from Streib and Lent.[91] Kammhuber conceded the point a year later when Schoenert petitioned him again following tests with the Do 217.[91]
1943 ended with pilots from NJG 1 leading the claim charts. Lent was acknowledged to have 76 and led the Luftwaffe in this field. Streib's total stood at 63, Meurer 62 at his death, Schoenert 56, the deceased Frank, 55, the late Geiger 53, Prinz zur Lippe-Weißenfeld 51, Becker, Gildner and Knacke—all of whom had 44—were killed in the year. Schnaufer and Vinke had claimed 42 and 37 respectively. Walter Ehle, killed on 18 November became the earliest casualty of the battle over Berlin.[30] At this time, German night fighters had abandoned the old wild boar operations along with the rigid beacon-based Himmelbett system for a simple practice of using their own radar to detect bombers once ground controllers led them to the bomber stream. When there, pilots were expected to fight until fuel or ammunition was expended. The tame boar method predominated in what was to become a successful period for the night fighter force.[88]
In the midst of the battle, I./NJG 1 lost group commander Meurer—with 65 claims—the third highest scoring night fighter of the war at the time in January 1944. He utilised the Schräge Musik weapon too close to a British bomber which exploded and took Meurer with it.[92] In March 1944 another fighter leader, Egmont Prinz zur Lippe-Weißenfeld was killed on day 12.[93] During the following weeks Bomber Command selected southwest Germany as its main area of operations, allowing for their return over neutral Switzerland. The Luftwaffe responded by transferring II. and III./NJG 1 to France. III./NJG 1 operated from Laon from 20 April. Night fighter operations over France proved costly for the Luftwaffe. Bomber Command flew on moonlit nights and was provided with strong Mosquito fighter support. Luftwaffe pilots hardly managed to engage the bomber streams.[94]
On 23/24 March 1944, Harris authorised a sixteenth, and final attack upon Berlin nearly five weeks after the last; having postponed it from 21 March. 811 bombers set out, with 147 providing diversion raids to
On 31 March 1944, Bomber Command carried out its single most costly operation during the war when it attacked Nuremberg. Bomber Command had chosen a direct route in favourable weather conditions enabling German night fighters to be fed easily into the bomber stream. Harris direct route took the stream across several night fighter assembly points and the resulting battles left 95 RAF bombers destroyed.[101] NJG 1 units were scrambled from as far as France. 8./NJG 1, based at the Château de Marchais, near Marchais, Aisne, under the command of Dietrich Schmidt, were sent into combat. Schmidt recorded the horror of combat. When he landed in Germany he found human hair and flesh on one of his propellers, presumably from the Halifax bomber he shot down that night.[102] 2./NJG 1 flew four Bf 110s from Saint-Dizier and operated from Laon; the remaining eight Bf 110s from the Staffel had been destroyed in an American attack on their base shortly before.[103]
The decline of the Luftwaffe night fighter force began only three months after arguably its greatest success. Aerial resistance declined by day and night and a state of air supremacy was achieved by Allied air forces. The Luftwaffe's shortage of fuel to operate and provide sufficient training for fighter crews became apparent.[104] The OKL had not foreseen the collapse of its day and night fighter force and had assumed that Bomber Command would not resume deep-penetration raids for some time. Incredibly, the high command thought the Luftwaffe could prevent a landing in Western Europe. By June 1944, most night fighter units had been moved to the periphery of Luftflotte Reich in Italy, Austria, Hungary and Western Europe. Only NJG 1 and 3 remained in Germany.[105]
On 31 May 1944 NJG 1 reported the following strength; Stab with He. 219 and Bf 110 contained two aircraft with one operational. I./NJG 1 contained the Bf 110, He 219 but also had some
OKL correctly surmised that high-frequency technology rather than the number and quality of night fighters would decide the next phase of the battle. They drew the wrong conclusions from their successes in early 1944 and wrongly assumed the straightforward devices such as Naxos, SN-2 and Flensburg radar detectors coupled with a high level of training would inflict severe damage on the enemy provided their secrets could be kept from the enemy and enough of them were made available. Production was concentrated on SN-2, while centimetric radar came low on the list of priorities. The radar types in use, used long-wave radar waves which were prone to jamming and created high drag. The decision not to fit SN-2 to He 219s caused high losses of the type. Only Ju 88 units received Naxos. In December 1944, a final concerted effort to regain the high-frequency lead was made in the SN-3 radar.[109] The Allied breakout from Normandy in August 1944 destroyed a significant portion of German early warning systems supporting the Kammhuber Line. This weakened day and night defences but did not leave them helpless. German Y-services continued to provide intelligence on impending air attacks.[110] The Luftwaffe's hope of keeping German radar from the enemy failed. On 13 July 1944, a Ju 88G-1 equipped with the Flensburg radar detector set, landed in England in error and allowed the British to develop counter measures; the Germans never regained a lead in the radar field.[86] Flensburg had been able to detect Monica radar emissions which warned RAF crews of an approaching aircraft.[81]
In equipment the German night fighter force remained capable. The Bf 110 may have been considered obsolete, but in the hands of experienced pilots it remained a formidable night fighter. The victory claims submitted by I./NJG 1 (He 219) and II./NJG 1 (Bf 110) have been analysed from June 1944 onward. Operating under the same conditions II./NJG 1 regularly shot down more bombers than the He 219-group. Nevertheless, Bf 110G production was tapering off as Ju 88G production increased to 339 in December 1944.
From July 1944 to May 1945, Bomber Command made 10 large raids per month. From October 1944 60-80 Mosquitos flew into Germany on an average of ten nights per month. The He 219 pilots in NJG 1 could do little to oppose them. In July 1944 NJG 1 He 219s claimed three of them; but only one near the British aircraft's operating height of 9,000 m (30,000 ft). Soon, the task of opposing the Mosquito intruders fell to single-engine units. Confounding operational issues further, distrust permeated between crews and ground controllers for jamming and the use of decoy aircraft made interceptions difficult. Pilots had no choice but to follow their directions because the only long-range radars, Naxos and Flensburg, became useless by July 1944, and SN-2 was beginning to show signs it had been compromised. The British tactics of flying below 3,000 m (9,800 ft) caused so many contacts on the SN-2 screens it was difficult to identify and follow a specific target. Window and jamming made it very difficult for night fighters to find the bomber stream.[115] The intruder danger became so acute by December that I./NJG 1 reported operations on only six nights claiming one victory for six losses.[116]
Germany's rapidly deteriorating military situation necessitated the use of the night fighters in roles for which they were not equipped or trained. In December 1944, the Wehrmacht and
1945: Destruction of the Kammhuber Line
In the Oil campaign of World War II Allied bombing of Axis oil targets in 1944 had an enormous impact on the Wehrmacht. Oil production fell causing fuel shortages which limited the effectiveness of German land and air operations.[120] By mid-1944 Speer warned that if the oil plants could not be protected, the Luftwaffe would run out of fuel.[121] The fuel shortage directly affected the Luftwaffe night fighter defences. Training, already inadequate, was curtailed and the night fighters were not in a position to impose serious losses on Bomber Command after August 1944.[122] In the winter 1944/45, the night fighter force contained 1,355 aircraft. This impressive force was 85 percent operational but the fuel shortages forced it to remain grounded.[86] On 10 January 1945, NJG 1 reported a strength of 20 Bf 110s (18 operational) in Stab/NJG 1, I. Gruppe, 64 He 219s (45 operational), 24 of 37 Bf 110s combat ready in II. Gruppe, 31 from 73 Bf 110s in III. Gruppe and 24 from 33 in IV. Gruppe.[123] The remaining crews were regarded as among the Luftwaffe's most precious assets. Their loss to the Mosquito intruders of 100 Group were out of proportion to the psychological damage done. Thus, one historian writes, an air of "Mosquito phobia" took hold by mid-1944.[122] Hans-Heinz Augenstein was another member of a successful NJG 1 night fighter team to be killed by an intruder in December 1944.[124]
Along with fuel shortages the Luftwaffe night fighter force had to contend with technical setbacks by late 1944. No. 100 Group RAF Mosquitos were equipped with Serrate radar detector allowing the RAF crews to home in on emissions created from German SN-2. Other Mosquitos were equipped with "perfectos" which sent interrogating pulses to trigger the IFF (identification friend or foe) in German fighters. When the German set replied, the signal betrayed the aircraft as hostile along with the bearing and range of the German crew.[125] Losses were sustained against the British intruders and were compounded when German crews switched off their sets which exposed them to friendly-fire.[125] The impact of the technical and fuel failures were evident in the statistics. In January 1945, 1,058 sorties were flown, 117 aircraft claimed 1.3 percent of the attacking force and 47 reported lost. In February 1945, another 47 were reported lost and 181 enemy bombers claimed; 1.2 percent of the attacking forces.[126]
The German defences so weakened that by the time of the Bombing of Dresden, the weather was biggest obstacle to Bomber Command.[126] Just six bombers were lost over Dresden, three of those losses were caused by bombs dropped upon lower flying bombers.[127] Hans Leickhardt, NJG 5, was the only Luftwaffe night fighter pilot to submit a claim on this night.[128] Night fighters proved capable of inflicting damage on the bomber streams for the rest of the war. On 21 February 1945, Bomber Command attacked Duisburg, Worms and the Mitteland Canal, losing 34 bombers. German pilots claimed 59 shot down; NJG 1 claimed 14.[129] The February battles were the last successes of the night fighter force. The use of Neptun, or FuG 218 radar improved detection rates because of its resistance to jamming and Bomber Command crews kept their Monica sets on longer than before. The Naxos-Ju 88s were reporting few losses than other types on this time, for it gave German crews warning of an enemy to the rear.[130]
To retrieve the desperate situation in the night war, Göring authorised the implementation of intruder operations over Britain again. Schnaufer, commanding
Elements of NJG 1 continued to resist Bomber Command to the end of the war over central and eastern Germany. I./NJG 1 flew a last night fighter operation on 3/4 April 1945.[138] The last victory of the war was claimed by III Gruppe on 16/17 April 1945.[136]
Commanding officers
Kommodore
- Oberst Wolfgang Falck, 26 June 1940 – 30 June 1943[9]
- Oberst Werner Streib, 1 July 1943 – March 1944[9]
- Oberstleutnant Hans-Joachim Jabs, March 1944 – May 1945[9]
- I/NJG 1
- Hauptmann Günther Radusch, 1 July 1940 – 6 October 1940[9]
- Major Werner Streib, 18 October 1940 – 1 July 1943[9]
- Hauptmann Hans-Dieter Frank, 1 July 1943 – 27 September 1943[9]
- Hauptmann Manfred Meurer, 28 September 1943 – 21 January 1944[9]
- Major Paul Förster, January 1944 - 1 October 1944[9]
- Hauptmann Werner Baake, 2 October 1944 – 8 May 1945[9]
- II/NJG 1
- Hauptmann Heinrich Graf von Stillfried und Rattonitz, 2 October 1940 – 6 October 1940[139]
- Major Walter Ehle, 6 October 1940 – 17 November 1943[139]
- Major Eckart-Wilhelm von Bonin, 18 November 1943 – 25 October 1944[139]
- Hauptmann Adolf Breves, 26 October 1944 – 8 May 1945[139]
- III/NJG 1
- Hauptmann Philipp von Bothmer, 1 July 1940 - 1 November 1940[139]
- Hauptmann Schön, 1 November 1940 – 1 February 1941[139]
- Hauptmann von Graeve 8 February 1941 – 5 June 1942[139]
- Hauptmann Wolfgang Thimmig, 6 June 1942 – 31 May 1943[139]
- Major Egmont Prinz zur Lippe-Weißenfeld, 1 June 1943 – 20 February 1944[139]
- Major Martin Drewes, 1 March 1944 – 8 May 1945[139]
- IV/NJG 1
- Major Helmut Lent, 1 October 1942 – 1 August 1943[139]
- Hauptmann Hans-Joachim Jabs, 1 August 1943 – 1 March 1944[139]
- Major Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer, 1 March 1944 – 26 October 1944[139]
- Hauptmann Hermann Greiner, 1 November 1944 – 8 May 1945[139]
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- ^ Aders 1978, pp. 170–171.
- ^ Aders 1978, pp. 172–173.
- ^ Aders 1978, pp. 176–178.
- ^ Hall 1998, p. 143.
- ^ Aders 1978, p. 185.
- ^ Aders 1978, pp. 188–190.
- ^ Aders 1978, p. 190.
- ^ Boiten 1999, p. 147.
- ^ Aders 1978, pp. 200–201.
- ^ Aders 1978, p. 205.
- ^ Parker 1998, pp. 207–208.
- ^ Manrho & Pütz 2004, pp. 5–6.
- ^ Parker 1998, p. 486.
- ^ Price 1991, pp. 91–96.
- ^ Murray 1983, pp. 274–275.
- ^ a b Hall 1998, pp. 144–145.
- ^ Price 1991, p. 123.
- ^ Bowman & Davey 2013, p. 79.
- ^ a b Price 1991, p. 94.
- ^ a b Addison & Crang 2006, pp. 65–66.
- ^ Addison & Crang 2006, p. 68.
- ^ Foreman, Parry & Mathews 2004, p. 234.
- ^ Foreman, Parry & Mathews 2004, pp. 236–237.
- ^ Aders 1978, p. 207.
- ^ Aders 1978, pp. 211–212.
- ^ Parry 2003, pp. 199–201.
- ^ Boiten 1999, p. 384.
- ^ Parry 2003, pp. 194–198.
- ^ Foreman, Parry & Mathews 2004, pp. 238–240.
- ^ a b Foreman, Parry & Mathews 2004, p. 247.
- ^ Aders 1978, pp. 166, 207, 211.
- ^ Aders 1978, p. 211.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Aders 1978, p. 227.
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Further reading
- Bowman, Martin (2011). 100 Group (Bomber Support): RAF Bomber Command in World War II. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-1-84415-418-0.
- Chorley, W. R. (1992). Royal Air Force Bomber Command Losses of the Second World War: Aircraft and Crew Losses, 1944. London: Midland Counties. ISBN 978-0-904597-91-2.
- ISBN 978-1-898697-15-2.
- Hinchliffe, Peter (1998). Luftkrieg bei Nacht 1939–1945 [Air War at Night 1939–1945] (in German). Stuttgart, Germany: Motorbuch Verlag. ISBN 978-3-613-01861-7.
- Mackay, Ron (2000). Messerschmitt Bf 110. Wiltshire: Crowood Press. ISBN 978-1-86126-313-1.
- Mason, Francis (1969). Battle Over Britain. London: McWhirter Twins. ISBN 978-0-901928-00-9.
- Scutts, Jerry (1998). German Night Fighter Aces of World War 2. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-696-5.
- Weal, John (2012) [1999]. Messerschmitt Bf 110 Zerstörer Aces of World War 2. London: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-753-5.